Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

International Navies Issue FFG-7s: Square Pegs?

And the Winners Are ... the FFG-7s The FFG-7s in War and Peace The Military Balance The Coast Guard: Quo Vadisl Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs Why Doesn’t the Navy Sing?

Sea Power: Opportunities

Training the Quicksilver Crews

Our Vagabond Crews

The Offensive Surface Ships

The Talent for Judgment

Flying the Rubber Cows

In Search of . . . Patrol Combatants

Mare Liberum

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

International Navies Issue

(See March 1984 Proceedings)

Edward J. Rudnicki—Thank you once again for an outstanding International Navies Issue. I am sure that I’m not the only Proceedings reader who welcomes this opportunity to learn what the ‘ ‘other fellow” is planning and doing.

I must admit, however, that I am growing weary of Dr. Scheina’s apolo­gies for Argentina’s failure in the Falk- lands Conflict. His articles, while provid­ing valuable insight into the workings of the Argentine defense establishment, seem to overlook one basic fact: namely, that with all their “valor,” “heroism,” and geographic advantage, the Argentine forces still came out second best.

“FFG-7s: Square Pegs?”

(See B. R. Linder, pp. 38^t3, June 1983; T. S. Sher. pp. 14-18, September 1983; J. M. Purtell, pp. 119-122, October 1983; B. A. Becken, p. 97, November 1983; R. Hillery, p. 28,

December 1983 Proceedings)

“And the Winners Are . . . the FFG-7s”

(See pp. 110-150, April 1984 Proceedings)

“The FFG-7s in War and Peace”

(See D. T. Stokowski, pp. 112-115, April 1984 Proceedings)

Commander Paul X. Rinn, U. S. Navy, Chief Staff Officer, Destroyer Squadron- 361—As a surface warfare officer who has spent the majority of my 15 years of naval service on board frigates, I have always been concerned with FF class ship design problems and proposed battle group employment. It was, therefore, with great professional interest that I read Commander Linder’s article. The disser­tation was factual and an articulate state­ment of the U. S. Navy’s problems in employing its latest low-cost frigates.

Having recently reviewed that article and those concerning FFG-7s in the April 1984 Proceedings, I believe a comment is necessary from the viewpoint of some­one who deals directly with the employ­ment of these assets against today’s threat. I have had the opportunity to par­ticipate in battle group operations in the

Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and Western Atlantic with Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates incorporated at an ever-increasing rate. Based upon my ex­perience with these ships, I would give them high grades in some of the very areas Commander Linder found them wanting. The evidence shows that, when operated aggressively, the FFG-7 is a superb antisubmarine warfare (ASW) pouncer inside the outer screen. The FFG-7’s role as a shotgun escort for the aircraft carrier is complemented by effec­tively using her fire control system’s ex­ceptionally short detection to engagement times. In addition, her unique blend of capabilities results in a perfect platform to fill the ever-vacant screen station dur­ing battle group replenishments. Given the FFG-7’s flexible engineering capabil­ity and Tartar-Harpoon allocations, the battle group commander is provided with an excellent counter marker which can effectively maneuver with the best of the Soviet gas turbine warships.

Commander Stokowski is correct when he states that “the tactical commander given charge of an Oliver Hazard Perry- class frigate must consider carefully all the tactical options that an FFG makes available.” He fails, however, to state another aspect of FFG employment that must be considered—training readiness. The tactical commander must also evalu­ate each FFG under his command as to her readiness in each warfare area, not just in terms of equipment status, but per­sonnel status—in particular, the level of ship crew training—as well. As “state- of-the-art” as these ships are purported to be, the individual crew determines whether or not the ship’s full fighting potential is realized. FFG-7-class ships can fulfill a wide variety of mission areas. Taking each warfare mission area individually, the FFG-7 scores high in terms of her capabilities. The ability of an individual platform to integrate into the carrier battle group and perform in differ­ent mission areas simultaneously depends largely on the proficiency of her crew and the aggressiveness of the ship’s on-board leadership.

