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Contents:
Joint Use: Not Cleared for Takeoff
October 1983 Issue
Back to Basics
Shipboard Training
The End of the Line
Needed: An Innovative Joint Naval Strategy
The Critical Link
Sink the Navy
Earl Hancock Ellis
In Other Words . . .
A Matter of Principle Training Junior Officers Remember Pearl Harbor The Naval Gun: Encore! Encore!
An Almost Ready Reserve
Training Sailormen
Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom
Education and Professionalism
Seakeeping
The Forces for Forcible Entry
The Bear Facts
Sealift
Off-the-Job Training for Shiphandlers
As I Recall . . . Learning Cryptanalysis
War, Morality, and the Military Professional
Where Does the Buck Stop?
“Joint Use: Not Cleared for Takeoff”
(See A. C. A. Jampoler, pp. 81-87, November
1983 Proceedings)
Captain Philip Erbsen, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Jampoler’s article was excellent. I believe a copy should be distributed to the Secretary of Defense, congressional staff members, and members of Congress (especially those who sit on the House Armed Services Committee).
However, he overlooked one important argument against joint civil-military use: sabotage or terrorist attacks.
The easy access to the hangars, parked naval aircraft, and repair shops would jeopardize the entire operation of the naval air station. Keep in mind what happened to the buildings that housed the U. S. and French troops in Beirut.
I know Moffett Field well, having flown with the Military Air Transport Service for many years. It would be a disaster to have hundreds of small private planes based there, making their regular and touch-and-go takeoffs and landings.
“October 1983 Issue”
(See A. L. Conrad, K. W. Brock, p. 14,
December 1983 Proceedings)
Robert A. Desrosiers—I would like to thank you for your outstanding articles in the October issue. I’m looking at opportunities for education throughout the U. S. armed services, and, after reading your articles, I have decided to enlist in the Navy. I hope one day to become an officer and make a career out of serving my country.
“Back to Basics”
(See G. E. Rector, p. 73, November 1983
Proceedings)
Captain Daniel G. Martinez, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve—Captain Rector’s essay is a masterpiece of evidence in favor of Admiral H. G. Rickover’s argument that many essays are useless.
A pattern has emerged to identify the sort of literature that has no place in journals: the use of token quotations of military or literary historic principals (von Clausewitz is a favorite), historical inaccuracy, trite value judgments, and overstatement of an ideal.
Rector’s essay lacks clarity. He implies that the Marine Corps is of unique importance on the basis that certain basic characteristics are necessary if a nation is to be great and is to remain great, but he never states what the “basic characteristics” are. Then he avers that “ ... [America has] lost sight of some of the things that helped make this country what it is today.” But we never learn what those “things” are, or what Captain Rector’s qualifications are to make such a judgment.
Rector’s paragraph about the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir shows a disregard for historical accuracy. The “yawning chasm” in the Finchilin Pass which Rector referred to was 16 feet wide. (The photograph printed with Rector’s essay was cropped to give the appearance of a “yawning chasm.”) The X Corps, which retreated from the Chosin, was made up of more than marines. And were it not for Navy, Air Force, and Marine air power, there would have been no retreat; the X Corps would have been annihilated. Also, Marine engineers didn’t air-drop anything, but U. S. Air Force C-119s delivered bridge sections to Finchilin Pass.
Rector also made some trite value judgments. For example, his statement that the Marine Corps provides the world’s finest military training is absurd because there is no consensus, even among marines, on what is the finest training. Rector’s implied proposition, “if it’s Marine, it’s the best,” is an un- falsifiable doctrine and therefore useless, except as an expression of faith. Rector also defines professionalism as “standing ready to meet our country’s needs at any time, and doing so coolly and capably.” Weaning recruits on a diet of apocryphal Marine Corps lore is no way to prepare them to enter our ranks.
Finally, Rector makes a blatant overstatement of an ideal: that every marine is the quintessential citizen and warrior, and that the Marine Corps incorporates the highest virtues to which humanity can aspire.
The Marine Corps is a pillar of U. S. military might and a great symbol of military virtue. The bravery of some marines in combat is so obvious that exaggeration
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of their deeds is not necessary, nor is it sound to conclude that all Marines in all battles are heroic. An appreciation of Marine Corps history tends to fill one with awe, while a casual familiarity with the history is usually expressed in clumsy flourishes.
“Shipboard Training: The
Team’s the Thing”
(See D. S. Appleton, pp. 107-113, October
1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Jeffrey R. Sander, U. S. Navy—Where has Captain Appleton been hiding? Or, rather, why hasn’t anyone been listening all these years? My shipboard experience is not extensive, but I say amen to his Commander Cavendish and crew. I would gladly volunteer to test his team training ideas with real teams, missions, and ships.
As an ensign in charge of Repair Five (propulsion repair party) on a Knox-class frigate, I was crying for some direction. There was no system for training my repair party (or team). No one offered any help. I had a pretty good idea of what our missions were—my chief machinist’s mate repair locker leader and 1 had to post assignments for each of the various evolutions our repair locker would be called on to perform. It was then possible to match qualifications to assignments or to determine who needed training in what skills. But we did not find the secret for motivating 20 individuals to leam the various skills required by their assigned positions and the positions of their teammates. We did not know how to integrate individual skill training into team training. What hurt me the most was that no one in the chain of command seemed to care whether we were a team or not.
When I asked my superiors what I was supposed to do during general quarters drills—a fairly infrequent event, fortunately, since it was such a frustrating
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experience—I was told “training.” When I asked “how,” I was told, personnel qualification standards (PQS). The exchange would continue until I would be told, “Well, just do something, I’m sure you’ll figure it out—and make sure no one is sleeping in case the XO walks through!”
In hindsight, I can think of many ways to mold a team. But, would I have been given the time—my own and all the team members’? Was it important to my department head and captain? Apparently not, since no one seemed to make an issue of the state of my team’s readiness and training. Was I held responsible? No. Was anyone responsible? Not that I could tell.
On another ship, while undergoing refresher training, I pleaded with Fleet Training Group personnel for some extra “team training” for my inport emergency teams. They had assets available, and we had the time; they refused. They didn’t have any more idea how to team train than I did, much less help develop a long-term system for continued team training.
Current shipboard training is mostly hot air; check off the boxes, punch the tickets, pass refresher testing, and report training complete. I’ve passed major inspections, passed refresher “training,” and won the battle “E.” But I can’t say I’ve served on ships ready for battle.
As Commander Caustic Kostik points out, who needs one more paperwork nightmare in the name of training and battle readiness? But wouldn’t a system like the one presented by Commander Cavendish enable us to do our mission better? It would give each crew member an idea of how his small effort fits in the big picture. Today, no one knows or cares much about what anyone else is doing. We may “team train,” but does everyone on the team know what the training is supposed to accomplish? Would the team still function if one or more members disappeared?
