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he massive ship construction program of the Soviet Navy—perhaps the most obvious manifestation of Soviet naval development—is changing the character of that navy. For some two decades, there has been a continued increase in capabilities of the fleet coupled with more ship-days at sea, more firepower at sea, more aviation at sea, and more complex naval exercises.
Still another stage in Soviet naval development is indicated by the appearance of the nuclear-powered battle cruiser Kirov and reports that the Soviets are constructing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) to carry conventional takeoff and landing, high-performance aircraft. At the same time, new submarines, surface ships, and aircraft are being introduced or are in the offing. Among these “platforms” that provide a significant increase in capability over their predecessors are the “Oscar,” “Typhoon,” and “Victor III” submarines, the Sovremennyy, Udaloy, and Slava surface combatants, the “Helix” ship-based helicopter, and the expected “Blackjack” strike aircraft. And, improvements are being made in several aspects of Soviet naval command, control, and communications (C3), especially in space-related activities, including sun’eillance.
Significantly, the ‘ ‘best’ ’ of the Soviet system continues to be allocated to the military sector while the overall Soviet economy continues to suffer from poor management, poor quality control, and poor productivity. Furthermore, the Soviets remain a highly scientific and innovative society, as was the tradition in tsarist Russia as well. Future innovations in military-related technology and, to a lesser extent, in military doctrine thus can be expected to continue. These characteristics of the Soviet Union, when coupled with the sociopolitical attitudes of the Soviet state, demand that the officers of the U. S. Navy and others interested in the defense of the United States and of the West continue to read and think about Soviet developments and activities, and that they ask what the Soviet fleet will look like in the future.
Can the current momentum of Soviet naval construction continue? Can sufficient trained manpower be provided for these ships? How will the Soviet Navy change during the next few years? How will Brezhnev’s death affect the navy? What will be the most significant threats from the Soviet Navy to the United States during the coming years?
The special issue of the Proceedings on the Soviet Navy in October 1982 was intended as a starting point
for such a discussion. In an effort to encourage further dialogue on these issues, the Proceedings has asked several qualified observers to present their views on specific aspects of the Soviet Navy in the 1980s and beyond. Their responses follow. They will, hopefully, stimulate more thought and subsequent comment and discussion in these pages.
Norman Polmar, Editor, Guide to the Soviet Navy
Their Submarines
By Captain Thomas A. Brooks, U. S. Navy
Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov’s “balanced fleet” of the 1990s will contain a number of exciting and impressive ships. But despite all of the attention being given to Soviet surface ship developments, such as nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers and the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier which will enter service at the end of this decade, the Soviet Navy is, and will remain, primarily a submarine navy. In Gorshkov’s own words: “Therefore, today the chief branches of our Navy are its submarines and naval air forces. . . ,”1
It is clear from Gorshkov’s writings, as well as from a listing of Soviet naval missions, that the primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to deploy and to protect strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) for use in what Gorshkov describes as “the attack against the shores.” As the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command, the SSBNs
must be protected at all costs, and large portions of the Soviet Navy submarine, surface, and air assets are dedicated to this task. Again, Gorshkov has articulated this intention clearly: “To give our submarines reliability in combat and all-round protection, our Navy includes surface ships of various types and aircraft to deal with the enemy’s submarine and antisubmarine forces. . . ,”2
Although this statement appears to overlook the mission °f anticarrier warfare, writings and shipbuilding programs demonstrate that the anticarrier warfare mission still enjoys a very high priority and may, in fact, be cloaked under the guise of protecting the SSBN since, in Soviet eyes, the carrier battle group, with its integral antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, could pose a significant threat to Soviet SSBNs if allowed to penetrate into northern waters.
A glance at Soviet shipbuilding programs should remove any doubt as to what is the capital ship of the Soviet Navy. Although carriers, Kirovs, and Sovremen- fryys are big ruble items, the lion’s share of the shipbuilding budget goes to “Typhoons,” “Oscars,” “Delta Ills,” Alfas,” “Victor Ills,” “Kilos,” “Tangos,” and new classes of submarines building in shipyards across the Soviet Union.
In the period 1972-1982, the Soviets completed almost 0 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs and SSGNs).3 ssuming a conservative SSN/SSGN completion rate of hve Per year for the 1980s, the 1990 Soviet Navy, a though more “balanced” than today with carriers, large cruisers, etc., will still be a submarine navy with at least he same numbers as today, but with substantially more modern and capable submarines.