The FFG-7 is an extremely capable platform. The challenge is, Commander Linder stated, to maximize her capabili­ties across the broad spectrum of warfare the Soviet Union embarked upon an un­precedented military buildup, compara­ble to the Nazi rearmament prior to World War II. During the last ten years, the So­viets have devoted twice as much of their gross national product (GNP) to military expenditures as the United States has. The Soviets have 361 fleet submarines, three times as many as the United States has; they have 20,000 pieces of field ar­tillery and mortars, four times what the United States has; they have 50,000 tanks and 62,000 armored vehicles, five times what the United States has. In addition, the Soviets have us outnumbered two to one in tactical air. Finally, they have pro­duced six times as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as the United States has in the past ten years. This is all declared for the world to see in a publica­tion of the prestigious International Insti­tute for Strategic Studies entitled The Military Balance.

Under these circumstances, our allies’ efforts assume even greater importance. We are pleased to see that Canada has turned the comer in appropriations for defense to the extent that last year’s budget increased expenditures by 11.3% before inflation and that the Canadian Government has again reaffirmed its commitment for a 3% annual increase in defense expenditures net of inflation.

However, Canada remains at the bottom of the NATO heap with Luxembourg and Iceland in terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP. We would hope that this shortfall will be remedied.

The NATO policy is a two-track one of negotiation in good faith on the one hand and deployment to counterbalance Soviet armament and missiles on the other if these negotiations do not bear fruit. This NATO decision was made in December 1979; deployment began in December 1983.

The Soviets have now terminated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ne­gotiations and left the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva. They have not agreed to a date for a re­newal of these strategic talks. They have said that their reason for doing so is our planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and intermediate cruise missiles over a period of five years, which they say is destabilizing. What, then, is the balance of intermediate-range missiles in Europe today? The Soviets have 611 missiles in place in Europe. Of these, 243 carry mul­tiple independently targeted reentry vehi­cles (MIRVs), producing just under 1,100 warheads in the Soviet arsenal. Under NATO agreement, we deployed ten Pershing IIs and 15 cruise missiles in Europe in December 1983. These new missiles, when added to the 180 Pershing Is already in place (which will be re­moved as additional Pershing IIs and cruise missiles are deployed) total 205 warheads. Therefore, the warhead ratio is better than five to one. At the end of the deployment period, the Soviet ratio would be 1,100 to 572 if no additional Soviet missiles are deployed. Under these circumstances, no one should say that deployment of the NATO intermediate- range missiles in Europe is destabilizing.

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President Reagan has said that our ini­tial object is to reduce strategic warheads by one-third, or to 5,000 warheads. He would also reduce launchers by one-half by the end of the first phase of these ne­gotiations. More than a year ago, the President suggested a zero-to-zero option which would remove all intermediate- range missiles from Europe. The Soviets objected to this because they would have had to remove 1,100 to our 180 war­heads. Insofar as battlefield weapons are concerned, some months ago, the United States and its allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after removal of 1,000 battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe, however, America’s total nuclear weapons have

declined by one-third in the past 20 years. Our nuclear stockpile has been cut by 40% since 1970.

To further reduce the nuclear stockpile, President Reagan has suggested a “build- down,” i.e., two nuclear warheads must be removed for each new warhead in a more advanced system deployed. The long-range objective would be to remove nuclear weapons entirely.

The question remains as to whether or not the Soviets will return to the negotiat­ing table. It certainly is in their interest as well as our own. The Soviet intran- sigency is a misguided attempt to influ­ence elections in the United States and to paint President Reagan as a “war­monger.” Yet, the Soviets were the ones who walked out on the intermediate- range nuclear forces talks while still pre­serving their overwhelming military strength in Europe. Their strategy of at­tempting to influence elections will back­fire with the U. S. electorate just as it did in the 1983 German election.

President Reagan has said that, despite our differences, the United States and the Soviet Union continue to share common interests, and that “foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms.” In January 1984, in a major ad­dress on Soviet-American relations, the President said that there is no rational al­ternative but to steer a course which he described as credible deterrence and peaceful competition. If we adopt this approach we might discover areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

“The Coast Guard: Quo Vadis?”