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The introduction of planned maintenance system (PMS) was before my time, but I’ve met no one who was there who can’t tell about nay-sayers. Not that PMS isn’t without many problems, but it is a relatively simple method of managing an otherwise unmanageable, complex problem.
From the pier, PQS looks like a good program; from the other side of the quarterdeck, it is one of the ultimate experiences in micro-management yet invented. PQS is oriented to individual progress, not team development. It requires careful paper management, not deckplate leadership. Keeping track of how many points Seaman Jones got signed off this week obscures the question of whether he learned anything that will help contribute to his own or his shipmates’ survival. It’s time we admitted that PQS in its current form is bankrupt.
Using broad team training goals and criteria presents a more manageable and efficient way to reach the same end—a combat-ready ship prepared for sustained operations at sea. And, despite Commander Kostik’s fear of having to invent the wheel, many necessary training goals and criteria already exist, in the forms of Fleet Training Group check sheets and fleet exercise publication exercise descriptions. Without doubt, some simplification and distilling are needed in the development of criteria cards available for all hands to read. But don’t these standards have to be studied already in order to leam and teach our missions? The team and displayed goal-oriented approach depend on teamwork, leadership, and pride in ownership.
“The End of the Line”
(See E. M. Smith, pp. 104-105, April 1983 Proceedings)
Commander Francis X. Steele, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The reviewer of Robert
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Pisor’s book notes that, “To American TV audiences who watched at home, it threatened to become an awful rerun of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the catastrophic siege that drove French forces from Vietnam.” It threatened to become a rerun of Dien Bien Phu only because of the press. The military situation and the results were different. But the public was dragged through a wringer and even now the man in the street couldn’t tell you who won at Khe Sanh. How is he supposed to decide for himself?
At Khe Sanh, the North Vietnamese lost an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 troops killed, against 205 U. S. Marines, plus some U. S. Army casualties. After these losses and some spectacular press coverage, the North Vietnamese withdrew. So it’s not too difficult to figure out who won.
Press “objectivity” in Vietnam was laughable. If a journalist reported anything positive, he risked being accused of “selling out.” Excuses were found not to report a victory for our side. A reporter could say he didn’t believe the casualty figures. He could say, “Maybe it was a strategic victory for the North Vietnamese.” Or, as was reported when the North Vietnamese withdrew at Khe Sanh, “The withdrawal might have been a goodwill gesture.”
“Needed: An Innovative Joint Naval Strategy”
(See J. F. O'Connell, pp. 107-109, August 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Leo Choptovy, U. S. Army—I agree with Captain O’Connell’s statements about the Soviet submarine threat. If the United States and its allies are to win a naval war against the Soviet Union, they must be willing and able to strike against the heart of Soviet maritime power—the Soviet Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet bases. Attempting to kill each Soviet submarine as she transits south into the Atlantic Ocean is attrition warfare at its best, a fine complementary method for the destruction or damaging of individual submarines. The situation in the Pacific is much the same. Defensive barriers, however, don’t win wars; offensive action does.
I also agree that the job must be shared with the Air Force to be successful and affordable. But, instead of using our B-52 and B-1B bombers just for attacking surface shipping and using our nuclear- powered attack submarines (SSNs) to attack Soviet Naval Air Force (SNAF) bases with cruise missiles, the roles should be reversed. While bombers should be used to attack shipping, SSNs should not attack land targets. The missiles must replace antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons on a one-for-one basis. Firing any weapon will alert Soviet ASW forces.
Using scarce, valuable SSNs to attack land targets is not effective. Using bombers is. B-52 (and later B-1B) bombers have the capability to carry 20 cruise missiles each. These aircraft are in our inventory, or soon will be, as part of our nuclear deterrent. In a conventional war, these aircraft should be available without lessening our nuclear deterrent since our missile silos and ballistic missile submarines will be on full alert. Also, only a portion of these aircraft need be used conventionally.
We do not have any long-range, conventionally armed, air-launched missiles in our inventory, but the technology to produce them exists. These missiles should not be duplicates of our nuclear cruise missiles except for different warheads. This would complicate disarmament talks needlessly. The missiles need only fit the same weapon racks and use the carriers’ existing electronics.
The new cruise missile should; have a range of 750-1,000 nautical miles, employ stealth technology, explore alternative guidance systems, and accept several alternative warheads, including large high-explosive warheads, antimaterial and runway-cratering submunitions, and naval mines. It should also be inexpensive enough to procure several thousand copies.
These new missiles would be used to attack SNAF bases, command, control, communications, and intelligence assets, fixed surface-to-air missile sites, and early warning systems. The naval mine version would be used to block ports and canals. The carrier aircraft could be escorted by Air Force AWACS (airborne warning and control system), EF-111A, and F-15 aircraft with tanker support. Employing carrier aircraft by squadrons would saturate Soviet defenses.
These attacks would be carried out round-the-clock while our carrier battle groups (CVBG) transited into attack positions. Ships from our CVBGs would be safe from coordinated Soviet air, land, and sea attacks. Attacking naval aviation, supported by U. S. and Allied tactical strike squadrons, would find weakened, disrupted Soviet air defenses. Their targets would be ships and submarines trapped in harbor, SNAF aircraft, naval support facilities, and command posts, as well as transportation, industry, and shipbuilding. Marine Corps units, Navy Seals, or Army Special Forces troops might be inserted for overt and covert operations.
This threat to the northern and eastern flanks of “Mother Russia” would force the Soviets to reinforce these areas at the expense of the Western European Central Front. Combine this threat with similar threats to its Baltic and Black Sea coast, and the Soviet Union may decide not to attack at all.
(Continued on page 81.)
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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 28.)
but
none of these is the lawyers’ goal.
The “strategic” aim is to represent the client in the best way possible within the °unds of legal ethics. The lawyer who Performs his tactics elegantly, but uses he wrong tactics, will be unsuccessful. “e will also most likely be sued for malpractice. Thus, the choice of tactics based °n an overriding strategy appears to be a Prerequisite for professional competence.
Second, this sense of professional pur- P°se, based on strategic thinking, is a marvelous leadership tool. The junior Leer who has some concept of strategic 8°als can think in broad terms, rather an just worrying about passing the next engineering inspection, reviewing leave
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“The Critical Link: Junior Officers and Strategic Thought”
T. C. Pierce, pp. 132-133, September 1983; J. F. Giblin, p. 90, December 1983 Proceedings)
lieutenant David B. Mather, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy—Bravo Zulu to Lieutenant Pierce. He does a good job °f developing the idea that an earlier emphasis on strategic concerns would enhance the “intellectual framework” needed at later career stages. He also recognizes the need to consider tactics as subservient to strategy. I would like to raise two additional points..
. First, true professionals in any specialized field have some overriding “strate- 81C ’ purpose to their efforts. Lawyers employ various tactics, such as plea bargaining, appeals, and legal maneuvering,
and managing his division. When can fit these managerial tasks into S('me matrix relating the tasks to an overstrategic purpose, the junior officer (or senior officer) acquires a greater appreci- *°n of the job’s importance. This sense importance, and resulting professional Pnde, will almost automatically be Passed on to one’s subordinates, making e m the division more rewarding. Mo- ae "'ill improve.
