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part of the U. S. war plan until 1944. Serious torpedo and diesel engine deficiencies existed and were either unrecognized or glossed over. The prevailing overestimation or the effectiveness of ASW forces and more than 20 years oi peacetime attitudes had firmly rooted submarine doctrine
Today—just as before World War II—the U. S. Navy has a great deal of confidence in its submarine and antisubwarfare tactics. But our World War II torpedoes were full of unpleasant surprises when the shooting started, and we caiTt afford to be surprised today.
In September 1939, all of the world’s major navies had seriously flawed doctrines for undersea warfare and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) that were soon proved wrong by World War II. The ability to recognize and discard these initial misconceptions and outworn ideas about how to use and fight submarines was a determining difference between the naval winners and losers.
The Japanese never understood how to use their large, technically advanced, tactically competent submarine force or how to cope with a more adaptable U. S. Navy submarine effort. After almost winning World War I with submarines, the Germans unaccountably entered World War II with a limited concept of the strategic impact of submarine warfare, not enough U-boats, and badly flawed torpedoes. The Royal Navy overestimated the effectiveness of active sonar. The large Italian and Soviet submarine forces persisted in a piecemeal victim’s role and had no appreciable influence on the outcome of the war.
The U. S. Navy was as wrong as any other navy about submarines. Its submarine force was equipped and trained to serve as an adjunct to the battle fleet. The submarine guerre de course that eventually strangled Japan was not
in caution. .
U. S. Navy ASW policy was not so much wrong as ll was nonexistent. Fortunately, the U. S. Navy was able to assimilate Royal Navy wartime ASW knowledge as rapidly as it was bitterly gained. Through costly experience and repeated frustration, the U. S. Navy Jeamed how to both use and fight submarines. This understanding led to final victory.
After almost 40 years of undersea peace and spectacular technical progress untested by war, it is reasonable to as sume that, as in 1939, the U. S. Navy clings to concepts about submarine warfare and ASW that may be dangerously wrong. Without the rigorous testing of war, there 's a tendency to adopt comfortable concepts that may h more convenient than correct.
There are many submarine and antisubmarine issU and perceptions that should be analyzed to deduce the wartime validity.
Weapons: Weapon launch is a statistically rare event- tops the broad-based ASW pyramid made up of resear and development, acquisition, training, maintenance, s veillance, and tracking. Billions of dollars, millions hours of tedium, and thousands of hours of peril will focused into a few hundred warshots. Torpedo effect' ness may be the variable that most directly drives the o come of ASW combats.
Straight-running (and relatively straightforward) t mal torpedoes had a surprisingly poor reliability recor the early stages of World War II. Both German and U-
torpedoes failed to perform as expected until wartime fixes were made. There is no reason to believe that complex homing torpedoes, more subject to the vagaries of the ocean environment, will function much better. Homing torpedoes are the modem weapon system that has been least tested in combat. The British experience in the Falk- lands was inconclusive. Although a large number of ASW torpedoes were expended, modem homing torpedoes have yet to sink a submarine. Perhaps the most pointed lesson of that small ASW war is that estimates of torpedo expenditure rates may be low given the understandable wartime tendency to “classify the contact with a torpedo.”
It is almost impossible to conduct realistic peacetime tests of modem ASW torpedoes. Ideally, dozens of war- shots should be fired at fully evasive, 40-knot, doublehulled, deep-diving, titanium-hulled drone targets with anechoic coating, using sophisticated countermeasures in a variety of deep, shallow, and under-ice ocean environments. Since this would be prohibitively expensive, most torpedo testing must be a piecemeal evaluation of fire control, propulsion, guidance, acquisition, terminal homing, fuze action, and warhead lethality based on the optimistic assumption that if subsystems check out separately, they will also perform as advertised when combined in an interdependent complete operational sequence. Computer runs, destruction of moored hulks, and test and exercise shots in less challenging circumstances cannot precisely gauge the wartime effectiveness of torpedoes.
