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will be keen about his unit being inc in such an assignment
equipment, manning, facilities, peacetime workload or alert status, forward deployment requirements, legislation, and contingency capability without mobilization. Quickly considering the impact of those decision factors seems to indicate that a real-time specific mission for a reserve unit should be one that does not require continuous forward deployment. Also, because of the time needed to mobilize, a minimum required response time in excess of a week from alert to deployment would be necessary.
A mission required in the event of hostilities, but not necessary in peacetime, is ideal. Manning, equipment, and facilities pose no special problems for consideration but must be provided appropriate to the mission assigned. The units that meet these criteria and seem to be successful in accomplishing a real-time mission in support of the Total Force are aviation units with specialized training requirements, such as Naval Reserve patrol squadrons and the air reserve force’s associate aircrew programs.
What kind of real-time mission can a sizable Marine Corps Reserve force handle in a crisis situation? Is there a mission with the appropriate response time, training requirements, and peacetime workload that would enable the Selected Marine Corps Reserve to make a larger contribution to the active Marine Corps?
Perhaps there is in Norway. The Marine Corps’ only land pre-positioning project is a Department of Defense- directed program to enable the rapid reinforcement of Norway on NATO’s critical northern flank. Would it be feasible for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve to assume the mission of providing a MAB, thereby releasing a 2nd Marine Amphibious Force MAB from that contingency?
Such a radical suggestion must bear careful scrutiny in light of the missions already assigned to the reserves. Could a reserve MAB do the job? Could a reserve MAB get there fast enough?
Assigning the Norway mission a 4th Marine Division MAB is not illegal nor is there any forward deployment associated with it. However, contingency capabilities might be reduced since the MAB could not be employed without at least a partial mobilization. However, it seems reasonable that a prospective Norway reinforcement would most likely coincide with a general heightening of world tensions and a partial mobilization.
Could a Marine Reserve MAB respond quickly enough? The Selected Marine Corps Reserve regularly conducts mobilization training in operational readiness deployment tests requiring a reserve unit notified on Wednesday to deploy on Friday evening and begin operating on arrival at a training destination like Camp Lejeune. The successful conduct of mobilization operational readiness deployment tests indicates that, given sufficient airlift, the reserve unit could match the ten days of warning postulated for an active MAB. The actual deployment time of a reserve unit could most accurately be determined by an exercise. But the airlift of a Marine Reserve MAB would involve special considerations. It would require more detailed coordination since its units are more geographically dispersed than those of an active MAB.
Could a Marine Reserve MAB be trained well enough to do the job on its arrival? Given a proper training cycle before assignment, the answer is probably yes. There is no question that an SMCR MAB assigned a mission in Norway would require more training resources than are allotted a similar unit with a more general mission. The difficulty in maintaining the readiness of SMCR units is probably not the lack of training of individual Marines or even companies. Rather, it is the lack of command and control at the battalion level because of the lack of training time for such a large force.
A Marine Reserve MAB would certainly require additional training time and resources to master the intricacies of command and control and fire support coordination. The Army National Guard has recognized the need for additional training resources for a unit assigned a high priority mission. To increase the combat readiness of the 49th Armored Division, a Texas National Guard formation, it was found necessary to increase the number of training days by ten days for individual soldiers and as much as 24 for some key personnel.
Besides the additional training time required for higher level tactical operations, a Marine Corps Reserve MAB assigned the Norway mission would hay® learn the arduous job of arctic surVIVc Deploying and operating under ^ conditions require special training equipment. Units from the Royal fines, the Canadian Army, and the wegian Army are proficient in No because they specialize in a way “V active MAB could not afford and sti tain the flexibility for other operatic This requirement for extensive spec ^ ized training may be the reason W ) SMCR MAB would be capable of P1 ing up the Norway mission.
The personnel turnover in reserve u is usually less than in active forces, so lessons learned in previous cold we^ver operations would tend to carry _jne longer. In addition, unlike other M ^ Corps units, a significant number 0 Division/Wing Team units are *°cat^1[ier areas that have access to cold vve ^ training areas. Finally, a Norway ^ signed Marine Corps Reserve would have the advantage of doing itive training aimed at particular tral ugf for specific terrain with a limited nu ^ of scenarios. This is analogous 10 s advantage a battalion landing team ej^ ^ when it is able to rehearse a com ,j_ arms exercise several times in the ^ iar terrain of the Delta corn1a° Twenty-nine Palms. Taken t0®e%vell these factors represent a situation suited for a reserve unit to make a s'g cant contribution to a real-time ims t
Intangible advantages to be ob } from assigning a Norway mission reserve MAB include heightened nl0ge. that ensues from the Marine Corps^ serve’s realization of its tangible c y bution to the Total Force. ^
should also increase if assignment Norway MAB is based on unit Vs ^ mance because you can bet that ^ Marine in the 4th Division Wins ^
Lieutenant Colonel Cathey, a 1967 gradu3 gpr U. S. Naval Academy, holds an MBA ft®® ^3!" versity of West Florida. He has served as a ygt- observer and regional flight direction officer nam and as a primary flight instructor a c0p. leader at Naval Air Station Saufly Field, Pe ^ fri Florida. He is presently the Special ^sM jSstf*- Marine Corps Reserve to the Deputy Assistan tary of the Navy (Reserve Affairs).