In comparisons of the U. S. Navy’s and Soviet Navy’s warfighting abilities, it has often been stated that the U. S. avy, although lagging in terms of numbers, is superior to e Soviet Navy because of our ability to operate tactical aviation at sea and because of the superiority of our submarines and their crews. By the end of the decade, the °viets will be operating four Kiev-class VTOL carriers and their first CVN, but still will not be able to compete '|'lth the U. S. Navy in the realm of carrier aviation. Can e same thing be said for the submarine forces? Will the quality of our submarines and their crews continue to compensate for the considerable numerical advantage the oviets will have in nuclear attack submarines? The pic- re for the submarine force could be markedly different, etting aside the diesel submarines for the moment, o ay we see a U. S. attack submarine force of 92 SSNs j°n3Pare<I with a Soviet force of some 65 SSNs and about th —ulmost a 30% Soviet advantage. The ages of
e forces are approximately comparable, with a slight °|e going to the U. S. force.
t he advantage probably goes to the United States in 0jms of quality of hull, crew, and weapon systems. In Nav^11 caPahhhy, the advantage also goes to the U. S.
ow look at the same comparison in five and then ten nears‘ By 1988, we should have commissioned 12 or 13 n W SSNs,4 but half again that many will have reached the minal retirement age of 25 years. Thus, the U. S. submarine force will be fortunate to maintain a 90-ship force and could only sustain that number if a three ship per year or better building rate is maintained. It takes nearly four new submarines per year to reach and sustain a 100-ship force at a 25-year lifetime and almost three and a half at the predicted 30-year lifetime of a Sturgeon (SSN-637)- class submarine. Recent experience at budget time suggests that a sustained rate in excess of three per year may never be achieved.
Meanwhile, a Soviet SSN/SSGN building rate of five per year yields a 1988 Soviet force which has increased by a handful of units after retirement of the “Echo” SSN/ SSGN and “November” SSN classes. The Soviet numerical advantage is now more than 30%; the average age of the Soviet force has improved to where they have a slight edge; and the quality mix is decidedly improved with “Alfas,” “Victor Ills,” “Oscars,” and newer SSNs replacing the boats that have been retired. The advantage probably still remains with the U. S. Navy, but any U. S. qualitative edge will be slim.
Without changes in our building program, the picture in 1993 is disturbing. All U. S. Navy Permit (SSN-594)- class and earlier submarines would have been retired, and the first of the Sturgeon class is in the 28th year of service. At a building rate of three submarines a year, the U. S. submarine force lingers in the low 90s, and our force has aged markedly.
The Soviets in 1993 will have probably added at least one new class of SSGN and two or more new classes of SSNs. The Soviet numerical advantage in nuclear units will have again grown, but the primary difference will be in the age and quality of the Soviet force. Of the approxi-
mately 120 Soviet SSN/SSGNs, almost half will be ten years old or newer.
Clearly, the impact of this quality upgrading of the Soviet submarine jeopardizes the tactical margin we rely upon today. With a force this new, it is logical to assume that the decided advantage that the United States enjoys in submarine quieting will be significantly diminished: some 60% of the Soviet SSN/SSGN force will be “Victor III,” “Oscar,” and newer—all quiet submarines.
How will the quality of the next decade’s submarine crews and general tactical capabilities compare? This is a difficult area to quantify. It is clear, however, that today’s Soviet submarine skipper is considerably more competent and professional than his predecessor was only a few years ago. One can assume that this trend will continue as the Soviet submarine force continues to mature. With a newer force, quiet submarines, experienced crews, and improved sensors, the challenge posed by the Soviet nuclear submarine force of the 1990s will be much tougher to counter than it is today.
Finally, we cannot ignore the Soviet diesel submarine force.5 While a diesel is no match for an SSN in most scenarios, there are many situations where the diesel submarine can be a potent weapon. Arrayed in barriers, where she can take advantage of her quiet battery mode of operation, the diesel need not compete with the speed and endurance advantages of the SSN. The diesel submarine then becomes what the Soviets have termed a “mobile minefield.” A U. S. nuclear-powered submarine venturing into waters adjacent to the Soviet Union had better take into account the diesel barrier threat. The Soviets, now building three diesel classes (one only for foreign transfer), will continue to operate a large diesel sub force.
We need also to consider the threat posed by mines. The Soviet Union has a long tradition in mine warfare and learned valuable lessons in the employment of mines during World War II, with the preponderance of the damage inflicted by the Soviet Navy on the German Navy being by mines. Conversely, the Soviets learned about the potency of mines first hand from the losses they suffered from German minefields in the Baltic Sea.