In spite of the difficulty and expense of testing, the Navy must rigorously and objectively examine the performance of torpedoes to determine whether they can destroy threat forces wherever they may be encountered. Concurrently, torpedo inventory levels should be reviewed to ensure they are ample for combat, testing, and training. Onerous and expensive problems may be uncovered, but the U. S. Navy’s best and most basic ASW/undersea warfare investment is an adequate supply of torpedoes that can sink threat forces.
Soviet Rollback Tactics: Current defense-in-depth concepts, made necessary by threat standoff weapons launched from high-speed platforms, have a corollary weakness. Distance and dispersion buy a valuable protective cushion for a carrier, but far-flung antiair warfare (AAW) and ASW escorts are isolated and vulnerable. As the depth of defense is increased, individual escorts or pickets become less capable of mutual support. The bloody struggle of attrition between AAW picket destroyers and kamikazes at Okinawa in World War II is a classic example of this trade-off. Modem command, control, and communication techniques and technology have increased
During wartime, this LAMPS-III pilot might be counted as one of the lucky ones. His ship is still steaming. Other pilots returning from missions may find they have nowhere to set down—their ships have been sunk. With rollback tactics, the Soviets will concentrate their strikes on towed- array ships in the ASW Outer Zone.
the effectiveness of dispersed formations, but they cannot revoke the military principle of concentration. At some point, it becomes more productive for an attacker to abandon the approach of directly attacking a protected force and roll back its defenses by destroying the adversary s protecting forces.
Most U. S. Navy tactics are based on the assumption that Soviet submarines and strike aircraft will focus their attacks entirely on carriers or the most important unit in a formation. There are good reasons behind this assumption, but none are based on compelling evidence. Furthermore, nothing prevents the Soviets from abandoning a car- riers-first targeting doctrine as soon as the friction of war begins to erode their peacetime tactical perceptions. Deliberate anti-escort tactics were extremely effective in the U. S. submarine campaign against Japan. Rollback submarine and air strike tactics based on either seeking out or destroying escorts as they are encountered may be equally practicable and productive for the Soviets. The U- S- Navy should analyze possible enemy tactics based on rolling back or punching through screening escorts to facilitate destmetion of screened units, and it should develop contingency tactics to counter them. The Navy is often too busy reacting to the crisis of the moment or fears that considering alternative perspectives will weaken the defense of a usually monolithic party line. This practice must end. The Navy cannot afford to be surprised by an enemy tactic.
The Soviet air and submarine threats are synergistic- They may strive to saturate a carrier battle group’s air defenses with coordinated air- and submarine-launched missile strikes timed for simultaneous impact. This time- on-target attack is lethal but difficult to mount. A “Backfire” pilot and an “Oscar”- or “Charlie’’-class cruise missile submarine commander will have trouble singliuS out a carrier target from the ruck of escorts, decoys, and
they will expose themselves to destruction. The tactical dynamics of the U. S. Navy’s current conception of a coordinated Soviet attack on a carrier battle group should be examined more closely from the Soviet perspective. A prohibitively high degree of timing, communication, skill at arms, tenacity, and good luck may be required for its successful execution.
A more workable Soviet approach may be for attacking aircraft and submarines to strike the first legitimate (i.e., nondecoy, nonmerchantman) target encountered. By rolling back screening escorts, the Soviets ultimately may be able to hammer home more numerous and effective submarine and air attacks on naked carriers. A useful punch- through effect could be achieved by concentrating rollback submarine attacks on escorts in a single sector.
U. S. towed-array ships in the ASW Outer Zone are Particularly vulnerable to Soviet rollback tactics. A duel Pitting a towed-array ship with her light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopter against an aggressive “Alfa”- or “Victor”-class nuclear attack submarine Would be a close battle. And if the opponent were a diesel electric “Foxtrot”- or “Tango”-class patrol submarine Positioned on or near the array ship’s track, there might lot even be a contest. Reliance on passive acoustic sensors, typical in Outer Zone ASW, is not conducive to es- eort self-defense. Whether isolated escorts can passively detect, localize, and attack Soviet submarines bent on destroying them is an intriguing tactical problem that merits investigation.
