The FFG-7s in War and Peace

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The late Hoosier comic Herb Shriner never failed to draw a laugh when he told of his boyhood pal who was always trying to put square pegs in round holes.

“And he could do it, too,” Shriner added, “he was stronger than most kids.” But, there’s nothing funny about the charge that the Navy’s newest class of escort, the FFG-7s, are “square pegs” that don’t fit into the Navy’s “round holes of operational planning.” Lieutenant Commander Bruce Linder used those words in the June 1983 Proceedings and, in August 1983, we announced a contest designed to augment the several constructive suggestions Linder made on how best to employ the FFG-7s strategically and tactically. The envelopes have all been opened, and, as will be seen on the pages that follow, a clear winner has emerged: the Oliver Hazard Perry -class guided missile frigates.

The FFG-7s in War and Peace

By Lieutenant Dennis T. Stokowski, U. S. Navy

Duncan (FFG-10)

Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) Clifton Sprague (FFG-16) Wadsworth (FFG-9)

Clark (FFG-11)

George Philip (FFG-12)

Samuel Eliot Morison (FFG-13) Sides (FFG-14)

Eslocin (FFG-15)

John A. Moore (FFG-19) Antrim (FFG-20)

Lewis B. Puller (FFG-23) Flatley (FFG-21)

Mahlon S. Tisdale (FFG-27) Fahrion (FFG-22)

Copeland (FFG-25)

We know what escorts do in wartime: protect vulnerable ships from enemy attack. But what are the FFG-7s, designed especially for the escort mission, supposed to do in peacetime? Presumably, get ready for the next war. How the FFG-7s prepare themselves in peacetime will go far in determining their wartime value to the fleet.

In discussing the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, three employment schemes seem most plausible. These were enumerated by Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters, U. S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, in con­gressional testimony: “These frigates are intended to accompany amphibious forces, underway replenishment groups, and serve as convoy escorts to provide protection against air, surface, and subsurface threats.”¹ Although these are not the only tasks that these new ships can conduct, these missions are good points of departure for an analysis of tactics that a task group commander can employ to get the maximum use from his FFG-7s.

When an FFG-7 is assigned to one of these three missions, any tactical decisions involving that frigate must consider both inter­nal and external factors. The external factors include the type of threat, location of forces, the environment, and the number and type of other platforms in the same formation. The internal fac­tors include the weapon systems on board the frigate in question, including both the number and type of helicopters embarked. Internal factors are especially important in so large a ship class because the last hull off the builder’s ways will be considerably more capable than the first. Generally, the USS Underwood (FFG-36) and later ships will be equipped with the SQR-19 tacti­cal towed array sonar (TACTAS), Mk-16 close-in weapon sys­tem, Mk-36 super rapid-blooming offboard chaff (SRBOC), and the rapid assistance, securing, and traversing (RAST) system.² Although installation of the SQR-19 on the FFG-7 through FFG- 35 seems reasonable, the required lengthening of these hulls (ex­cept for the FFG-8, which was lengthened) to accommodate RAST does not seem likely.

The LAMPS-1II SF1-60B helicopter is due in the fleet in fiscal year 1985 and will be assigned to the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. One must remember, however, that the Seahawk will also be committed to Spruance (DD-963)-, Kidd (DDG-993)-, and Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class ships; therefore, many FFG-7s are likely to deploy without this help until a substantial number of the aircraft become available. This is unfortunate when one considers that the Oliver Hazard Perry class is the first U. S. Navy escort built in the last 20 years that will not have a standoff antisubmarine weapon. The design philosophy assumed that such a capability is not necessary on board a ship with two heli­copters, each of which can deliver antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons at extended ranges. The error of this assumption is ob­vious when one considers that it will be many years before there are sufficient numbers of Seahawks to assign just one to each frigate!