By Captain Jack Nicholas, U. S. Naval Reserve
In 1979, three significant events occurred which have had far-reaching effects on the submarine reserve program
(Program One of the 37 programs which make up the Naval Reserve). First, a five-year plan was developed by repre-
’Fc F^'
sentatives from Atlantic and Pacifi submarine reserve programs. ^1)
This long-range program was r>
160
Proceedings
/ Octot>er
,9^
Program One: The Submarine Reserve
Periscopes, like the one being worked on by a reservist, left, and two active duty counterparts, have their ups and downs. But, unlike this one which is definitely down, the submarine reserve trendline is up, up, and away.
Figure 1 Units in Submarine Reserve
85 87 Projected
84 85
76 78
Fiscal Years
With thUref °rder|y changes to coincide the Perioc|°"°W'n® events ant'cipated in
^Co •
^orv*l?'S,S’on'nS °f the three new ^ DeCo Mnd (AS-39)-class tenders 1l)-cl:>.mmissioning of two Fulton (AS- ► ^lass tenders
fron, aVersion °f the Proteus (AS-19) 3s Pacif'ISS''C tender to an attack tender Sed or P°laris subs were decommis- ^ fistabp ^onvertcd to attack roles kases-_^S- ent °f three new submarine
hatigor mgS Bay> ^an DieS°- and at r
at attack^ adddion of floating dry docks t^nce „ suhmarine intermediate mainte-
Sec0 d‘Vity (IMA) sites-
Cer Was0 3 suhmarine reserve flag offi- °f Njav.aSsoc'ateiJ with the Deputy Chief ^re), 0 ®Perations (Submarine War- ^hief o/vTd offer was made by the SP°nsors fVa* ^cscrve to major program lr| any w0 reserve flag officers to assist offer, a /'.■f Possible. Op-02 accepted the k nts in th°Ugb suPPort from ah incum- “een strlu Op-02 position has always rrillriicat0n^’ tbere's no douht that com- '^Prove'r? uS Were enhanced and insights
Thircj because of this action. a°W kn’ and most important, what is a fninoft1' as tbe Submarine Reserve f e SRPr °ard (SRPB) was established. r0m ke1S composed of senior officers °rSaniZa^ suhmarine force and reserve ,|Jre subm°nS Wbo assess current and fu- ,,lattersar'ne reserve program readiness Arinin,,nd f)rov'de recommendations for r,,1e fore 3nC* P0*icy to improve subma- ,rieHibersC .Mobilization potential. Voting CaPtain/c1IKdude representatives of the otnrnander level from Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare) Op-02; Director of Naval Reserve (Op-09R); Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force; Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet; Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Reserve Detachment 106; Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Reserve Detachment 219; and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Submarine Warfare Reserve Detachment 0206.
Ad hoc (non-voting) members from other commands or OpNav offices are invited to participate as agenda items dictate. The Op-02 submarine reserve flag officer acts as board advisor. The board has met annually and considered more than 100 agenda items since its establishment. When an item remains open, commitments are obtained from board members as to what action they will take regarding those within their purview.
Program policy recommendations for the sponsor’s approval are discussed and evaluated well before promulgation. Concurrence in pilot projects is obtained from all interested parties before they start. Through working and social meetings, representatives to the SRPB get to know each other. Understanding fostered by face-to-face deliberations facilitates year-round cooperation.
Program One has gotten stronger as a result of the close cooperative effort of regular and reserve officers working within Op-02. Ten new units have been added during their tours and more are projected.
Force commander’s headquarters personnel have assumed responsibility over the years for ensuring that manpower authorization change requests are consistent in their presentation of Selected Reserve requirements. Invariably, when they receive a request for a change from an active-duty command, it deals only with the basic allowance (peacetime active) billets. With virtually no recognition, they have ensured that the requests do not change by omission the Selected Reserve contingent gaining command unless there is reason to do so.
Active-duty submarine flag officers have been strong supporters of Program One, even in the face of shifting attitudes within the Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense hierarchy. This support has been the major reason why the submarine reserve has more than doubled in size while the overall Naval Reserve was reduced by one-third in terms of pay billets funded.