The vulnerability of escorts to submarine and air strike rollback tactics is a problem that is not amenable to quick fixes. The simpler era has passed when there were time and dollars to build escorts faster than they could be sunk. Changes in both U. S. ASW and A AW tactics may be required to prevent critical erosion of battle group defends through escort attrition.
Shallow Water ASW: The positions of both surface ship and submarine losses in World Wars I and II cluster heavily around coasts and choke points, with the majority inside the hundred fathom curve. Historically, naval warfare has been essentially coastal warfare. This pattern will continue in almost any conceivable scenario for World War III. However, the U. S. Navy is most diligently preparing to fight submarines in the deep open ocean, a place that no logical Soviet war plan requires them to be. Most of the U. S. Navy’s primary ASW sensors and weapons do not work well in shallow water. The assumption that NATO allies will handle shallow water ASW is untenable. The most significant shallow water ASW advantage the British, Dutch, and West Germans may have over the United States is an honest willingness to squarely face this serious problem.
A Neglected ASW Sensor: Helicopter dipping sonar is the most neglected sensor in the U. S. inventory. It can detect submarines in the critical ASW Inner Zone, in the noisy area near carriers, and make rapid and accurate attacks on submarines there. It functions reasonably well in shallow water, does not “beacon” the position of the protected force because of its relatively low power, and is less affected by poor acoustic conditions than any other type of sonar. It is an economical, reusable sensor mounted on a mobile platform that can operate from most surface ships. In short, it is an ASW tactical bargain.
Submariners generally agree that a helicopter with active dipping sonar is the nonsubmarine ASW platform they fear most because of its unpredictable mobility and because it is difficult to evade a helicopter after it has gained sonar contact. It is also the only ASW aircraft that has an appreciable probability of killing a submerged modern diesel submarine. For this reason alone, the U. S. Navy should retain capable active sonar helicopters as long as the Soviets have a large and effective diesel submarine force.
In spite of their well-documented effectiveness, helicopters with active dipping sonar apparently have a low priority in the U. S. Navy’s air ASW acquisition scheme. The proposed replacement for the SH-3H, the SH-60F (a cheaper variant of the SH-60B, LAMPS Mk-III platform), continues to drift in and out of fiscal limbo. This useful air ASW platform is in danger of joining the blimp in premature extinction.
The Maneuvering Board Syndrome: Some misperception of ASW arises from what could be termed as the maneuvering board syndrome. Neat screen sectors and stations are plotted on a maneuvering board where they are as motionless as flies in amber. Submarines, when detected, are plotted as ragged little trails of Xs penetrating the screen. A geographic rather than a relative plot would
usually reveal that most of the motion is generated by the transiting formation, not by intercepting submarines. This may be particularly true for Soviet submarines.
Until a few years ago, most naval analysts visualized a naval meeting engagement soon after the start of a general war. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet would set sail for the North Cape. Most of the Soviet Navy’s submarine force would be arrayed in the Atlantic and, actively directed by the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS), would converge on U. S. carrier battle groups for a cataclysmic midocean clash.
This perception is fading fast. In a more plausible theory, Soviet submarines are positioned in a series of barriers beginning somewhere on their side of the Greenland- Iceland-Norway Gap and ending well inside the Barents Sea. SOSS may cue submarine concentration against U. S. naval forces, but it is equally probable that Soviet submarines will cautiously patrol assigned barrier sectors and wait for their targets to come to them. The latter scenario presents the most difficult ASW problem.
An aggressive submarine closing a target is dangerous but vulnerable. A submarine stationed in the right place quietly waiting for her prey is even more dangerous and almost impossible to counter with passive acoustic sensors, which have become the backbone of current U. S. Navy ASW practices.