It makes little sense to delay strategic c mking until a military officer’s mid- (^eer training. Would it make sense to (je a y°ung doctor just beginning resi- cy training not to worry about healing
Wh'ents’ ^Ust *earn ,0 reac* x_rays weH?
Pr f ’ then’ should we tell young Navy 0 cssionals, charged with employing
tactics which can result in massive national and international consequences, not to worry about strategy? Granted, the junior officer is not involved in strategic planning. However, the junior officer’s involvement in strategic understanding could go a long way toward reducing tactical errors and increasing professional pride.
“Sink the Navy”
(See C. C. Pease, pp. 32-36, September 1983
Proceedings)
Roger Smith, Mechanical Engineer, U. S. Army Tank-Automotive Command—Captain Pease displays advanced thinking. However, he has neglected several potentially important areas for submarine development. It may seem odd for a designer of Army vehicles to lecture a naval officer on submarines, but we have
Super
thin
Kapton
overlapping commitments in the area of amphibious warfare.
The potential of launching armored assaults from submarines should not be ignored. Submarines are also more efficient in delivering supporting fire for such an assault than surface ships are. They have the advantage of providing surprise, rather than trying to obliterate the target. These concepts reflect lessons learned on land during both World Wars 1 and II on the efficient use of assaulting forces and materiel.
These vehicles are feasible. We proposed a tracked landing craft to the Marine Corps a few years ago that could have served as a transition vehicle. Submerged control of later generations of tanks and carriers presents problems, but these should be solvable.
If Captain Pease is successful in getting his ideas accepted, I hope he won’t neglect the contribution we can give.
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“Earl Hancock Ellis: The Man
and His Mission”
(See D. A. Ballendorf, pp. 53-60, November
1983 Proceedings)
Commander James W. Philbrick, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Naval Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, Norfolk, Virginia—Dr. Ballendorf reports a remarkable vignette of Marine Corps history through Lieutenant Colonel Pete Ellis, who is said to have prophesied the World War II Pacific Campaign as early as 1921. Ellis’s death from alcoholism is shown to be inevitable; his last days are described in detail as his secondary diagnoses of nephritis, neuropathy, and Korsakoff syndrome ran their courses, killing this remarkable officer. As reported by Dr. Ballendorf, “His inability to conquer his alcoholism was pathetic, but he doggedly moved ahead in the face of what he must have known to be impending personal doom.” Such was the state of the art of alcohol rehabilitation in the 1920s.
Ellis suffered at the ill-informed hands of the military and society, each of which then considered alcoholism to be a lack of willpower or a moral blight. To lose a
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man of Ellis’s perception and intelligence would be considered criminal today in view of present-day alcohol rehabilitation standards. Alcoholism is a disease marked by its chronicity, progression, fatal aspect, and delusionary nature, such that the alcoholic cannot see the true nature of his illness. The close-knit band of fellow officers who knew of Ellis’s “drinking problem” would presumably today recognize his rampant late-stage alcoholism and place him in treatment with several thousand other officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps team who each year are returned to duty as recovering, abstinent alcoholics, capable of continuing productive service.
Too bad Pete Ellis wasn’t afforded the opportunity to recover from his disease and watch the progress of the island-hopping campaign which he had the prescience to report. If he could have just stuck it out until 1935 when Alcoholics Anonymous came on the scene.
“In Other Words . .
(See M. R. Lend, pp. 147-148, October 1983
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John D. Sullivan, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Lenci’s assessment of the state of the education of naval officers in other languages and cultures is right on the mark. I recently completed a tour of duty on the staff of Commander, U. S. Forces, Japan. Of the nine naval officers assigned to this joint headquarters not one had received language training prior to his assignment. Since the staff mission includes bilateral defense planning and other interface with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and various government agencies, this is appalling. By comparison, both the Air Force and the Army provide extensive language training to officers filling similar key billets requiring interface with the host government.
In addition to the numerous excellent reasons the author cites for developing our officers’ language abilities, there is an equally critical justification. If we cannot speak the language of the nation with which we are dealing, we become dependent on that nation’s interpreters. Whether we are dealing with potential adversaries or with allies, this places us at a disadvantage, especially in negotiations. No matter how fluent the English of our counterparts may be, without an understanding of their language, we have no way of knowing whether subtle meanings are properly expressed, or even if basic ideas have been correctly conveyed. No matter how honest and conscientious the interpreter, we are still allowing an outsider or even a competitor to represent our position. This is a problem in peacetime; it can be a disaster in war.
While I agree with Commander Lenci’s solutions—especially the required language proficiency for all Naval Academy midshipmen—the goal of language training for all overseas personnel is a bit unrealistic. I cannot imagine sending the 6,000 sailors assigned to the USS Midway (CV-41) and DesRon-15 ships to study Japanese for a year at the Defense Language Institute. It’s tough enough to get “A” School graduates. But, it is essential to fill the key positions on those overseas staffs and units with language- qualified personnel. We also need to develop pools of linguists who can be drawn upon to supplement capabilities in a contingency. First, program enough officers through language training to fill all of the billets already identified as requiring language ability. Second, reevaluate all billets on overseas staffs and units to determine additional billets for language-trained officers, and begin programming officers. Priority should be given to billets in Japan and key NATO countries. This billet review is essential. The language requirement for billets has often been dropped by commands in order to solve short-term manning problems. Third, implement the kind of “short course” basic language training that Commander Lenci proposes. Most officers and key senior enlisted should receive this training prior to reporting to their overseas billets. Fourth, expand and increase emphasis on the excellent intercultural relations programs and on free or low-cost voluntary language courses at overseas bases.
Finally, those personnel assigned to billets requiring routine interface with host-country counterparts should be required to live off-base; others should be encouraged to do so. Living off-base may be less convenient, requiring some adjustment in life-style, but to understand a culture one must understand how the people live, work, play, and think, as well as learn the language. The Navy needs this capability.
“A Matter of Principle”
(See R. L. Earl, pp. 29-36, February 1983;
J. W. Harrell, pp. 24-25, August 1983; D. R. Mets, pp. 94-95, September 1983, R. Lenahan, pp. 91-94, November 1983 Proceedings)
Sergeant Major K. R. White, U. S. Army (Retired)—Colonel Lenahan has penned an apologia for an operation that needs no apology. Nor does that operation need any near-repetitions.
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I am forced to agree with Major Earl. A “well-trained, cohesive, and spirited military unit ...” would have been far better than an agglomeration.
I believe Major Earl has been misunderstood. He stated that there should have been a single-mission commander for the entire operation. The mission was essen- bally a ground mission; transportation Was a support function. The mission commander should have been selected on operational grounds, not on bulk of assets or communications-capability criteria.
