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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE MUSEUM
W/iaf makes this 1894 photograph of Naval War College students and staff memorable is not the mutt, whose name was either Hans or Nero, or the two Swedes, right, the first foreign naval officers ever to attend the College, but the fellow in the straw hat whose spirit has pervaded the War College throughout its hundred-year history.
By Anthony S. Nicolosi
William McCarty Little was bom in New York City in 1846 to wealthy parents who were accustomed to spending summers in Newport, Rhode Island. During the Civil War, he attended the Naval Academy, which was located in Newport throughout the conflict. Appointed a midshipman in 1863, he was advanced to the next class and graduated in 1866, by which time the school had returned to Annapolis, Maryland.
The Naval Academy period of his life was especially
important as the beginning of what was to become a close nendship with Commander Stephen B. Luce, who for a hrne served on the staff. Although it is difficult to accu- mtely assess the nature of the relationship at this point, it 's reasonable to conclude that the young and impression. e midshipman was acquainted with the dynamic Luce’s Vlews on naval professionalism. Service on the blockade and at the Academy during the war had generated strong convictions in Luce concerning the training of seamen, the education of officers, and the uniqueness of Narragansett ay for naval purposes. These views took root at the Newport Naval Academy and, for the remainder of Luce’s long !~e> would be his paramount interest. Indeed, he became e acknowledged champion of education and training in e Navy and the foremost advocate of the region. In °62, he published the first book in the United States on Seamanship, and the next year, he published the first of Several articles on formal recruit training. He also joined ''mh others in a determined effort to keep the Academy in ewport when the war ended.
. Considering McCarty Little’s affection for Newport, it ■s likely that he was attracted to Luce’s projects. Whatever ls Noughts, though, upon graduation in 1866, contact ''nth Cnee came to an abrupt end, at least for a while. But e association with Newport continued, albeit intermit- ently. ln 1867 and 1874-77, he served on board ships of e North Atlantic Squadron, which regularly visited Nar- ragansett Bay. The year 1873 found him on duty at the Recently established (1869) Naval Torpedo Station on Goat , .and, a site familiar from his Academy days. It was at ‘s time that he married the beautiful and talented Anita nartrand, a Newport Summer Colony belle of a socially Pr°minent Cuban family.
tl 1870s, Lieutenant McCarty Little had set-
ed into the routine of sea and shore assignments. While Prospects for rapid advancement were almost nil during ls period, characterized as the “dark ages” of the Navy, e demonstrated an enthusiasm and skill that won him the ention of his superiors and gave promise of a successful areer. Zeal and application were not his only assets, how- heer‘ Handsome in appearance and dignified in manner, Y Was generous with his time and generally liked by all. ac at ions spent abroad as a youngster, chiefly in France ere his family owned property, nurtured a deep appreci- int°n ^°r Continent, which manifested itself in a keen § Crest in art, music, and language, especially French, Punish, and Italian, which he wrote and spoke fluently. n 1876, he lost the sight of one eye in a gun accident on 0re- After an extended leave of absence, chiefly in Eu- se^6’ returned t0 active duty. Several years later, while rv,ng as navigation officer on board the USS Adams in ^ askan waters, his good eye became badly strained, and ere was danger of complete blindness.
The incident led to his return to New York where, under expert medical care, he recuperated sufficiently to accept an assignment to the USS Minnesota, one of the ships of the naval apprentice training squadron. Before he was fully recovered, however, and while still under the care of an eye specialist, he received orders to the Asiatic Station, where there would be no possibility of receiving proper care. Filled with anxiety, he nevertheless decided to obey his new orders, but he registered his apprehension in person with the Navy Department. What followed was unexpected and traumatic. A medical board was quickly convened and as quickly decreed an immediate discharge for medical reasons. Strenuous objections, based on the fact that his condition was temporary and that he had already improved markedly, proved to no avail. Thus, at the age of 38, after 20 years of flawless service, McCarty Little found himself cast upon the beach.
“Oh, was there ever sailor free to choose/that didn’t settle somewhere near the sea?” McCarty Little’s choice was Newport, and, from his retirement in May 1884 until his death 31 years later, the “City-by-the-Sea” was his official residence. Newport was especially attractive, too, because it afforded the opportunity to continue his connection with the naval service he loved as much as he loved the sea.