Periscope Detection: The Neglected Opportunity: Submarines use their periscopes a lot. In spite of advances in sonar, radar, and electronic support measures, the seaman’s eye is the sensor most efficiently coupled to the seaman’s brain. An experienced submariner can gain more tactical information from a single periscope observation of less than ten seconds duration than hours, perhaps days, of acoustic and electronic surveillance. One look is often enough to jell a mass of other sensor data into a coherent tactical picture. The periscope is also the submarine sensor that is most difficult to deceive.
Periscope exposure is usually a sound calculated risk. For 80 years, periscopes have sighted ships and aircraft hundreds of times more than they have been sighted in return. This overwhelming edge in detection is still in the periscope’s favor.
Submarines are becoming more difficult to detect acoustically and magnetically, and other submarine signatures are being analyzed and reduced by all of the major naval powers. The periscope’s signature, however, has been only slightly reduced since 1914. The use of radar transparent materials, such as ceramics, and other stealth design practices could sharply reduce the periscope’s radar signature, but periscope visual signatures may have bottomed out. Thus, as other submarine signatures are reduced, periscope detection remains an ASW bargain that is too often overlooked.
Surface escorts and ASW helicopters work in the “look zone” where periscope exposure is most frequent, but they make surprisingly few detections. ASW helicopters may have the most opportunity to detect periscopes, but vibration, a heavy crew workload, and the lack of a decent periscope detection radar has limited their success. Non-
ASW aircraft detect about as many periscopes as ASW helicopters.
Surface ships are equally poor at detecting periscopes. In the typical mismatch, a highly trained observer is peering through a periscope that is exposed a few inches above the surface and represents the state of the art in electrooptics. Most likely, a pair of glazed 18-year-old eyeballs are looking back through unfocused binoculars. Both visual and radar detection of periscopes require training, experience, and a high degree of motivation.
Existing radar, signal processing, and electro-optical technology can provide U. S. Navy ASW crews with allweather, affordable, human-engineered, maintainable periscope detection systems. Much periscope electro-optical technology itself and developments during the Vietnam War for ground and riverine warfare are directly applicable to ASW. Ironically, river patrol boats and UH-1B helicopters from F1AL-3 (Seawolfs) of the old brown-water navy may have been better equipped to sight periscopes than most current ASW ships and helicopters. Attention should be given to a tactical and technical program to exploit and deter the opposition’s use of periscopes.
ASW Inner Zone versus Outer Zone: In 1963, the Soviet Navy introduced the “Echo”-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine armed with the long-range SS- N-3 missile. This development caused the U. S. Navy, with encouragement from the Department of Defense, to shift the focus of its ASW effort to more than 150 miles from the center of a protected force and over the horizon to what is now known as the ASW Outer Zone.
This is a bad idea, which almost guarantees that the Navy will enter any major war on the wrong ASW foot- While the flashy “Oscar” and her long-shooter sisters can never be ignored, about 90% of the threat from Soviet submarines by almost any standard of measurement (total warheads, warhead tonnage, launchers, platforms) is concentrated in the ASW Inner Zone and will remain so-
Torpedoes are the most lethal and the most numerous submarine threat weapon. To use them, a submarine must close to within ten miles of a target. The five- to 75-mde autonomously targeted sea-skimming missile is the second most dangerous and numerous submarine threat weapon- Although the maximum range of his missiles may be beyond the nominal 50-mile (or first convergence zone) outer boundary of the ASW Inner Zone, a mission-ofl' ented “Charlie” commander will most likely close we‘ within the maximum missile range to positively identify his target.