Colonel Lenahan agrees with the single-commander concept, says this was Ihe case, and proceeds to list several sub-commanders who were appointed to formalize working arrangements.” This does not agree with Major Earl’s concept—a competent, trained unit with one mar>, at the right place, in charge.
Colonel Lenahan lists an impressive array of plan reviewers, which appears to corroborate Major Earl’s premise. Such a bst also smacks of a well-managed, efficient operational proposal. Operations Plans are usually approved by commanders and attested to by the battalion and division operations officers. As has been sa,d many times in these pages, manage- merit is not command, and efficient and effective are not the same thing.
Also, apparently, aircraft and crew changes, excessive time on station, and allied problems were taken in stride. This indicates a desire to do something, not necessarily to go in and accomplish a dif- 'cult mission with minimum loss of life, here are times when “yes, sir” must not e an automatic response.
Finally, I learned two truths early in my 30 years of service. If you are about to be captured, or if you must abandon equipment for any reason, thoroughly estroy everything. Leave nothing of value to the enemy. Take or destroy everything that is classified. If you want extract under difficult circumstances 'V'ih six birds, the planning figure must e double that at the start. Begin with 12.
Was Desert One feasible with an eight-bird start? Do sophisticated equipment and complex operations necessitate
rnilita,
quire principies?
Gaining Junior Officers”
S** VI Alexander, S. A. Sprayberry, [ -100, October 1983; J. P. Adams, pp. 21 cember 1983 Proceedings)
Li,
bat System, Engineering Development Site—I have never written Proceedings before, but as a junior officer, I couldn’t let you get away with this article. Although I am sure Lieutenants Alexander’s and Sprayberry’s intent was honorable, their biographies give them away as unqualified to comment on the trials and tribulations of a seagoing junior officer.
Their belief of how a junior officer on the average will divide his or her time within the command is infuriating. This gross oversimplification or the hint that any two days are alike for a division officer is naive. What study did this come from? Since all of the pictures are of surface line, one would have to assume that this article is applicable to surface warfare officers. If we are talking about a junior officer in port, what happened to the quarterdeck watches, inport exercises, myriad inspections, and training lectures which would also occupy major portions of his or her time? At sea, all this and at least one in four watches can transform any junior officer into a “crisis manager.”
I support the idea of better communication between commanding and junior officers, but to imply that the junior officer training problem can be solved by an “I” division setup with the commanding officer is inadequate. Junior officer train
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ing is a daily process requiring the support of the entire chain of command from the work center to the commanding officer. The authors underestimated the involvement of the executive officer, department heads, fellow division officers, and the chief petty officer mess in the training process. One problem commanding officers face in motivating junior officers is how to motivate overworked division officers to take undermanned divisions and meet too many commitments, with too few assets, and too little time to prepare. They rely on junior officers to take tremendous amounts of responsibility in a short period of time. If this responsibility is not combined with daily counseling and support from the chain of command, then it can be damaging to the junior officer.
The authors have identified an extremely complex problem. A better solution might be arrived at if we stop writing questionnaires and start talking to junior officers.
Lieutenant Commander Michael E. Duffy, U. S. Navy, prospective executive officer of the USS Robert E. Peary (FF-1073)—Lieutenants Alexander’s and Sprayberry’s focus fails to reflect the most important challenge facing an unrestricted line officer when he or she arrives at the first command—to qualify professionally in the ship, submarine, or aircraft. This is what will make or break the junior officer. It is unfortunate that the authors have used the title “Training Junior Officers” but have failed to offer any real recommendations or observations on the goal of officer training—to become professionally proficient in their warfare specialty.
The authors also place too much onus on the commanding officer to personally take the hand of the new ensign or lieutenant (junior grade). What about the officers between the commanding officer and the nuggets? The department heads should take the initiative and interest to guide the younger officer.
The authors should rethink their approach to junior officer training if they want to attract the attention of an audience which may be in a position to improve it.
“Remember Pearl Harbor”
(See J. E. Costello, pp. 52-62, September 1983;
J. K. Taussig, p. 150, November 1983; R. D.
Haslach, pp. 17-21, December 1983
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Taussig’s cogent comments reminded me that we both have a deep personal interest in the truth about Pearl Harbor. In Joe’s case, disabling wounds robbed him of carrying on into the third generation the illustrious family tradition of flag rank. In my case, President Franklin Roosevelt’s personal plot to put my little schooner in harm’s way ultimately resulted in providing an escape platform from Corregidor, capture, and likely death. One down, one up in Roosevelt’s score, both unpremeditated. Or were they?
While researching Cruise of the Lanikai, Incitement to War (Robert E. Krieger, 1982), I corresponded with Professor Prange. He was a meticulous researcher, but one who looked so carefully backward to ensure his accuracy that important new developments either were not cranked into the picture at all, or were set aside awaiting total confirmation. This brought his point of solid conclusion to be engraved in stone at about the era of tail fins on motor cars. Abundant new clues in the form of wide disclosures from Japanese intercepts were not used at all. Unfortunately, Prange started failing physically at about the time much of this material became available. With his painstaking research habits and one more lifetime, he would have come up with a far better book than did Goldstein and Dillon. But, let us give them due credit that they saved from oblivion what had
been checked and double checked.
As for Joe Taussig’s wonder about General Douglas MacArthur’s air force getting clobbered on the ground at Clark Field after nine hours’ warning, the story is not all that obscure. It was important in writing Cruise of the Lanikai; I dug into the subject as far as printed sources and personal interviews made possible. I found that MacArthur earlier had made clear to his opposite Navy number, Admiral “Tommy” Hart, Commander-inChief Asiatic Fleet, that he understood little about radar, and that he had great confidence in his early warning net of ground observers. Hart, occasionally managing to get in a few words, prophetically observed that cloudy weather or sabotaged telephone lines would blind him. Possibly germane, MacArthur also volunteered that the 90 to 100 Filipino pilots were superior to his own, adding a corroboration of the general Army and Navy view that the Army Air Corps was an insubordinate outfit.
The following paragraphs are quoted from Cruise of the Lanikai:
“At about 5 A. M., General Brereton [Commander Far East Army Air Force] tried to see General MacArthur to get his permission to bomb Formosa as soon as the planes could be readied. He managed to penetrate only as far as the Chief of Staff, [Brigadier General] Sutherland, who told him to prepare for the attack, but to await MacArthur’s approval before heading north.
“ ... A small, early morning enemy raid over north Luzon had alerted U. S. fields and all planes took off, the bombers without bombs, in observance of [Chief of Army Air Corps, Major General] Arnold’s injunction not to be caught napping on the ground. [Arnold had telephoned Brereton immediately after Pearl]. By 11:30 A. M., the ‘all clear’ having been sounded, the bombers landed in order to arm for the raid on Formosa tentatively scheduled for late afternoon, so that withdrawal could be made under cover of darkness.