The Naval Torpedo Station was flourishing, the North Atlantic Squadron visited regularly, and a recruit training station had just been established on Coasters Harbor Island, two miles north of the city. Many officers associated with these commands lived with their families in the city, including Commodore Stephen B. Luce who had established permanent residence in 1880. Thus, McCarty Little and Luce became neighbors in life and, as we shall see, in death.
The friendship between the two men was revived in 1878 when McCarty Little was assigned to the training ship Minnesota commanded by Luce. In 1881, when a training squadron was officially formed with Luce as its head, McCarty Little served as his executive officer on board the flagship USS New Hampshire, which at the time was permanently located in the current off Coasters Harbor Island. On his return from the Alaskan tour in 1883, he once again came under the tutelage of the elder officer, when he rejoined the Minnesota.
When McCarty Little retired, Luce was already deeply involved in a campaign to establish the Naval War College. The previous March, he had outlined the proposal to Secretary of the Navy William Chandler. In June, a committee which Luce headed recommended Coasters Harbor Island as an appropriate site. Chandler gave his endorsement by appointing Luce president of the new school in September, and the creating document, Navy General
Order 325, appeared on 6 October. From this time forward, until the first class of eight students assembled in the former Newport Poor House on Coasters Harbor Island in the summer of 1885, Luce occupied himself with a multitude of problems incidental to operating a school.
It was only natural that Luce should call upon McCarty Little for help. His young, retired friend was anxious to stay in touch, and had applied for and received permission to attend the Torpedo School—a six- to eight-week affair. Luce’s overture was responded to with alacrity, and McCarty Little became deeply involved. Although the details of his contributions are nowhere fully recorded, McCarty Little assisted in the preparation of teaching aids, established and maintained a library, and fulfilled administrative duties of a routine nature.
The Naval War College’s second year brought additional duties and responsibilities. Luce had been detached in June 1886 and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan took over as president as well as lecturer in naval history and strategy. At the time, the circumstances of the College were desperate, and the outlook for its future was grim. Mahan’s traits included a strong resolve to do his very best, and in this he was aided by the companionship and the material support of the ubiquitous McCarty Little. This time, in addition to serving as librarian and preparing maps and charts for Mahan’s lectures, he delivered lectures on war gaming, a subject in which he would develop a high expertise and reputation.
Just what piqued McCarty Little’s interest in war gaming is not known. But, that he inaugurated it at the College is certain. One contemporary, William L. Rodgers, years later rationalized that the College’s study program, chiefly lectures and readings, was sadly deficient and that something else was urgently needed to challenge the imagination and the latent talents of the student officers. He suggested that McCarty Little was the first to recognize the problem and that his response was the war game.
The gaming technique itself was already popular in Army circles in this country, and it is likely that McCarty Little was introduced to it by Major W. R. Livermore, U. S. Army, a recognized authority who was stationed at Fort Adams, just across the bay from Coasters Harbor Island. Livermore published the first book on war gaming in the United States in 1879. Entitled The American Kriegspiel, it was based on usage of the German military staff, and it went through a number of editions. When war gaming was first conducted at the Naval War College in the late 1880s, it was known simply as “The Kriegspiel.”
Livermore and McCarty Little ultimately became close friends. Years later, when Livermore published a second edition, he credited McCarty Little in the introduction with having developed the “Naval Kriegspiel” in the United States.
Although it appears certain that McCarty Little’s interest in war gaming was stimulated by the experience of the Army and more directly, the influence of Major Livermore, he drew heavily from sources in Europe, where the technique was used for naval purposes. In this connection, his first lecture was on the war game developed by Sir Phillip Colomb and introduced into the Royal Navy in 1878. There is reason to believe the Colomb game was acquired from the naval attache in London, Lieutenant French Chadwick, a future Naval War College president.
The College course of 1887 included several lectures by McCarty Little on the subject and his first war game. The launching of the technique was a notable success, at least according to one journalist observer who wrote: “The subject presented by [McCarty Little] is far in advance of the naval war game as set forward by any English or German naval officers . . . .”