Although long-range weapons have been effectively used at almost point-blank range, nobody has ever achieved any success launching a weapon beyond its maximum range. Thus, some of the Outer Zone threat may slide into the Inner Zone, but this cannot be reversed-
An apparently compelling argument for emphasis on Outer Zone ASW is that if all submarines are detected an sunk in the Outer Zone, none will leak through to the Inner Zone, and the threat will disappear. Unfortunately, nnore than 30 years of fleet exercise experience shows that significant percentage of threat submarines will leak 'nl°
the Inner Zone. Geometry is at the core of the problem. The Outer Zone encompasses more than 250,000 square miles of ocean. If we have learned one thing about ASW, it is that given sea room and time, a submarine is virtually undetectable. She has an abundance of both in the Outer Zone. Conversely, in the 8,000-square mile confines of the Inner Zone, submarines must trade their own safety to gain targeting data and close to firing positions.
The ASW Inner Zone is a noisy and brutal pit where submarines must be killed quickly before they sink ships. Active sonar and “flaming datums” will be the primary means of submarine detection, and the passive array/data processing engineering marvels of the Outer Zone might as well be checked at the entrance. Numbers of ASW platforms, rapid localization, and plenty of lethal weapons are what count most in the scrambling, direct-path Inner Zone environment. Unfortunately, the U. S. Navy is shaky on all of these counts. The large circular and horseshoe screens with pouncers of the World War II and Korean War eras may have been actually better able to deal with today’s threat than are the handful of surface escorts and rapidly dwindling number of very tired SH-3H helicopters that now constitute the Inner Zone protection. There have been plenty of technical and tactical improvements in Outer Zone ASW, but the Navy has stood still or regressed 'n its capability to conduct ASW at close quarters.
For the past two decades, the Navy has concentrated
90% of its ASW resources and attention in the Outer Zone, where only ten percent of the threat will reside. When asked why he robbed banks, Willie Sutton was supposed to have replied with some surprise, “Because that is where the money is.” The U. S. Navy had better be able to conduct ASW effectively in the Inner Zone because that is where the submarine threat will be.
Opposed ASW: Historically, the submarine has been a sea denial weapon of a power that did not control the sea and airspace above the area of submarine operations. With few exceptions during World War I and World War II, the United States and its allies conducted ASW in a relatively benign environment. Consequently, U. S. surface and air ASW platforms have evolved as soft systems that are not survivable in contested areas. With the demise of the ASW carriers, the United States also became more de-
.Is submarines get quieter, nonacoustic ASW gets more attention. The l'. S. Navy lias invested in ASH' aircraft with magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment like the S-.1A ( ,
\ iking, right, /lying by the Trench Daphne -class patrol submarine. Hut there are numerous other nonacoustic ASH
technologies being examined by both the U. S. and Soviet navies. pendent upon forward patrol aircraft bases that are militarily and politically vulnerable. | —- |
In contrast to previous U. S. enemies, a primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to exercise sea control to ensure the survivability and readiness to strike of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The Sovi | w ^ |
ets routinely use surface and air forces to support all types of submarine operations. They respect the effectiveness of Western ASW techniques and probably believe that the surest way to counter them is to destroy ASW platforms. Moreover, Soviet war plans permit the bulk of their submarines to operate in or near their home waters where they may be protected. U. S. ASW forces are in danger of becoming the hunted rather than the hunters. No ASW aircraft operating within range of Soviet aircraft (including some not generally considered to be fighters) or within the surface-to-air missile (SAM) envelopes of surface ships is safe. Although Soviet SAM ships will not mark the location of submarines, they can block the approaches to submarine havens. Coordination of the protective umbrella over submarines may be an important task of the Soviets’ new, highly capable “Mainstay” airborne warning and control system (AWACS). To roll back the protective air cover over havened Soviet submarines so that U. S. ASW aircraft can prosecute them would require an offensive against Soviet “Mainstay” and long-range interceptors such as the look-down/ shoot-down MiG-25M “Foxhound,” Su-27 “Flanker,” and