“Antiaircraft and plane crews were enjoying a routine lunch, when shortly after noon, completely without any local warning, high explosives came shrieking down from 108 twin- engined bombers, escorted by 84 Zero fighters. At Clark Field, all but one of the B-17’s were lined up on the runways. The fighters were just readying for takeoff. At Iba Field, American fighters, low on gas, were circling to land.
“For two hours the Japanese bombed and strafed. Obsolete 3-inch guns shooting ammunition made as far back as 1932, lobbed shells thousands of feet short. Many of the fuses were duds. ...”
The answers are simple: lack of radar, the use of which a whole year earlier had been instrumental in winning the Battle of Britain; MacArthur’s fatal indecision; obsolete ground defenses; and inferior aircraft with inexperienced pilots.
There has been a lot of hand-wringing over a loss that didn’t make much difference in the war’s progress. The small force of bombers, some 35, plus a few dozen second-class fighters, would not have lasted long on their wretchedly defended fields against the overwhelming air forces the Japanese had available. Furthermore, a roughly equivalent number of U. S. heavy bombers in the South Pacific and at Midway failed to hit a single moving target. It was too little too late, or not at all. The good stuff, such as there was of it, had gone to Europe.
“The Naval Gun: Encore! Encore!”
{See M. L. Mosbrooker, J. A. Murray, pp.
105-109, July 1983; F. J. McGrath, p. 16,
November 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Hill, U. S. Coast Guard, Executive Officer, USCG Duane (WHEC-33)—If we are serious about shore bombardment, there must be an alternative to the hard choice between denuding the antiair warfare (AAW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) screens and getting the shore bombardment job done.
Construction of a class of Coast Guard cutters which are optimized for a package of missions in the inshore-narrow seas environment could provide this alternative—ships that are not too valuable for other missions to risk doing shore bombardment, unlike the DDG-51. This package of missions could include shore bombardment, shallow water ASW, and interdiction and protection of coastal traffic. All of these, with the exception of shore bombardment, are now considered Coast Guard wartime missions. In addition to the 155-mm. vertical-loading gun, these missions require that the ship’s weapon systems be selected to counter the most common inshore adversaries— missile boats and diesel submarines.
The German-designed “Meko 200”- class frigates being built for Turkey illustrate the type proposed. This class is to be equipped with the five-inch Mk-45 gun, a Phalanx, Sea Sparrow, two quad Harpoon launchers, a fixed helicopter hanger, two triple Mk-32 torpedo tubes, the AN/SPS-49 radar, short-range rapid blooming chaff decoy launchers, and the Dutch equivalent of an Mk-92 fire control system including a separate target illumination radar. Using four diesels for propulsion, they will have a maximum speed °f 27 to 28 knots, all on a full-load displacement of 2,400 tons.
The 155-mm. vertical-loading gun, which weighs essentially the same as the Mk-45, would be substituted for the five-inch gun. In addition, a gun system such as Goalkeeper or an upgunned Phalanx capable of firing the 30-mm. GAU-8 round mounted fore and aft would be preferred to the Sea Sparrow and Phalanx 20-mm. systems of the “Meko” design because it could also be used against small vessels and targets ashore. A reduction of the number and type of systems would also simplify training and Maintenance.
While this design may not be ideal for the Navy’s usual operations, the class exceeds minimum Coast Guard requirements. They are larger and considerably tuore complex than the 270-foot Bear class being built now. As such, construction by the Coast Guard would seriously compromise other budget priorities. A Workable solution would be for the Navy to fund construction of the vessels and for the Coast Guard to bear the higher operating costs. This is not without precedent. In 1982, the Navy budget included $300 ffllion for updating the weapon systems °f Coast Guard cutters. This amount was ^mall for the Navy budget, but almost naif of the Coast Guard acquisition and c°nstruction budget for the year.
This partnership could result in procurement of adequate numbers of gun systems on relatively inexpensive platoons and an improvement in the Coast Guard’s capabilities both in peacetime and in war.
Training Sailormen: Why Isn’t It Working?”
(See W. Scanland, pp. 54-57, October 1983 Proceedings)
hief Data Processing Technician W. C. j e,Te/, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)— J1 this former Navy instructor’s view, aPtain Scanland scored a bull’s-eye "nih his article. There is no comprehen- l'Vc training plan for any section of the • S. Navy.
to Staining the hardware and then trying 0 train the fleet to use it correctly is driv- 8 the maintenance costs out of sight. In ese days of tight budgets, there is a §reat misdirection of funds in the acquisi- n dollar versus the training dollar as
directed by Congress. Our legislators have been lock-stepped into believing that the end product that counts is finished hardware in the inventory. Neither the Department of Defense nor the individual services have tried very hard to convince Congress that training is a necessary part of the acquisition cost.
The problems of training sailorpersons would fill large volumes. A few suggestions regarding target areas for improvement follow:
► Too few detailers realize that many Navy courses have well-defined prerequisites which the prospective trainees must meet,-or they will not have a chance of passing the course. The prerequisites have been determined by course instructors and advisors based on technical skills required to accomplish the task.
► Education and information officers in the fleet hardly have time to do their command-required reading, much less read the course-offering descriptions. They have no idea of what the trainee will need in the way of preknowledge. Their job is usually a collateral duty, which means it is a low priority in the “jobs to be done” list. This does not mean that the education and information officer is shirking his duty, but that priorities need to be redefined.
► Sailorpersons are their own worst
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enemy when it comes to training. They apply for quotas to avoid a part of their deployment or work-ups. They may be division slackers and think school is a soft, nonduty assignment. They are easy to spot—they are the ones with the special request chits always in the signature loop.
The end result is that the sailorperson who has all of the qualifications and the desire often misses out on the training. This also means that the command will lose out in the end by not having the qualified person there to repair the equipment when it goes down.
There is no easy approach to meeting Captain Scanland’s objective of an enlisted professional career development program, but it is worth the time and effort to develop a pilot course and evaluate the results. The basic data base is available. Something must be done, or we are going to lose more second- and third- hitch sailorpersons to civilian industry than the service can afford.
“Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom”
(See A. C. A. Jampoler, pp. 22-28, July 1983 Proceedings)
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General Giulio Macri’, Army of Italy (Retired), former lecturer, U. S. Com-
The F/A-18 may be called upon to serve many roles, including service with the Naval Reserve. But until there is an F/A-18R, the Naval Reserve’s RF-8G Crusader is the only totally viable tactical reconnaissance aircraft in the U. S. Navy.
mand and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—Captain Jampoler was right on the mark when he said, “We are better served by a restored, vigorous Europe than by enfeebled allies.” His article is of interest in light of the fact that it seems that the Reagan Administration is considering a shift from the current “first in Europe” to a “first in the Pacific” strategy.
My concern extends to World War II when I fought alongside U. S. forces for the liberation of Europe and also, after the war, when I served in the NATO organization in Naples. For ten years, I was in charge of Italian relations with the NATO allies, and in particular with the United States. I appreciate the indispensable role of our alliance with the United States and the unique role of U. S. armed forces and of U. S. influence in keeping peace and stability in the Middle East and throughout the Mediterranean.