(See R. Fraser, pp. 40-45, February 1984;

G. D. Bond, B. P. Clarke, A. Iglesias, pp. lb-

21, April 1984 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Thomas A. Nies, U. S. Coast Guard—Before we reemphasize the Coast Guard’s military posture, the first step we should take is a reevaluation. We must realize that, while it is an armed ser­vice, the Coast Guard’s existence is deeply rooted in its peacetime perfor­mance. The highly visible search and res­cue, law enforcement, and aids-to-navi- gation missions were legislated by Congress. And Congress is not likely to forego those services that it deems neces­sary. The public is not likely to suddenly desire a Coast Guard that considers its military duties most important.

Dare we forget about politics? I sus­pect much of the renewed interest in mili­tary readiness is a result of the scramble to avoid the budget axe in the early years of the Reagan Administration. Decisions should be avoided that, while currently popular, may be hard to support under future administrations. It could turn out to be a short step from a buildup of our military capabilities to a small branch of the Navy and a civilian regulatory agency. Someone may decide that de­fense dollars are best spent in the defense department.

Admiral O. W. Siler, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired), Commandant of the Coast Guard, June 1974-June 1978—Com­mander Fraser expresses some interesting thoughts, but the primary one is that the Coast Guard is not militarily ready. The concern over ability to respond in a “come as you are” war sounds valid, yet the Coast Guard does respond to calls for action in militarily unusual roles with great alacrity. The recent and ongoing deployments to Grenada illustrate how invalid an assumption is that the Coast Guard is not ready for a military call.

The author points out that the relation­ship between the Coast Guard’s wartime and peacetime missions is at once a strength and a weakness. It is the great strength of the service, and the real rea­son that the U. S. Coast Guard exists today as the potent force it can be. Com­mander Fraser speaks of a lack of clarity

INTIMIDATION

at the lowest level

of purpose and a benign neglect of war­time responsibilities. These are not Coast Guard deficiencies initially. For exam­ple, the Coast Guard has attempted for many years to arrive at reasonable justifi­cations for funding requests to bring the Coast Guard Reserve port security forces to the strength it believes necessary. The first step must be an analysis of the threat against which those Coast Guard forces must react. To this date, no threat analy­sis, other than Coast Guard-generated statements, has been developed and ac­cepted. It is not that anyone denies the existence of a threat to ports in wartime; it is simply that none of the usual agen­cies—CIA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, etc.—knows any better than the Coast Guard what the precise threat might be and all refuse to make an estimate, deferring to the more qualified agency. Lacking an indepen­dent threat analysis, funding and addi­tional personnel are usually denied.

I differ somewhat on the institutional barrier inhibiting the Coast Guard’s war­time preparedness. It is not that daily rou­tine drives out long-range planning; it is simply a matter of priorities. Daily re­quirements preclude the time or resources to conduct extensive drills and planning for a circumstance which is indefinite. The on-hand problem takes precedence over the future one. Resource allocation is simpler when you exhaust those re­sources on activities to which you must respond right now.

The author expresses problems with ship and aircraft design in the Coast Guard. He states, correctly, that since World War II, vessels and aircraft have been built for peacetime missions. If they were built for wartime missions, and not simply as Coast Guard vessels or aircraft which may be diverted to wartime use, the costs would be considerably greater. Ship construction in the Coast Guard is not undertaken lightly—witness the small number of cutters built since World War II. If each one cost two, three, or five times as much, the fleet would be either much thinner or much older. Even now, the vessels are more than 40 years old in many instances. I do not perceive an ad­vantage for the Coast Guard in operating a fleet of FFGs or vessels such as World War II destroyers only because they carry armament. It is important that the vessels be equipped for peacetime operation. Fortunately, we have had more peacetime need for a Coast Guard than a wartime augmentation of the Navy.

The 19 knots of the 270-foot Bear class were known to Navy planners long before the approval of the design. A vessel of that speed, with space and weight reser­vations for wartime armament, was con­sidered a significant contribution. It was certainly not the most desired Navy solu­tion. Neither was it to Coast Guard plan­ners who would have preferred more space, speed, and capability. The length, speed, and characteristics were compro­mises between what was hoped for and what could be funded. Even with the cur­rent administration, which has put far greater emphasis on military readiness than when this class was planned, there is no apparent loosening of the purse strings for Coast Guard preparedness. An inter­esting analysis of the Sear-class capabil­ity is presented in the Coast Guard Alumni Association Bulletin (J. A. Pier­son, Jr., “The Military Readiness Capa­bility of the Coast Guard 270-Foot Me­dium-Endurance Cutter,” January/Feb- ruary 1984, pp. 16-21).