The Soviets possess the world’s largest inventory of mines, and Soviet submarines have minelaying as one of their primary missions. Thus, it must be anticipated that U. S. nuclear subs penetrating into waters which the Soviets consider sensitive (e.g., Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, Sea of Japan) will encounter minefields as well as nuclear and diesel submarines. If we are going to operate our submarines in forward areas, we must be prepared to operate in a mine environment.
All of these factors point to a steadily growing challenge to U. S. submarine forces in the next ten years. Unless we take some dramatic action, we may no longer be able to rely on our being quieter, smarter, and better equipped. The tactic of “sneak up on him and shoot him before he knows you are there” will no longer be viable in an era when we may not be able to count on having the acoustic advantage. Our technology will probably keep our submarines quieter in relative terms, but if the enemy submarine is already so quiet that our sensors cannot detect him, what difference does it make if we are ten decibels quieter?
The scenarios of the 1990s portend an entirely different tactical situation which, in turn, demands dramatic changes in tactics. It conjures up pictures of extended, multiweapon “dog fights,” a world of active sonar and other detection devices, decoys, sophisticated torpedo countermeasures, etc. The submarine that is more maneuverable, more survivable, better armed, has better decoy devices, and is better operated in extended engagements will emerge victorious.6
Satchel Paige is quoted as saying: “Don’t look back. Something might be gaining on you.” The U. S. Navy submarine force today is the finest in the world and could remain that way. But the naval officer or political leader who does not hear the footsteps closing from behind simply isn’t listening. The time to start sprinting is upon us . . . now!
Their Surface Forces
By Captain James Kehoe, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Until the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy was primarily a coastal defense force which served as an extension of the Soviet Army to seaward. The design of Soviet warships reflected this mission. They were relatively small, fast, heavily armed, and had good seakeeping characteristics to enable them to operate effectively in the rough waters along their extensive Arctic and Pacific coastlines. They were, however, limited in their ability to carry out sustained operations at sea for long periods of time. They were also dependent upon shore-based naval aviation for air support and more dependent on shipyards and factories for maintenance support than comparable U. S. warships.
In the mid-1960s, following their humiliation in the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets made a decision to deploy ships to the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and several other critical areas around the world on a limited, but regular, basis. The ships that made these early deployments suffered from obvious limitations, and requirements to correct them were quickly identified and incorporated into new ship designs.
Knowing that in peacetime it normally takes about 12 to 15 years for new naval requirements to be translated into new ships, it should not have been surprising when, about 1980, we saw the results of these requirements reflected in the design of the 28,000-ton nuclear-powered missile cruiser Kirov, the 12,500-ton cruiser Slava, the 8,000-ton destroyer Udaloy, and the 8,000-ton destroyer Sovremen- nyy. Earlier we had witnessed a continuation in the development of a sea-based air capability in the design of the 38,000-ton Kiev, and indications of the coming construction of a larger aircraft carrier.
The design of these new Soviet warships reflects size, internal volume, and sustainability characteristics that U. S. designers normally incorporate into ships in order to give them the capability to meet the worldwide mission requirements of the U. S. Navy. The technological sophistication and innovative combination of capabilities incorporated into these new Soviet ships—and the tremendous cost that they must represent—are unmistakable indications of the Soviet attitude toward conventional naval Power. Also indicative of the strength of the Soviets’ attitude, perhaps suggestive of their intentions for use, is the tact that these new ships are in series production.
The Slava, with her long-range surface-to-surface and
^ ace‘fo-air missile systems, is well suited to provide w support for Soviet aircraft carriers. The Sovremen- nyy • with her heavy gun battery and surface-to-air missile ays eiTls> is well equipped to provide support for Soviet ^ophibious forces; while the Udaloy, like the USS SpruCe (DD-963)-class destroyers, can provide the antisub- ar,ne screen required for a new Soviet carrier. The Uc ear~powered cruiser Kirov, on the other hand, has 'Pie air, surface, and antisubmarine warfare capabili- her 'hS unecluaieci by the U. S. Navy, that could make su "le ?enterPiecc of a surface action group, or capable of PPortmg Soviet submarines in northern waters.
hy have the Soviets optimized the Slava, Udaloy, and
Sovremennyy for a single purpose? This answer is strongly suggested by the observation that, given the tremendous weight, space, and power requirements of advanced weapons and sensors, a ship designer would have found it almost impossible to fit a full set of equipment for a second warfare capability into any one of them without significantly increasing their size and cost. Even at their present size, the tremendous cost of these new ships suggests that—with the retirement of many smaller, less expensive combatants built in the late 1950s and early 1960s—the Soviet surface force will be smaller in numbers by the 1990s. There are no indications, at this time, that the Soviets intend to replace these older ships on a one-for-one basis.