Those who argue for the shift in policy, such as former U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, are the same people who initiated unilateral detente, under another administration, on behalf of the Warsaw Pact. From this unilateral detente emerged and developed the “peace movements,” neutralism, and unilateral disarmament that are now ravaging Europe. It is almost unnecessary to add that these movements act on behalf of the Soviet Union, which, on one hand, supports the peace movement, and, on the other, betrays all signed agreements in pursuing a unilateral arms race. A change in U. S. strategy away from Europe cannot be but to the advantage of the Soviets. It is because the European front is weak that the Soviets are “chafing at the bit.”
The Western line runs south for thousands of kilometers from Cape Nord in Norway to as far as Eastern Turkey and —as Captain Jampoler points out—lacks the necessary depth which would permit serious defense. The Soviets manifest a superiority there of at least three to one.
The critical question for U. S. and European security is: “How do we correct this imbalance?” President Ronald Reagan provided the key to the solution in his 23 March announcement of a U. S. commitment to develop defensive systems against nuclear attack based on lasers and particle beams. This same technology can
f
be deployed in Europe not only against Soviet SS-20 missiles, but also against attacking the Warsaw Pact armies. Land- based laser weapons can repel Warsaw Pact aircraft and defend against tactical nuclear and conventional missiles, and even against artillery shells. Space-based lasers can clear the airspace over Europe of attacking high-altitude Soviet bombers. If the West leads the Warsaw Pact in such technology, we can deploy it to gain immediate air superiority in any conflict and deploy our aircraft, defended by lasers, against attacking Warsaw Pact tank columns.
As we have unfortunately seen in recent years with the “nuclear freeze” movement, the United States is not immune to the disease weakening Europe. With politicians meddling in military affairs, it is time we retired military officers, both in Europe and the United States, inform our citizens of the actual military situation they face and begin to concern ourselves with politics.
“An Almost Ready Reserve”
(See H. W. Serig, pp. 37-45, September 1983;
C. F. Ward, P. J. Smith, pp. 16-21, November
1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Peter B. Mersky, U. S. Naval Reserve—As an active Naval Reservist with 15 years of drilling, including two tours with VFP-306, I can say that the need for new, fleet-comparable equipment, including a dedicated reserve carrier, has always presented a problem.
I was gratified to read Mr. Serig’s comments concerning the caliber and skill of those in the Naval Air Reserve. (It should be noted and clarified that his article dealt solely with the tactical “side of the house”; the patrol and helicopter wings seem to be in much better shape, although the recent acquisition of E-2Cs by VAW-78, the standing down of VA- 303 to transition to the F/A-18, and the creation of F-14 and A-6E augmentation reserve units seem to auger well for the carrier reserve wings.)
Though not an aircrew member myself—I served as an air intelligence officer—I have “sampled” the high-speed, high-G world of the naval aviator, and retain the utmost respect and admiration for the capabilities and dedication of these men who make the most of their ancient equipment. Actually, the F-8 was flying for the reserves long before 1970, as Mr. Serig indicates. Two Washington, D.C.-based Crusader squadrons were recalled during the 1968 Pueblo Crisis, and the F-4 also joined the reserves on a regular basis in 1974, not counting an abortive attempt to equip a Los Alamitos, California, unit in the late 1960s.
Speaking from my own experience, the RF-8G Crusader which equips VFP-206 and VFP-306 is still the only totally viable tactical reconnaissance aircraft in the U. S. Navy today. The F-14 tactical air reconnaissance pod (TARPS) does fill some of the void left by the demise of the fleet light photographic squadron VFP-63 in June 1982. But the TARPS is only part of the larger unit, i.e., the fighter squadron and the fighter pilot syndrome works adversely when toting a TARPS.
The thrill of flying the F-8, whatever the variant, continues to draw reserve applicants to Andrews Air Force Base. The RF-8G, as it is configured now, with the P-420 engine of the fighter version, is a breathtakingly fast airplane endowed with considerable power and range. However, as Mr. Serig points out, the airplanes, not the design but the actual airframes, are 25 years old. The demand- lng requirements of high-speed, low- down twisting and turning of a tactical reconnaissance run, not to mention periodic carrier qualification periods involv- lng slamming down onto a deck at 160 miles per hour, have taken their toll on the Crusaders. Serious thought must be g'Ven to a replacement if there is to be a continuation of tactical reconnaissance in the reserves. I am told that the F/A-18R is °n the way, with a changeable nose which can replace the normal internal cannon with cameras, but not until the early 1990s. Seven years will be a long time to wait.
It is interesting to note that the EA-6As of VAQ-209 and VAQ-309 are actually Marine aircraft. The Navy did not operate the two-seat EA-6s in the fleet, until VAQ-33 received the type a few years ago. And as far as the venerable KA-3s of VAK-208 and VAK-308 are concerned, what will replace these veterans? Without A~6 bombers in the lineup, only the A-7 has a secondary aerial tanker capability.
Mr. Serig’s article draws attention to a long-time plight of the Naval Air Reserve. The selected air reservists are s°me of the world’s most skilled military Professionals. Their association with the reserves is one of the dedicated volunteer who believes in what he is doing and asks only the chance to continue their job with the right tools.
‘Education and Professionalism”
(See W. p. Mack, pp. 40-47, October 1983,
R. Large, p. 25, December 1983 Proceedings)
^ark J. j Offenbach—Our Navy is a submarine, carrier, and air Navy. Any officer candidate should take at least one o-day submarine mission, and spend ®n°ugh time with a carrier in order to per- °rm a solo takeoff and landing on a car- r,er m at least one type of aircraft.
.E°r reserve officers training corps . MC) programs, summer duty should mclude one summer beneath the sea, one summer on a carrier, one summer learn- jng to fly, and one summer taking off and landing on a carrier.
the Naval Academy’s standards °uld be more concentrated. As much as e academic year should be spent under- ea> on a carrier, and in the air.
Although experience is not enough, we annot afford a Navy of textbook officers o lack direct contact with the three
areas of sea duty. While Admiral Hyman G. Rickover would have a priesthood of the sea, I would prefer practical priests. Keep physical fitness and sports, but make them all be sea and air sports— scuba, windsurfing, hang gliding, rowing, swimming, and water skiing. This should also include games that may be played in the confines of a submerged sub: chess, go, shogi, Chinese checkers, backgammon, and computer games.
There is room for judo, karate, boxing, football, and basketball on carriers, cruisers, and shore duty stations, but we need more concentration on water sports, and sports and games that can be played on destroyers or submarines.
A cadet who studies in a classroom on a vessel is bound to come out a better naval officer than one who takes the same course with the same instructor on shore. Also, officers who teach one class per day while on sea duty may be more inspired in their duties than officers sentenced to teach a full day ashore. Engineering, electronics, communications, strategy and tactics, and navigation can be taught on board ship. Languages, computer and spoken, ancient and modem, can be taught on board ships.