The six-point program advocated in the article will accomplish nothing if funding levels remain the same. It is not that the Coast Guard does not desire to provide greater emphasis to military readiness, but that it cannot with the current budgets and routine demands.

The question, then, must become whether the Coast Guard will be an orga­nization oriented toward service to man­kind and our nation in peacetime, but with some considerable capability to fill a

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wartime role and act promptly and re­markably as an immediate force-in-being of lesser status than the Navy—with cor­respondingly lower profile and less esca­lation potential—or whether it will be an auxiliary service of the Navy which can serve fully and promptly in wartime mis­sions, and can also be used, although

somewhat less efficiently, for lifesaving and law enforcement missions in peace­time if time is available from naval func­tions. The latter is, in fact, the status as­sumed by numerous navies of less powerful nations of the world.

The greatest fault in Commander Fraser’s article, which pinpoints several

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weaknesses in Coast Guard readiness planning, is in his last paragraph. He omits the administration from his listing of organizations which must make a com­mitment. The Department of Transporta­tion, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and the White House must be convinced that there is a wartime role for the Coast Guard, and that the military readiness role should be supported. The latter orga­nizations, which control funding deci­sions, must recognize the contributions to be provided by the Coast Guard as a force-in-being, and the potential for con­frontation avoidance through use of the “white ship.” If we are to realize a mili­tarily ready Coast Guard, it will be be­cause the service is funded to be prepared for the unanticipated case. The long, slow buildup can be handled should it arise.

The Coast Guard has apparently opted for the first alternative, which I believe is appropriate. Quo vadis (“Whither are you going?”) must be addressed to the decision-makers who do not fund military readiness. Action of this type could en­hance our nation’s sea power through improved readiness and flexibility in re­sponse from existing vessels and trained personnel with only small incremental funding changes.

“Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs”

(.See K. R. McGruther, pp. 34-39, February

1984; R. S. Hibbs, p. 31, April 1984

Proceedings)

Frank Uhlig, Jr., Editor, Naval War Col­lege Review, Former Editor, Naval Re­view Issue of Proceedings—Commander McGruther has continued his useful cus­tom of writing provocative articles.

At least, he has provoked me.

The most important theme in Com­mander McGruther’s article is that we are incapable of developing a strategy of our own; however, he says, not to worry: the real job is to “understand, account for, and then overcome our opponent’s strat­egy.” He pins everything on our being able to divine accurately whatever it is the opponents might do in time for us to deny them their success.

If our politicians will be unable to give our military forces the necessary guid­ance, then it is up to the leaders of those forces to come up with something suita­ble for the politicians, as Admiral Harold Stark did in November 1940 with his Plan Dog. It was upon Plan Dog that the U. S. strategy in World War II was based. Someone has to decide what it is we want to happen and what it is that we do not want to happen.

While we should be able to do such things as “locate and exploit” the foe’s sensibilities and “compensate for our own vulnerabilities,” to do them well, we must first know our own objectives.

Commander McGruther makes many assumptions, such as the Soviets “would prefer to fight a major war only in and around Eurasia and presumably beneath the nuclear threshold.” They might pre­fer to fight there and under those circum­stances, but not necessarily. Moreover, it could be the United States that might wish to fight only in that place or under those circumstances. Or both opponents might prefer that. Our aim is not neces­sarily in opposition to the foe’s every aim.

While there is no doubt Commander McGruther is correct in his view that “at war’s end, it is desirable that the Soviet Union not have a fleet,” he ought not to leave us in the dark as to why that is so. How desirable is that condition, why is it that desirable, and what price should we be willing to pay for its accomplishment?