The success of war gaming in the College was matched by the success of another type of game being played in the waters of the bay by Rear Admiral Luce who had left the College in 1886 to become commander of the North Atlantic Squadron. During the summer and fall of 1887, he kept his ships in Narragansett Bay for long periods, thus putting them at the disposal of the College. This was in accordance with his total concept of education, which involved his “school of application,” i.e., ships with which the College could test its theories and concepts. The consequence was a joint Army-Navy maneuver planned at the College with the assistance of Major Livermore and carried out in the bay. The project involved the Army detachment at Fort Adams, the Torpedo Station on Goat Island, naval apprentice seamen from the Naval Training Station, and ships and men of the North Atlantic Squadron. There were two maneuvers, one a night torpedo attack on the ships of the squadron in October, and the other, a sham attack on Newport in November. The sham attack had Luce’s ships run by Fort Adams at the entrance of the bay followed by a torpedo attack as the squadron passed Goat Island, and an amphibious landing on Coddington Point, just north of Coasters Harbor Island, opposed by a force made up of naval apprentice seamen. Major Livermore served as umpire of the maneuver, assisted by McCarty Little, and a lengthy critique followed at the College.
The joint maneuver of 1887 was almost a solo performance. Luce did not get the chance to repeat it since the Navy Department looked askance on the proceedings, and it would not be until after the turn of the century that the practice would be reviewed and permitted to continue for a few years. Meanwhile, as far as the College was concerned, the school of application consisted mostly of steam launches which, while supplied with some regularity, were never in sufficient numbers to satisfy the College’s requirements. The ultimate result was that the College would place a greater reliance on war gaming.
McCarty Little repeated his lectures in 1888 and 1889, all the while refining procedures and augmenting rules through continued staff game playing. Livermore was now closely associated with the work of the College, and in 1889 lectured on military tactics and strategy. At the time the College was located on Goat Island and combined with the Torpedo Station. Henceforth, for the next several years, it would be officially known as the Naval Torpedo Station and War College.
The transfer of the College from Coasters Harbor Island to Goat Island represented a victory for those who sought its ultimate abolishment. The victory proved to be shortlived, largely because the commander of the Torpedo Sta- tl0n was Commander Caspar Goodrich, one of Luce’s committee who had recommended the establishment of the school in 1884. Goodrich kept the College functioning, and he persuaded Secretary of the Navy William C. Whitby’ a close personal friend, to include $100,000 in the department’s appropriation bill of 1889 for the construc- hon of a separate College building. It was something of a surprise to friend and foe alike when the legislation passed w'th the allotment intact.
While Goodrich must be credited with sustaining the . °uege and perhaps instigating an important measure for lls continuance, he did not work alone. Luce, retired in <>9, and other College supporters worked unceasingly to ket the legislation through Congress and then to arrange °r the building’s construction, not on Goat Island as spec- !led in the original legislation, but on Coasters Harbor sland. It is reasonable to assume that McCarty Little P*ayed an active part in these matters. He was on the scene as a member of the staff, albeit an unofficial one.
ln the end, the outcome was successful, and it was nierely a question of when the new College building Would be ready for use. Courses were suspended in 1890 and 1891, when actual construction began on the southwest corner of the island and adjacent to the former Poor
I j?„Use- Subsequently, Mahan, who had been detached in . was reassigned and contributed to the design of the mterior of the building that was completed in 1892.
^tiring this construction period, McCarty Little contin- ed to reline the war game and inaugurated another impor- nt service, that of translator of foreign language tracts on aaval warfare tactical and strategic subjects. His first ranslation was of the Italian naval war game by Lieuten- ,nt A- Colombo of the Italian Navy. During the next two ^cades he would translate many other works, including Q Veral of book length, from French, Spanish, Italian, and crman. These he added to the growing College library in . lch he continued to take a great interest. His most sig-
II lcant contribution, however, had to do with the publica- k°n Captain Mahan’s first sea power book. The study,
ased on lectures of naval history given at the College, as mstigated by Luce. Getting the circumspect Mahan to aCc°mplish the task, though, was a project in which Luce n McCarty Little collaborated, and the latter, chiefly ar®u§h persistence, persuaded Mahan to find a publisher moved things along until the work finally appeared in rir>t. McCarty Little also drew some of the charts used in the volume.
a ^le Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, PPeared in May 1890, but much to the chagrin of Luce q McCarty Little, without any mention of the Naval War ,ege in its introduction. Both men registered their dis- y with the budding apostle of sea power who satisfacto- sg exPlained the omission and included the honors in his ^ sea power study, which appeared two years later. wCLarty Little was convinced from the start of the true h of the book, and he became one of the author’s ^ °ngest supporters. When in 1893, a frustrated Mahan Lim *°rced t0 leave the College for sea duty, McCarty dis' C added ^'s vo‘ce to others protesting the decision. His aPpointment was subsequently more than balanced,
however, by the news of the fine reception Mahan received abroad, and one might well imagine with what pleasure he wrote Mahan’s wife: “It is seldom that merit received such an overwhelming acknowledgement, and especially when it is in the case of one who keeps himself so thoroughly in the background as Captain Mahan; and all the more bitter must be the pill for those who have sought to pooh-pooh his work.”