MiG-29 “Fulcrum” both on the ground and in the air. Using all source intelligence, carefully timed “Yama- moto”-type F-14 intercept missions supported by tankers and U. S. AWACS could prune the Soviet AWACS force and the rather meager number of Soviet long-range ASW aircraft, as well. Concurrently, nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) could target Soviet ships with long- | THE HUU" This is as much a political as a military problem and must be handled with tact and understanding. Detailed prepositioned security agreements are equally as important as prepositioned military equipment. U. S. SSNs conducting ASW in Soviet home waters will be priority targets. A high cumulative probability of kill will build against them as they are prosecuted by a wide range of Soviet systems whose individual capabilities may be unimpressive. On paper, a divisya of “Mirka”-class frigates sprinting and drifting with dipping sonars, old Mi-4 “Hound” ASW helicopters, or a pair of “Romeo”-class diesel submarines do not have lethal statistics, but they can be a serious cumulative problem for an SSN that must operate in the same area of Soviet home waters. Mines also threaten SSNs operating in Soviet waters. In the old open-ocean submarine scenarios, careful degaussing and quieting efforts coupled with prayer constituted adequate submarine mine countermeasures. These are not enough for the U. S. submarine that has a mission to seek out and destroy Soviet submarines in their most likely area of operations. The Soviets have ensured that submarine and ASW operations will be woven into the whole warp and woof ot sea control warfare. This major contribution to generally weak continental naval doctrines deserves respect and requires the United States to review its tactics, technology’ and naval attitudes. |
range SAM batteries. This counterair campaign to bring ASW aircraft to bear on Soviet submarines must be paralleled by increasing the security of forward patrol aircraft bases. Iceland and the Aleutian Islands are the northern keystones of ASW surveillance and patrol aircraft operations that make a forward naval strategy possible. Maintaining the effectiveness of facilities there and in Norway, Bermuda, the Azores, Diego Garcia, and the Mediterranean in the face of air attack, submarine-launched missiles, special warfare operations, and possible full-scale airborne or amphibious landings is a difficult task that must have the highest priority in the initial stages of war. Fortunately, in a kind of reverse flip of the domino theory, it may be possible to secure the vital Icelandic keystone to the North Atlantic by establishing an early firm foothold in Norway. | Nonacoustic ASW: Submerged submarines have more than a dozen detectable physical signatures. To date, it has been practicable to tactically exploit only their acoustic and magnetic signatures. However, the same signal pr°' cessing advances that enhanced passive acoustic detection enhance nonacoustic detection of submarines. The Sovie1 Union and, presumably, the United States are investing heavily in nonacoustic ASW. Unclassified material sug' gests that future detection of submerged submarines from space is possible. If this capability was possessed by botn or either side, it would have a sweeping effect on submH' rine operations but probably would not end the submarine’s effectiveness as the primary element of modern sea power. Surveillance is only one of several factors in ASW |
(.1 | PrnrppHinoc / Alll’USt l"^ |
Knowing a submarine’s location can provide insight into enemy intent and permit passive avoidance tactics in some situations. Effective ASW, however, requires placing a weapon on a submarine to sink her or at least prevent her from performing her mission. ASW weapons, even those with nuclear warheads to compensate for considerable “dead time” during weapon flight, have short ranges. An ASW platform must get well within 100 miles of her target to launch any existing or envisioned standoff ASW weapon. To attack a submarine, an ASW platform must be able to survive on, above, or under the immediate ocean area where the submarine quarry is located. This requires a degree of sea control, even if the ASW platform is an attack submarine. In addition, an enemy submarine is a moving, uncooperative target. Although precise real-time surveillance is valuable, it alone does not ensure ASW success.
Very long-range, possibly land-based ASW weapons with midcourse and terminal guidance are required to fully exploit real-time, wide-area submarine surveillance from space. This is a tall technological order that may be more challenging than the surveillance itself, particularly if the weapons are to have conventional warheads. A cruise missile carrying a homing torpedo that could be precisely guided to its target through a satellite data link would best fill this order.
