Their Broken Promises

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Beneath the shroud of protective gear, behind the grotesque mask, a Soviet soldier may be the last thing a dying Afghan free­dom fighter sees. For the evidence is strong and growing that among the promises the Soviets have failed to keep is that they will not engage in chemical warfare. We should expect no better from the Soviets in arms control agreements.

Arms control is an integral part of our overall doc­trine of deterrence of war and national defense. The process of arms control includes strategic and conventional warfare in space, air, land, and sea.

The naval service is already constrained by existing arms control agreements that regulate ballistic missiles, submarines, and the testing of missile warheads. The So­^viet Union has proposed expanding such agreements to uiclude further restraints on missile systems and deploy­ments of ballistic missile submarines, new limitations on cruise missiles, and turning certain ocean areas into "zones of peace.” President Jimmy Carter at one time sought to restrict antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations by creating sanctuaries where ASW operations could not be conducted.¹

The arms control process will continue, and the naval services will (and should) be involved. What is needed at this point is a healthy examination of the successes of past ^arms control efforts, focusing on Soviet-U. S. agreements ^and lessons learned that can be applied to the future. I will ⁿot address the primary goals of arms control, but will concentrate on the violations of the terms of existing ^agreements.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) It: No discus­sion of the SALT II Treaty can be complete without ini­tially considering its legal status. Although the treaty was signed in 1979, the United States has never ratified the agreement; hence, it never entered into force.

Under a 1969 Vienna Convention, which regulates treaties, once signed, parties should not take any action that would prejudice ratification. Plans to carry out reduc­tion or dismantling provisions of an agreement can be postponed until the treaty is in force. If a party takes a new action that directly conflicts with provisions of the new agreement and would provide the party with an unequivo­cal unilateral advantage over the other party, this is viewed as having prejudiced ratification. These actions can be considered violations.²

The United States has signed but not ratified this Vienna Convention. The Soviets have done neither. The article on observance of a treaty while it undergoes ratification rep­resents a customary international law standard accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan promised in a Me­morial Day Address at Arlington National Cemetery that the United States would comply with existing arms control agreements if the Soviets did also. This statement was vague and applied to any agreement, not just SALT II. Since then, there have been numerous and ambiguous administration statements to the effect that not all of SALT II was meant.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have clearly stated that SALT II never entered force and that they are not under any obligation to abide by its provisions.³ Yet, by reading the U. S. press, a person could assume that both parties are adhering to SALT II provisions. A review of treaty provisions, however, reveals that the Soviets are not abid­ing by all provisions.

In January 1984, President Reagan released a report to Congress on the noncompliance of the Soviet Union with various arms control agreements.⁴ A most interesting rev­elation contained therein was the acknowledgement that the United States no longer considers SALT II to be await­ing ratification. Hence, actions taken from the time SALT

II was signed until the end of 1981 are regulated by the customary international law standard contained in the Vi­enna Convention. Actions from 1982 are regulated by the political commitment to not undercut SALT II.

Probably the most important provision of SALT II lim­its the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). By the end of 1981, neither party was to have more than 2,250 SNDVs.⁵ The United States has just under 2,000 SNDVs. The Soviets still have about 2,500.

The State Department does not view this Soviet failure to reduce the number to 2,250 as “undercutting” SALT II since launchers could be dismantled at any time.⁶ It ap­pears that failure to reduce the number is not a violation since it is an action that can still be taken. This failure, therefore, is not an agenda item in the SALT compliance oversight commission, the Standing Committee Commis­sion (SCC), despite its strategic and military significance.

SALT II also prohibits each party from developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rapid reload ca­pability or from storing extra missiles near launcher sites (Article IV, paragraph 5). The Soviets have produced thousands of ICBMs since SALT I was signed in which launcher numbers were “frozen.”⁷ The number of mis­siles greatly exceeds the number of newer silos replacing older ones. What happened to the older and extra missiles? Senator James McClure (R-ID) has reported older missiles are now deployed at intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites using “soft” nonaccountable launchers.

