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The Weeks After
Their Tattletales (Our Problems)
The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine
Guerrilla Warfare at Sea Think (Don’t Talk) Tactics
Contents:
That Dangerous Polyester Look
Using and Fighting Submarines
Wanted: A Fair Press
Wanted: A Professional Press
Wanted: A Responsible Free Press
Leyte Gulf Remembered
Escalation and Naval Strategy
A More Relevant Navy
Self-Confidence—the First Requisite
Nicaragua: Soviet Satrapy
Restoring Order South of the Border
Not Ready on the Firing Line
No Bastions for the Bear
The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs— Round Two
“That Dangerous Polyester Look”
(See D. M. Kennedy, W. R. C. Stewart, pp. 97-98, January 1984; J. W. Cupp, p. 23,
March 1984; H. Adams, p. 106, July 1984 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Matthew V. Fenton, Merchant Marine Reserve!U. S. Naval Reserve—Dr. Adams is to be complimented on his loyalty to the ManMade Fiber Producers Association lobby he represents. Regrettably, he shows little knowledge of the hazards found in a shipboard environment.
The study quoted by Dr. Adams claims that it is harder to ignite polyester and nylon than cotton and that thermoplastic fibers when burning, “evolve substantially less heat.” Should fleet officers and enlisted men, who may be exposed to fire, take comfort in the sure knowledge that once their Certified Navy Twill uniforms melt onto their skins, it will burn cooler than cotton?
As for the study’s contention that drops of melted polyester “do not increase [the] severity of a bum injury or complicate subsequent treatment of the bum,” I would like to suggest that its authors speak to the corpsmen who treated the bums of Royal Navy personnel after they were scared by melting plastic clothing in fires during the Falklands Conflict.
Furthermore, the study’s contentions apply only to conventional clothing worn in conventional environments not requiring protective clothing and ignore the fact that a ship is inherently hazardous and always requires the wearing of protective clothing. I suggest that since we can’t wear asbestos suits all of the time, a return to long-sleeve, 100% cotton uniforms is in order.
It’s time we put safety over convenience and banned polyester from the fleet for good.
“Using and Fighting Submarines”
(See H. A. Caldwell, pp. 62-69, August 1984 Proceedings)
Sonar Technician G (Surface) First Class Richard S. Mathews, Jr., U. S. Navy, Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center, Pacific—The lead to Mr. Caldwell’s article implies that there is some similarity between antisubmarine warfare (ASW) preparation (or lack thereof) now and prior to World War II. This implication slights those who are involved in making today’s Navy ASW program innovative and highly effective.
Contrary to what Mr. Caldwell writes,
► We conduct ASW “freeplay” exercises during which the submarine moves freely, and neither side is restricted in the weapons that can be used.
► If a Soviet submarine abandons the “high-value unit” and goes for the escort, the probability of our destroying the attacking submarine would be high.
► “A duel pitting a towed-array ship with her light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopter against an aggressive ‘Alfa’- or ‘Victor’-class nuclear attack submarine would [not] be a close battle.” The “Alfa” or “Victor” has lit" tie chance against such a LAMPS-shiP combination.
► The SH-3D Sea King helicopter’s dipping sonar is not the nonsubmarine sensor most feared by submariners. A frigate equipped with a LAMPS helicopter and a towed-array sonar is potentially niore deadly.
I must agree with Mr. Caldwell on one point. We do need a long-range AS weapon. The addition of a cruise missn with an on-board signal processor worn significantly enhance our ASW surface capabilities.
“Wanted: A Fair Press”
(See R. L. Upchurch, pp. 68-74, July 1984: Tillman, R. J. Lauer, pp. 22-25, September 1984 Proceedings)
“Wanted: A Professional Press”
(See B. Baker, pp. 74-76, July 1984; B. Tillman, R. J. Lauer, pp. 22-25, September 1984 Proceedings)
“Wanted: A Responsible Free Press”
(See J. M. Smith,-pp. 77-85, July 1984; B- Tillman, R. J. Lauer, pp. 22-25, September 1984 Proceedings)
William Key—To borrow an expression1 from the nuclear fraternity, a major pt0® lem with the media today is that of 3,1 instant “critical mass.” ,
The thrust of these articles is balance and powerful. To provide some perspec five on mass, Captain Baker cites tn “400 reporters” who massed at Barbados on the second day of the Grenada libera tion. The total membership of the ‘ UP. chuckers” from the Pacific actions 0
sist ri ^3r ^ WaS Par Pewer’ an(J con" bo’^ corresPondents and Navy Marine public affairs officers, con- °St ^'ar II and Korean War
mil>S^°nC*entS ^a<J some background in v^1 7 act'vities, either from the sere- from covering maneuvers, or from lng down to the sea in ships; many
mil t av'at’on editors in a period when i ary aviation was good press. They note lnIonr>ed and uniformed. They did frstorm ashore looking like fugitives they1 U ^0urt^ °I July picnic. Above all, hon 7re not a "eddcal mass” to be Th kbefed, and protected,
is c 6 cr'l’cal mass” of nuclear energy for <thtr°7C*' ^ similar need is indicated hrm 6 media mass.” Heaven forbid, pheever’ ’bat it be termed “control.” led Fesu*tant bowl would be uncontrol- and highly critical.
•hor former Marine—The au-
PoinfhaVe d°ne an outstand*ng job pin- the -ln® tbe Problem that exists between
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Press and the defense community. storn °rtUnately, there is a side of the ootrf Was overlooked. The defense prej,^1111-11^ uses anb manipulates the tiSesS t0 ltS °wn udvantage and then chas- the a wben it fails to play the game by \y0ri ,e ense community’s own rules, fvith ' '^■3r por example, was replete Ho mc’l?ents °f high-ranking officers adva man‘Pulated the press in order to s0rnnfe Jbteir own careers. While there is fiCereta'nS to be said for the celebrity of- p0_ ’ 11must be remembered that such Ihe a7 Status cannot be achieved without defe1 op *be press. In addition, we in the Press'56community commonly use the vye. ,to a<Ivance our causes, whether defge °bbying (via the press) for a larger cess S6 ^u<J§et> °r announcing our suc- ln combating a potential enemy.
