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To find a way for a pilot to outlive a doomed aircraft takes a lot of research, development, test, and evaluation—all of which, in turn, take a lot of money. Wouldn’t it be awful if the Navy couldn’t find a way to save its pilots because it didn’t spend enough money?
Eating Our Seed
Corn
Acquisition managers of 1971 can recall the turmoil introduced by the “fly before buy” policies promulgated at that time under Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 5000.1. Massive changes in program funding, schedules, and plans for testing were introduced to provide independent operational testing of all weapon systems planned for production and to assure that all costs associated with production and testing of such articles were paid for by appropriate Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, prior to milestone approval for the next phase of each program. Few of the Navy’s program managers or their senior managers of that time remain in the Navy today. Fewer still realize that DoD Instruction 5000.1 was only one major link in a chain of many continuing decisions commenced in the mid- 1960s to manage acquisition of new weapon systems so that visible cost accounting and cost performance evaluation could be applied to defense system management. This was a natural consequence of the cost-effectiveness criteria and policies developed during Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s era.
The adverse impact of these policies has been severe
because little or no fiscal adjustment has been provided 0 the RDT&E account to accommodate the resulting lar-c increase in its financing burden. The result has been, f'rS ’ major curtailment of research and exploratory deveW ment in the midst of rapidly growing opportunities scientific and technological investment; second, ina e quate funding for full-scale experimental prototyping P{0 grams; and third, considerable contribution to the Prob . of “acquisition stretch-out,” which has characterized de fense acquisition during the past 15 years. .
The Navy’s RDT&E funding is unable to patchy nearly the amount of research and development it did 12 15 years ago because of the incorporation of large c‘ penses previously borne by other appropriation accoun j This increase in purchasing requirements has been with° corresponding budget compensation. In addition to ^ resultant erosion of purchasing power, there has been.,. shrinkage in RDT&E as a fraction of total Navy inVe0f ment. As a result of these two factors, the percentage , Navy resources now being allocated to basic research a development has dramatically declined. - p
In the mid-1960s, DoD wanted to gain improved de 1
0:
Peration and Maintenance fuel fund to direct RDT&E
Transferred the costs of prototype construction from
Pro,
fai
"0(1
^ ~ correction of deficiencies transferred the costs of Navy training device develop-
'on of research and development costs by requiring the *^T&e account to pay for all costs associated with develr "Potent of new weapon systems. Consequently, over the decade, the Navy:
, deduced the military manning of major range and test ac'lities and transferred these functions to civilian person- ?el funded by RDT&E
transferred the maintenance of military aircraft supporting R&D programs, as well as logistics costs, to
Reallocated associated fuel costs from the general Navy
a°sts
s- Curement accounts to RDT&E, including costs for demanufacturing tooling, unit costs, logistics support, etory delivery tests, independent operational evaluation,
and introduction to RDT&E transferred the costs of operating the Navy’s major and test facilities from other accounts to RDT&E
► Transferred aircraft component improvements from Navy Aircraft Procurement to RDT&E
During the past 15 years, dozens of transfers in these categories have occurred, with a cumulative impact each year of between 1% and 3% of the total RDT&E appropriation (See Table 1). A conservative estimate (based only upon identified RDT&E appropriations transfers and ignoring any new starts initiated in RDT&E without an appropriation transfer) shows that approximately 20% of the RDT&E account (or nearly 2% of the Navy total obliga- tional authority) is now associated with support and procurement tasks not allocated in RDT&E 15 years ago. This cumulative effect is shown in Figure 1.
These percentages do not reflect the large changes in scope of testing now required to obtain a Milestone III production decision for a full-scale development program. Two major naval aircraft programs indicate that between 25% to 35% of the number of prototype aircraft purchased and flight test program cost can be directly attributed to the much greater level of test effort associated with both systems engineering testing and independent operational evaluation now required to support a production decision.