The combined capabilities of these new ships suggest that by the end of the decade the Soviets should be able to form several battle groups with the capability of conducting long-range air, surface, and antisubmarine warfare. A new, large aircraft carrier would be the centerpiece of a carrier battle group, supported by ships of the Udaloy and Slava classes and capable of worldwide operations independent of shore-based air support. The Kirov-class cruisers could operate in support of the aircraft carrier or, more likely, could be the centerpiece of a surface action group. The Sovremennyy-class destroyers, with their surface-to- surface and surface-to-air missiles, and heavy main gun battery, could operate in support of a carrier or surface action group or, more likely, could support force projection ashore.
The A7ev-class carriers, with their multipurpose capabilities, are capable of serving as the centerpiece of carrier battle groups. In the final analysis, however, there is not sufficient evidence to say how the Soviets intend to use these new ships. We will have to analyze the Soviet Okean-85 and Okean-90 naval exercises to determine the indications of those intentions.
Another aspect of Soviet surface force developments during the next decade is that, unless there is remarkable change in current trends, the Soviet Navy will not have the large amphibious assault and logistic support capability that was envisioned a decade ago by Western intelligence analysts. The appearance of the large, 40,000-ton replenishment ship Berezina and the 14,000-ton Ivan Rogov- class amphibious assault ships sparked strong speculations of the development of these capabilities. However, large numbers of the ships will not become a reality in the near future. Certainly, the Soviets will be able to use merchant ships for logistic support and roll-on/roll-off merchant ships for amphibious operations if required. However, these alternatives would not suggest that the Soviets intend to conduct large-scale force projections, requiring assault and sustained naval operations off a foreign shore.
The existence of multiple Soviet battle groups in the next decade, with the capability of conducting operations worldwide for long periods, could permit the Soviets to threaten U. S. interests in the Third World. While the intent of the Soviets to engage in such confrontations and to project power into the Third World may not yet be their public policy, it is obvious that Admiral Gorshkov is providing the military capability for such ventures.
Their Space and Anti-Space Systems
By Norman Friedman
Any evaluation of the threat presented by the Soviet Union to U. S. naval and maritime forces depends on an estimate of the kinds of warfare in which we could be engaged in the future. The U. S. planning scenario is still primarily a Central Front war beginning with a Soviet surprise attack in Europe.
However, it seems more likely that in the future the United States would become embroiled in a conflict in the Third World. Admiral Gorshkov has justified Soviet naval expansion as required to protect Soviet proxy forces in the Third World. It appears that the covert Soviet ship construction effort, including one or more full-deck aircraft
carriers, is specifically to operate in Third World waters.
In this context, it is not difficult to imagine that U. S. forces could come into confrontation with the Soviets in a way clearly not leading to strategic escalation. Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union might find themselves embroiled in a limited naval confrontation or conflict in distant waters. In that case, the Soviet naval threat would take on a very different form than in a major NATO- Warsaw Pact conflict.
Satellites would be central to naval capability on both sides, and might logically become tactical targets. Space basing is uniquely associated with distant operations for both navies. Space denial would be a particularly efficient means of preventing either navy from operating effectively. Current Soviet interest in antisatellite weapons thus has an important naval dimension.
The possibility of a naval-oriented war in space is an interesting case of the interface between tactical and strategic issues. That is, in some important instances, U. S. strategic policy may require that tactical advantages are foregone. A current example of this is antisubmarine warfare. Advocates of arms control argue that it is important for strategic stability that tactical ASW be limited to reduce their threat to strategic missile submarines.
Satellites have three current naval functions. They are used for reliable long-range communications, largely replacing earlier high-frequency radio systems. They can also serve vast ocean areas reliably, basically independent of the atmospherics which plagued earlier types of radio. Moreover, at least in theory, communications satellites can be relocated (or replaced) to cover crisis areas. In the past, it was necessary either to build local facilities (connected ideally to home by land-line) or else to move them there on board ship. British success with satellite communications between London and naval forces off the Falk- lands is a case in point; it can be contrasted to the U. S. communications problems in presatellite days in Vietnam.