The SALT II Treaty lacks precise definitions of what constitutes a “rapid” reload as well as how close “nearby” is for storage sites. The United States claims that Soviet silos can be refurbished and reused in a few days. According to testimony before Congress, the reload time was once described as a matter of hours.⁸ Some re­ports claim that the Soviet SS-18 ICBM has in fact been tested for “rapid” reload and refiring.⁹ There is virtually no discussion of the “nearby” storage sites of missiles since SALT II generally limits launchers, leaving each side unconstrained in missile numbers. A few days’ reload capability apparently is not considered a violation by the United States. This issue is not an agenda item in the SCC.

SALT II prohibits each party from using non-ICBM launchers for ICBM purposes (Article IV, paragraph 8). The Soviet SS-20 is an SS-16 ICBM lacking one stage and with a different front end. The SS-20 was categorized in SALT II as an IRBM, although with a single reentry vehi­cle it is capable of ranges that qualify it as an ICBM and exceed that of the Soviet Navy SS-N-18.

Official U. S. Government sources classify the SS-20’s range in terms of its multiple independently targeted reen­try vehicles (MIRVs), the range of which is less than the

5.500     kilometers required of an ICBM. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), however, listed in its Military Balance 1982-1983 an SS-20 Mod-3 single war­head variant as having a range of 7,400 kilometers. Under Article II of SALT II, if any launcher has been developed and tested for launching ICBMs (by definition exceeding

5.500     kilometers), then all launchers of that type are con­sidered ICBM capable. Yet, throughout the remainder of SALT II, the SS-20 is clearly defined as an IRBM. Hence, either the IISS’s data are incorrect, or the United States has accepted the Soviet “intent” to always use the SS-20 as a theater weapon.

Obviously, this categorization of the SS-20 as an IRBM was agreed to during SALT negotiations. Press reports indicate that, when observed by national technical means (NTM), it is impossible to distinguish between the SS-16 and SS-20 until after launch.¹⁰ All SS-20s can be up­graded theoretically to SS-16, giving the Soviets a “breakout” capability. The SS-20 capability is not an SCC agenda item since no violation of the treaty has taken place.

In October 1982, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin notified the United States that the Soviet Union had test- launched a new ICBM, the SS-X-24. Since that time* there have been numerous reports that the Soviets are test­ing more than one new missile, although one new ICBM is the maximum number permissible under SALT II (Article IV, paragraph 9).

The first test was apparently of a medium-to-heavy mis­sile from a fixed silo that had ten MIRVs. Later tests were of a light mobile missile with one to four reentry vehicles. Although not all U. S. intelligence assets monitored initial firings, adequate data were collected on the 30 May 1983 test.

The possible testing of two ICBMs is to be an item of discussion at the SCC and was one of the violations publp cized by the Reagan administration in January 1984. The Soviets claim that the second missile (the SS-X-25) is not part of the new ICBM series but an improved version of the older SS-13.

If, as the Soviets claim, the SS-X-25 is an upgraded SS-13, then the magnitude of the upgrading itself appears to constitute a violation of SALT II provisions that “pre­vent” major modification of existing missiles (Article lV< paragraph 10). Some press releases state that the SS-X-25 is MIRV capable. The SS-13 has only one reentry vehicle- The SS-X-25 reportedly has a throw-weight 200% that of the SS-13. If true, then such modifications would meet the definition of a “new” ICBM in the First Agreed State­ment and Common Undersanding of Article IV, paragraph 9. It appears an irreversible flagrant violation has taken place.

Another reported SALT II violation is the testing of the SS-18 ICBM in excess of ten reentry vehicles. Tests of the SS-18 took place in 1978 and 1979 in which the bus made more than ten “dips.”¹² To consider this a violation, it¹⁸ necessary to prove that the additional “dips” were of the same kind as those for dispensing reentry vehicles. It permissible to exceed the maximum number as long as it^,s obvious to the opposition that a warhead is not being ^re leased (Article IV, paragraph 10). Complicating the matted is the U. S. acceptance of ten as the maximum nunibe tested.

Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with ranges e* ceeding 600 kilometers and which are carried on “heavy bombers are regulated under SALT II (Article IV, p^ar^ graph 14). “Heavy” bombers are defined as the SoV>^ “Bear,” “Bison,” or any bomber capable of carrying ^a. ALCM with this range (Article II, paragraph 3). The So^vl

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ets reported in their data base that they possessed no heavy bombers capable of carrying these ALCMs. The United States accepted this assertion.

The Department of Defense, however, reported that the AS-3 “Kangaroo” ALCM has a range of 650 kilome­ters.¹³ But the range of the AS-3 has been determined by political and not technical means. Apparently, the trade­off was that the United States would accept less than 600- kilometer range on the AS-3 if the Soviet Union would accept U. S. assurances on the Hound Dog missile.¹⁴

The Department of Defense also reported that the Sovi­ets are developing an ALCM with a range of about 3,000 kilometers for use in “Bears,” “Backfires,” and “Black­jacks.” If there is a violation here, it is not from the sub­stantive issue but rather from a failure in maintaining the data bases used in the SCC (Article XVII, paragraph 3).

SALT II contains both a strict prohibition against inter­ference with NTM and an escape clause that permits con­tinuation of existing methods of construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul (Article XV, paragraph 3). There have been widespread reports in the press of concealment ^at production plants, missile testing at night, and exces­sive encryption of missile test data. For example, Niles Lathem reported in the 23 August 1982 New York Post that there was a ten-acre shed built over 12 rail lines at the SS-18 production plant at Dnepropetrovsk. In the 1 April 1982 Washington Post, Jack Anderson reported that SS- 16s were tested at night. Numerous sources have reported encryption of the SS-18, SS-20, SS-N-19, SS-NX-20, SS-X-24, and SS-X-25. SALT II does permit encryption as long as verification is not impeded. The subject of en­^Cryption is under SCC discussion and was publicized by President Reagan in January 1984.¹⁵ Also, there is an ad­ditional problem of deliberate falsification of missile test data.

The problem in raising the issue of interference with hlTM is that if we admit that the practice is effective, it ^SuPports the contention that the treaty is unverifiable and Undermines the arms control “process.” It would also

reveal a lack of capability by the intelligence community.

SALT II also included a protocol that contained addi­tional restrictions to be in force through 1981. Among them was a prohibition on SS-16 mobile ICBM launchers (Protocol Article 1). Production of some SS-16 missiles themselves is prohibited by a Treaty of Common Under­standing, which has not expired (Article IV, paragraph 8).

The press has repeatedly referred to SS-16s in the So­viet Union. Problems in discussing this issue include the possibility that SS-16 launchers are test and training sites. (This has been refuted by reports that they are operational, which is prohibited by Article XII.) Also possible is that the launchers were fixed and not mobile or that activity at SS-16 sites may have actually been preparation for the SS-X-25.

One press report attempted to quiet alarmists by stating that it was launchers and not missiles that had been sighted, forgetting that SS-16 launchers are prohibited.¹⁶ According to William E. Jackson, a Brookings guest scholar, the Soviets admitted at the SCC to testing mobile launchers.¹⁷ The subject of the SS-16 is a subject for SCC discussion and was publicized by the President in January 1984.¹⁸

Finally, the Protocol in Article II also prohibits deploy­ment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with ranges exceeding 600 kilometers. The Department of Defense reports that the Soviets are developing the SS-NX-21 SLCM, which will have a range of about 3,000 kilome­ters.¹⁹ Obviously, this is not a violation since develop­ment was not prohibited, only deployment.

IISS Military Balance 1983-1984 credits the Soviet Union with a deployed SLCM that exceeds 650 kilome­ters. The Soviets did admit to developing a version of the SS-N-3C SLCM in the 1960s with a range exceeding 600 kilometers. It would be very difficult to call this a viola­tion since the United States apparently accepted Soviet assurances that the missile is not deployed operationally with this excessive range.