1965
1966
• RDT&E flight hours
• Personnel support
• Long-range training $30m* = 2%
1967
1968
• Petroleum, oil, and lubricants for RDT&E Estimated at 0.6%
1969
• Office of Naval Research Headquarters
• Ship support
• Flight hours
• Aircraft support $41. lm = 1.9%
1973
• Advance ship design $10m = 0.4%
• PHM lead ship $30.4m = 1.2%
1970
1974
• Aerial targets
• Harpoon
• Mk-48
• Training devices
• Phalanx
• CAPTOR
$55.5m = 2.1%
*m = million
1971
•Two S3 A test aircraft $59m = 2.8%
1975
$3.4m | • Hi-fragmentation |
|
14.1m | projectile | $2.5m |
5.3m | • A4M attack |
|
2.8m | delivery system | 0.6m |
23.2m | • SM-1 midcourse |
|
6.7m | guidance • Ship contract | 17.0m |
| design • Tactical logistics | 29.4m |
| support • Management Support Naval Applied Sciences | 1.5m |
| Laboratory • RDT&E ship | 4.8m |
| support | 1.4m |
| • Test and evaluation | |
| support $80.7m = 2.7% | 23.5m |
range
$65. lm = 2.0%
• S3A
1972
1976
$21 m
> Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Center $ 12.4m
1 National parachute range 0.6m
' ASROC/
SUBROC 1 P-3 fleet satellite communications 1 OV-10 initial operational test and evaluation Aegis consolidated ships electronic device 45.0m
Barking Sands tactical underwater
1.0m
3.9m
9.9m
-7.7m
LU
°3
I-
O
cr
This increased cost of doing business (many hundreds of millions of dollars for the above two programs alone) has been passed on to the RDT&E account without compensating financial resources, thus still further reducing its ability to procure basic R&D of the extent and nature of 12 to 15 years ago. If this scope of effort is assumed to be reasonably typical of the increase in testing requirements of all production prototyping efforts, it constitutes an additional “tax” of approximately 25% to the 6.4 (engineering development) RDT&E account, or 10% of the total account, that was not present prior to 1971. The additional impact of this obligation has reduced actual investment to less than 5% of Navy’s total obligation authority relative to levels of about 9.5% in 1965 (see Figure 1).
DoD intended at the time for these budget transfers to continue RDT&E allocation in the outyears to compensate for each increase in program or functional requirement. However, such intentions and decisions are not inherently tied to outyear decisions. Consequently, each succeeding program objectives memorandum year has squeezed the RDT&E account by progressively limiting its fiscal guidance, breaking the earlier contracts on the basis of newer >,
o 12 .c
"5
< 11 76
o 10 73
S 9
xi
O
>, 8
>
as exigencies and priorities. These priorities have ten<^c otls be near-term and have created a series of fiscal deC1if v0r that have reduced total allocations to RDT&E in *a (S of operating, maintenance, and procurement acccm
19TQ | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | ||
• CH-53E | $20m | • Ice Breaker $1.4m | • Mini-expendable |
| |
• Additional Atlantic | • CH-46 rotor |
| jammers $l.lm |
| |
Underwater Test |
| blades | 4.7m | • F-14 recon 10.3m |
|
and Evaluation |
| • Deep passive |
| • CH-46 reliability |
|
Center | $3. lm | sonobuoys | 2.2m | and maintainability |
|
• Aegis consolidated | • Avionics initial |
| demonstration 6.6m |
| |
ships electronic |
| operational test |
| • AV-8A avionics |
|
design | $6.5m | and evaluation | 4.8m | modification 1.5m |
|
$29.6m = 3.6% |
| • Proteus/P3 |
| • AA missile system |
|
|
| software | 1.2m | engineering 10.8m |
|
|
| • Survey equipment |
| • SM-1 |
|
|
| initial operational |
| improvements 0.5m |
|
|
| test and |
| • RDT&E capital |
|
|
| evaluation | 1.3m | investment |
|
|
| • A-6F Harpoon initial | equipment |
| |
|
| operational test and | installations 0.6m |
| |
|
| evaluation | 3.2m | • Barking Sands —8.7m |
|
|
| • Antiship missile |
| $23.7m = 0.6% |
|
|
| defense test |
|
|
|
|
| range • Net miscellaneous | 1.7m |
|
|
|
| (-) $16.3m = 0.4% $20.5m = 0.6% | -4.2m |
|
|
1980 |
| 1981 |
| 1982 |
|
• Component |
|
|
|
|
|
improvement program $59.6m = 1.3% |
|
|
|
|
|
^eanwhile, the shift toward near-term interests has been ev'dent within the RDT&E individual accounts.