Reliable long-range communication is central to Soviet naval operations. The Soviet political system requires that Kremlin leaders be able to exert the fullest control over all deployed Soviet military forces. Note that totally centralized decision making requires that all information is available at headquarters. Thus, even as the Soviets move toward what may look like U. S.-style operations in the Third World, they will continue to make many of their key tactical decisions in Moscow, on the basis of information sent directly to Moscow.
The major naval use of satellites is navigation. Although various inertial systems and earth-based radio systems (e.g., Loran and Omega) promise accuracies within a few miles, only satellites can give worldwide accuracies within feet. For example, the extraordinary accuracy of the Trident II (D-5) missile will be attainable largely through the use of navigational satellites. On a tactical level, navigational accuracy, combined with secure, reliable communications, makes it possible for ships to rely on tactical data collected by external or “off- board” platforms, i.e., on data which can be collected without any requirement for them to radiate. Such systems could include satellite-borne sensors, ship- or land-based aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, etc.
As in the case of communications, there are earth- bound substitutes, but they are expensive, and—once they have been built—they are permanent. Only space-based navigation systems have the flexibility that characterizes navies; only they can react swiftly enough to a rapidly developing and unexpected crisis.
The most critical issue of all is reconnaissance. U. S.
and Soviet experiences with reconnaissance have been radically different. Current U. S. satellite reconnaissance systems are virtually all strategic in nature, intended either to measure slowly changing Soviet military capabilities or to warn of a Soviet nuclear attack. The U. S. Navy has relied on systems, such as the E-2 Hawkeye aircraft, integral to afloat forces, or on others, such as the SOSUS (sound surveillance system), fixed in location, and well adapted to central planning scenarios.
Only recently have satellite-based tactical reconnaissance systems become important to the United States. For example, proposals for an outer air battle missile, which would extend battle group defense beyond Soviet antiship missile range, generally require the construction of a new generation of radar warning satellites. Some satellites would be used to target antibomber missiles; there is even some hope that ultimately satellite-based sensors will be valuable for ASW.
The Soviets, with a very different concept of naval operations, have never operated forces with such integral scouting or targeting capacity. In the past, they have relied largely on off-board systems, such as the land-based nigh-frequency direction finder and the “Bear-D” reconnaissance and targeting aircraft based in the Soviet Union (> e., well located for their central planning scenario). For the Soviets, the development of satellite equivalents of heir active and passive intelligence systems was a prereq- u'site for that expansion into Third World waters that Admiral Gorshkov has promoted.
The Soviet ability to deny the United States such capabilities might be an important element of any overall Soviet Third World strategy. The Soviets appear to expect jMacks on their reconnaissance satellites. They tend to u'ld substantial numbers, and to maintain the ability to mplace casualties within a short time. This ability has een manifested in the past when they have swiftly minched satellites to cover such rapidly developing crises as the U. S. operations in the Indian Ocean from 1979 °nwards and during the Falklands War. Also, to some extent, a rapid relaunch capability is consistent with the united lifetime (and, probably, limited reliability) of the Soviet systems.
The United States has preferred to develop individually VerY expensive, long-life communications, navigation, ar|d reconnaissance systems, investing in the individual satellites rather than in the ability to replace them rapidly. This philosophy does not take into account the possibility of satellite failure because of an attack rather than to natural causes. Until recently, the U. S. Government tended to discuss the issue of satellite vulnerability in any limited war context. U. S. satellites are so intimately linked to strategic warning and command and control that many would argue that any attack on our satellite systems would be undertaken only as part of a massive strategic strike. Why else would the Soviets decide to blind us?
This asymmetry runs very deep: to the Soviets, satellite-based reconnaissance and communications systems are vital elements of their tactical warfare. They are not particularly important for strategic operations. With the development of the “Delta”-class submarine and her SS-N-8 missile and later naval strategic systems, the Soviets can locate the elements of their strategic attack forces within the areas that they control, and within very easy range of reliable communications. They have shown little interest in exotic surprise attack sensors in which we have invested heavily. The Soviets have often demonstrated that they do not believe in the surprise-attack scenario that fascinates American strategic planners and analysts.
We can, therefore, expect the Soviets to consider antisatellite operations an integral part of any distant-area naval strategy they develop over the next few decades. They will probably try to blind and muzzle us, without taking into account the extent to which such actions might be interpreted by Washington as an escalation of a limited conflict. We are belatedly developing our own ability to attack their satellites, but it seems unlikely to achieve the desired deterrent attack; after all, they have designed their systems to replace losses, and we have not. That is not to decry the value of our own antisatellite weapon, but rather to keep its limitations in mind.