The Naval Academy can serve twice as many midshipmen if half the classes are at sea any one semester. For some types of service, it may be artificial to limit cruises to one semester, but it would be even more “educational” for classes to join their cruise at sea. With carriers, this should be no problem.
Education and training should be integrated as much as possible. The semesters at sea should be followed by semesters ashore. While undergoing sea duty, midshipmen should also be assigned a minimum of four hours actual shipboard duty per day. Also, mixing Officer Candidate School, ROTC, and Naval Academy students in the same sea duty vessel will produce a more cohesive Navy.
“Seakeeping”
(See 1. W. Kehoe, K. S. Brower, E. N.
Comstock, pp. 63-67, September 1983
Proceedings)
H. David Kaysen—This article deserves careful study, for its implications are staggering and terrifying. It is possible that our cookie-cutter approach to ship acquisition over the past decades has been turning out the wrong ships (FF- 1052, DD-963, FFG-7) in droves and is programmed to do so for the foreseeable future (CG-47, DDG-51). All of these classes, as the article points out, perform their missions well in calm tropic and subtropic seas. But is that where SeaWar 1985 staged the majority of its naval encounters? Is that where the Soviet fleets are?
Fortunately, a solution is at hand within the halls of Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Ship Research and Development Center. It is low in cost, low in risk, and does not require advancements in technology—the small waterplane area twin hull ship (SWATH). The Navy has more than ten years of experience with the SSP Kaimalino. The Japanese are building a 3,000-ton SWATH. The Coast Guard is designing SWATH patrol boats. The naval engineering community has dozens of concept formulations, preliminary designs, and feasibility studies gathering dust.
SWATHs do “look funny”-—sort of like a semisubmersible drilling rig— when compared to monohulls. There are myths still circulating about exorbitant cost differentials, primarily the result of the wrong technological yardsticks for the cost estimates. (SWATHs cannot be as costly “per pound” as hydrofoils and surface effect ships, or the population of semisubmersible drilling rigs would not be growing constantly.) But the bottom line is stability, whether the job is exploring for oil or watching for incoming missiles with an Aegis combat system; and SWATHs can do that job cheaply, efficiently, and for much longer in a larger area of the world ocean than their monohull counterparts.
The proposal is not to scrap all of our frigates, destroyers, and cruisers in favor of SWATHs. But careful consideration should be given to curtailing the CG-47 and DDG-51 production runs in favor of SWATH equivalents which would allow the Navy to operate when and where it is needed, rather than when and where it can.
“The Forces for Forcible Entry”
(.See C. E. Myers, pp. 119-122, November 1983
Proceedings)
Charles E. Myers—Near the end of the middle paragraph on page 120 of the November issue, my text should have read: “Successful forcible entry has required equipment, combined arms, inshore tactics and readiness that are uncommon [not “common”] to our current naval forces.”
Unfortunately, current events seem to support that uncomfortable conclusion, and planned cuts in munitions, stores, and ordnance for practice indicate a lack of acceptance of the importance of mission readiness.
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“The Bear Facts”
(See R. G. Moore, pp. 112-115, August 1983;
W. K. Earle, pp. 144-147, November 1983
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Carl R. Smith, U. S. Coast Guard, Executive Officer, USCGC Taney (WHEC-37)—Captain Earle’s report of the Taney's, demise is exaggerated. As she approaches her 47th birthday, Taney is getting new boilers so she can carry out Coast Guard missions for the rest of this decade.
The Taney and her three remaining sisters, the Ingham (WHEC-35), Duane (WHEC-33), and Bibb (WHEC-31), are still ‘‘Coast Guard cutters in the finest tradition—flexible, responsive, manned by true professionals.” Legions of Coast Guardsmen who have sailed in the Secretary-class cutters will attest to their outstanding design, construction, and superb seakeeping characteristics.
“Sealift”
(See J. L. Holloway, pp. 28-37, June 1983,
M. O. Miller, p. 103, September 1983; M.
Adams, p. 122, October 1983; R. V. Buck, p.
24, November 1983 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral George H. Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Adams’s attack on the U. S. Merchant Marine suggests that he is out of his depth, drowning in a sea of vitriolics.
The U. S. Merchant Marine, by law, Section 101, Merchant Marine Act of 1936, (as amended) is “necessary for national defense and development of foreign trade . . . ,” and that it shall be “capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary (auxiliary Navy and military sealift) in time of war or national emergency.”
The law goes on to state that the Merchant Marine shall be capable of carrying all domestic and a substantial portion of foreign U. S. waterborne commerce.
Today, the U. S. Merchant Marine is sinking fast. Yet, the United States has hundreds of thousands of soldiers and their dependents deployed overseas—in
Europe, Korea, and the Middle East. Without a strong Merchant Marine, there is no way the U. S. armed forces can support the Americans now overseas in the event of major attack before they are annihilated or herded into cattle cars bound for Siberia.
Our government has an obligation to support and defend U. S. citizens it stations overseas in the name of national defense. We must not repeat the tragic blunder of pre-World War II, when we sent an army to the Philippines, only to watch helplessly as its survivors suffered a living death in the Bataan death march.
If, as some insist, we can rely on foreign merchant ships in war, we can with equal logic, rely on foreign armies, navies, air forces, and coast guards to protect us, thus saving still more money.
“Off-the-Job Training for
Shiphandlers”
(See W. B. Latham, T. E. Garrigan, pp. 136138, October 1983 Proceedings)
Captain T. F. Davis, U. S. Navy (Retired), Trident Submarine Shiphandling and Piloting Instructor—The October issue was outstanding. Captain Latham and Tom Garrigan list the advertised reasons for poor shiphandling expertise and offer an obvious solution—simulators.
In May 1979, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward sent a message to his fleet commanders saying, “I’ve had 12 collisions and 12 groundings in 12 months, and I want something done about it,” or words to that effect. The result was a navigation school developed under Commander Training Command, Atlantic, to teach junior officers to be navigation department heads. But the course will never solve the problem.
Admiral Hayward’s message eventually arrived at the Naval Training Equipment Center (NTEC). They then went to a contractor in order to identify the problem and receive recommendations. The resulting study pointed out that naval officers are not adequately trained in shiphandling, nor are ships’ navigation teams well trained in piloting, and it recommended using simulators similar to those used to train aviators. The recommendations described something less sophisticated than the shiphandling simulator at the Computer Aided Operation Research Facility (CAORF), but more capable than the simulator at the Marine Safety Institute (MSI).
Almost five years after Admiral Hayward’s message, prospective commanding and executive officer (PCO/ PXO) aviators receive training at MSI while commissioning Trident crews receive training at CAORF. NTEC has produced an interim part-task shiphandling simulator for evaluation—a low-cost trainer which will train midshipmen and junior officers in basic shiphandling skills. It is not a complete trainer. The Navy has done little to solve the original problem. The reason is simple—lack of interest, especially from those surface warfare experts who believe shiphandling can only be learned at sea.