Viewing the overall historical trends of these policy Ganges on RDT&E, 6.4 RDT&E funding increased from
18% in 1970 to approximately 40% of the total RDT&E budget before decreasing slightly to current levels. At a slightly slower rate, 6.3 (advanced development) grew from 13% to 29% of the RDT&E budget by 1983 (see Figure 2). The two combined now make up about 65% of all RDT&E. Although some of this growth was offset by transfer of funding from 6.6 (operational testing) into 6.4, the bulk of growth resulted from both a transfer of burden from procurement accounts into RDT&E and an increase in the scope of testing required prior to production. However, the total RDT&E account, during the same period of time, has not increased significantly, but has risen at a rate only sufficient to cover inflation. (From 1967 to 1983, it rose from $1.95 billion to $6.09 billion—about a 6.5% annual growth rate.) During the same period, it has shrunk as a percentage of Navy total obligational authority from historic levels between 10% and 11% to 9.5% in 1981 and 7.8% in 1983.
Therefore, lacking either real dollar growth or even a “fair share” retention of historical investment levels, the overall purchasing power of the Navy R&D program has steadily decreased because of the introduction of major
Table 2 | Percentages of the RDT&E Budget for | |
| 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6 Accounts |
|
| 1965 | 1982 |
6.3 | 11.0 % | 27.7% |
6.4 | 9.6% | 34.5% |
6.6 | 34.2% | 12.9% |
Total | 54.8% | 75.1% |
new purchasing requirements into the RDT&E program without compensating funding, and because of a shift in investment strategy toward near-term priorities.
One of the most visible and serious side effects of incorporating these requirements into the 6.3 and 6.4 accounts has been the dramatic and permanent drawdown of resources devoted to research and exploratory development, which now receives only 13% of RDT&E funding compared to 33% in 1965.*
The large apparent growth described in Figure 2 for both 6.3 and 6.4 RDT&E is illusory. It is true in the relative sense, but not in the absolute. The spurious nature of this growth can be viewed by considering the aggregate of the 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6 accounts, covering the entire spectrum of full-scale systems development and operational testing. The percentages of the RDT&E budget for the three accounts in 1965 and 1982 are shown in Table 2.
If, conservatively, 30% of the total RDT&E budget is deducted from the 1982 aggregate to reflect its uncompensated burden, only about 45% of that budget is being expended in work for which 55% or more was being expended in 1965. Expressed in 1982 dollars, the 1982 investment, after removal of the uncompensated burden, was $2.4 billion in the 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6 accounts, compared to $2.2 billion in 1965; thus, equivalent investment has remained, at most, about the same. Hence, even the two areas of Navy RDT&E appearing to have received the largest dollar growth actually have not experienced a real RDT&E growth, and to conclude that they are being adequately funded would be erroneous.
Other developments have resulted from DoD’s requirement that RDT&E pay for all costs associated with the development of new weapon systems. For example, previous categories of development activity have been forced downward into 6.3 and lower levels of RDT&E.
Evidence of this point and the underlying funding stresses in 6.3 and 6.4 that have contributed to it exist in numerous examples:
► In 1972, the missile-armed patrol hydrofoil (PHM) lead ship program was transferred from Navy shipbuilding and conversion to 6.4 RDT&E. Supporting RDT&E funding was subsequently shifted from 6.4 to 6.3. All RDT&E funding for hydrofoils was ultimately terminated.
► All new advanced ship prototype programs in 6.3 RDT&E were eliminated.
► Aircraft experimental prototype programs in 6.3 RDT&E were dramatically reduced.
► The annual $60 million high energy laser program, clearly a full-scale prototype experiment, was transferred from 6.3 to 6.2 (technology base) RDT&E with no budge1 compensation; hence, there was a tremendous adverse impact on other 6.2 programs.
► The surface effect ship (SES) program funding was shifted from 6.3 to 6.2 RDT&E and reduced by a factor of 20 in funding levels.
► Operating and maintenance support of NR-1, an operating research submarine, was transferred to 6.2 RDT&E-
► Numerous full-scale system feasibility demonstrations were funded in 6.2 RDT&E rather than 6.3 RDT&E- Some of these include two-stage dual jet torpedo warhead demonstrations, the compound air masking system (a*' ready demonstrated once in full scale), the rudder roll stabilization system (already demonstrated by the Coast Guard in full scale), the advanced stored chemical energy propulsion system, and the low drag vehicle (LDV-2)-
As a result, technology base is now procuring even less of the type of research and exploratory development of 13 years ago than its 13% share of the RDT&E budget would indicate.* Exploratory development, in particular, 's being severely curtailed. A true measure of what we are investing now in 6.2 RDT&E, compared with 1965 levels, is difficult. Considering only the programs mentioned pre' viously, we can estimate that more than 15% of 6.2 technology base is now supporting programs once supported with 6.3 or other funding sources. Thus, current investment in exploratory development is less than 25% of 1963 levels in terms of share of RDT&E resources, and less than 42% of 1965 levels in terms of real dollars (See Fig' ure 3). The Navy is slowly eating its seed com by reall°" eating RDT&E resources into preparatory production aC' tivity, having essentially “backfitted” the maj°f nonrecurring costs of production into RDT&E. In 6lC meantime, the burgeoning growth of scientific knowledge is creating an ever increasing number of investment opp°r' tunities in basic research and exploratory developmen which resources will not fund, but which could be vital to national interests.