A new possible violation results from a disclosure from

Soviet general officers during an SCC meeting in Geneva on 22 November 1983. The Soviets apparently admitted they had more MIRV-capable ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise mis­siles than were permissible under SALT II.²⁰

Other potential violations that have not received much publicity include the possible testing of a new submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23 with a throw-weight greater than allowable limits, the conversion of older SS-11 silos into SS-X-24 launchers in violation of provisions prohibiting single reentry vehicle missile silos being upgraded to a MIRVed capability, and “Backfire” production in excess of the 30-aircraft-per-year promise.²¹

Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms: Soviet compliance with the expired Interim Agreement has been extensively reported in the past. The Soviets have in fact violated the Interim Agreement. Soviet acknowledgement of these violations is fully documented in a State Depart­ment Special Report.²² Violations include the failure to dismantle older ICBM launchers as required by rules gov­erning their replacement by newer launchers. This issue was raised at the SCC where the Soviets agreed to delay sea trials for new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) until ICBM launcher dismantling was complete.

The State Department reports minor procedural difficul­ties since the first incident but states deactivated launchers in question cannot be used to launch missiles or be quickly reactivated. Interestingly, the United States considers cer­tain deactivated Polaris SLBM launchers fully SALT I accountable.

Other SALT 1 violations are not quite so neat. Although the number of ICBM launchers was frozen, the Soviets constructed about 150 new Type III-X silos. They claim these are command and control silos. There is a wide vari­ety of opinions as to why these silos have characteristics of missile silos. It is difficult to label this a violation since the silos probably do not contain missiles. The real problem is that these silos might be converted to missile launchers and represent a “breakout” threat.

A major SALT I violation was the wholesale upgrading of the Soviet ICBM force despite an upper limit to what

constituted allowable growth in silo size. Here, a comb' nation of new technology and extremely poor treaty wor ing permitted the Soviets to strategically upgrade the'f ICBM force while remaining within the precise letter ⁰ the law. The Soviets had specifically rejected the unite eral U. S. definitions in question and warned us of me intentions.                              _h

The Interim Agreement also prohibits interference W' NTM, but the unit of measurement that is constrained ¹

|9»⁴

the launcher. Hence, the encryption is not relevant to the prohibition. Furthermore, the escape clause permits unde­fined continuation of existing practices. Interference with NTM observance of launchers was raised by the SCC but, according to the State Department, not considered a viola­tion since the practices did not impede verification.

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: The ABM Treaty prohibits a nationwide ABM system. The Soviets appear to be building the basis of such a system and could “breakout” of the treaty and quickly implement an effec­tive national defense. The latest evidence is the reported massive battle management radar at Krasnoyarsk.²³ This new phased array early warning radar is apparently ABM capable and is neither near the Soviet border nor oriented outward (required by the treaty).

The ABM Treaty does not define types of radars, and the Soviets claim this radar is for tracking objects in space. This item received extensive publicity in the January White House report. Certain American scientist groups have argued that the Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for antisatellite, not ABM, operations.

Perhaps the other most important violation is the testing of surface-to-air missile (SAM) radars in an ABM mode. Poor treaty wording complicates the matter. The subject was raised at the SCC; treaty compliance was upheld once the Soviets were challenged.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger admitted that SAM radar ABM testing did take place.²⁴ There have been continued reports in the press that SA-5, SA-N-6, SA-10, SA-11, and SA-12 SAMs are being tested in the ABM mode. If true, an SAM ABM capability would be a major building block in a nationwide defense system.

A most interesting rebuttal to the practice has been that the testing is against tactical warheads.²⁵ The treaty only Prohibits ABM systems against strategic warheads. Still, these systems might be effective against U. S./NATO naval strategic warheads.