Commander McGruther tells us that Soviet planning is “extraordinarily de­pendent on attaining objectives within prescribed periods of time.” But, if we ruin their timetable, should we expect them to give up and go home? If things don’t go according to their plan, shouldn’t we expect them to try some­thing else, or try another way, or try a little harder? Surely, those are the ordi­nary experiences of war. If a country makes the dreadful decision to go to war, it does not do that lightly and does not expect to quit when mishaps arise.

The author is correct in his observation that “naval forces have the resources and mobility to take the fight to the enemy at critical times and places” and that they can provide the United States with “of­fensive options that best suit its wartime objectives.” Naval forces have mobility, but not everywhere—only as far as the shoreline. They cannot move an army from south of the Alps to the middle of the Fulda Gap, nor from Abadan to Tehe­ran. Moreover, if our wartime objectives are merely to respond to the enemy’s ac­tions, we would have no aims to be ad­vanced by “offensive options.”

As to “framing a U. S. strategy,” we must still know first whether we wish to fight and, if so, when and where.

Finally, having already given up West­ern Europe, Commander McGruther says that “even in the worst case,” we should be able to “preserve a safe haven from which to threaten continued Soviet domi­nance on land with our naval forces and long-range striking power and deny them their ability to consolidate their gains.” This would, of course, condemn us to the status of being no more than a nuisance. The Soviets could put up with that for a long time, probably longer than we could.

Surely, if war were to come, we could do better than that.

Why Doesn’t the Navy Sing?

Major E. M. Leonard, U. S. Marine Corps—On a recent Indian Ocean de­ployment on board the USS Cleveland (LPD-7), I had occasion to cross the equator and be initiated into the Ancient Order of Shellbacks. One of my duties on that memorable day was to lead the royal choir composed of other unfortunate Navy and Marine pollywogs. The Ma­rines sang out the Marine Corps Hymn, loudly and proudly, but I was puzzled when none of the Navy sailors or officers knew the words to “Anchors A weigh.”

I checked in the Bluejackets’ Manual (Naval Institute Press) and found no trace of the words to “Anchors A weigh.” In fact, I didn't find a single Navy man on board the ship who knew the words to that tune.

Sailors would develop more pride in themselves and their service if they were taught their service song in boot camp and sang it occasionally—perhaps on the Navy’s birthday.

“Sea Power: Opportunities”

CSee 1. L. Byron, pp. 68-72, February 1984

Proceedings)

Captain Robert C. Powers, U. S. Navy— Commander Byron’s comments on cur­rent issues are interesting. However, he makes a serious error by focusing on sin­gle or limited missions for designing ships.

The assumption that a carrier battle group (CVBG) is the “smallest surviv- able surface formation” is flawed. Sur- vivable against what? Where? To prop­erly carry out a broad naval strategy, one must be able to quickly form numerous capable task groups (not always “battle” groups) to perform missions such as large-area offensive antisubmarine war­fare (ASW), choke point closure, block­ade, sea lines of communication protec­tion, logistic force protection, and amphibious force protection. These mis­sions do not always require a carrier or a CVBG. They can benefit from land- based air support, and, in some cases, require it. It is a shallow strategy that thinks only in terms of fighting with lim­ited numbers of CVBGs.

Even within a CVBG, surface combat­ants cannot be overly specialized. Each must have a baseline capability in all warfare areas in order to survive and be effective. Unlike a submarine, the sur­face combatant cannot pull the plug when the area heats up. The myth that a CVBG is a fixed citadel that steams into harm’s way must be dispelled. It is a dynamic grouping of ships whose position in the CVBG disposition changes daily. Ships may be separated by hundreds of miles. Indeed, a CVBG may consist of several mutually supporting “battle units” or “battle elements,” each with a task that requires multi-capability. Operating un­der the umbrella of the carrier air wing adds to the survivability and capability of these ships, but it does not relieve them of the need to be multi-capable. The air wing is not always airborne or nearby when needed.

Finally, if one believes that a CVBG will fight as an intact, cohesive unit in a battle, he has not read naval history or operated with a CVBG. Naval battles tend to evolve into melees in which the individual capability of each ship weighs heavily in the outcome. When the battle heats up, the carrier is going to run for safety if she can in order to preserve that valuable asset to fight again. The individ­ual capabilities of the surface combatants that cover that retreat and remain to fight will decide the tactical outcome. The strategic outcome may well depend not only on the CVBG mission success, but also on the degree to which the carrier and her air wing survive to fight again.