In the Navy’s effort to rebuild and expand, the probls"1 has become even more acute. Now, nearly all new sign1''' cant upgrade programs must pass through a 6.4 RDT& phase. The urgency of corrective action by means of Pr°' grams that will upgrade fleet capabilities in the 1990 era dramatically increases the already familiar problem °* large number of new starts called for in the first year ofttie five year defense plan. The demand for immediate RDT&E dollars and the institutional difficulty in resisting new starts now places even greater stress, as well, on tn 6.3 account. Use of 6.3 RDT&E for transitioning success ful 6.2 technology into full-scale system feasibility dejj1 onstrations is consequently becoming more and more m ficult, as witnessed by nearly all managers working in 1
•Fiscal year 1965 is used as a base year since it is the first year in which Category 6 of the Navy appropriation was fully defined and accounted according to the present financial system, and since it is the year preceding the changes discussed herein.
•In addition, from 1965 through 1982, indirect costs associated with in-house laboratory effort have increased from 41% to 50% of total labor costs, thus f reducing the purchasing power of technology base dollars.
6-2 and 6.3 RDT&E areas. Consequently, considerable effort has been devoted to improve management of 6.2 to 6-3 transition. These efforts are severely hampered by the lr>herent funding stresses now built into the 6.3 account.
The recent policy guidance by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins for 75 existing Navy RDT&E programs to be terminated in program objectives memorandum year 1985 indices the severity of the 6.3 funding stress. This position W'U essentially ratify the informal policy of the past few yoars attempting to “single up” on only one potential candidate to fulfill an operational requirement at the beginning of experimental prototyping (i.e., full-scale feasibil- "7 demonstration) rather than at the end. Rather than develop competing alternative full-scale concepts, more effort is now being devoted to justify and select “win- r|ir'g” systems for production commitment prior to 6.3 funding and full-scale demonstration, thus transferring to 'de 6.3 (Milestone I) decision what only a few years ago Was associated with a 6.4 (Milestone II) decision. There is sitnply not sufficient money in 6.3 RDT&E at present to
^uPport an alternative policy. But this is not as it should be.
The proper use of 6.3 funding should be to ensure exPerimental prototyping and full-scale feasibility demonnation of competing system concepts so that a proven Preferred alternative is selected for full-scale development. Failure to provide 6.3 funding to pursue this policy causes serious problems in the acquisition process. These Problems, which are historically evidenced, include:
* Extended delay in obtaining decisions for full-scale feasibility demonstration systems because of competition of concepts at Milestone I
► Inability to transition many 6.2 RDT&E programs into 6.3 RDT&E, thus causing a dilemma as to whether they should be terminated or continued in 6.2 RDT&E
► Lack of competing alternatives at the time of Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) II (engi-
As Navy resources allocated to basic R&D have diminished, RDT&E has also been forced to bear many additional costs, such as maintenance and fuel costs for military aircraft previously handled by other accounts. Below, an A-7 Corsair is readied to test a new weapon at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake.
Table 3 Specific Findings of Study Groups
Defense Science Board Summer Study—1981
“There is insufficient funding for technology demonstrations which are an essential part of technology transition.” (Provided with discussion calling for more in-the-field critical technology demonstrations where military value can also be assessed; i.e., advanced development.)
Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: “Department of Defense Experience in the 1970’s”
Cost growth of hardware programs with competition equal to 16% versus 53% for those having no competition.
“It is reasonable to conclude that a ‘better’ weapon system resulted from the development of [full-scale prototype] competitive hardware before full-scale development began.”
Defense Science Board Task Force on Acquisition Cycle—1977 “Full-scale development period (from DSARC II to DSARC III) has not significantly changed over the last 15-20 years, despite the increasing complexity of our weapons systems. On the other hand, the ‘front-end’ period from initial program conception to DSARC II has increased substantially— from less than two years ... to an average of nearly five years. . . .”