We have two options. We can discipline ourselves not to rely too heavily on space-based assets, knowing that we may lose them early in a protracted nonstrategic war. Alternatively, we can make efforts to develop our own satellite replacement capability, apart from the shuttle. After all, the shuttle itself would seem to be a prime target in space warfare. The more we rely on satellites, without thinking through defensive measures for them, the more the inevitable Soviet naval thrust into space warfare threatens our operations.
Their Operations in the Third World
By Milan Vego
Age,’
°viet naval diplomacy in the Third World has been by j.n ^arge very successful. The presence of Soviet naval ces *n a crisis area in some cases has greatly compli- theW^ ^ nava* movements and limited the options to c West in resolving many crises. As the late-Admiral in varC* ^e8ener’ Federal German Navy, so aptly stated ls essay “Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear
Pr
’ published in Naval Review 1972:
“Where both parties are present and as long as either one side is avoiding a military clash, the relative strength of naval forces does not play the same role as in war, for there is no fighting. Any fighting ship capable of firing a first shot in a way that sets in motion the spiral of escalation is enough to prevent attack.’’
However, it should be stressed that while the Soviet Navy could complicate U. S. moves in certain sea and ocean areas, such as the Mediterranean, it cannot prevent the United States from acting if its own or Western vital interests are at stake. Nevertheless, by deploying naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, the Soviets have succeeded in becoming a participant in regional affairs. Also, by using naval forces in support of its clients, ship visits to selected ports, and naval transfers, Moscow’s prestige has been considerably enhanced. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet naval presence has not been a sufficient guarantee that a client will remain a client. The employment of Soviet naval forces so far has been useful only when the needs of a client coincide with those of Moscow, as Egypt’s example proved.
The Soviet Navy role in expanding the country’s influence and enhancing Moscow’s prestige among the less developed countries has included:
► Providing support to a Soviet client (or clients) against a Western client (Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973)
► Helping a client in confrontation with the United States or other Western powers (the Pueblo incident of 1968, the EC-121 incident of 1970, the Jordanian crisis of 1970, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait blockade of 1973)
► Supporting a client against a Western country which does not enjoy U. S. support or patronage (the West African patrol of 1970-1971)
► Demonstrating Moscow’s support for the domestic authority of a client state (port visits to Somalia in 1969, Sierra Leone in 1971, and Ethiopia in 1979)
► Providing support for a favored faction in a civil war (Angola in 1976)
► Protecting Soviet citizens against an established government (the Ghanaian incident of 1969)
► Providing protection of the country’s or client’s assets at sea (sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria and South Yemeni troops in 1972 and 1973, respectively; sealift/air- lift from the Soviet Union to Syria in 1972, and Angolan crisis deployment in 1975)
► Showing the flag in a crisis by deploying forces in certain sea/ocean areas
► Carrying out ship visits to selected ports in order to demonstrate both presence and a special relationship to respective littoral states
The costs of naval diplomacy in the Third World, as practiced by the Soviets so far, have been relatively small. The Soviets have generally estimated U. S. responses correctly. There are no instances where the coercive naval diplomacy practiced by the Soviets has suffered major setbacks. Since 1967, there has been an apparent increase in the sophistication in the use of naval forces for support of the country’s foreign policy objectives as the Soviets accumulated experience. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, concurrently with growing perceptions of U. S. and general West impotence, it became evident that the Soviets were seeking to increase their influence in the Third World. Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan are the more extreme examples. Moscow’s policy of force in the Third World was not based on bluff, but on a realistic assessment of its own forces’ capabilities and possible U. S. and Western responses. The Soviets currently possess limited force appropriate to the protection of their clients’ interests in the Third World. They have adopted a local war doctrine which seems to accept the possibility of conflict—even with the United States. More important, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to intervene in the Third World whenever the opportunity for expanding their influence seems to warrant the risk.
The Soviet Navy’s major capabilities for conducting sea denial tasks have steadily broadened to include sea control in the sea and ocean areas in close-to-home controlled waters. Moreover, since the mid-1970s, it has become increasingly apparent that the Soviets intend to create forces to project power in the most distant areas of the world’s oceans. Currently, the Soviet Navy possesses modest but growing power-projection capabilities.