Besides taking into account the FFG’s strategic task and spe­cific equipment, one must also consider whether the Unite States is engaged in a global war or deploying ships in peace­time. (The “peacetime” setting includes conflicts that do not drastically alter the overall distribution of our naval forces.; The reason for this distinction is that the best preparation for war would be deployments as close as possible to those one worn expect in wartime. The constraints imposed by the necessity ^t0 “show the flag” as well as to maintain a fleet with peacetime dollars does not always allow for this. For example, one-third o U. S. aircraft carriers are generally deployed, whereas fewer than one-quarter of the escorts are in such a state. Presumably.¹ war were imminent, an increased readiness posture would ensure a greater number of deployable escorts. The net result is that in peacetime an FFG-7 might be part of a carrier battle group- whereas war plans may have the FFG-7 as part of an underway replenishment group.

In addition to U. S. military posture, another concern must be addressed when discussing the tactics for employing the OH^ve Hazard Perry class. Although the Navy’s leadership may ^say that there is only one Navy, the constraint imposed upon a ship by making one-half of her crew part-time employees greatly r^e' duces the peacetime effectiveness of that ship. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 1, the frigates being turned over to the reserves have hull numbers below 36.³ This is the “unimproved” version and will remain that way for the near future. These 16 ships are an important part of the Navy, but because their reserve status may have a significant impact on planning for their future u^sej they should be considered separately when discussing tactica considerations of the Oliver Hazard Perry class.

One of the most important tactical considerations for the FFG-7 is where to station the frigate relative to the formation being escorted. The officer in tactical command must weigh eac applicable factor to find the best location for his FFG-7.

The passive capabilities of the SQR-19 TACTAS call l°^r stationing an FFG-7 beyond the second or third convergence zone of the escorted group. This is especially true for high speed of advance in which task group self-noise, as well as the ratio o

Table 1 Naval Reserve Force FFG-7 Implementation

Ship NameIHull Number                      Home Port     D^a,e

Long Beach                    Jan 84

Philadelphia                    May

Philadelphia                      Aug    ⁸⁴

Long Beach                 Jun ⁸'

Philadelphia             Sep ⁸²

To Be Determined           Jan ⁸

To Be Determined            Jun ⁸

To Be Determined            Aug ⁸

To Be Determined               Sep ⁸

To Be Determined        Jan ⁸

To Be Determined           Jan ⁸

To Be Determined               Jan ⁸

To Be Determined              Nov

To Be Determined               Jan ⁸

To Be Determined               Jan ⁸

To Be Determined               Jan ⁸

sprint-drift time for the towing ship, will be high.

The presence of a helicopter on the FFG-7 also pushes the ship’s station outward, as one does not have to consider gaps in coverage between ships in an outer ASW screen. This is espe­cially true with LAMPS-III, where information passing between the helo and “home plate” will be extremely efficient. The pres­ence of two LAMPS-III Seahawks makes distant stationing even more feasible because greater areas of sonar interest may be in­vestigated. Two Seahawks would also lend flexibility should it become necessary to position the FFG-7 in close proximity to the main body; it is still possible to maintain a credible sonobuoy barrier using two helos. Doing so with only a single helo on each FFG-7 would be extremely difficult.

The installation of SRBOC with the SLQ-32 implies stationing near the escorted vessels so that these systems could—in con­junction with those on other escorts—provide an umbrella of Protection. This is important when the air threat is greater than •he submarine threat, although the presence of cruise missiles on am, surface, and subsurface platforms makes closer stationing a consideration in all three threat environments.