“There is no pat answer to this question [as to how many prototypes are required]. ... If there are two or three possible solutions from which a single ‘best solution’ must be chosen, then two or three prototypes may be in order. [If] one or all solutions are obvious, then the use of prototypes merely for the sake of competition can be wasteful. ... On the other hand, competitive prototyping at less than the system level . . . can often reduce cost and schedule leading to FSD [full- scale development] by a significant degree.”
Project Hindsight Report—1969 “These examples suggest that the greater use of prototype system development in the advanced development category, to provide focus and spur to research in science and technology, can be a successful prelude to fixed price production contracting and still ensure a significant increase in operational performance.”
Table 4 Advanced Prototyping First Flights
Aircraft (All DoD) | 1960-69 | 1970-79 | 1980-83 |
Experimental | 19 | 17 | 3a |
Prototypes | |||
X-Craft | 7 | lb | r |
Ships/Craft | |||
Hydrofoils | 5 | 0d | 0 |
Air cushion vehicles | 2 | 3 | od |
Surface effect ships | 2 | 2 | 0 |
SWATH ships | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Monohulls | 1 | 1 | 0 |
“One Navy Program (DIGITAC A-7) bJVX prototype cX-29; the | Navy is not » oil) andLCAC | ||
participant Does not include production lead unit | for PHM (hydrof | ||
(air cushion vehicle) |
neering or full-scale development) decisions
► Delay and disruption/stretch-out on majority of programs at points of DSARC decisions
► Major cost growth because of lack of competition prior to full-scale development
►Chronic funding instability in nearly all 6.3 programs These findings have been documented in one form or
another by nearly every major DoD acquisition policy study since the mid-1970s which examined program performance trends over the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, as well as by the Project Hindsight Study of 1969. Summary extracts of these studies are provided in Table 3
and are supported in the detailed findings of each refef' ence study.
Hence, a corollary conclusion of the above investment findings is that 6.3 RDT&E is becoming less and less capable of supporting the competitive prototyping polie>eS necessary to improve acquisition program performance- Paradoxically, DoD Instruction 5000.1 has introduced an adverse long-term effect into acquisition program Per formance because of the lack of an accommodating re structure of RDT&E funding policies. .
In other words, DoD and Congress have succeeded 111 determining the true cost of introducing new weapon s)’s terns through the development cycle and into the fleet, t*01 have failed to provide the corrective funding allocati°nS for RDT&E which were implied and which the implemen tors should have anticipated.
The 1977 Defense Science Board Acquisition Cy°e Task Force Study did indeed recommend reduction in 1 ie number of programs being approved for full-scale deve opment. However, the reason for this was to reduce m level of those programs approved and intended for produc tion at the time of DSARC Milestone II, in order to ensuf the availability of procurement funding for each progral1 successfully completing full-scale development. The ove all objective was to reduce average program transit10, time for production and initial operational capability an to avoid the wastage of programs that complete full'sca development but never enter production for lack of Pr curement funds. The recommendation was not intended reduce experimental prototyping at the Milestone I leV^ '
The current application of policy to reduce the fluff1 of RDT&E programs not only in 6.4 RDT&E (post-M1 ^ stone II) but also in 6.3 RDT&E corroborates the degr° of funding stress in both accounts. It also supports , assertion that the 6.3 (Milestone I) decision has come to be regarded as the key point of decision for ‘u scale development rather that its original intended purp° of initiating experiments for the support of future fu scale development decisions. ot
The impact of failure to identify and alleviate the r°^ problems created by the DoD RDT&E policy decision^ the 1960s is seen in the dramatic reduction in advan° prototype aircraft and ship development, DoD-wide, “ trated in Table 4. DoD is nearly out of business, and
Navy is now completely out of business in these areas. Restoration of any reasonable level of development will Squire a new investment strategy and redressment of underlying RDT&E illnesses.
This policy shift has occurred despite an essentially Unanimous contrary view regarding the desirability of in- leased levels of experimental prototyping expressed over a Period of 12 years by four separate DoD study groups insisting of national RDT&E leaders. Why has no responsive shift in policy in this direction been implemented? Perhaps because such a proposed policy has not heretofore been recognized as linked inherently to fundamental accrued funding illnesses of the scope outlined here. That is, efforts to reconcile such recommendations have been attempted only within the funding guidance of each succeeding year’s program objectives memorandum without recognizing that conservatively, 30% of the Navy’s RDT&E investment has been insidiously eaten aWay by its reorientation to production. Viewed in this light, a 30% increase in the Navy RDT&E account to redress this situation could reasonably enable implementa- hon of such a prototyping policy and bring relief, as well, m the severely pressed 6.1 (basic research) and 6.2 RDT&E programs.
