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space-based laser weapons which, according to Deputy Secretary of Defen*e for Research and Development R*ehar DeLauer, could be operational as early
as this year, and a submarine-launche
self-initiated antiaircraft missile (SIAN1 like the one the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency developed for use on board our submarines against enemy antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft and helicopters. Such weapon could be duplicated by the Soviets for use on board their submarines not only against our ASW aircraft, but also against our E-3A and E-2C aircraft.
Another near-term technology weapon that should greatly concern
naval planners is the stealth cruise sile. Even now, our Air Force is dev oping this missile on a priority basis for an initial operational capability • introduction in 1986. Soviet forces could well have a stealth cruise mis
tection and destruction by many
of oUf
Defending Naval Task Forces
The maxim that strategy plods while technology sprints seems to portray the situation faced today by naval planners attempting to equip our Navy with weapon systems to defend our task forces in the face of an ever-increasing threat from a fast-growing Soviet Navy equipped with the latest weapons.
In planning the defenses of our naval task forces, our Navy seems to be slipping behind in its relative defensive capabilities vis a vis Soviet offensive forces. Several reasons for this are:
► A preference to continue to build ships and weapons that technically cannot handle the current—much less projected—enemy threat; this could be caused by a mesmerism with numbers and a tendency to substitute procurement for defense
► A head-in-the-sand confidence about the effectiveness of new defensive systems, such as the E-2C Hawkeye and the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers coupled with a tendency not to give a very capable enemy (the Soviets) credit for being able to develop similar new weapon systems
► A lack of sufficient capable weapons on board our ships to cope with the massive, repeated, and coordinated Soviet missile attacks that could be expected in a war with the Soviets
► A lack of urgency in developing and equipping our ships with defensive systems, such as directed-energy weapons, that will be able to handle the very substantial Soviet missile threat.
It took the 1973 war, which they almost lost, to convince the Israelis that they must keep their armed forces equipped with the latest weapons. We cannot afford the luxury of a war to discover this rather obvious conclusion.
Our Navy does not seem to recognize the extent and complexity of the missile threats from Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of repeated, coordinated attacks against our naval task forces. To cope with these threats, we have built 31 Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers with no surface-to-air missile defenses and are building about 50 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates with one missile battery. The unmodified Spruance destroyer cannot cope with missile attacks, and the Oliver Hazard Perry- class frigates’ defenses can be saturated by two missiles. Granted, to improve this situation, a Sea Sparrow battery and two Phalanx installations are being installed on the Spruance-class ships and one Phalanx installation on the Oliver Hazard Perry-class ships. However, even with these additions, their defenses can be saturated by relatively few missiles. More important, these close-in weapons do not contribute to the air defense of the aircraft carrier— the prime mission of escort ships. If the carriers are to be defended successfully against the predicted Soviet missile attacks, the escort ships must be capable of contributing to their defense. The escort ships should be equipped with vertically launched Standard II missiles, as well as fire-and-forget close-in weapons for their own defense.
The Navy’s E-2C/F-14 combination currently provides an excellent outer defense for its carrier task forces. The new Ticonderoga cruisers with their AN/SPY-1A phased array radars and Standard II missile batteries should significantly improve intermediate area defenses, at least for the close-term future. However, it is unwise for our defense leaders to assume that the E-2C/F-14/ Ticonderoga systems will continue to provide adequate force defenses in light of new technological developments that soon will be operational.
Soviet naval warfare doctrine, however, emphasizes attack on the enemy’s command and control systems, such as the Ticonderoga and the E-2C, whose radars can be located and identified from hundreds of miles away. These systems would be vulnerable to Soviet antiradiation missiles. A more ominous threat would be Soviet development of an advanced strategic air-launched missile (ASALM) similar to the one under development by the U. S. Air Force now a joint services program. This missile is powered by an integral rocks* ramjet engine, giving it hypersonic speed; it is guided by combinations of radar and infrared guidance systems which include antiradiation homing- The missile has already been tested successfully to a range of about 600 kilometers (the current SALT II range limitation), and it is undoubtedly capable of greater ranges if desired.
The ASALM was designed to be used on our bombers to shoot down enemy airborne warning and control system aircraft and electronic counterme sures aircraft, and in an air-to-ground mode to destroy Soviet long-range search radars in order to improve pene' tration of Soviet air defenses by our bombers and cruise missiles. Such a missile in Soviet hands, used against our E-2C, EA-6B, and E-3A aircraft and Ticonderoga ships, could render our task force defenses ineffective.