The Standard missile system (unlike some of the other weap­ons discussed) will be installed on all ships of the FFG-7 class, and would therefore seem to pose less of a tactical dilemma. But •his is not the case because the SM-1 (MR) missile profile, in most scenarios, is best used from a position very near the tar­red vessel. Consequently, if a considerable number of other missile ships are available, it might be best to let those ships do •he antiair warfare (AAW) work and station the FFG-7s in the outer ASW barrier. This appears more reasonable when one con­siders that the older guided missile ships are generally equipped ^with the SQS-23 sonar and do not have the passive capability of the FFG-7s with the SQR-19. The superior AAW capability of an SM-1/2 (ER) missile-equipped ship over that of an SM-1 (MR)- cquipped FFG makes a further case for placing the frigates away from other AAW ships. Finally, if a “Backfire” bomber equipped with an AS-4 “Kitchen” antiship missile is likely to uttack, the capability of the FFG-7 class—without a three-di­mensional radar and with only a medium-range surface-to-air missile—makes an intercept unlikely, and the relative impor­tance of the FFG-7 as an AAW asset is even less significant. Although the point may seem to be that the AAW potential of the Oliver Hazard Perry class is questionable, the tactical com­mander would no doubt believe that an FFG-7 stationed 60 to 100 nautical miles from a task group’s center would be better suited for self-defense against an air threat than a Spruance-class destroyer or a Knox (FF-1052)-class frigate.

Presence of a direct-support submarine, although unlikely in •my scenario other than that involving a carrier battle group,

When assigned to protect amphibious warfare ships, FFG-7s like the Antrim, above, should be placed in the vanguard of the amphibious group in transit to the objective, and then pulled back to defend the group’s flanks as it nears the beach.

would allow the stationing of FFG-7s closer to a formation’s center, because the attack submarine’s performance in ASW is unequalled. Poor sonar conditions, including congested shipping lanes, would also cause the frigate’s station to be moved closer to the formation’s center and would make SQR-19 towing less likely and active SQS-56 operation more probable.

Underway Replenishment Groups: During congressional testi­mony on the fiscal year 1983 budget, Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters presented documentation that fixed the Navy’s projected goal for FF/FFG types at 101 vessels.⁴ One may assume that 46 FF-1052s and 55 FFG-7s account for this projection, and that all other frigates will have been previously decommissioned. A typical underway replenishment group (URG) escort might therefore be one Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer, one FF-1052, and two FFG-7s. As the URG transits from the United States or some relatively secure overseas base to a forward area, the only threat that can challenge those ships throughout their route is a submarine. Surface or air attack could be expected in the middle part of the voyage but not within a day or two of the departed base because of air support from that base. Attack in the area in which the URG will replenish a task group is also less likely if the group to be replenished contains an aircraft carrier; her air wing could effectively shield the URG. Therefore, escorts should be stationed so as to best defend against the most likely threat—the submarine. If the FFG-7s had the SQR-19 installed, and especially if Seahawks were embarked, the optimal tactic would be to have them operate as a passive pair ahead and to either side of the group. They could then coordinate sonar infor­mation and speed contact localization. Also, having two ships that are LAMPS-III-capable would be more effective than a pair consisting of an FFG-7 and an FF-1052. With two FFG-7s, ei­ther ship could efficiently control the helo during prosecution of a submarine. Although an FF-1052-class ship could also control a helo, the FFG-7 with the LAMPS-III system could do it more effectively. The FF and DDG could then be stationed closer to the replenishment ships, with the DDG on the AAW threat axis. If the FF had a LAMPS-I helo embarked, she could be used in a pouncer role, should a sub evade the FFG-7s.

Another reason for placing the FFG-7s ahead of the URG is to provide antisurface protection; their passive sonar capabilities against surface ships should not be overlooked. Seahawk/O/ivtr

113

Proceedings / April 1984

A. D. BAKER ¹¹¹

Hazard Perry coordination should bring Harpoon use to a higher level of speed and accuracy than currently exists in the fleet.