ABM rapid reloads are also prohibited. Precise defini­tions are not found in the document, although “auto­matic” or “semi-automatic” capability is specifically Prohibited. The press reports that the new Soviet SH-08 ABM system can be reloaded in two hours.²⁶ Since the hardware is underground, NTM cannot monitor the reload method.

In addition, mobile ABM systems are prohibited. Again, widespread press reports of an existing Soviet mobile system are countered by the argument that systems 'n question are “transportable” and not “mobile.”²⁷

Finally, the ABM Treaty set a limit on the number of ^test launching silos, and a common understanding defined *he location of these test sites. The Soviets were caught in 1974 having not actually deactivated excessive ABM launchers and in 1975 of having an extra ABM test range. ^°th items were brought up at the SCC and declared by the State Department as not strategically significant (even 'f true).

Nuclear Testing Treaties: The United States and Soviet ^nion have signed two agreements—the 1974 Threshold

Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions—which regulate the magnitude of under­ground nuclear explosions. The United States has ratified neither agreement. There is a widespread public debate over the ability of the United States to verify that tests are within specified limits. President Reagan reports that the Soviets have exceeded the limit around 15 times. Brand­ing of these tests as violations is complicated, however, because both parties agreed that “1-2 slight unintentional breaches per year would not be considered a violation.” Furthermore, neither treaty has been ratified by the United States, thus the violation would be against the Vienna Convention customary international law rule similar to SALT II.

BiologicallChemical Warfare Agreements: In his speech to the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations on 17 June 1982 and in his more recent report to Congress, President Reagan has officially ac­cused the Soviet Union of violating the 1925 Protocol pro­hibiting the use of poison gases and bacteriological meth­ods and the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. Despite some well-documented State Department special reports, there are problems with such accusations.²⁸

The United States has repeatedly claimed that the Sovi­ets and Afghans are using chemical warfare in Afghani­stan. The Soviet Union, however, can claim that this use is not a violation to the 1925 Protocol since a state of war does not exist, and they specifically appended a reserva­tion to the Protocol stating it only applies to conflicts with nations that are parties. Afghanistan is not a party. War crimes, trials conducted by the Soviet Union, seem to in­dicate they accept the ban on chemical warfare as custom­ary international law. Unfortunately, the Protocol lacks any mechanism for compliance enforcement.

The United States has documented the use of various toxic agents in Southeast Asia. Agents are being used by Laotians internally, but Laos has not signed any prohibi­tion against use. The Vietnamese adhered to the 1925 Pro­tocol in 1980 but appended the Soviet-style reservation. If a violation of these agreements in Southeast Asia can be attributed to the Soviet Union, it would be because the Soviets transferred biological agents or delivery mecha­nisms to these states. Supervision of Laotian, Kam­puchean, and Vietnamese use is not prohibited.

That toxic agents in the Soviet inventory may not be biologically but chemically produced, as implied by an East German text, is no matter.²⁹ The Convention regu­lates agents or toxins “whatever their origin or method of production.”

Conclusion: The Soviets have violated the SALT I In­terim Agreement and ABM Treaty. The Soviets are in fact not living up to the SALT II Treaty, although the specific violation is that of customary international law and possi­ble political commitments but not the treaty. The Soviets may have violated existing chemical warfare agreements in Afghanistan as expressed in customary international law and have violated the biological warfare agreement by transfer of agents/means in Southeast Asia. Compliance

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SOVIET MILITARY POWER 1984

that

Despite assurances from arms control supporters

with nuclear testing agreements is difficult to determine.

The debate over arms control violations occurs at dis­tinct levels. On one hand, it can be shown that few legal violations have in fact transpired because of the difficulty in establishing what constitutes a legal violation. On the other hand, the Soviets have done certain deeds that Con­gress and many Americans have been led to believe are prohibited. Many experts have assured the public that vio­lations are not taking place or that NTM is capable of detecting significant violations. These same experts, when pressed, acknowledge that most of these actions did occur but do not constitute a violation or significant violation.