Still, while a dedicated supporter, McCarty Little never developed as close a friendship with Mahan as that with Luce. They did work closely from the beginning, and with the passage of time, Mahan came to appreciate McCarty Little’s great ability. When Mahan returned to the United States after his successful European tour, and after retirement, he occasionally visited the College to present lectures. These and past lectures were routinely delivered to successive College classes by a member of the staff whenever Mahan could not be present. This task normally fell to McCarty Little, and he was not reticent about recommending improvements. Mahan, on his part, apparently welcomed his assessments and at times solicited them.
Whereas McCarty Little had been on hand for the publi-
cation of Mahan’s first sea power book in 1890, he was absent from Newport when the new College building was completed and dedicated in 1892. In 1891, he had been appointed special commissioner to Spain for the Columbian Exposition and was assigned to the embassy in Madrid as acting naval attache. His special task was the supervision of the construction of replicas of Columbus’s ships. McCarty Little returned to Newport late in 1893 after the ships were safely delivered to the exposition site in Chicago.
^“Wedi
The two-year absence did not diminish his interest in the Naval War College. On the contrary, McCarty Little conducted a flourishing correspondence with Luce and
Livermore, and he quickly involved himself in the work of the school upon his return. He arrived just in time to witness Mahan’s forced departure and to lend much-needed assistance to Commodore Charles H. Stockton, its acting president. Largely because of renewed hostility in Washington, there had been no course in 1893. The following year, the College was made subordinate to the Naval Training Station through consolidation under a new Naval Station Command. The immediate result was the assignment of two of the four staff quarters in the new College building to Station personnel.
Thanks largely to the courageous response of Captain Henry Taylor, College president appointed in 1894, the plot to immobilize the College went awry. At great personal risk, Taylor conducted a publicity campaign in the New England region on the merits and the current plight of the College. The tactic worked as public awareness resulted in pressure on the Navy Department. The ever optimistic McCarty Little calculated correctly when he informed Livermore: “I am inclined to think that the seeds are too deeply planted to be easily dug up. The chief work for the War College for its first few years is to establish itself . . . but if in the next two or three years it did nothing else but live, I should be satisfied—once the opposition is dead, the rest is easy sailing.”
But the opposition died hard. Although consolidation failed to result in a complete takeover of the College building, the Station did not retreat from its purpose. It simply pursued a new tack, one calculated to isolate the College and to prevent its further expansion on the island. McCarty Little read the signs accurately and wrote to Luce of the conspiracy in 1895, at which time the Station had launched an effort to become completely shore-based.
The Navy Department regulation of 1883 establishing the Naval Training Station required that officers and men be quartered on ships and not on shore. Until 1889, the principal vessel used for this purpose was the USS Ne^ Hampshire, which was tied up at South Point. The vessel was originally anchored off Coasters Harbor Island, but in 1883, much to the chagrin of Luce who was away at the time, she was brought into shore. In time, she settled into the mud, and her environs became badly fouled. An outbreak of typhoid on the vessel resulted in her being dragged back into the current, and subsequently she left [he area. Thereafter, recruits and staff were quartered on ships of the training squadron which were routinely in the day, on the island in tents during good weather, and in a drill hall-gymnasium on South Point and in the old Almshouse when the weather was poor. The USS Constellation hed up at the point in 1894 but was used for training purposes only. Gradually, the number of training vessels in the bay decreased, and the Station did nothing to hold on t° them. On the contrary, the Station’s objective was to Persuade the Navy Department and Congress that crowded c°nditions prevailed and that recruit barracks should be constructed on the island. McCarty Little reported to Luce hat recruits from other training sites were being sent to Newport. What bothered him most was the proposed loca- ll°n for the barracks, and he confided: “It seems quite Possible that the barracks will be so placed as to be very close to the north windows of the College and ‘flank it’ so hat in the course of time the College building will be in |he very position for the officers of the Training Station. 0 you begin to perceive a slightly mousey odor?”