A technological breakthrough permitting wide-area, real-time nonacoustic ASW surveillance has many strategic and tactical implications. For example, if the United States had this capability and the Soviet Union did not, protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would be much easier for the United States and its allies, and U. S. SSNs could be used more effectively against Soviet SSBNs havened in their home waters. In addition, although new patrol tactics and areas might be used, U. S. SSBNs would be more survivable than they are now, as would be U. S. carrier battle groups, which could be employed more aggressively than is now prudent.
If the Soviet Union had this capability and the United States did not, the Soviets could more easily protect their SSBNs havened in home waters, and Soviet general-purpose forces could be released for SLOC interdiction and other missions. Also, U. S. SSBNs, carrier battle groups, and SLOCs would be more vulnerable.
If both the United States and the Soviet Union had this nonacoustic surveillance capability, the side with the best command, control, and communications capability would be best able to exploit the breakthrough. Many off-setting factors would cancel each other. Naval warfare would remain a horse race, perhaps with a higher premium placed on command, control, and communications. Finally, if the rigid surface of the polar ice cap remained opaque to nonacoustic surveillance, the tempo of Arctic submarine operations would increase markedly.
SLOC Dilution: Soviet submarines attacking the Atlantic and Pacific SLOCs are limited by the number of weapons they can take to sea. With perfect luck and no opposition, each Soviet submarine that is deployed before war starts or that penetrates barriers to gain a position athwart the SLOCs can expect to sink a maximum of about 20 ships before she has to rearm. In practice, the submarine will not sink a ship for every torpedo or missile she carries, and she must reserve torpedoes for her own protection. In addition, ensuring that only ships carrying vital military cargo are attacked rather than less important commercial cargo is difficult.
A U. S. SLOC protection strategy based on dilution of military shipping might be simple, effective, and relatively inexpensive. As soon as hostilities appeared eminent, the sea-lanes could be flooded with chartered shipping. Most of it would be used to fill out huge expanded convoys containing ships with military cargo. The remainder would be sailed independently in a manner to mask the outline of convoys. In this shell game, the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System would be unable to distinguish ships with military cargo from ships carrying commercial cargo or in ballast. Any attempts by Soviet submarines and aircraft to more precisely identify high-value ships would increase their vulnerability. U. S. tactics based on reaction to “flaming datums” would be aimed at converting each Soviet submarine weapon launch into an ASW prosecution. To flesh out inadequate numbers of escorts, we should consider Arapaho and other schemes to incorporate ASW capability in merchant hulls.
The number of ships carrying military cargo sunk in the opening stages of a war can be cut by one-third or more by doubling the number of merchantmen targets in the shipping lanes. On a fiscal basis, this is a good investment. Most military cargoes are extremely expensive, costing far more than the bottoms carrying them or those that might be sunk in their stead. Furthermore, many military cargoes are critical to maintaining the very thin edge that will keep the United States in the land battle in Central Europe or Northeastern Asia. Most military cargoes are irreplaceable in the course of all but the longest war. If they are not delivered, the war would be very short, indeed.
The West has a number of large merchant ships, mostly supertankers, which are surplus to both peacetime and wartime requirements. Many are highly automated and can be sailed by small crews. The number of torpedoes or missiles that a ship can absorb without sinking is proportional to its length and displacement. These same factors tend to protect the crew. A fast supertanker in ballast (perhaps with some of its tanks filled with syntactic foam) and with its crew protected in makeshift citadels could be an attractive torpedo and missile sink to draw the finite venom of Soviet anti-SLOC forces. The United States should weigh SLOC dilution now so that if it promises to be effective, it can be immediately activated when needed.
Thus, it is evident that many U. S. Navy submarine and antisubmarine warfare tactics and perceptions must be critically examined. Their wartime validity is an important and proper subject for serious professional debate.
Mr. Caldwell is a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy and the Naval War College and holds an MA degree in national security studies from Georgetown University. Since his retirement from the Naval Underwater Systems Center, he has been a naval analyst in Washington. D.C.