The Soviets appear to be strict constructionists. To dis­cuss a violation, it must first be established that a treaty is in force and that both sides have agreed to a specific provi­sion. Strict constructionism means that extremely precise wording is mandatory in future treaties instead of vague provisions. We should not expect the Soviets to live up to the spirit of an agreement.

We must assume Soviet nonadherence to loopholes and therefore routinely explore circumvention of existing agreements by also investigating what is not regulated. For example, we should consider the possibility that “Ty- phoon”-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile subma­rines have reloads on board. Submarine-launched ballistic missile reloads are not prohibited by any existing agree­ment, and the tonnage/missile for a “Typhoon” is roughly twice that for a “Delta.” Recent press reports state the SS-NX-20 is being loaded on board “Typhoon” in clips of two.³⁰ Here is an area that could be regulated under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

Skepticism about assurances from arms control “ex­perts” is warranted. Often, to sell an agreement in the United States, experts provide assurances of what is meant by provisions. The specific wording of a document itself should be the source of all assurance. We should also guard against failures to maintain data bases and semantic infiltration from these agreements. For example, the Sovi­ets do not have 62 ballistic missile submarines; they have about 85. The more common number 62 refers only ^t0 those regulated by SALT I.

Verification of compliance with arms control agree­ments takes the threat assessment question out of the hands of the military and intelligence communities and places it in the hands of diplomats and politicians. Reason­able standards of determining facts are replaced by legalis­tic proof requirements.³¹

Violations are difficult to detect, and the West is sell- deterred from publicizing them, because of a fear of ex­posing intelligence capabilities (or lack of), the need to then act, which will expend resources, and of backlash from arms control supporters. Supporters are quick to de­nounce criticism of arms control by talking in terms of th^e “process” and building blocks for future agreements. • seems the real definition of a violation is whether it ^|S strategically significant, repeated, provable, not irrevers­ible, and whether the public will cause political problems-

Verification is not the major stumbling block to arms control agreements. We probably can verify compli^anC° and lack of compliance. What is the issue is that once have verified that a prohibited act has occurred, mechanisms exist to ensure that the offending action W ^ cease or that parties will appropriately redress the action

adequate remedies do exist, the answer is often talk t° lowed by inaction. World public opinion is generally ¹⁰ sufficient to modify Soviet behavior. New negotiation and addressing issues in the proper channels are time-con suming and often unfruitful. The threat of tit-for-tat sc improvement, sanctions, or withdrawal is self-deterred^ the West because of political constituencies including strong arms control community. The ultimate self-hc y< military action, is an empty threat.

Hence, we must proceed with the arms control P^roCC*_si but we must do so with our eyes wide open. We m ^ accept from the start that the Soviets will violate and ^e

19»^J

ploit agreements, while the West will probably live up to both the letter and the spirit of the law. Democracies often do nothing to enforce treaty compliance from totalitarian states. The West chooses to live with this dilemma. We must tailor future agreements with this in mind and incor­porate compensatory provisions such as routine indepen­dent oversight of treaty compliance and data base mainte­nance. We also must dispel the notion that security can only result through arms control. Good national defense capabilities can also buy security.

The uncertainty of the arms control process is well un­derstood by experts but not by the public. The American public has the right to judge these issues and can properly do so once presented with all the facts. In the meantime, our negotiators, arms control officials, and Congress must understand both the legal and political nature of arms con­trol verification as well as the lessons learned from the past. It is not enough to react, we must anticipate and understand arms control.

'Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 253. 'Martin A. Rogoff, “The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Un­ratified Treaty,” Maine Law Review, No. 2, 1980, pp. 263-299; Robert F. Turner, “Legal Implications of Deferring Ratification of SALT II,” Virginia Journal of international Law, Summer 1981, pp. 749-784.

“Andrei Gromyko’s Press Conference in Bonn,” News and Views From the USSR, Press Release, Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., 19 January 1983, P- 5.

Pact Sheet accompanying “The President’s Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,” White House press release, 23 January 1983, p. 5.