Reserves have been engaged in everything from running worldwide command post exercises to assisting with preparation of presentations for congressional committee hearings. The existence of the capstone unit of Program One (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Submarine Warfare] Reserve Detachment 0206) is a result of the involvement of a reserve officer in a major command post exercise. Acting as the Op-02 “response cell” at the Alternate National Military Command Center, he was also charged to assess preparedness of Op-02 to support the Chief of Naval Operations at that site in time of national emergency. Deficiencies reported in 1980 were resolved when the Op-02 Reserve Detachment was estab-
161
'"RS 1 October 1984
actiye
sePe
ari°e
in ensuring that personnel leaving 1 £
service have information on the re . .
lished in 1981.
For the remainder of the 1980s, Program One should grow along with the rest of the Naval Reserve. Adjustments will be made as Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) methodology continues to improve and ship manning documents are approved. A concerted effort is needed to ensure submarine reserve officers understand NAMMOS, so they can assist gaining commanders in properly assessing mobilization requirements prior to submission of any manpower authorization change requests.
As a start, the NAMMOS User's Manual should be studied. Even without the manual, however, it should be understood that the strength of the arguments for establishing and maintaining any mobilization selected reserve billet are proportional to the influence the incumbent may have in delivering missiles and torpedoes on the enemy. Members of battle staffs at force commander headquarters and repair divisions at IMAs are more likely to be selected reserves than administrative personnel at a base.
Currently, full manning of Selected Reserve requirements on tenders is being inhibited by the artificialities of the Unit Readiness Reporting (Unit Rep) System. Under this system, the manning algorithm for readiness compares current (peacetime-active) manning to the manning required on board one month after mobilization is declared (M + 1). Since reserve manpower may constitute 20 or more of the total manning required at M + 1, tender readiness can never climb very high until mobilization is declared and implemented. At this time, the Unit Rep algorithms are being reviewed to determine how they may be modified to reflect current, peacetime, and projected wartime, mobilized readiness.
Submarine qualified training and administration of reserves (TAR) officers and petty officers are programmed for assignment to Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic headquarters, Norfolk, and Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific, West Coast Representative, Commander, Submarine Group Five in San Diego in fiscal year 1986. This will lessen the need for dovetailed assignment throughout the year of Selected Reserve officers and senior petty officers at these headquarters to handle day-to-day reserve matters. It will provide continuity which will permit management of a distribution system for submarine training materials among reserve units. They may also be able to assist the civilian personnel specialists mentioned in the preceding section to assure billet stability.
Some instability may occur in the late 1980s because of other reserve requirements. In areas where Naval Reserve Force frigates and active force battle groups will be home-ported, there may be a diversion of non-submarine personnel from Program One to man billets in what are recognized as units with higher manning priorities. An “SS” (submarine qualified) designated sailor or officer with a submarine warfare designator (1125) must be assigned to a Program One unit if a billet match exists.
However, most enlisted billets, especially for submarine IMAs, require only engineering or repair skills. Mechanical, electrical, and operational ratings are most affected. To a lesser extent, operational ratings may also be diverted to these new frigates or battle group ship augmentation units (for battleships, nuclear aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers, and nuclear guided missile cruisers). Program One units unable to sustain high enough manning levels may have to be moved to areas where demographics indicate available candidates. The disruption accompanying such movements in the 1970s may be repeated in the 1980s.
Reserve commanding officers can
minimize the impact by: -n«
► Actively recruiting dolphin-we
sailors to fill unit vacancies -ne
► Focusing training of non-subm
qualified personnel on acquiring su fine repair navy enlisted classify codes Jef5
► Obtaining cooperation of comma
program in general and the subm- program in particular. . yj-
Much of the success achieved in ^ ing Program One has been based ^ relationships between submarine o ( established during their years of a( service as members of nuclear and/or submarine school classes^ ^ shipboard wardrooms. With about submarine officers on active duty, a ^ percentage of contemporaries know' ^ other by name, personal reputati°n’ from working together. yjs
As the nuclear-powered ^eeg0sfi\ grown, so has the number of Pe’’s ^ who have served in these ships- K -jp ists will probably not serve in them ^ for there are no mobilization re^cjej( ments for additional officers on _n j(i submarines beyond those reqmf peacetime. ^
Conversely, because of past sn of nuclear-trained officers on activc the more senior ones have been c° ^ ously at sea and have had no contac ^ reserves until they were promoted to tain. At that point, their most c°m^ attitude may be, “Who needs ,c However, the attitude usually chanr “Send me more!” I
fla’J
Captain Nicholas was graduated from * Academy in 1958 and completed nuclear P^tQ [s'a', submarine training. He is currently attache cjv* Command Center 106, Washington, D- syste. ian, he is Deputy Director, Submarine ^ ^ Maintenance Monitoring and Support O 1 Sea Systems Command.
162
Proceedings / Octobe