Such an action, though impacting other resource alloca- hon issued within the Navy, would address the sympto
because the policy would be susceptible to near-term vision priorities similar to those characterizing the cur-
matic illnesses described previously, by:
* Enabling the funding of competitive experimental prototype programs (or critical issue portions thereof) in support of Milestone II full-scale development decisions
' Facilitating the improved transition of 6.2 RDT&E tochnology to 6.3
* Restoring financial health to the Navy technology base, o°th by increasing its funding and by restoring to 6.3 the resPonsibility for funding all full-scale experimental Prototyping experiments
* Restoring overall Navy RDT&E investment to approximately 1965 levels (though distributed differently between toehnology base, 6.3, and 6.4)
' Improving funding stability, program cost, and sched- performance within approved programs Shortening the acquisition cycle The most feasible corrective policy would be to estab- requirements for competitive prototyping in 6.3 RITT&e to ensure more than one alternative at each Milestone II decision is available. With accompanying fiscal §u'dance providing for growth of the Navy RDT&E ac- ^°Unt for this purpose, a real growth of approximately °% overall could be anticipated over the five-year de- er>se plan, the major portion being in 6.3 with smaller directive increases occurring in technology base, as well.
Failure to develop such a policy, or too gradual an im- Pmuientation of it, could render corrective action ineffec- Uvi dei
[em investment strategy. Corrective growth rate should be 'mited only by the rate at which viable competing proems can be brought forward through the program objec- es memorandum process.
Such a policy would restore the critical element of the investment strategies of the 1960s and also provide for increased investment by an amount approximating the known shortfall in RDT&E purchasing power accrued during the past 18 years. (In simplistic terms, doubling 6.3 RDT&E investment to enable competitive prototyping would increase total Navy RDT&E investment by 25% or about $2 billion in 1985 dollars.)
The counterargument, of course, is that such a change in policy will impact the Navy’s most recent allocations to other appropriation accounts and that the effects of the past 18 years have freed procurement and operating funding so it could be spent on the most near-term interests of the Navy—i.e., immediate readiness for conflict.
Three points can be made in rebuttal. First, near-term investment views have gradually become an incorrectly accepted long-term policy, having been in effect now since the Vietnam War. We are becoming excessively wedded to near-term priorities in our resource allocation, to the detriment of our long-term health. Second, the adverse impact on our long-term capabilities has been much greater than previously recognized because of the gradual infusion over many years of new financing burdens into the RDT&E account. Advocates of current RDT&E investment levels have been arguing from a deceptive data base, indicating much more R&D investment than has actually been the case. Third, we are paying dearly in our acquisition process for this excessive near-term investment strategy by suffering chronically from underfunded R&D programs, too few options at the critical milestone decisions, and lack of competition between concepts.
Hence, a policy of structured RDT&E growth for competitive experimental prototyping is necessary and is the most feasible means of introducing corrective resource allocation to the Navy’s long-term operational capabilities and acquisition process. Implementing such a policy does not conflict with any higher level acquisition policy guidance and is in accord with the major DoD study recommendations of the past decade. It requires only modest annual increases in the share of the Navy budget allocated to R&D and can be justified by specifically identified burdens in the RDT&E budget which have not been compensated for with other sustaining resources. Finally, this policy would restore the past practice of allocating a portion of the 6.3 RDT&E investment to prototypes not carried into production, in order to accrue the benefits of a much larger base of systems that have had full-scale feasibility demonstrations.
An action to correct a problem clearly identified in both its origin and impact is entirely warranted.
Captain Duff received a bachelor’s degree and a doctor’s degree in mechanical engineering from MIT. He has served in the USS Brown (DD-546), as project officer for the construction of two hydrofoils, as the first officer-in-charge of the NSRDC Hydrofoil Special Trials Unit, and as deputy project manager and field deputy project manager for the PHM program. Captain Duff has also served on the staff of Chief of Naval Material responsible for Acquisition Programs System Engineering Division, as head of the Ocean Warfare Division of the Tactical Technology Office, DARPA, and as Assistant Chief of Naval Research and Naval Development. He is currently deputy director for Research and Development, Ship Systems Directorate, Naval Sea Systems Command.