SALT II Agreement, Selected Documents No. 12B, U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, July 1979), Article III, pp. 18-20. All references to SALT II made hereafter in the text are cited from this document.

^John Loftus, Washington Times, 5 January 1983, p. 3.

U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 2nd. ed. (Washington, P‘C.; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 6.

Soviet Military Power, 2nd ed., p. 21; U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee, Panel on The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Com­prehensive Test Ban Treaty; SALT II: An Interim Assessment, HASC No. 95-95 (Washington, D.C.; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 14.

George C. Wilson, Washington Post, 16 April 1983, p. 13; Committee on Present ganger, Has America Become Number II?, June 1982, p. 16.

₎ 'Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 1 April 1982, pp. 13-21.

'Hendrick Smith, The New York Times, 12 August 1983, p. 3; White House press telease.

Miles M. Costick, “Soviet Military Posture and Strategic Trade,” National Secu- Uty in the 1980’s: From Weakness to Strength, W. Scott Thompson, ed. (San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 192; Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York, N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, *980), p. 264; Navy Times, 14 June 1982, p. 23.

^,3U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington. D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1981), p. 61.

^,4See Department of State response to a request by Senator Church: SALT II Nego­tiating Record on Various Issues, 15 August 1979, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1979, pp. 553-554; Talbott, p. 234. ¹⁵Michael Getler, Washington Post, 6 June 1983, p. 27. See also White House press release, which cites difficulty in determining SS-X-25 characteristics because of excessive encryption.

^,6“Washington Roundup: Cautious Start,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 June 1982, p. 19.

^,7Michael Gordon, National Journal, 7 May 1983, p. 956.

¹⁸Hendrick Smith, The New York Times, 12 August 1983, p. 3; White House press release.

¹⁹Soviet Military Power, 2nd ed., p. 23.

²⁰Ted Agres, “Fresh Cheating Laid to Soviets on SALT,” Washington Times, 8 December 1983, p. 1.

^2,Ted Agres, “Soviets Defy SALT II, Prepare MX-type Silos,” Washington Times, 23 December 1983, p. 4.

²²U. S. Department of State, “Compliance with SALT I Agreement,” Special Report No. 55, July 1979, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1979, pp. 313-325, hereafter cited as Special Report No. 55. ²³Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, New York Post, 27 July 1983, p. 35. Since this initial report, there have been numerous reports in Aviation Week and Space Technology.

²⁴John Loftus, Washington Times, 15 September 1982, p. 3.

²⁵Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 5 April 1983, p. C-15.

²⁶“Soviet Test Defense Missile Reload,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 29 August 1983, p. 19; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “Soviets Accelerate Missile De­fense,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16 January 1984, p. 15.

²⁷Special Report No. 55; Malcom Wallop, “Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements: So What?” Strategic Review, Summer 1983, p. 18.

²⁸U. S. Department of State, “Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia,” Current Policy No. 342, Statement by Richard Burt before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10 November 1981; “Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Af­ghanistan, ’ Special Report No. 98, Report to the Congress from Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 22 March 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982); “Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update,” Spe­cial Report No. 104, Report from George P. Schultz, November 1982 (Washing­ton, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982); “Yellow Rain: The Arms Control Implication, Current Policy No. 458, Statement by Lawrence S. Eagleburger before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24 Feb­ruary 1983, Chemical Weapons Use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan,” Current Policy No. 553, U. S. Submission to the U.N. Secretary General, 21 February 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

²⁹SpeciaI Report No. 98, pp. 17-18.

Washington Roundup,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 November 1983, p. 17.

Robert Joseph DeSutter, “Arms Control Verification,” PhD dissertation, Univer­sity of Southern California, April 1983, p. 453.

Commander Tritten is a rated subspecialist in strategic planning, interna­tional affairs (Soviet Union and Europe), and antisubmarine warfare. A naval aviator, he has a BA from the School of International Service at American University, an MA from the Florida State University, and an AM from the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations. He is currently a doctoral candidate at the University of South­ern California.