He concluded with the warning: “The barracks must niove while their strength is in the ascendant, and we may c Prepared for an early advance along all the line. As they SaY. we see them at work planting their batteries.”
The project came to fruition in 1900 with the construc- '°n of a massive building, Barracks B, directly behind the ollege. With the former Almshouse on the east, the wa- ers °f the bay on the south and the east, the College was now literally penned in. As subsequent events would Prove, however, not so thoroughly as to prevent construc- '°n entirely. In 1904, a small library-archive annex was a tied to the rear of the College. Since McCarty Little was Very active in the life of the College at the time, and in ''lew of his association with the library from an early date, ls role in the project was an important one.
McCarty Little’s principal contribution to the College’s c°urse of instruction in 1894 related chiefly to war gam- 'n§- During his absence from Newport, the College con- aeted one course in 1892, at which time a game was P*ayed but not completed. The staff continued to develop e technique in 1893, and the following year under Cap- dln Taylor, the game became an integral part of the study regime. Whether or not McCarty Little was instrumental n this change is not known for certain, but he was once again hard at work gathering data, developing rules, and °verseeing play.
Another innovation of Taylor’s administration was the . ent problem and solution. This amounted to the as- gnrnent of a main problem to the class, generally at that to C nava* defense in coastal waters, and each student had Provide a rational solution. The solution was subse- M ently tested by war gaming. The concept or something ery similar had been prominent in McCarty Little’s think- 8 lor several years. In a letter of 1891 to Major Liver- 0re he likened it to: . . a play at a theater with full
Planations of the reasons of each move.” tj v'dently the addition of the student problem and solu- n >n the curriculum dispelled any reservations McCarty
Little may have had about war gaming as it was done at the College. Perhaps because of this he applied himself with extraordinary zeal and the games were declared a resounding success. Taylor attested to this when he remarked in a closing address that “in these games as in many other matters connected with the College, much is owed to Lieutenant William McCarty Little, whose professional ability and thorough knowledge of these subjects have always been at the service of the College and whose advice and assistance has been most valuable.” Over the next few years the games were enlarged in scope and were greeted with increased enthusiasm by the students.
It was at this time, also, that McCarty Little became active in the Rhode Island Naval Militia. In the two decades before World War I, the only naval reserve force in the country was made up of the naval militias of the several states. Rhode Island established an organization in 1891, the same year that Congress passed an act appropriating funds for arming state organizations. In 1896, McCarty Little became commander, and his influence became almost immediately apparent.
In December 1896, the Naval War College, responding to Department instructions, issued a plan for Navy-militia relations. The plan called for militia cooperation with the Navy for coastal defense purposes. In effect, the U. S. Navy through the direct involvement of the College would supervise militia activities. During wartime, these would consist of the creation of mosquito fleets, construction of shore batteries, mine laying, telegram services, and the establishment of coastal signal stations. During peace, assistance would be given to an inspecting officer of the militia. The supervisory plan was subsequently put forward by McCarty Little at a meeting of the Association of Naval Militia held in Boston in June 1897. It would become the basis of militia operations during the Spanish- American War, which began in April 1898.
With the outbreak of war, McCarty Little was in the forefront of arrangements for the state’s naval militia, including the establishment of coastal signal stations and the inventorying of private vessels for possible naval use. He brought the militia into the naval service at Newport, and he served temporary duty as executive officer of the Naval Training Station with headquarters in the Constellation.
With the conclusion of the war, McCarty Little was once again back at the College, but now as an official member of the staff. Theretofore, his many years of service had been as a volunteer and without compensation. During this period, McCarty Little sought to persuade the Congress to enact legislation promoting him from lieutenant on the retired list to captain. The campaign began in 1896 and involved correspondence with friends and associates and the acquisition of testimonials and endorsements. Success finally came in 1903.
Through the first decade of the new century, Captain McCarty Little, U. S. Navy (Retired), settled into a work regime which included varied responsibilities. He routinely read Mahan’s lectures to new classes, translated foreign language works, assisted Mahan in the writing of his last book, and continued to oversee the expanding war
games. Outside the College, his Everett Street residence was a popular gathering place for naval officer friends and many important questions were discussed around his dining room table. The most significant aspect of his career, however, was its relationship to both old and new generations of staff members and students at the College. The philosophy of education of the 19th century, which focused primarily on concepts and on original research, was changing, as, indeed, the Navy itself was changing, emphasizing preparation for command situations. The new emphasis was manifested by dynamic young officers such as William S. Sims, Bradley Fiske, William L. Rodgers, and William Veazie Pratt, who were motivated by the demands occasioned by the new U. S. battleship fleet. They were practical types, not prone to metaphysical pursuits, who viewed the College in a completely different light than did the generation of the founders.
McCarty Little confronted the new generation without trepidation. Indeed, he acknowledged their legitimate goals and worked conscientiously for their accomplishment. This involved no difficult transition, for the world of war gaming was inherently compatible with the prevailing preparation-for-command mentality. Nonetheless, through it all, he never abandoned the philosophical traditions, the notions of principles, and the importance of the record of the past. These continued to be personally important and for all of his outward zeal for the new mood, he nurtured and preserved them as best he could. This attribute was amply reflected in his often quoted—but perhaps oversimplified—admonition to new students that “A principle applies when it applies and it doesn’t apply when it doesn’t apply.”
McCarty Little, then, was a catalyst for change, one that allowed for synthesis and transition without institutional trauma and disruption. The essential knowledge of the past lived in him and came to the fore, at times conspicuously, in the enthusiasm which he manifested for the new state of the art.
Nothing better demonstrates the new complexion of things at the College than the adoption of the applicatory system, later termed the military planning process. The system was a method of teaching based on the idea that military principles were learned best by application. It consisted of three parts: the estimate of the situation, the writing of orders, and the evaluation through gaming or maneuver board exercises. Its purpose was to permit officers in command situations to exercise intelligent options for the resolution of problems rather than to be slavishly bound to a method conceived at a higher level.
The system was borrowed from the Army, and the evidence suggests that its success at the College was largely the result of McCarty Little’s efforts. The tale has been told variously, but Captain William L. Rodgers’s version is especially convincing. Rodgers, a member of the College staff assigned to the Army War College, 1907-08, brought the system to McCarty Little’s attention. Together, they introduced it into the summer session of 1909 without prior administration approval. The following year, McCarty Little had a free hand in development of curriculum, and “he started the new staff in conformity with the Army system,” securing the College president’s consent once indoctrination was completed.
The first article on the applicatory system appeared in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings in 1912. Bearing the laborious title “Notes on the Applicatory System of Solving War Problems with Examples Showing the Adaptation of the System to Naval Problems,” it appeared under the by-line “members of the staff of the United States Naval War College.” Not long afterwards, the Naval Institute published an article by McCarty Little on war gaming, which went on at some length about the new applicatory system and its relationship to the game. He noted in particular: “It is the war game that had led to the adoption of the system,” and “The game sought the method and not the method that sought the game.”
Rodgers and McCarty Little collaborated in another significant change in the academic program. Rodgers was not at the College in 1910 when McCarty Little had charge of curriculum development. Rodgers returned late in 1911 as president and together with McCarty Little inaugurated changes in the study regimen directed at converting the voluntary student participation of the past to a structured system in which the student was obliged to study and encouraged to produce quality results. Several years later, Rogers stated: ‘ 'The essential features of the change which I believe I and Captain Little were chiefly instrumental in introducing in the College policy, was to organize and stabilize the instructual efforts of the College and turn officers in attendance from voluntary and undirected efforts of their own coordinated and collective effort under the control of our institutional organization. This I believe was a matter of great weight in the progress of the College and the development of tactical and strategic study in the Navy.”
Another of Rodgers’s reforms was to increase the length of the course. Again, he credited McCarty Little with vital assistance from as early as 1909. Their ultimate proposal made to the Navy Department was for a 16-month course- What resulted was a ten-month course and only after McCarty Little made a special trip to Washington to persuade an old friend, Rear Admiral R. F. Nicholson, who headed the Bureau of Navigation. Four students constituted the first and highly successful long course in 191 L Two years later, the old four-month summer conference was phased out.
In the summer of 1913, McCarty Little’s health began to fail. Relatively free from major illness for the better part of his life, the condition proved traumatic and led to a lessening of his heavy schedule at the College. One contemporary associated the illness with the strenuous efforts made in preparing his last lecture, “The Philosophy of the Order Form,” noting that “after that he did not appear for some time and then only occasionally.” The fact is that he was terminally ill and that, at most, the long, arduous hours spent in preparing the difficult lecture, helped to sap his energies, making him more susceptible to the debilitating effects of the disease.
The “Philosophy of the Order Form” lecture was McCarty Little’s last major contribution to the College. I* lacked symmetry of format and to the casual reader might
^ lecture delivered at the Naval War College.
We :
*■ Motto: "Necessity is tiie Mother of Invention.”
If it were not for the stimulus of necessity, all effort in the world ^ u d stop, and the universe would come to an end. Therefore We want to spur up action, and the real necessity is not avail- e. we must create an artificial one.
“ Assume a virtue if you have it not.”
2- The Name “ War Game ” vs. “ Chart Maneuver.” hi embarking on this lecture I would like to say, by way of (| aCe’ Hlaf flle name Game, War Game, has had much the same fiek[eC'at'n^ effect as ^ie ferm Sham Sight has had with regard to eC ’Maneuvers. To avoid this the army has had recourse to the sa^r-SS'°n Maneuver. We, of the navy, may in like manner a l ^art Maneuver, and we have lately decided so to do. There is d llr.Iler reason why it is well for us to prefer that term, namely, tio accentuates *l'e fact that the strategist’s real field of opera- b0nS^ cllart’ iust as fl15 architect’s real field is the drawing ara i indeed, Jomini calls Strategy " War on the Map.” for War ’tseH I133 I36011 declared to be a game, and rightly so, lt.11 I’as the game characteristic of the presence of an antagonist. ]no'as’ however, another characteristic which differentiates it from * otIler games. The latter are played for sport; and good aims re<Iu'res reasonable chances of winning for each side, and on h l° give arnusement even to the losers. In the game of war, itle other hand, the stake is life itself, nay, infinitely greater, lay be the life of the nation, it certainly is its honor,
rHE STRATEGIC NAVAL WAR GAME OR CHART MANEUVER.*
By Captain W. McCarty Little, U. S. Navy.
[copyrighted. ]
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.
O
Irue ^e*n.^ case- McCarty Little may be viewed as a Coll Practiti°ner °f what he preached to his Naval War
even have qualified as a pseudo-intellectual exercise, hav- jng much wit but little substance. Informal, almost pedes- ,nan 'n tone, it was steeped in metaphorical usages and acked supporting detail. If this appears to be a serious ln '^ment, it is not meant to be. The peculiar style and Usages were merely a consequence of a keen awareness of is audience—mature, professional fighting men, and of Is desire for the fullest comprehension as expeditiously as Possible. For him, this was the correct “end in-view,” "I lch he stressed time and again as the chief obligation at a levels of commands. Conceivably, there is a relations ’P also to his admonition that “success in war is the Product of the right thinking, rightly applied, in time.”
Ce,nber 1912 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
°Th^e auc^ences- The 6 ^ro°^’ course> lies in how well he was received.
I9nemarks William Veazie Pratt, staff member during after’.are instruct've- Writing to McCarty Little shortly lec/ . lec'ture on the order form, he remarked: “Your re is doctrine and ... I place it as the best I have
heard. It will live when time and conditions have buried in forgetfulness other more locally intense lectures. That is the beauty of it, the single truthful atmosphere and naturalness it conveys.”
A man of clear perceptions who would go on to become College president and ultimately Chief of Naval Operations, Pratt recognized McCarty Little’s great value to the College and the service and went on to say: “The War College and its followers are at the turn of the roads, before us somewhere lies the correct way, but that way is not too clear at all, neither is it entirely free from dangers. It is well that one of the best fitted of all the lovers of the College and what it stands for—Truth—should speak to the younger generations coming on.”
The lecture served as McCarty Little’s last word on the importance of War College education. Not that anyone in high places at this time was any longer seriously contemplating the institution’s demise. On the contrary, never before had the College more supporters in Congress and in the Navy Department, and as war clouds in Europe became more threatening, that support would increase. Nonetheless, the aged veteran could not resist the opportunity. He enumerated the accomplishments of the College and concluded with the statement: “Now, think it over, and tell yourself frankly if you can think of any great improvement in the Navy, outside of material and the handling of guns, that cannot be traced back to the influence of the War College!”