Surface combatants are indeed “spe­cialized” today, but not to the extent Commander Byron suggests. Frigates are ASW specialists. Cruisers are antiair warfare specialists. Destroyers represent a more all-around capability, dependent on class. All have antisurface warfare capabilities. All have baseline capabili­ties in all warfare areas and warfare sup­port areas, including helicopter support capabilities.

If any change is needed in the surface combatant design philosophy, it is toward ships that have a balanced multipurpose capability that includes more aircraft ca­pability. The day is past when naval war­fare of any kind can be performed with­out naval aircraft. The extended combat horizon of modem naval warfare de­mands that new long-range weapons have organic surveillance-targeting aircraft. These aircraft have to be ship organic, not “battle group organic,” because of the dynamic, long-range force dispositions previously noted. As Commander Byron notes, the benefits of placing aircraft on many small platforms outweigh the “marginal cost advantage of a large hull design.” To obtain a true distribution of

Naval Operations.

The answer to the “what” goes far beyond the scope of this article but must combine the prescription and direct line management action. Our business-as- usual personnel policies will not solve the problem within NMPC. However, one possible approach is to create a project manager within the personnel command, analagous to the Systems Command proj­ect managers for major weapon systems, with the charter to match ship manning to combat readiness. If we recognize the problem, provide resources to solve it, and establish realistic long-term goals in support of the Navy’s primary measure of effectiveness, our ships will be ready to deploy before deployment rather than upon return.

“The Offensive Surface Ship”

(See T. J. McKeamey, pp. 64—69, December 1983; T. L. Galliard, p. 87, February 1984;

F. J. Glaeser, pp. 16-20, March 1984; A.

Jones, p. 31, April 1984 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Terry McKear- ney, U. S. Navy—I have considered both Mr. Gaillard’s and Commander Glaeser’s comments and have decided to plead guilty. Both fault my proposals for strengthening the offensive posture of our surface combatants as being too conser­vative, and I admit that I left volumes unsaid as to what we could do in this area.

A useful perspective to add to the de­bate at this point is one of economics. The “how much is enough?” question hangs over our heads these days, and I’m beginning to sense that the bottom line may drive whatever improvements can be made to the surface ship’s offensive power. 1 don’t mean that we should look toward the surface force as a source of sea power on the cheap, but one of the major attractions of the potential offen­sive power of the modem surface ship is that it offers a healthy punch for a modest investment. For example, the cost of re­activating the four /owa-class battleships will break down to approximately half a billion dollars apiece, about the same cost as a new frigate. In view of the high visi­bility the Navy has gotten out of the USS New Jersey (BB-62), the funds spent thus far seem to have yielded a reasonable re­turn in terms of the impact the ship has made as an offensive naval weapon de­ployed in the key role of demonstrating presence.

Keeping the price tag in mind, I dis­agree with Mr. Gaillard on his apparent view that advanced hull forms are at the high end of our expectations. The tech­nology for such platforms is already in place, and the concepts for the employ­ment of the surface effect ship and the missile-armed patrol hydrofoil have been well thought out. The investment needed to bring these units into the fleet in suffi­cient numbers to make an impact is prob­ably what killed these programs. Despite my tendency to see offensive surface ships in fiscal terms, the funding would have been worth it, as I indicated in my article. As close as we are to hatching a new generation of surface combatants, the curtailment of these programs is penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Commander Glaeser has touched on what may be the major problem of our tactical planning these days: the urge to place every fleet element in a precon­ceived place complete with labels that limit our imagination. Restructuring our naval forces, however, must be done in­crementally, if only because the bureau­cratic process used to generate new sys­tems works this way. For this reason, I still consider the rather limited horizons I have set for our surface combatants’ of­fensive roles appropriate.

1 appreciate Commander Glaeser’s faith in my community’s ability to guide the service to the future, but I am con­vinced that all “blue suiters” must be­come generalists regarding the issues of new ships, weapons, and tactics.

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