The primary Soviet amphibious assault force presently comprises some 30 major amphibious ships and some 13,000 men in the naval infantry. This force is adequate for carrying out small-scale amphibious landing operations in the direct support of the Soviet ground forces in their respective Eurasian theaters of combat operations. However, as in other components of the power-projection forces, the Soviets obviously intend to increase their hitherto limited capabilities to conduct amphibious landing operations beyond the sea areas contiguous with the homeland’s shores. The new Ivan Rogov-class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and the 3,400-ton “Ropucha”- class tank landing ships (LSTs) are too large for employment in the Baltic or Black seas or even in the Sea of Japan. They are probably intended to provide a modest capability for possible intervention in Third World areas. Significantly, the /G'ev-class VTOL carriers can also be employed for support of amphibious assault against weak opposition, embarking some 25 Mi-8 “Hip” troop car- rier-gunship or Mi-24 “Hind” gunship helicopters.
The Soviet Navy’s power-projection forces are almost certain to be increased in the future. By the mid-1990s, the Soviets are expected to have in service one or two large nuclear-powered carriers, four Kievs, about five nuclear- propelled Kirovs, and numerous modem cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. In addition, about four or five Ivan Rogov-class LPDs as well as a large number of the LSTs could then be in service.
Moscow is expected to continue the extensive use of its well-proven naval diplomacy methods to expand its influence in the Third World. The Soviets obviously believe that potential benefits in carrying out a policy of force in the Third World outweigh the costs. The Mediterranean will remain, as it has been since 1964, the focus of Moscow’s attempts to effect the shift in the Third World balance to its favor.
The Caribbean and Central America are apparently heading toward increased turbulence in the 1980s. Moscow’s chief objective in that region is to divert U. S. attention and military resources, thus allowing the Soviets a freer hand in areas more vital to their global strategy, notably Western Europe and the Middle East/Southwest Asia.
Another possible and highly positive effect of the U. S. action on Grenada is that the Soviets might be more circumspect before making further attemps to strengthen and expand their military presence in the Caribbean and Central America. Perhaps rumors concerning possible deployment of Soviet missile-armed submarines close to the U. S. coast, using Cuba as a base in response to the Planned U. S.-NATO missile deployment in West Europe, wdl not materialize.
The present Soviet and Cuban efforts through Nicaraguan regime in support of El Salvadorian and Guatemalan Marxist-led rebels, the campaign aimed at destabilizing democratic governments in Costa Rica and Colombia, and the pro-U. S. regime in Honduras, all indicate that Moscow’s strategy has been carried out.
Until the fall of 1983, the Soviet-Cuban objectives in acquiring a foothold in the Eastern Caribbean had been very successful. However, a decisive and successful U. S. action in Grenada in October caused a serious setback for Moscow and Havana in spreading their influence. The U. S. rescue mission on Grenada not only prevented the Soviets from using that island as a base for their long- range maritime reconnaissance aircraft over the central Atlantic, but also from posing a potential threat to the U. S. and Western oil sea lines in wartime. As a result of the recent events on Grenada, there most likely will be a drastic lessening of the Soviet-Cuban threat to a number of East Caribbean nations, and also Surinam and Venezuela. However, any weakening of resolve on the part of the United States to defend its own security interests in that region, as well as those of its friends, will surely lead to renewed attempts by Moscow and Havana to spread socialism in the area.
Moscow’s aim currently is to use Cuba as a base to disrupt the shipping of troops and materiel from the U. S. Uulf Coast ports in case of a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact. It should be pointed out here, that more than half of all the supplies to be directed from the United Mates to Europe, in case of a general conflict, will be carried by ships using the Gulf ports. Moreover, the Vuban Navy appears to be acquiring a power-projection capability, as recent transfer of the Soviet “Koni”-class /'gate and “Polnocny”-class LSMs show, for possible 'ntervention in support of Havana’s proxies in the region.
But even if Cuba is to remain formally neutral in case of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the United States will be °reed to assign considerable naval and air strength to Monitor military activities on Cuba, and if necessary, take ^ecisive action there. Thus, in either case, fewer U. S. rces will be available for use in European waters or in e Western Pacific. The present threat to U. S.-Western Sea lines of communication may well be complemented by hew Soviet bases in the area, notably Nicaragua or possi- y Panama, unless the United States does not act deci- ‘ lvely t0 prevent such a situation from taking place. Moscow’s quest to obtain routine ocean access to naval air facilities in the Mediterranean apparently confines. Until now, the Soviets have not been able to find th CC'Uate replacement for facilities in Egypt. However, ere is little doubt that the Soviets are intent on obtaining
routine access to port and ship repair facilities elsewhere in the Mediterranean, notably in Yugoslavia and Albania.