Amphibious Ready Groups: Only one-third of the projected escorts assigned to amphibious ready groups will be frigates. Their contribution to antiair warfare is even less important than in the URG situation, as the greater assigned number of more capable DDGs reduces the air defense contribution of the FFG- 7s. Here, too, the FFG-7s generally should be placed in the van­guard of the task group to provide protection against surface and subsurface threats out to a range that would give maximum pro­tection to the amphibians. As the amphibious ready group ap­proaches the amphibious objective area, the FFG-7s should fall back to a position from which they could protect the flanks of the amphibious ships near the beach. The greater firepower of the DDGs’ five-inch guns makes them better candidates for naval gunfire support. In a likely scenario, the amphibious ready group may rendezvous with either a surface action group centered around a battleship, or with a carrier battle group. In either case, the FFG-7s may be replaced by other escorts that could provide flank protection. The FFG-7s could then be dispatched to pro­vide services elsewhere. They have speed greater than that of the Knox class and good range (4,500 nautical miles at 20 knots). They also have a self-defense capability which is greater than that on board the Spruance class. A formation of FFG-7s could quickly and safely move on to new duties.

Convoy: If convoys are to be escorted almost entirely by frig­ates, then a reverse of the stationing proposals given for under­way replenishment and amphibious ready groups may be neces­sary. Unlike the previous two cases, the FFG-7s would be the only escorts with area antiair capability. One would therefore have to consider placing them closer to the merchant vessels if an air threat is present. This would be especially true if the lone Spruance or one of the Knoxs had a TACTAS capability, and could therefore be placed in the outer ASW screen.

It may be that the Soviets would choose to use most of their naval forces closer to home, especially in defense of ballistic missile submarine operating areas. Another possibility is that they would conduct only a limited campaign against sea lines of communication, primarily directed at carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. In either case, the FFG assigned to convoys might be better used elsewhere.

It may also be better not to provide escorts, even if merchant vessels are targeted. Eight SL-7 containerships were recently purchased by the United States, each having the capability to deliver vast quantities of war supplies. Their speed allows them to transit from the U. S. East Coast to Europe in four days and to

the Persian Gulf via Suez in 11 days.⁵ These ships, with their 34-knot speed, cannot be effectively escorted by any combatant especially a 30-knot frigate!

Where, then, should the 35 or so FFG-7s assigned to the con­voys be used? They could augment escorts in other groups, or they could be used as stationary ASW barriers. The feasibility ot using P-3s, CAPTOR mines, and attack submarines to secure the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap is well recognized. But there are other areas that can be effectively controlled by OW Hazard Perry-class frigates.

For example, three or four FFG-7s equipped with SQR'^^s and Seahawks could operate in the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel. The commitment of these few assets could create a threat-free inland sea for intra-Gulf shipping, which would also be a “safe” area where convoys bound for Europe could assemble without escorts. The importance of this area is established by the fact that almost all of our petroleum supply⁸ for our NATO forces originate from Gulf Coast ports.⁶ The FFG- 7s would also help to protect our offshore oil platforms and the associated network of crude oil piping from sabotage by subma­rine-delivered divers. With their surface-to-air missiles and Sea- hawk/Harpoon capabilities, the FFG-7s could defend themselves from Cuban forces, which now include more than 200 modern tactical aircraft, many patrol combatants, and two “Foxtrot - class submarines.⁷

In a similar manner, an FFG-7 could be stationed at the Strait of Gibraltar. Several could also be stationed across the Mediter­ranean from Tunisia to Sicily. It is always assumed that our allies will seal the Dardanelles and the Bosporus when hostilities break out, but what about the subs already in the Med on D-day? The FFG-7 barriers could limit Soviet submarine operations to the Eastern Mediterranean or prevent breakout to the Atlantic.

Finally, although the Soviets may not conduct extensive an­timerchant action in the Atlantic, their numerous Pacific Fleet submarines could find the supertanker route between Valdez an the contiguous United States a tempting target. Once again, here is another escort job for which the FFG-7 is well suited.

Carrier Battle Groups: No FFG-7s are currently projected t°^r assignment to aircraft carriers as escorts. Should the Soviets choose not to engage merchant shipping, but rather concentrate their naval power against carrier battle groups, then one may fⁱⁿ FFG-7s in a role for which they were not designed. Should this be the case, then the Oliver Hazard Perry-class ships shorn probably be used as plane guards.⁸ But instead of the usual pla^nt' guard station astern of the carrier, the FFG-7 should be place abeam of her for several reasons: