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U. S. pilotless aircraft have been around in many configurations—a World War / flying bomb biplane, above, a 1960s drone ASW helicopter, left, a Vietnam veteran RPV, above, facing page, and a multimission SkyEye R4E-30, right—over the past six decades. And it may be that we ain’t seen nothing yet.
Never send a man where you can send a bullet, so said Sam Colt, 19th century inventor and firearms expert. Notwithstanding the demonstrated technological capability and much ballyhooed performance the Harpoon and Tomahawk missile systems, the U. S- Navy has yet to field an operational system that can achieve Mr. Colt’s bullet concept. That system is the mini-remotely piloted vehicle (RPV).
Since about 11 years after Wilbur and Orville WrigW first made their historic flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in 1903, there have been RPVs. RPV use, however, has been relegated in most instances to that of targe1 drone. Only recently have they piqued the interest of mil*'
Defeating Surface-to-Air Missiles
AWACS or EA-6
Carrier Strike Aircraft
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Jr Surface-to-Air Missiles
tary planners because of their expanded capabilities. Many considerations have added to the RPV’s attractiveness. For example:
► Expanding technology has provided a degree of miniaturization that has allowed highly advanced sensors to be packaged into a small weight and size.
► Increasing costs of major weapon systems have generated a need for low-cost alternatives.
► Increasing potency of threat weapons has generated a need to reevaluate the use of our scarce, high-cost military resources in a high-threat environment.
Because of its relative low cost, high survivability based on small size, inherent flexibility, and capability developed through state-of-the-art technology, the remotely piloted vehicle has become most attractive for expanded military application.
A Long History:x RPVs and their cruise missile cousins share a 60-year heritage. The U. S. Navy first attempted to employ pilotless aircraft in 1917 when Glenn Hammond Curtiss was contracted to deliver a pilotless biplane for use as an aerial torpedo. Although the “flying bomb” was not controlled from the ground, the gunner’s objective was to judge the distance to the target and set the engine to run until the desired point was reached. At the preset range, the engine was supposed to stop and the wings fall away, allowing the fuselage to drop onto the target.
Economic restraints occasioned by the end of World War I essentially ended U. S. development of RPW- Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, in Great Britain, work continued at a steady pace. The British, in an attempt to satisfy their own economic restrictions, sought to replace wartime aircraft losses with low-cost, pilotless aircraft- The fruition of this development occurred on 3 September 1924. A pilotless biplane, with full radio control in place of the clockwork mechanism used to provide prepr®' grammed flight control inputs, flew from the deck of HMS Stronghold. Although the flight culminated after only minutes because of engine failure, it marked the first true RPV.
Thereafter, British development of pilotless airplatie-j scored success after success. Their aircraft were desigr>e to fly 300 miles. In July 1927, one of the aircraft launch® from Stronghold and designated “long-range gun 'vlt Lynx engine”—LARYNX—successfully flew the fu length of a course over the sea off the coast of Somers® ' Devon, and Cornwall. From then on, British RPV deve opment was directed solely at perfecting a target drone firing practice. Spurred on by the debate between t Royal Air Force and Royal Navy about the vulnerability1 capital ships to attack by aircraft, the Air Ministry contracted for a radio-controlled target aircraft specifically for simulated attacks against the fleet. In January 1933, a drone accompanied the Home Fleet during its spring cruise to the Mediterranean. The pilotless aircraft is said to have survived more than two hours of concentrated gunnery before being recovered safely. Although it was downed four months later, the Royal Navy learned an important lesson in both gunnery and the need for RPVs.
In the United States, the ancestor of modem U. S. RPVs was being developed in Hollywood. Actor Reginald Denny’s nine-foot-span model airplane was being marketed to the U. S. services as a target drone to replace the inore expensive Tiger Moth biplanes, which were being used in prewar fleet exercises. Suddenly, in 1942, the United States found itself engulfed in World War II, and a new impetus was generated for these miniature target drones. By war’s end, almost 14,000 drones had been delivered to the U. S. Army and Navy.2
U. S. RPV development went into remission again following World War II until the intelligence-gathering needs of the late 1950s and early 1960s stimulated a resurgence of effort to fill the gap caused by the inadequacies of manned aircraft. U. S. intelligence and political efforts suffered three catastrophies, which again brought RPVs into close scrutiny:
^ On 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 was downed over the Soviet Union, and he was taken prisoner. As a result, the Paris summit was cancelled, and the United States was politically embarrassed.