Two other near-term threats to our E-2C and E-3A aircraft are: Soviet
oUf
mis' ;sile
in the same time frame. Its timely
110
Proceedings / -Iub
the]
big guns—obviously a primary
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Present radars and defensive missiles w°uld be so improbable that new technology would be required to meet this Particular threat.
Possibly the easiest of our defensive shortcomings to remedy would be the insufficient numbers of effective weap- °ns within the task force to counter the Predicted numbers of attacking weap- °ns. Justifying the requirement for additional Phoenix missiles for the F-14 aircraft and additional Standard II mis- S'les for the ships already equipped Wlth these systems, and providing addi- l'onal magazine spaces in ships to handle the extra missiles should be possible. even in a highly controlled budget environment.
Then come the harder choices among °verall priorities. Is it more worthwhile to concentrate on attaining the Navy’s 600-ship goal by buying ships that will a°t contribute significantly to the Davy’s primary mission? Or should the money be spent to modify the Navy’s more capable major combatants? On “Oard all larger ships, it would be ad- V|sable to install vertical launchers to mplace the missile mounts now in use. *nis would improve the ships’ rates of lre to cope with projected coordinated Soviet missile attacks. Second, all sur- ace-to-air missile-equipped ships should be updated to make use of the more capable Standard II missiles. Finally, all escort ships should be ecNipped with a medium-range missile ^aPability to assist in force missile demise. This especially applies to the Pruance-class destroyers, which have n° medium-range missile batteries.
The battleships Iowa (BB-61) and e!v Jersey (BB-62) are ideal platforms 0 equip with large numbers of vertical Surface-to-air missile launchers and magazines. Their primary mission oould be that of protecting the car- r,ers. Unfortunately, they are being ecNippe(] with limited range surface-to- mrface missiles and are being groomed 0 Provide fire support with these and mission once air superiority has been gained. However, to operate these n,ps without air support and local air Priority would consign them to the j?me fate as the Prince of Wales, arnato, and Bismarck.
To emphasize the need for adequate umbers of Phoenix, Standard II, ^°se-in fire-and-forget missiles, Pha- nx guns, and up-to-date electronic Untermeasure equipment, one has fmy to look at the threats to our naval j. rces in areas such as the Norwegian e®. the eastern Mediterranean, the northwest Indian Ocean, or the northwest Pacific. In these high-threat areas, it is easy to conjure visions of massive coordinated attacks: 20 to 30 major surface units, including Kirov cruisers with 20 SS-N-19 missiles, and other surface units with numbers of SS-N-3s and SS-N-12s (all missiles are large and supersonic, with firing ranges of more than 250 miles); 30 to 40 submarines, including “Oscars” capable of the submerged launching of 24 SS-N- 19s, and “Charlies” with shorter-range SS-N-7s and SS-N-9s; an air threat of at least 200 aircraft arriving in closely spaced groups of ten to 20 aircraft from several directions, each aircraft carrying at least two long-range supersonic missiles.
With threats like those to be expected in a current combat situation, and as Soviet naval forces and their capabilities continue to grow, it would seem that there should be an urgency in our research programs to develop weapons that can handle this dangerous and growing threat. For the immediate future, equipping our ships and aircraft with the latest defensive missiles and electronic countermeasure systems may suffice. But in the not-too-distant future (1985 to 1990), even these will not be able to handle the missile threat, and the only effective counter will be di- rected-energy weapons—initially, a high-energy laser beam weapon and ultimately, charged-particle beams.
Their development for shipboard installation on the Navy’s major combatants— carriers, battleships, and cruisers— should be receiving top priority in development funding. Unfortunately, this is not being done.
It is hoped that more thought and urgency will be given to the improvement of defenses for the Navy’s principal tactical weapon system—the carrier—in order to keep abreast of the fast-growing Soviet threat. The carrier is still the weapon system that gives our Navy a localized measure of superiority over Soviet naval forces, and is still our country’s most useful political/ military tool in responding anywhere in the world to local crisis.
Traditionally, the United States has been slow to recognize the military applications of its new technologies and to transform them into operational weapon systems. It is imperative that more thought and urgency be given to equipping our Navy with the proper weapon systems required to control the vital sea lines of communication— which translates to ensuring the survival of our aircraft carriers.
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0ce«lings / July 1984