In the Indian Ocean, the Soviets possess strong maritime positions in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and its northern and southern approaches because of routine access to naval bases and airfields in South Yemen and Ethiopia. They also enjoy access to Mozambique’s ports. Thus, the Soviets are well poised to interdict shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Mozambique Channel. The Soviet naval position in the Indian Ocean could well be improved
in the coming years if their proxies—South Yemen and Ethiopia, as well as Libya and Syria—succeed in undermining the security of their neighboring pro-Western countries, specifically Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Sudan. Because of their overwhelming presence in Afghanistan, the Soviets may decide to foment Baluchi nationalism under the Marxist auspices in the hope of creating a client state on the Arabian Sea. This would permit the Soviets to acquire a position overlooking the strategically important Strait of Hormuz and a new vantage point for exercising direct pressure against Pakistan and Iran.
Since the end of the Vietnam War and particularly after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Soviets have greatly improved their position in Southeast Asia for projection of their power there and for using coercive naval diplomacy. By establishing a client relationship with each of the communist-ruled Indochinese states, Moscow has created a capability useful in any regional conflict there, regardless of what was the original motivation for the involvement.
By deploying naval forces in the South China Sea, the Soviets have established a new balance of power in the area. In the 1980s, the Soviets might use their naval forces in support of the Vietnamese punitive invasion of Thailand, or Vietnam claims in the Spratley Islands dispute with China or the Philippines. Moscow might also choose to use naval strength to support a favored faction in case of civil war in the Philippines, more internal strife in Indonesia, or the outbreak of communalism in Malaya. The most catastrophic consequence for U. S. security in the Western Pacific and also for its allies there would be establishment of a communist-led or left-wing regime in the Philippines. If such a regime would be formed, then the Soviets could acquire yet another strategic position from which to threaten U. S., Chinese, and Japanese merchant shipping.
The Caribbean and Central America are heading toward increased turbulence in the 1980s. The chief Soviet objective in that region is to promote turmoil that will divert U. S. resources and allow the Soviets a freer hand in areas more vital to their global strategy. The present Soviet- Cuban efforts in destabilizing El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Colombia and the establishment of pro-Cuban regimes on Grenada and in Surinam all indicate that the Soviet strategy toward the region has been carried out. The Soviets’ aim is apparently to use Cuba as a base to disrupt shipping, threatening U. S. Gulf ports or use of the Panama Canal in case of a general war. Hence, a large Cuban naval buildup is under way. Moreover, the Cuban Navy appears to be acquiring a power-projection capability for intervention in support of Havana’s clients in the region. And the present Soviet threat to U. S. and Western shipping may be complemented by new Soviet bases, notably in Nicaragua.
The African continent appears especially susceptible to a set of low-level Soviet military activities, including the use of naval forces. The Soviets are expected to continue to support their clients there. The most likely use of the Soviet coercive naval diplomacy in the area would come in support of the Marxist regime of Angola and Mozambique against South Africa’s incursions or in support of the Marxist-led insurgencies in some of the pro-Western, littoral African states.
The Soviets correctly assume that the perception of military capabilities, when dealing with the problems of the Third World, is often more important than real power. They continue to set clear and simple Third World objectives and pursue them with vigor and persistence. The Soviets do not seem to be deterred after suffering a setback. In the coming decade, there will be more challenges to the West in the Third World.
‘Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Morskaya Moshch’ Gosudarstva (The Sea Power of the State) (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976).
2Ibid.
3A11 estimates on Soviet shipbuilding and order of battle are derived from Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983).
4AU figures pertaining to U. S. Navy ship construction are derived from the “FY84 Five Year Defense Plan” as submitted to Congress. In all cases, numbers used are ships completed.
’See John L. Byron, “Diesel Boats Forever,” Proceedings, December 1982, pp. 35-43.
6See Richard Pariseau, “How Silent the Silent Service?” Proceedings, July 1983, pp. 40-44.
Captain Brooks was graduated from Fordham University. He received his master’s degree from Fairleigh-Dickinson University. He entered the U. S. Navy in 1958. Captain Brooks is currently the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Atlantic Command.
Captain Kehoe is well known for his work in conducting comparative naval architecture studies of U. S. and foreign warship design practices, for which he received the American Society of Naval Engineers Gold Medal for 1981 and the Legion of Merit. Prior to his retirement from the Navy in 1982, he served in three destroyers and three aircraft carriers, including command of the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753).
Norman Friedman is a theoretical physicist and strategist at the Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York. His series of naval studies has included analysis of Soviet naval missile systems and tactics, Soviet naval responses to U. S. naval innovation, the utility of ballistic missile defense, and strategic conflict with the Soviet Union.