► Two weeks later, a U. S. RB-47 conducting electronic surveillance was downed over the Barents Sea. The Soviet Union captured two of the five crewmen.
^ In October 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a U. S. U-2 was shot down by a Cuban missile, killing the pilot.
Although the urgency of these incidents was not enough to provide RPVs for immediate use, they were ready by 1964 for use in Vietnam. Between 1964 and 1965, more Rian 3,435 RPV sorties were flown over Southeast Asia. Missions included photo reconnaissance, electronic intelligence gathering, bomb damage assessment, psychological warfare (propaganda leaflet dropping), and electronic Warfare. While nearly 5,000 U. S. airmen were killed in Southeast Asia, RPVs allowed their “pilots” to return safely from each mission. Not only did RPVs save lives, however; with their use, the political ramifications of captured aircrews were avoided.3 In fact, Chinese display of Wrecked RPVs in Peking, downed during illegal overflights of their country, seldom brought even formal diplomatic protest.4
Battlefield Integration: Today, tactical RPVs have been Proving their mettle in hostile environments almost daily. Integration of RPVs with tactical strike aircraft has played a major role in Israeli successes against Soviet-made air defense systems in Lebanon. As far back as 1973, the Israelis employed harassment drones during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to saturate enemy air defense systems and allow strike aircraft to attack Egyptian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites while they reloaded.5
Most recently, Israeli success in destroying Syrian SA-6 sites has been directly attributed to their use of RPVs.6 While low-flying RPVs configured “electronically” to resemble aircraft occupied Syrian gunners, higher-flying reconnaissance aircraft photographed SAM firings and collected data on their location and electronic parameters. In other cases, once the SAM sites were radiating, the Israelis fired antiradiation missiles at them, knocking out the antennas. Then, attack aircraft quickly followed in to drop munitions on the missiles or control vans.
RPVs also furnished combat commanders with near real-time tactical reconnaissance. Equipped with electrooptical sensor packages and digital data links, RPVs provided imagery of enemy positions and even enemy fighters positioned on runways for takeoff. Equipped with zoom magnification, high-resolution imagery was projected on screens overlayed with maps of Lebanon to give battlefield commanders a complete picture of the fighting. Instrumental in these successes was the low rate of attrition for the vehicles. Because of their small size and low infrared signature, the RPVs were virtually immune to hostile fire.7
Applications to Naval Warfare: RPV development within the U. S. Navy can be kindly characterized as low- key. Such roadblocks to technological change as institutional bias and bureaucratic inertia can be blamed in part for U. S. failure to adapt RPVs for naval missions. However, U. S. Navy sluggishness in developing RPVs is probably more closely related to the fact that aviators normally oversee aviation projects. Rapid, successful development of a program that could one day make your job obsolete can be less than conducive to career longevity.
However, the Navy recently procured an Israeli designed and produced RPV system for naval applications. In testimony before a congressional subcommittee in early March, Admiral Watkins indicated that the Navy was procuring ‘both the reconnaissance drone as well as drones for other purposes.”8
The greatest rewards for near-term RPV development lie in their use in augmenting current tactical aircraft (TacAir) assets and in integrating their capabilities with other battle group platforms. The secret is to develop specific vehicles for specific missions. For example, three platforms could be designed to cover most naval missions. In addition to basic control data links, each vehicle might include the following capabilities:
► Intelligence/Reconnaissance Vehicle
Television and forward-looking infrared radar Data link information exchange Communications intelligence and signals intelligence relay capability Laser designator
► Harassment Vehicle
Electronic support measures system Explosive warhead
► Electronic Warfare Vehicle
Jamming capability Chaff laying capability
Whether operating as part of a carrier battle group, amphibious ready group, or surface strike group built around the New Jersey (BB-62) or Iowa (BB-61), a squadron of RPVs finds application in every conceivable mission area. A number of warfare areas and RPV applications follow to illustrate this point.