In order to produce and maintain competent seafaring professionals, there must be a career-long system of training, starting with midshipmen. (Almost none ever get to make landings, even with a small patrol craft.) The newly commissioned officers at basic surface warfare school in Newport must gain the fundamentals. Prospective officers of the deck must have concentrated training and experience. Those returning to sea from shore duty must have refresher training. PCO/ PXO candidates must be experts in all shiphandling and navigating phases. In addition, ships must have simulator facilities to train their piloting teams to negotiate harbors, rivers, and ports under varying conditions of weather, current, and environment.
Navy regulations require that the commanding officers train their junior officers in shiphandling—a difficult task if they lack this knowledge themselves. Many commanding officers won’t let their junior officers have the maneuvering con because they lack shiphandling confidence themselves. Simulators are available but enjoy very limited use. This also applies to the Navy’s number one shiphandling course at the amphibious school in Norfolk. From 1979 to 1981, the Coast Guard and occasional aviators attended. Naval personnel weren’t ordered to the course, and few volunteered. Now naval amphibious groups are attending, as are more aviators. It is an outstanding course; I recently attended it and found it most effective.
Today’s complicated weapon systems depend upon knowing the ship’s exact position and require precise ship maneuvers for optimum use, or to avoid incoming missiles. Propulsion reactors and ponderous dangerous merchant cargos are familiar visitors to the world’s harbors. We need better-trained conning officers.
As far as can be determined, no officer trained at CAORF, MSI, or the Navy amphibious school has had a shiphandling accident. It is incredible that surface warfare prospective commanding officers spend many months preparing for command, but not a single day is dedicated to shiphandling.
“As I Recall . . . Learning Cryptanalysis”
(See J. J. Rochefort, pp. 54-56, August 1983
Proceedings)
Captain K. G. Schacht, U. S. Navy (Retired)—It was my good fortune to serve under Lieutenant Safford for 12 months during my first assignment, the battleship USS New Mexico (BB-40), in the mid- 1930s. Lieutenant Safford was our gunnery officer. As a newly commissioned ensign, I had little direct contact with him. However, there were stories. All hands agreed that Safford was a brain; Perhaps the smartest on board ship. One story concerned our turrets; each had three 14-inch guns. A design defect caused the projectiles’ inability to follow separate trajectories while in flight. Instead, the outer projectiles crossed over during flight, frequently “kissing” one another, creating havoc.
Safford solved the problem by modify- lng the firing circuitry of each turret. He added an inductance which delayed the tr*ggering of the second and third 14-inch gun for a tiny fraction of time. However, he deferred recommending his innovation as a formal modification until later in his tour because of the “red-tape delay” in approval from the most bureaucratic of the pre-war bureaus, the Bureau of Ordnance. Thus, the New Mexico enjoyed the advantages of a more effective main battery for many months.
Gunnery Officer Safford, while respected for his technical “know how,” 'd have a weakness. He lost his cool when a situation became chaotic. Accordingly, during a complex gunnery fir- lng drill exercise when many events were competing for attention, the story has it ! at one of his dutiful assistants would lsolate his phone circuit until near the end 0 the drill when events had slowed to normal. This eliminated several unnecesSary and confusing questions and orders.
Morality, and the Military Professional”
P- R. Schratz, pp. 46-51, September 1983;
• ones, p. 150, November 1983 Proceedings)
^Jtsign Leo. S. Mackay, Jr., U. S. Ie^l9' Captain Schratz’s article chal- ges the military professional to recon- c* e ^'s foie in a defense establishment Pable of incinerating civilization with gS COncept of himself as a rational being, ^ocrowing from the Judeo-Christian con- P of a “just war” and Clausewitz’s ti0Serj'on that war is a continuation of na- ex i • Policy by other means, the author P ains how he has come to view our
nuclear strategy and defense policies as moral. However, in his resolution of the moral issues he has shortchanged the very U. S. moral superiority which gives meaning to the East versus West conflict.
The problem with his resolution lies in its premise that the important moral consideration in our policymaking is not the morality of each policy at the moment, but the direction in which the structure of policymaking is moving. When we free ourselves from moral constraint there is no impetus to change the direction of policymaking, and policy tends to stagnate. If every policy is not made to meet the highest standards of moral responsibility then we lose the moral superiority.
Captain Schratz’s final points cast doubt on his other contentions. Since every aspect of our doctrine is not required to conform to the highest moral obligations, it does not follow that the communist enemy is the only international outlaw. Also, if we are free to violate our own concept of morality, then all of our policies cannot be defensive.
The problem with moral resolutions of this type is that, while they are grounded in fact, they sell short the precepts of rational and moral armed conflict. They are rationalizations which encourage moral complacency.
‘‘Where Does the Buck Stop?”
(See B. D. Cole, p. 102, November 1983
Proceedings)
Robert J. McDonnell, Bell Telephone. Laboratories, Research and Development—Commander Cole fails to understand both the engineering and the human process.
Companies receiving government contracts often hire engineers and technicians for those projects only. Once a contract has been fulfilled, many engineers and technicians are turned loose to seek employment elsewhere. If the equipment proves defective or unreliable, persons “responsible” may no longer work for the company. The military’s only recourse is to not contract with that firm again—if the company still exists.
A system’s reliability is directly proportional to its component count. Here, we enter the realm of functional individual training system (FITS)—a component manufacturer’s theoretical gauge of reliability measured in failures per billion hours. Every system part possesses an assigned Fit Rate, and the summation of components in the system and their respective FITS determine a system’s mean time to failure. But these theoretical computations are only guidelines.
Prototypes are then subjected to torture-testing, during which they are vibrated and cycled through temperature extremes. If they pass the torture-testing, the design becomes firm, and manufacturing begins.
Despite all precautions, an electronic or mechanical part still may spontaneously fail for no apparent reason. For example, integrated circuits often fail in such fashion, and no one is to blame— not the manufacturer, the engineer, or the maintenance technician. No one can be demoted, fired, or disciplined for this failure. The integrated circuit should be court-martialed! Perhaps stepping on it would release one’s frustration.
Cole’s article contains disturbing, subtle implications suggesting an inflexible approach to managing people. Branches of military service, big corporations, and small companies consist of people. Despite training and discipline, people share a common weakness—they make mistakes, sometimes gross, sometimes minor. However, effective managers, whether commanding officers or project engineers, understand that humans are fallible. Regardless of rank, workers are human first, and sailors, pilots, or engineers second.
A gross lapse in performance of duty should be scrutinized carefully and disciplinary action taken if required. But every human error need not be so carefully dissected because a “knee-jerk” response to every goof undermines a manager’s effectiveness. Such behavioristic responses can clog an entire system with trivial data, and everyone becomes frustrated.
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Must the buck always be launched? The answer is no.
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