Failing in health and no longer fully involved in the work of the College, McCarty Little continued to correspond with associates of former days on active duty, particularly to get their assessments of the results of College education. The response of W. L. Rodgers, former College president and commander of the battleship USS Delaware, had to be especially satisfying. Rodgers referred to College graduates in the fleet and to the excellence of their education for command. While applauding the ability to
think and reason soundly,” he bemoaned the fact that most fleet officers were deficient in these regards. He sharply criticized the uninitiated by noting: “They have little idea of utilizing the intelligence of their subordinates. They have no idea of established doctrine as able to supplant minute instructions.” He urged “plenty of problem solving and order writing” at the College.
In January 1915, McCarty Little’s health took a turn for the worse. His immediate response was to request and be granted detachment from all duty in connection with the Naval War College. On 12 March, he died.
The funeral procession included a battalion of naval recruits from the Naval Training Station on Coasters Harbor Island and members of the staff of the Naval War College headed by Rear Admiral Austin Knight, College president. Among the many distinguished figures paying their last respects was Rear Admiral Luce. Two years later, Luce would be accorded a similar demonstration of the esteem of his military peers, and laid to rest in a grave next to that of Captain McCarty Little.
Mahan had died the year before McCarty Little. In league with other naval reformers committed to the further development of professionalism in the service, this trio had set out upon a hazardous course, one fraught with bureaucratic and political obstructions, to realize a truly remarkable success. Theirs was the “good fight” for the obvious benefits that were to accrue to the service they deeply loved.
The brilliant William S. Sims, College president, 1917, 1919-23 exemplified the Luce-Little quest for professional excellence. He was known, too, as a severe critic of
Perhaps the Navy’s greatest gunnery expert, William S. Sims was, as usual, right on target when he spoke of McCarty Little’s “invaluable work” for the Navy and the Naval War College.
the service’s shortcomings and no man to bestow compliments lightly. Sims paid the memory of McCarty Little what must be considered the highest tribute when he wrote to his bereaved wife: “Those of us who have been associated with him in the invaluable work he has done throughout many years realize fully the debt the Navy owes him. Within our time there have been few, if any, officers who have accomplished so much in promoting the real efficiency of the service; and for this reason his memory will always be held in the utmost respect by the service he really loved. And I am sure that those who come after us will honor his memory as much as we do; for so long as we have a Naval War College, his name must always remain intimately associated with its best traditions.”
The passing of McCarty Little created a void in the Naval War College that was sorely felt in the years ahead. During his age, the College experienced its most outstanding achievements, and while the times and peculiar circumstances were, in part, responsible, the unique ingredient of the “Attendant Spirit”—as McCarty Little was perceptively characterized by Admiral Reginald R- Belknap—was a very important contributing factor. Indeed, he was the essential corporate memory, the monitor, and guide for continuous progress and a principal defender. Mahan commented on his optimism and enthusiasm in the most trying circumstances and acknowledged that he had “more consecutive knowledge of the College’s transactions than anyone.” Through McCarty Little’s good offices, the institution, inherently in flux because of frequent changes in administration and the requirement to adapt to the exigencies of changing international situations, was able to realize continuity in purpose from generation to generation.
That McCarty Little was largely responsible for the internal development of the College is certainly true. However, this does not say it all, for among other things, he was an original thinker and a theoretician in his own right in matters relating to naval warfare. To what degree has not yet been adequately assessed, though recent investigations tend to represent him in the company of his illustrious peers, Luce and Mahan.
To understand why McCarty Little was not accorded full recognition for his role, we have only to refer to Sims who noted that his “single minded devotion to the interests of the service as a whole and the War College in particular” was an inspiration for all. Pratt, too, admitted as much when he recorded: “It was a revelation to know one who could fight so earnestly for a cause he believed in, yet could be so utterly forgetful of self.” In essence, McCarty Little was a man with a mission, a mission which provided no place for ego but rather a requirement to sacrifice for the greater good.
In the nearly 70 years since McCarty Little’s death, the Naval War College has from time to time benefited from the unusual zeal and commitment of one or another of hs associates. Invariably when this occurred, notable developments, including transitions in emphasis or methods, occurred. Conversely, during those periods when these associates were not present, notable achievements and progress were less in evidence. The lesson is clear, namely that the spirit of McCarty Little at the Naval War College, characterized by institutional loyalty, selflessness, dedication to mission, and continuity of thought and action, is in reality a spirit for all seasons.
Mr. Nicolosi is the Director of the Naval War College Museum in NeW' port, Rhode Island.