Antiair Warfare (AAW): Most effective in a low-threat AAW environment, RPVs could be used in coordination with fighter aircraft or alone. The low-threat AAW scenario envisaged is one in which Third World tactical aircraft are providing opposition. Working in consonance with combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft, RPVs could visually identify threat aircraft while the CAP aircraft stay outside the range of threat weapons and remain ready to engage at the first sign of hostilities. In the absence of organic battle group air assets, the remotely piloted vehicles could be used for the same identification procedure. This would allow greater time for weapon release decisions while satisfying rules-of-engagement requirements and reducing the possibilities of inadvertent friendly-ver- sus-friendly engagements.
Another benefit in the AAW arena could be to establish an airborne positive identification zone to visually identify friendly aircraft returning to the force, thereby reducing friendly losses. Transmitting video pictures directly to a surface control ship, several RPVs could be positioned along the threat axis to provide in-depth coverage. The same approach could be applied to the AAW problem in the amphibious objective area, especially in the absence of a carrier to provide dedicated support. Returning helicopters and transitioning close-air-support aircraft could be quickly identified while still at a respectable distance from the main amphibious group.
Antisurface Warfare (ASUW): Probably the most difficult aspect of ASUW is detecting and localizing threat surface platforms before they can bring their weapons to bear—whether these weapons are antiship capable missiles or simply ship gun systems. Carrier battle group TacAir assets providing long-range surface search work well in this mission. However, the assets required to thoroughly search the surveillance area are considerable, and by tying up these assets in the search mission, they will be lost to other missions. Once the threat is located, it must be continuously tracked, further exacerbating the situation. During peacetime, the additional opportunity costs of depriving our primary attack aircraft, A-6s and A-7s, of needed practice in ordnance delivery and tactics development, since they are spending most of their energy doing surface search, are difficult to quantify. Several reconnaissance RPVs, under the control of a surface platform or, better, under the control of an airborne early warning plat-
RPVs like this one launched from the USS Ranger (CVA- 61) on a photo reconnaissance mission during the Vietnam War were quite successful in that conflict. In only one year, more than 3,400 sorties were flown over Southeast Asia.
form to extend the total surveillance area, could replace surface search aircraft in this role. In the absence of TacAir, applying an RPV equipped for both day and night surveillance would prove powerful in over-the-horizon targeting. With continuous contact maintained on the threat platform, Harpoon-equipped surface shooters could stand off in virtual electronic silence and be ready to engage on command of the ASUW commander.
Operating in coordination with an aircraft war-at-sea strike, a combination of reconnaissance, harassment, and electronic warfare RPVs would improve the chances of a successful strike. While the reconnaissance RPV would be positioned to positively identify the target and provide laser designation at the last minute for smart standoff weapons, harassment RPVs designed to electronically simulate friendly aircraft could attack various ships’ radars, disrupting command and control on board the target and creating confusion long enough for air-launched Harpoon and antiradiation missiles to find their targets.
This approach to war at sea becomes even more urgent when an attack against the newer Soviet surface platforms such as the Kirov cruiser with her impressive lineup of AAW weapons is considered. The need for a technological edge cannot be better demonstrated than in this war-at-sea scenario.
Strike Warfare: Strike warfare encompasses the ability to carry out offensive naval operations against targets ashore. This capability resides with TacAir from the carrier battle group and with amphibious forces. Nonetheless, RPV augmentation for this sometime-neglected area of naval warfare could provide excellent dividends. RPVs operating from surface platforms safely out to sea would provide a near real-time reconnaissance picture of SAM placements, lucrative targets, bomb damage assessment, and even hostile air reaction from opposing airfields. Controlled and relayed through an airborne early warning aircraft, information could be presented directly to the force commander on board his flagship. With the addition of
lected targets would ensure maximum battle damage at the lowest cost to friendly assets.
RPVs could also augment naval gunfire support for amphibious landings. In addition to providing a last-minute photographic update of the objective area, RPVs could Provide laser designation of targets for laser-guided projectiles. Thus, RPVs could furnish pinpoint accuracy for targeting and, unlike TacAir, be available at any time, day 0r night, without competing priorities.
Events in Lebanon early this year underscored this vacuum in our capabilities. Naval gunfire support from our surface combatants off the coast, especially from the New Jersey, was used regularly to suppress artillery fire threatening the Multinational Force while the units were still ushore. Although the accuracy of this fire has been questioned, there is little doubt that the New Jersey’s 16-inch §uns accomplished the intended mission—suppression of hostile fire.
Nevertheless, the addition of an RPV would have been 'tieally suited to this mission. By spotting for the naval §unfire, in addition to damage assessment, an RPV could uuve improved the accuracy of the fire support. In fact, an 'ucrease in accuracy from the naval guns may have nested the need for air strikes within range of seaborne artillery.
In addition, employing a reconnaissance RPV in place °f tactical air reconnaissance pod system (TARPS)- jNuipped F-14s could have spared these aircraft and crews mm regular exposure to hostile missile fire and allowed meir selective use, obviating the political imperative to respond to attacks on our reconnaissance aircraft.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW): RPVs designed specifically for ASW operations could expand the flexibility of °Ur ASW forces both with and without the addition of Canier-based ASW aircraft. RPVs designed to carry a lim-
Some of the Mastiffs on this Israeli assembly line may now be in the U. S. Navy inventory, as a result of the Navy’s recent procurement from that country. Mastiffs are operated with portable control stations, which enable them to take off and land at a site distant from the control station.
ited number of sonobuoys could lay patterns and then climb to altitude and relay any information from the sonobuoys directly to the ASW module on board ship for processing. In a hot war scenario, an RPV equipped with a single torpedo could also be kept on station for urgent attacks if required. Or, conversely, the on-station RPV could be used in coordinated operations with ASW aircraft and helicopters. Designed to notify other ASW assets when sonobuoy activity is detected, the RPV could monitor the sonobuoy patterns layed by other aircraft while they operated in separate areas concentrating on electronic support measures, radar, or visual search.
Intelligence and Command and Control: An RPV equipped with remotely operated communications and signals intelligence monitoring systems could fill a void left when national sensors were not available. These RPVs would simply relay all data received directly to monitoring stations on board ship for analysis and interpretation. In addition, RPVs equipped with simple devices such as a radio relay capability could add to greater command, control, and communications flexibility for the entire force. Such a nonurgent capability as communication by ultrahigh frequency over the horizon with other units could be accomplished at almost any time.
Conclusion: The technology is available, and has been demonstrated, to produce an RPV capable of contributing
to most all aspects of naval warfare. Their application is limited only by the imagination of naval tacticians. Integrated into battle group operations, either with or without tactical air power, RPVs can provide a technological multiplier of much greater magnitude than their miniature stature might portend. The U. S. Navy should enlist this technology as an active member of the seakeeping team today. As Doctor Edward Teller, the father of the nuclear age, has opined, “The unmanned vehicle today is a technology akin to the importance of radar and computers in 1935.”9 ‘This section is adapted from John W. R. Taylor (ed.), Jane's Book of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 11-31. 2Ibid., p. 25.
3Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Where Have All the RPVs Gone?” Armed Forces Journal International, Februrary 1982, p. 40.
4Taylor, p. 30.
5Schemmer, p. 44.
6Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “Surveillance Integration Pivotal in Israeli Successes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 5 July 1982, p. 16.
7Robinson, p. 17.
8“Navy Buys Israeli RPVs to Spot Lebanon Targets,” Aerospace Daily, 8 March 1984, p. 44.
9 Schemmer, p. 38.
Commander Parker was commissioned in 1971 and has served in carrier airborne early warning squadrons (VAWs), the E-2C training squadron, and the staff of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Wing-12. In addition, he has served as Flag Lieutenant to Commander, Battle Force Sixth Fleet, and is a 1980 graduate of the Naval War College. He is currently assigned as the executive officer of VAW-120.
The Life Savers
By Major Gary I. Wilson, U. S. Marine Corps
Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) are unmanned aircraft piloted by remote control from a distant location. RPVs perform missions often too risky and costly for manned aircraft and are particularly useful over heavily defended hostile territory rich in air defenses. RPVs are virtually invisible and soundless to the ground observer using either visual or electronic means of observation. Their low radar profiles and masked signatures give RPVs “stealth” characteristics enabling them to complete missions covertly.
RPV technology has matured to a point where it demands Navy and Marine Corps attention. The RPV offers the Marine frontline commander a way of looking over the next hill without risking costly aviation assets. Unlike manned aircraft, the RPV can provide the combat commander with real-time combat information and can verify and complement intelligence. The RPV can furnish the commander of the amphibious task force with surveillance and reconnaissance of the sea, coastline, and force beachhead. The RPV can be used in conjunction with naval gunfire and carrier aircraft to acquire targets, defeat surface-to-air missiles, and suppress enemy radar. The RPV does not need extensive ground and airfield facilities from which to operate. In the early stages of any naval campaign, the RPV would prove valuable. Amidst today’s modern weaponry, several RPVs have emerged.
Canadair LTD CL-227 (Peanut): The CL-227 is a rotary-winged remotely piloted helicopter (RPH). Its nickname, Peanut, reflects its unusual shape. Powered by a gas turbine engine, the CL- 227’s flight endurance time is two to three hours. Maximum speed is 130 knots, and it has a 31-kilogram payload. Because the CL-227 is an RPH, it does not need a net, parachute, or landing strip for recovery. This unique recovery and launch capability has shipboard application. The Peanut can fly and hover over enemy territory at treetop level, making it difficult to detect. It is primarily a single-purpose system with a limited payload, currently not in full production, and still in the development stage.
Scout: The Scout, a twin-boom fiberglass RPV, is manufactured by Israel Aircraft Industries. Generally, a Scout unit consists of four to six RPVs, a launcher, a ground control station, a retrieval net, and a crew of 12. The Scout is reportedly being used under all weather conditions over hostile territory. Some RPV experts are skeptical of the Scout’s performance other than in the desert. By U. S. standards, the Scout is considered relatively unsophisticated and not state-of-the-art. Nevertheless, the combat-proven success of the Scout vehicle speaks for itself.
Mastiff: The Tadiran Mastiff has also been combat-proven by Israel. It has a two-cylinder piston engine, which drives a two-blade pusher propeller. With up to one kilowatt of electrical power available. Mastiff can employ a variety of equipment, such as a television camera, electronic warfare package, and laser designator. The U. S. Navy has purchased some Mastiffs.
Aquila: Lockheed is developing the Aquila for the U. S. Army. This RPV is capable of three hours of flight and is recoverable by net. The Aquila is designed for all-weather missions, day or night. It has a sophisticated state-of- the-art electronics package. Critics argue the Aquila is too expensive and complex. It seems the Army has chosen to make the Aquila an all-purpose RPV; thus it will create a vehicle too costly to use or with which to train.
SkyEye: The SkyEye, produced by Developmental Sciences, Inc., is a low-cost RPV designed to be multipurpose by simply interchanging payloads. It is a twin-boom vehicle of composite construction powered by a 40-horsepower two-cycle engine. The SkyEye can be recovered by net, parachute, or skids. Admittedly, the SkyEye does not have all the electronic sophistication ot Aquila, but it does offer greater flight endurance, payloads, and tolerance in center of gravity, which allows it to fire 2.75-inch rockets. The SkyEye’s potential as an offensive weapon capable of defeating surface-to-air missiles> destroying command posts and logistic operation centers, and countering the Mi-8 “Hip” and Mi-24 “Hind” helicopters warrants close examination.
The SkyEye costs less per vehicle than the Aquila.
Conclusion: Apathy is the major rea son for the lack of support for RPVs- RPV technology, as typified by SkyEye, has progressed far enough to suggest additional off-the-shelf procurements. Both the Navy and Marine Corps should scrutinize proposed manned aircraft developments and ensure that adequate consideration be given to the use of RPVs.
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