’be r>6 *S l^at we neec* t*le Press> and p0licfCSS needs us. The problem for our bourH,nakerS ’s ’° help formulate the ar‘es °f the relationship the defense
"'itho1"1*^ *S t0 ^ave w’’h ’^e Press’ 0per°.Ut sacrificing naval and military Hshj310tls °r national security. In estab- tive ® ’bese boundaries, security-sensi- limit7aS s*10uld be clearly defined “off defen, *°r Press- In this regard, the better56 comrnun‘’y must learn to do a dan„rj°k ’n educating the press about the niat;,?rS 'n disseminating sensitive infor-
lastiv° thff.public’
Hi(ist u’ftcers of the armed forces
responever l°se sight that their primary the ^nsibility is preserving the security of tpiate mer'can people, not ensuring ade- Witiri aecess for the press. It is only n ’he context of this responsibility
that a positive, working relationship with the press can be developed.
John McWethy, ABC News defense correspondent—An adversary relationship between the press and the military, the press and government, is healthy. Some critics can't understand: why the press refuses to be a cheerleader for the military or for the government; why the press won’t simply report what the government says without seeking opinions of others; or why the press must always question.
A soldier's job is to prepare for war and fight one if necessary—not to question why he is doing so.
A reporter’s job in a free society is to chronicle events of the day, scrutinize those events, talk to advocates and critics, and, finally, to reflect the opinions of both.
Both the professional soldier and the professional journalist contribute to the strength of democracy; they just do so in different ways.
There are grievous examples of occasions when reporters have failed to do their jobs adequately. For example, they have harshly criticized a military program without giving the government a chance to respond. But probably of greater frequency are the occasions when reporters did not do their jobs because they swallowed what the government said—right or wrong—without checking with industry, the governments of other countries, or experts with different perspectives.
Th.'. press is suspicious of the government and does, with what I am sure is irritating regularity for the government, doubt that the government is telling the whole truth. The suspicion is reinforced by repeated examples of government spokesmen revealing only that part of a story that best suits the spokesman’s boss or department—not what is best for the country—and by repeated attempts to use the press to provide only an administration’s point of view—a view frequently embroiled in the politics of the party that happens to be in power.
It is only natural that the government would try to put a self-aggrandizing spin on an issue, and it is only natural that a journalist should try to figure out what is politics, what is hype, what is half-truth, and what is not.
“The Great SAR Caper” illustrates this point. Every quarter, the Pentagon releases a document called the “Selected Acquisition Report” (SAR). It tabulates cost estimates for the major weapon systems and acts as a barometer for weapons suffering from runaway cost overruns. In one such report filed with much fanfare
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early in the Reagan Administration, the Defense Department announced that the SAR totals had shown the largest single decline ever recorded, with the Pentagon reducing by more than $20 billion what it would cost to build all these weapons. After an acrimonious press briefing, it turned out that the Pentagon—desperate for some good news on spending—had simply renamed a few programs, dropped some things from the list, and in the final analysis, had not only failed to cut costs, but realized a small overall increase.
The incident scarcely created a ripple in the press, but is the kind of thing that sticks in a reporter’s mind. There was no doubt someone was trying to sell the press misleading, inaccurate information in an effort to ease the political heat being administered by Congress over the high cost of “rearming America.” There is little doubt that the scheme had been sanctioned at a very high level.
The biggest change in press-military relations came during the Vietnam War. Both the military and the press carry deep scars from that period. It was a war that many in the military believe would have turned out differently if the press had somehow reported differently.
From the perspective of a newsman, the press was simply doing its job in Vietnam. Reporters were reflecting in their
stories what they saw. When the official government line on Vietnam—advanced by the President himself—turned out to be sharply at variance with what the reporters were finding, some critics of the press labeled such reporting as biased. As it turned out, the media and the nation were being grossly misled about what was going on in Vietnam. The United States was not winning the war, despite secret and unreported bombing runs into Laos and Cambodia, and some field commanders thought U. S. policy was lunacy. This is not to say the press was without blame for some excesses in reporting during that period, but the military and the government were also guilty of their own excesses.
Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U. S. Army, in his book On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, writes:
“There is a tendancy in the military to blame our problems with public support on the media .... The majority of on-the-scene reporting from Vietnam was factual—that is reporters honestly reported what they had seen firsthand. Much of what they saw was horrible, for that is the true nature of war. It was this horror, not the reporting that so influenced the American people.”
Watergate was another historic mhe stone for press-government relations-
Reporters went after this story
with zeal
because it smelled. It proved to be an other case of a president lying to American people.
In both of these cases, what the g° emment was officially telling the and what was really going on were t
esidents
very different stories. But presto don’t generally lie, and the press is n
generally guilty of gross excesses. In fact, during the deployment of
fines to Beirut, relations between
press and the military were extrei
good. ABC’s troops on the grot
the
me'y
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many of whom were veterans of far m^(
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daily with the American troops, nothing but praise for how they han ^ themselves, and said so night after mg on television. Eventually, as the situaU _
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ing, even though the members
Joint Chiefs of Staff were privately ^ pressing many of the same misgivir^* ^ their communications to the w House. . jon
After the Beirut bombing, televlS crews did go to the homes of the fam>
In the United States, call: (202) 293-0650
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was another historic mi e ress-government relations- nt after this story with zea lelled. It proved to be an f a president lying to 1 e sple.
these cases, what the g° officially telling the PreS^ s really going on were tw it stories. But president ly lie, and the press is n° lty of gross excesses, ring the deployment of rut, relations between 1 le military were extreme s troops on the ground"^ m were veterans of far mo
most of the Marines-—dea^
the American troops, a praise for how they hand e and said so night after mg . Eventually, as the situatl° egan turning sour for s, the press reflected the
idministration responded
t the media for biased reP° aough the members of
of Staff were privately e.^
ay of the same misgivings
tunications to the w
Beirut bombing, televis’d > to the homes of the farm 1
thospCfmS ®edeve rt or not, many of less T miheSWanted t0 talk- Nonethe- som'e a^[eC.W'tk critics of the media that cross h !6Visi0n rePorters and crews tasf„ . l lc line °f propriety and good nil, d,Ur'n2 lh°se days. After the first Frve m snowing distraught families, Bob Wori’n executive producer of ABC’s grieVi 6WS Tontght, banned the use of Parents and wives on his broad- one o/f steP toward dealing with A television’s greatest excesses.
tionsh61! W'Se editor once put this rela- viCes 'P between the press and armed ser- PersDp3™ t*16 Press and government in which Wtlen a mii'tnry audience, the a 6 WaS ^dressing, charged that Union ,mer*Can Press was the Soviet all of f ®rcatest friend, and because of reined ,S eXcesses> the media ought to be ence m ^ resP°nse. he asked his audi- guishp0nt question: What most distin- Unionl^*16 ldn'tct* States from the Soviet a strong military or a free press?
Leyte Gulf Remembered”
wee J p\ ...
/Vvw Ahlstr°m, pp. 45-53, August 1984 ceaMgs)
Colonel Fred J. Frank, V. S. sPectiv Ct‘red)—From the Army per- e’ there was trepidation from the
start as we commenced our landing at Leyte beaches at H plus 30 minutes on 20 October 1944. Our LST broached the beach after passing through land-based shellfire that damaged the ships on our starboard and port sides. At first, we figured it might have been a few short rounds fired from our ships, but then we saw that the flashes of artillery were from Japanese gunners. Navy aircraft quickly silenced their guns.
We then transferred to LSMs and landed, but heavy rains had turned the land into a quagmire, and the lightly surfaced roads broke down under our heavy traffic. Tacloban Airfield was only of limited use.
Returning from Tacloban, after checking our lines, we saw that all of the 155mm. gun crews had turned their sights toward the sea. Once we reached X Corps command center, we heard that the Japanese fleet was coming, but most of our major combatant ships had already left, leaving only the jeep carriers and destroyer-type ships in the gulf. In our area, Red Beach, the 24th Infantry Division had been slowed by the mud and had made only limited advances, while the 1st Cavalry Division had secured Tacloban and was proceeding inland. To the south, the 7th Infantry Division had secured only a foothold. We were surrounded. When I found some quiet time, I wrote a letter to my wife, one which she never received, telling her that we had landed and that I loved her.
During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the skies were crisscrossed with U. S. and Japanese aircraft. We had some P-38 aircraft at Tacloban Airport that supported the Navy effort to clear the skies. But it was despairing to watch other Navy aircraft braving the return fire while making three or four passes at a Betty Bomber, when a P-38 would have sawed the tail off in one pass. All of our land units dug in deeper during the battle, realizing that our lives depended on the courage, skill, and bravery of our naval support fighting in their light vessels against a stronger Japanese force.
I never read about the battle today without feeling a strong appreciation for the men on board the jeep carriers and destroyers who held off the Japanese fleet at Leyte Gulf.
“Escalation and Naval Strategy”
(.See L. F. Brooks, pp. 33-37, August 1984 Proceedings)
Captain Paul R. Schratz, U. S. Navy (Retired)— Captain Brooks’ essay offers an interesting intellectual exercise, but I find
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Capt.he pful is not new. lrre|4nT„Bru°0ks omits, apparently as Principle !° k’s argument, other moral ated by S °r a strategy: that war be initi- °f force h°,nPCtent authority; that the use ce$s; t^a|ave a reasonable chance of suc- cessfu, 11 offer a better situation, if suc- ’ an would have prevailed in its
Woridemely d'^'cidt t0 relate to the real Th
st;i. e reacler is misled initially with the Warf!^ent dlat historically “the means of onlv kC avadable have been constrained anv r ''taC lcchnology of the time, not by
that rS'derati0ns of P°licy- The notion not h eaPons could exist but deliberately hensihtUSe<^ would have been incompre- histor,,6’'° m°St tde rnilitary leaders of suPnort statement needs factual
Ware, ' believe that pre-Napoleonic closp CI,e ratber formal, stilted, daylight,
Political^ idri" affairs’ s,rictly limited Prevent h ’ lmited by logistics, and to bilitv f esertlon’ far short of the capa- ThecP ^apons technology, bed h i. dynast'c” wars of the era typi- the m rederick the Great ended with “total’,1ip°leonic “total” wars. But Wars rCVCn t0 Napoleon did not mean mobii” exterm>nation but of the total manDZat,on °f the resources of the state— solute>^er’ supPbes, transport. The “ab- theory jVar Clausewitz existed only in which 1 WaS tbe nbsolute scale against measure^ WarS—limited wars—were
Korean11'1 ^mer*can experience in the limited V‘etnam wars was certainly Wen as Pu '^ally and geographically as techn0i by self-imposed constraints on n°t ne °^y and weaP°nry. Escalation did kind onSarily.niean more of the same Was lm’tation. A political decision at°mifhnerally involved. We had the for the0l,nb’ but it was not used. Hence, Use of aUt l0r t0 state that deliberate non- to tng 3 Weapon is “incomprehensible,” ls. incomprehensible. ti°n conf11 i^ro°ks’ discussion of escala- “renUir r°' *s Puzzling as well. Two new strateyyCr?-nts'' are specified for military lead to lrSl’ “'be strategy should not “the strUnwanted escalation.” Second, tally s, atL'Sy should not fail catastrophi- staterrie°.U d escalation occur.” The first Priticipl11 *S a distortion of the moral force UC/(tdProportionality, that the °bjectivSe,must be proportional to the quiremees,, e‘n8 sought. The other “reobviousnt seems merely to torture the
>hSfv8y,.,.!h°uld never fail cata- effects sa u’ W'tb or without modifying are desin Cb 3S escalation. If these criteria Planner*^ to.be new anci helpful to the "'bat k’h | at *s new's not helpful and absence; that the means of war be moral; and that the goals sought be legitimate. Since these principles are not referred to and would certainly influence tactics of deliberate escalation, his model seems flawed.
Most important, nuclear strategy should not be treated as a bloodless, mechanical exercise. Dealing with megadeath in nuclear war creates a frame of mind where one death is a tragedy, a million deaths a statistic. The mind cannot comprehend the magnitude. As Arthur Koestler wrote in The Yogi and the Commissar, “Statistics don’t bleed. We are unable to embrace the total process with our awareness: we can only focus on little lumps of reality.” In essence, the world of the nuclear planner is out of touch with reality.
To approach the subject constructively, in the real world, there are two and only two principles which apply in planning and executing a strategy: the objective and control. (The so-called “principles of war” with which we are all familiar are largely good conduct guides which may or may not apply. “Surprise” at Pearl Harbor, for example, gained a brilliant tactical success and a strategic disaster; surprise in the Tet Offensive was a tactical disaster and a strategic victory.) The principles of strategy are universal. The objective, or mission, is the purpose or effect desired. Without this, as Clause- witz says, “war becomes a senseless thing with no object.” The objective is a clear appreciation of the purpose of the strategy, necessary in order to assess its validity.
Control governs those actions necessary to gain or retain the initiative in order to attain the objective. Control can be internal—political, economic, cul- ural, and psychological—or external— geography, weaponry, morale, technological change, environment, organization, communications, intelligence, and primarily, time and tempo. In its broadest sense, the achievement of war’s aim is some measure of control over the enemy.
Escalation, by contrast, is not a strategy. What, for example, is the common principle covering controlled escalation in Vietnam, the strategy of gradualism, and that covering the controlled nuclear escalation herein? Deliberate use of escalation as a means of control seems to go in the wrong direction. The main goal of war in a nuclear strategy, Bernard Brodie cautioned, “should surely be to terminate it as quickly as possible and with the least amount of damage possible—on both sides.”
It is commendable for a military officer to do serious thinking about strategy and modem war. Far too few of us have made the attempt—and especially to put our thoughts in writing. The military professional has made a bleak contribution to strategy-making in the nuclear era, leaving the task almost wholly to the. civilian scholar invariably lacking the seasoning of operational experience.
Unfortunately, neither the military nor the civilian contribution has been adequate. Both treat nuclear war and deterrence as activities taking part wholly in the technical dimension with no consideration for the sociopolitical or operational elements. Both violate the above principles of strategy and the three elements Clausewitz defined as intrinsic to war: political motivation, operational activity, and social participation. In addition, the civilian scholar has been criticized for other shortcomings: the dominance of the economic conflict model to produce theories which fall apart when the model is applied to operational reality and the bureaucratization of the art of strategy-making in “think tanks” whose dual loyalty to academe and the government tends toward both poor scholarship and irrelevant policy advice.
But welcome to the arena; any number can play.
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1 roc
Comment and Discussion
sea power areas. If nuclear suPrn.p|CerS' are the “best and the brightest 0 should one infer that the rest of the ^ fit corps is populated by the worst cpr dullest? Captions such as this \f) dence to the theses being advan Commander Cutler. ce t°
I greatly appreciate the pr()Ce^' “sound off. ’ ’ I enjoy reading the ' ings and look forward to the ne*
“A More Relevant Navy”
(,See F. J. Glaeser, pp. 114-115, August 1984
Proceedings)
Patrick Stinson—Commander Glaeser makes some valid points, however, his implied negative assessment of the worth of battleship reactivations is not one of them. Recommissioning Iowa (BB-61)- class battleships is a relevant move because no existing new ships in the fleet have main batteries composed of guns of a caliber heavier than 5-inch.
It might be possible to modify some existing Sixth Fleet ships to carry heavier main batteries as Commander Glaeser suggests. How much heavier? Because of physical limitations, they could not possibly be heavy enough to make the battleships’ batteries unnecessary. Anything beyond an eight-inch gun is out of the question.
As long as we consider amphibious assault units to be necessary, there will be a need for gunfire support ships. There are no ships afloat today that can perform the task of shore bombardment better than Iowa battleships.
“Self-Confidence—the First Requisite”
(See T. Cutler, p. 84, July 1984; W. B.
Hunt, D. J. Curran, p. 99-103, September 1984 Proceedings)
Commander Kenneth P. Weinberg, U. S. Navy—Commander Cutler’s contribution leaves the reader with two erroneous impressions: that there is an “epidemic proportion of screamers” in the surface warfare commanding officer community and that the cause for this phenomenon is the afloat executive officer (XO) billet.
I disagree with Commander Cutler’s thesis regarding the abundance of Captain Queegs. It is unfortunate that he has had such negative experiences with his former commanding officers. It is equally unfortunate that he finds proof for this thesis by comparing notes with his colleagues at the Naval Academy. In dwelling on the alleged abundance of screamer—commanding officers, his idea could slowly gain credence in the minds of his peers and juniors, condition the sensitivities of future officers to the presence of screamers, and in the end push the acceptance of and expectation that all, or just about all, commanding officers must rant and rave to accomplish their missions. By fitting past experiences of an extremely small sample size (his own), the proof for this erroneous thesis remains to be submitted.
I offer the experience of another small sample size—my own—to refute Commander Cutler’s first thesis. As a subordinate to seven commanding officers afloat, I saw no commanding officer motivate through fear. Naturally, their leadership styles were different! Yes, each reacted to the stress and demands of command in his own way. They all, however, shared several common attributes: they were students of naval warfare, motivators by example, and most importantly leaders. One in particular inspired several of my officer shipmates and me to make the Navy a career.
The reason for this proliferation of Captain Blighs leads the reader to Commander Cutler’s second thesis: the XO billet. While there can be no denying that the XO fights a paper war, one must point out there are strategies and tactics, as in any war, which must be employed. Training subordinates at all levels to respond and complete paperwork promptly and in the style set forth by the command, anticipating forthcoming correspondence requirements, and making plans are examples of those strategies and tactics. There is no magic potion which will forever eliminate or reduce paperwork, but the actions outlined above can keep the paperwork under control.
As a former XO, I spent much time working and moving paper. I also budgeted time to become involved with ship’s operations; to maintain currency in tactics, capabilities, and limitations; and to train the ship’s department heads to be XOs. To the best of my knowledge, my counterparts on board sister ships did basically the same.
I believe that Commander Cutler’s suggestion to switch roles of the operations officer with that of the XO would not work. Like it or not, the XO has the seniority to make things happen.
, in that
Commander Cutler is correct 1rS most prospective commanding 0 . a (PCOs) are removed from the opera1' ^ fleet during the time between the C _ XO billets. It is at this juncture 0^a/'varj- cer’s career when he has a tour wit , ous ashore staffs, works in the arena, and/or has a tour of duty in ington, D.C. pCQs
The present method of getting ^ updated is to detail them to a^oU0l)- months of “pipeline.” This training^,, sists of various courses which, taken in aggregate, comprise the ^ formal preparation for the PCO *3e °n)any assumes command. While there are positive facets to this pipeline appr . (0 the end result is that the PCO is f°rC “eat the elephant in one gulp- ,eto
A more practical approach migh e5 have periodic drills such as the re ^ have on an annual basis. This traju]ed would consist of regularly sc^e temporary duty assignments, Perand/ot weeks per year back in the fleetary schools. The purpose of these tempq0> assignments would be to keep the ^ current in terms of tactics, policieS'aCh ship/aircraft driving skills. This aPP |jne will not supplant the current P'P training but should: pq0'
► Shorten it, particularly in the ^
leadership and management training tactical employment courses ^(it
► Ensure that PCOs are more e
than now, thus allowing increase bility in detailing c0[po-
► Maintain an increased level ot
rate knowledge among PCOs ^ jffl
,bC '
Finally, I find the caption on Pa~' ^ of the May 1984 issue (“The A10-sterit Submarine, 1984-2014”) 'nCPnsjret0 with the U. S. Naval Institute’s advance professional, literary, an tific knowledge in naval, marit1111^.^
Chief Data Processing Technician
Having sailed in carriers for seve ^ as a civilian engineer and having saj more than 20 years in the Navy and Reserve, I agree 100% with Comma Darling. Imay
During my drilling reserve tirne^
f the
ed
on*6
flattops, I came away with one fee ' 0j fear; fear they would shoot thernse ^ 0f the rest of the watch through V1eXpe" weapons-handling knowledge an . gfl rience. I would never want to depe them to repel boarders. . fut
The answer is increased training this costs money. The shortage ^ structors, however, could be °v „cj-
It
i contractual ba*1
through the use of National Rif* ‘ ation instructors on a contractual t“anges
li
ft
wn5.
Navy
essay got my juices flowing- $ aggressive and thought-provokinf^tf that, unfortunately, does not discfl
“Nicaragua: Soviet Satrapy”
(See T. Ashby, pp. 48-56, July 1984; T. C. Hone, p. 99, September 1984 Proceedings)
“Restoring Order South of the Border”
(See R. K. Kolb, pp. 56-61, August 1984; T.
C. Hone, B. R. Davidson, p. 99, September 1984 Proceedings)
Frederico Q. De los Rios—It is true that the present flow of weapons to Nicaragua has created a powerful army, but the maintenance of that equipment is costly, and the resources available to the country are not sufficient to support its upkeep. Mr. Ashby fails to consider that the Soviet Union is in a difficult economic situation and that it will not be able to support its military presence in the region for a prolonged period.
The equipment Nicaragua has received, like T-54/55 tanks and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers (APCs), requires trained crews, and these vehicles suffer frequent breakdowns. In his article, Mr. Ashby also has not provided balanced perspective on this subject. For example, the T-54/55 can be engaged and destroyed by armored cars like the Panhard AML-90 light armored car with a 90-mm. gun, which has been used successfully by Israel. The AML-90 is in service with several countries in the area and is made in France. The BTR-60 APC suffers from almost the same defects as the T-54/55 tank. Its only advantage is its amphibious capability which allows it to cross rivers and beaches. However, this advantage will not benefit the soldiers and APC crews because most of Honduras and El Salvador is jungle—a terrain that favors guerrilla-type operations.
Artillery in the form of the 152-mm. and 122-mm. howitzers and BM-21 rocket launchers, though extremely useful in offensive operations, are relatively few in number. This capability can be easily countered by our 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers, if we train our friends to use these weapons and trust them with the equipment. Our military training is excellent, but if our soldiers do not know the language of our friends and how to treat our friends, we will not have success.
The port facilities being built in Nicaragua with Soviet and Cuban assistance have been reported to be able to handle ships up to 25,000 tons, including (according to Mr. Ashby) the Soviet Navy’s Kirov- class nuclear-powered missile cruiser. It is doubtful, however, that Soviet warships could use the installations without us knowing about it. And so far there is no news of such visits.
It is interesting that Mr. Ashby makes these alarming reports about Nicaragua without commenting on the use of Soviet weapons and Cuban technicians in Peru. Is Peru now a Soviet satellite? Hardly.
The Sandanista movement was dominated by democratic elements from every sector of the political spectrum in opposition to the Somoza dictatorship. However, after the popular revolution succeeded in over throwing Somoza, the newly elected Reagan administration began isolating and subverting the new regime through so-called covert operations and through the support of a guerrilla movement comprising the Somoza National Guard. In turn, the guard has allowed the Marxist element in Nicaragua to push the country into the arms of Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The hate that the Nicaraguan people feel toward that national guard and its remnents has helped the communists suppress the other democratic elements within the pretense of national security. This has given the Marxist element the chance to control the country and impose restrictions on the rights of assembly and free association.
The main cause of this situation has been the United States’ failure to accept social reforms and economic autonomy in Latin America, coupled with its history of intervention in the internal affairs of the countries in the region, thus establishing an atmosphere of suspicion. Our support of dictatorships that violate the human rights of their own citizens has aggravated the situation and provided a fertile ground for communist insurrection and for Cuban expansionism in the area.
If the United States continues its current policies, it will end up pushing Nicaragua deeper into the Soviet orbit, aiding our rivals and encouraging the proliferation of Soviet ideology.
“Not Ready on the Firing Line”
(See R. E. Darling, pp. 142-143, July 1984;
J. E. Sheets, p. 160, September 1984
Proceedings)
Paul V. Hanninen—During World War II, I spent the better part of two years standing in-port gangway petty officer watches on a Fletcher-class destroyer. The badge of that exalted office was a guard belt, from which hung a holster housing a monstrous gun. I believe it was a .45 caliber pistol. To this day, I have not fired that type of weapon. Had the need for its immediate use ever arisen, I might have somehow muddled through, quite possibly at the expense of a self-inflicted wound, such as a lost toe.
Commander Darling mentions a ten- year decline in Navy small arms train 'st Based on personal experience, I sU-. ^ that the decline of which he speaks m be 40 years in duration.
VV.C-
Weikel, U. S. Naval Reserve (Ret^e&
11 ’ of
have spent a total of four hours perthf, on small arms instruction, desp1 availability of an indoor range at ^ serve station. During my carrier u.
the Marine detachment expended jf
sands of rounds over the fan tarn j„
those sailors who were interes j, shooting expended a total of 25 r°aanon was amazing. There was no qualm t requirement for the sailors, s° elected not to bother with the dri Having observed watch standers
might also be possible to use the 1 of local police departments. 6 rangements may only increase n training, but handguns are the baslC , jn weapon for six of the 15 areas 1 Commander Darling’s Table I- . je- Commander Darling’s pr°p°saraji2' serves all the support it can mustet’ 0$ ing from each ship’s commanding to the Chief of Naval Operations’
“No Bastions for the Bear f J
(See D.B. Rivkin. pp. 36-43, April \F Glaeser, p. 14, June 1984; W. J- julv
15; June 1984; R. H. Smith, pp. >4'2 \9gi; 1984; L. E. Lacouture, p. 101, Augast R. O. Welander, J. D. Williams, p- September 1984 Proceedings)
“The Wartime Role of SoV'et SSBNs—Round Two”
(See C. H. Clawson, pp. 64-71, Mard1 Proceedings)
Commander James A. Marcel)’’
(Retired)—Mr. Rivkin s
such , ^'fect information to support sn a bold
ulative hypothesis based on consid-
^(not marineS anc^ missi*es> suggest- ntent b lackcating) 3 continuous commit- clear J r ^ov'et Navy to strategic nu- . warfare.
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SDernf0 fact and speculation. And the uiation is presented as fact.
lcnoF exarnple, Mr. Rivkin argues from mobi]11 ■ eveloPment by the Soviets of and lntercontinental ballistic missiles f0re th6W Strate§tc bomber to: “There- advant ^ are recons'dering the strategic role fha§- °/ sea'based missiles and the fenSiv 6 ^ov*et Navy would have in of- wareoefnuc>ear operations.” I am una- assertion. I believe this to be
less M 'ke Prev’ous facts. Neverthe- ^oriabl ff^'vk*n Presents it as an unques- A|SQe act equal to the other facts, sees as'fl r ^'vk'n 'nterprets what he Soviet J “ctu.ati°ns in the production of denCefa *st'c missile submarines as evi- the va]° 3 ^e^ate within the Kremlin on strate»Ue °f a sea'based element in their Sented Strike ^orce- This debate is prebest ofaS 3 btistorical fact, when, to the evidenknowledge, there is no direct ei'i'de,)Ce suck a debate. I see the same as an ,Ce. Rivkin sees but interpret it better flow of progressively “Zulus ^ iimited numbers of in tbe’ Golfs,” and “Hotels” early silesuumarine-launched ballistic mis- ^°ng-te°^ram 3S an interim until the gram c^ 3nC* exPensive “Yankee” prohiatUsan3e t0 fruition. Mr. Rivkin sees a 'Ween th ?,e^ate within the Kremlin be- kee” ci e Hotel” class and the “Yan-
°f inter^SS'-^katever tke case’ l301!1 ways
'‘°ns T’cting the evidence are specula-
Mv. »f?cts-
ntandgr p kln also argues from Com- ‘Vanu Glawson’s description of the ^artim eDC^ass (G. H. Clawson, “The N,” MR°le 0f Soviet SSBNs—Round Tanke ^80 Proceedings) that the antiShi e Was intended primarily for the strata r°*e> and that “its contribution to ^as mi nU<;Jear attacks against the U. S. insufficil0r' ^r' Rivkin also cites the Tankedn,^ *n numbers of deployed 'tl'Port^eS as evidence for the “minor”
Hiie r °f the “Yankee-”
Cllratelv | 0rnmander Clawson does ac- Po\ver n- e,scr'’:)e the “Yankee” as “high at the tilgksPeed, restively noisy. . kee’’ sbe was designed, the “Yan- art in f’I?sented the Soviet state-of-the- trated marine propulsion and illus- Stealth j 6 ^oviet choice of speed -over- Ptny bavar,dersea warfare. This choice Sessihente h611 PromPted by a Soviet as- ac°ti$tictkey could not achieve an ^maripg anta§e over G- S. nuclear s- The speed-over-stealth bn
^dings / n
' October 1984
choice might be explained as an antiship role (as both Mr. Rivkin and Commander Clawson suggest), but it can also be explained as a healthy respect for U. S. sub killer submarines which have the acoustic advantage. And, indeed from what we know of operations and exercises, the “Yankee” does not operate as a tactical warfare platform. And that’s a fact.
In reference to insufficient numbers of “Yankees” deployed, Mr. Rivkin has not considered that we have essentially been in a peacetime situation with the Soviets and have never been close to strategic nuclear war with them since the “Yankee” class was deployed. Soviet military writings make clear their belief that strategic warfare would be the result of a long period of rising tension. They do not expect the United States to execute a “bolt from the blue” attack against the Soviet Union in response to relatively minor provocations. Consistent American restraint (some would say timidity) in all the crises between the United States and Soviet Union since World War II must reinforce this view.
The Soviets have chosen to deploy relatively few “Yankees” and to keep the remainder in a high state of readiness. Their ability to surge “Yankees” in a time of crisis must be greater than ours
the Navy Department
(shipyard inefficiencies presumed to be equal), precisely because their peacetime posture is less stressing.
Even if the “Yankees” are not a first- strike launch system against our command, control, and communications system and Strategic Air Command bomber bases, as Mr. Rivkin asserts, that does not mean that their contribution is minor. Perhaps the Soviets look upon the “Yankees” as a survivable leg of the triad to strike U. S. cities. By having that survivable leg, they perhaps think this restrains the United States from launching a first strike against the two non-survivable legs of their triad. I would not call this minor. This line of argumentation was the central justification for our extensive nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program.
These are but a few examples. Mr. Rivkin’s article is rife with similar tendentious use of facts to draw dubious conclusions which are then presented as facts. There are just too many things we don’t know. Mr. Rivkin’s view is clear and definite, but it may be all, or in part, a mirage.
There is a more substantive issue in Mr. Rivkin’s article that demands comment. In a general nonnuclear war with the Soviets, Mr. Rivkin advocates that
k Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 © Houghton Mifflin Company 1984
we invade Soviet SSBN bastions and attack the Soviet assets that protect their SSBNs (but not the SSBNs themselves). He says, “by peeling away SSBN defense, the United States can exert strong counterescalatory pressure on Soviet decision makers.” On the contrary! In the proverbial fog of war, how are we to ensure that the Soviets understand that we’re attacking only surface antisubmarine warfare escorts and “Victor”-class nuclear-powered attack submarines riding shotgun for their “Delta” SSBNs? The Kremlin may miss such finesse and assume we’re attacking their SSBNs, that we’re trying to achieve a decisive strategic advantage, or even that we’re preparing to execute a strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Given well-documented Soviet recognition of the importance of striking first and the lack of consideration by the Soviets of subtle options in strategic warfare, attacks on their bastions are decidedly escalatory and an invitation to the Kremlin to “use 'em or lose ’em.”
In the same article, Mr. Rivkin suggests using B-52s and B-l bombers to attack Soviet warships protecting their SSBNs. Those bastions are located in ocean areas very close to the Soviet mainland! Do we expect the Soviets to recognize and accept Strategic Air Command bombers flying toward their territory as an attack on the Kiev or the Kirov? Holy Armageddon, Batman!
This does not mean that we concede strategic warfare to the Soviets. We should have a decisive strategic advantage over the Soviets, not only to deter their use of their strategic weapons but also to restrain the Soviets from using a strategic threat in peacetime to bully the Free World. Yet if the shooting starts, we must recognize the powerful strategic capability the Soviets have. Escalation control must be considered in our naval operations. In the event of a nonnuclear war with the Soviets, it is essential that we use our naval forces in such a way that there will be no perception by the Soviets that we’re beginning to pull their strategic fangs. This assumes, of course, that they exercise similar restraint. I believe they will—not out of any intrinsic good will, but because of a similar recognition that such an attack could prompt a first strike by us.
If Mr. Rivkin is right in contending that the Soviet Navy is pulling back from the global reach advocated by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov (a primacy of limited warfare) to defended SSBN bastions close to home as advocated by Admiral V. N. Chernavin (a primacy of strategic warfare), then so much the better! Every
noias ana prevent auueu iu&mu" - ^ for the crew members? But, again, 0 j tion to be made, ^ where does one find highly trained ^ less couples who are willing to serv
duty? . crew
As explained by Sollers, tne , lembers would form a local govern^ in the landing areas until a more s
rive*
Their homes wouia nxeiy navi- — strayed; relatives killed or mutilate ^ their lives, as they know them, an)d ^ America that they remember, wou gone—finished. Facing the choice
ing to rebuild in the contaminated
ness, many may elect to start their ^
anew, elsewhere, in a more isola“”
-------------------------------- . sfliP5
Consequently, the investment in u> is wasted.
One should not be pessimistic ^ ' chances of surVlVjViCf
the United States case of a nuclear conflict, but the
Soviet ship, airplane, and submarine protecting their SSBNs is not contesting us for control of the sea-lanes. In a nonnuclear war with the Soviets, let us sweep the rest of their forces from the seas, maintain our deterrent capability, but leave their SSBN bastions alone! If the bear stays in his den, the forest is ours.
“The Weeks After”
(See J. T. Sollers, pp. 143-145, July 1984 Proceedings)
Ensign Edwin L. Armistead, U. S. Navy— Mr. Sollers has proposed an original plan for survivability in a nuclear conflict with his Mobile Continuity Force (MCF) and its employment of prepositioned ships in the Antarctic regions. He has done a good job of designing the ship to incorporate all of the equipment and supplies necessary for a lengthy patrol period and the resupplying of survivors, yet he has failed to address the following moral, ethical, and fiscal considerations involved with the construction of such ships.
It is common knowledge that the government has plans to save its top officials, e.g., the President, the top military brass, etc., with the Air Force’s E-4 flying command post, in which the President will direct the strategic course of the war. But this measure has always been an accepted element of defense planning, and most Americans realize that in the event of a nuclear war, they will have to fend for themselves in order to survive.
Sollers’ ships, on the other hand, would have to be funded on the assumption that they would be built to help the American populace. But would they really help the nation as a whole? Probably only a few coastal locations, near the larger metropolitan areas would receive aid, while much of the U. S. interior would be left in isolation. Will the people of these central areas, knowing these facts, still be willing to finance the construction of such ships?
To build MCF ships would signal to many that the United States believes it can survive a nuclear confrontation and still be ready to defend itself. This idea contradicts mutual assured destruction— that a nuclear war is unwinnable, and thus should be avoided at all costs. To build these ships might prompt smaller countries to believe that because the United States thinks it can survive a nuclear war, their countries could be sacrificed in a battle between our nation and the Soviet Union. For even though the other countries would not be directly involved in a nuclear exchange, the inevitable worldwide contamination that would
follow would affect them, too. Wil MCF ships be available to help 0 countries as well? ny
Mr. Sollers doesn’t state how n ships would be required for the °Pera”del nor does he mention any manning g ^ lines. With our present sh°rtage , trained personnel, where would we ^ the people to man these vessels, a ^ event of the threat of war, manning ^ MCF ship would no doubt be easy, (0 would it be a favorable career cho1?, -s be a member of one of these s crews? And who would determine the ^ vice distribution of the crew? An ^ Navy crew might not be favored y Joint Chiefs of Staff.
As for Mr. Sollers’ suggestion reg^ ing a mixed crew of men and women ^ would continue the American na ^ why not have husbands and wives o same ship so as to not break up *1°ujsii holds and prevent added mental ang^s for the crew members? But, again, 0 ^ the personnel selection to be made
t^Apiaiiicu u j uv/uv.u,
members would form a local govern ., in the landing areas until a more s one was organized. This authority & . the ship and her crew immense p0". (e(. they would preside over vast areas o ^ ritory and control all of the facilihcs^ direct the distribution of suppheS ^ they have aboard. But would the ^ members want to come back to Ante Their homes would likely have bee ^ strayed; relatives killed or mutilate ■ their lives, as they know them- an
ing to rebuild in the contaminant
of the United States, where they selves might succumb to radiation
____________ , ^ jijS'
ships cannot help enough people 10 tify their great expense and are not a j, tion in the survival dilemma. The sions the crew would necessarily na make about whom they would help ^ more critically, whom they would a don could adversely affect the ship s^|j sion and purpose. Is the American P ready to deal with the tremendous P ^ lems associated with such a trouble^ vival plan, not to mention the imp the aftereffects of a nuclear exc Not one to advocate that the c°
should act like an ostrich and bury its head in the sand, I believe anything done to enhance the nation’s survivability in a nuclear war should be designed to reach as wide a population as possible and be accomplished under as low a profile as possible. I support stimulating a renewal
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“The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine” gJ.
(See P. Schratz, pp. 105-107, December 19 > D. Holley, p. 91, February 1984 Procee
Commander George Nekrasov, v, Australian Navy (Retired) ' ^ Schratz produced a very interesting timely review of two topical b°°, . own review of Viktor Suvorov s
was published in the Australian Defence Reporter.
outclassed, but it fought right w0therI start, because Russians fought f°r N Russia. In 1941, however, they s
dered—because they did not want t0^J for a repugnant system. Moreover, ^ of them were eager to fight for M
of public awareness of this issue and the renovation of existing nuclear survivable facilities.
“Their Tattletales (Our Problems)”
(See W. H. Gregory, pp. 97-99, February 1984;
R. R. Proctor, p. 27, June 1984; L. E. Goewey, p. 164, September Proceedings)
Ronald A. Weiss—Commander Gregory’s discussion was captivating. I sensed that something important had been omitted, however. Since the “tattletale” is in a tenuous position for survival in the event of a war, it is most likely considered expendable, especially in a preemptive strike situation. The scenarios and strategies discussed did not consider the possibility that the first strike weapon (nuclear?) could be carried by the tattletale herself.
Who needs a sophisticated delivery system from over the horizon when the weapon is placed 24 hours a day right in the midst of the U. S. fleet on an otherwise harmless, undefended older vessel? Unthinkable, you say? No one in their right mind would commit suicide to destroy an enemy fleet? A fatal flaw on our side would be to assume the enemy thinks as we do.
Would a government that brutalizes its own citizens, blasts 269 innocent airline passengers from the sky, and commits wholesale slaughter of men, women, and children of its neighboring countries hesitate to sacrifice a vessel manned by its own citizens, especially if it stands to gain so much strategic advantage?
Assuming that the tattletale does carry a weapon capable of knocking out our fleet without warning, the following possibilities manifest themselves:
► The crew members of the tattletale know that they are expendable, and just hope that they are not called upon to make the sacrifice (a “Russian roulette” as crews are rotated).
► Only a select few on the tattletale know they are expendable, such as the captain and the KGB officer on board.
► No one on the tattletale knows they carry the weapon which is to be triggered remotely from a central decision command post.
► The tattletale weapon can be delivered without warning after the tattletale has discreetly moved away. For example, could the weapon be placed in the sea ahead of the U. S. task force and detonated as the fleet passes?
It disturbs me that this eventuality was not considered in an otherwise excellent
article. I hope that our strategic plan ^ have considered this possibility- ^ gleet it could prove fatal. The s ows” that follow our submarines are ^ likely to be on a similar mission, carry ^ a weapon capable of destroying a • submarine without warning upon rec of a signal from a central decision p The prospect is frightening.
parif,c
-j 1 - ^yitll
On one point only do I disagre Captain Schratz. He states: ^uS. j0f
surrendered by the millions against Hitler [I agree] and against Nap y£t Bonaparte, too [I strongly disagreef j the Russians won both wars [1 a£,< The performance of the Soviet £ would be totally different in a dele war fighting for Mother Russia 1 u would be in an offensive campaign ■ ing beyond the Soviet borders. j position needs some qualifying-
In 1812, the Russian Army was a M
Russia alongside the Germans Stalin and all he stood for: comma" 4 oppression, and revolution. This e j[li‘j the appearance of General Vlasov an^ d Russian Army of Liberation. It t0 _ ry| the blunders and atrocities of Hitler J ist anti-Russian policies to convim ^ Russians that they should f'S ,, “Mother Russia and Father Stal'n’^gi|;
one. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky (Ffl (<r sky Papers, Collins, London, 19 sjl garded himself as fighting f°r against the Soviet system. Now v^£<i Suvorov’s book suggests that the ^ would profit by driving a wedge be^ ^ the Soviet regime and the people ^ < Soviet Union. He echoes none othe
de-
One concept that deserves more
- ■ hattle
able to attack than is the carrier ^
group. When taken as a whole, their
fl3s
■"“*£**
psychologically as well as matem Such a concept would force the Sovi^y
—r------------ ------ gjV'
over-tax their surveillance system > ® {
havl
concept would free our surface na jct thinking mainly in terms of the battle group escort duty, with its <■ ^ quent rigidity and defensive orien (0
itio0
wide'- 1
. . _ How are ^
separated and numerous groups 0 ^
to be supported? By oilers? If so,
we protect these support ships
be*'!
1C11UCU agaiiKM an auaviv .
that not all of the ships could be
satisfactorily, in time, with
support an effective V/STOL a'rcr^s pid
our doctrines. We must discuss fl
ail levels in
“Guerrilla Warfare at Sea”
(,See F. J. Glaeser, pp. 41-47, August 1983; N. Friedman, p. 183, October 1983 Proceedings)
“Think (Don’t Talk) Tactics”
(See F. J. Glaeser, pp. 113-115; December 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Gerald D. Roncolato, U. S. Navy—One of the hottest issues in the defense community today is military reform. This debate is healthy. Lacking outside criticism, our armed forces would probably atrophy as they deluded themselves that operational concepts of the past were perfectly suited to the present. As with all debates, however, this one tends to wander away from the point and now seems hung up on “more-cheaper- simpler” versus “less-costlier-more complex.”
Some valid military reform arguments have become obscured. The most important of these is “maneuver warfare.” As espoused by Liddell Hart, it is worth more consideration.
If operational art (the concept underlying the conduct of war proper) is seen as a spectrum, at one end lies “attrition warfare” and at the other “maneuver warfare.” The former holds that combat is a purely mathematical process; one side masses a sufficient amount of firepower to roll over the other. The latter, in its extreme, envisions combat as a primarily psychological process. One side convinces the other that to fight or continue to resist is fruitless, and the battle/war ends.
The conduct of most wars falls somewhere between these two extremes. The side that is materially superior can emphasize attrition warfare, thereby saving lives and reducing the chances of defeat. The side that is at a material disadvantage, however, must stress maneuver warfare (with a consequent increase in the risks incurred) to offset the greater
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technical power of its opponent.
The U. S. Navy would find it wise, as it faces a larger Soviet Navy, to consider the concept of maneuver warfare. If this concept is understood to mean maneuvering against the opponent’s mind in the hope of offsetting his material advantage, and not just the ‘ ‘Blitzkrieg’ ’ or the ‘ ‘End Sweep,” then its applicability to naval warfare in the latter part of the 20th century becomes apparent. Commander Glaeser’s articles underscore our Navy’s need to reorient its training, doctrine, and equipment with a greater emphasis on maneuver warfare. In doing so, he brings a sense of balance to the debate between the military reformers and the more traditional elements of the Navy.
How does this relate to naval doctrine? If war is seen to be a clash between wills, as both Karl von Clausewitz and Liddell Hart saw it, then we must strive to understand our opponent and his doctrine. Then we must develop a doctrine which will ensure success against him.
The Soviet Navy has done this effectively for nearly 40 years. The Soviets have designed and built their navy for the purpose of destroying the pillar upon which our doctrine rests, the aircraft carrier. They understand our doctrine and, within the context of their goals and objectives, have devised a strategy and have developed the hardware to implement it.
We have largely played into their hands, relying almost exclusively on aircraft carriers while neglecting the promise of such technological innovations as the cruise missile, the vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft (V/STOL), and new hull designs. We have failed to seek out Soviet weaknesses and exploit them. The U. S. Navy seems to rely on the technical capability of its hardware to the neglect of the innovative capabilities of its people. I believe that this is the main point of Commander Glaeser’s articles, one which deserves close scrutiny by our officers.
As Commander Glaeser states, the U. S. Navy is going to be outnumbered by the Soviet Navy for some time. We must, therefore, develop operational concepts to maximize those advantages we have and to minimize those of our potential opponents.
Our officers must become tacticians in the truest sense of the word. We must continuously enmesh ourselves in tactics, placing the burden of material management on our senior enlisted people. Our officers must be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of naval warfare, conditioned to think independently and innovatively. Only with such tools will we be able to adapt to the infinite faces war can as
sume. Furthermore, only with such to will we be able to develop truly fleX1 and responsive doctrines. , f
As emphasized by Comma0 Glaeser, we must also modify our °Pe tional doctrine. It must become 1,1 flexible. It must be able to find we ^ nesses within Soviet doctrine as we within the Russian mind
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tailed study combines the best of ^ maneuver and attrition warfares. 1° sence, this concept places subm^1^ and surface action groups (SAGs) on ^ leading edge of our naval forces, wit ^ aircraft carriers providing support for^^ lines of communications and ProteC jj. for our logistics. Technically, each j vidual SAG is considerably more vu ,
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planned on the need to attack um; - jS carriers and whose command struct ^ predisposed to tactical rigidity, con to offset the material disadvantage- This doctrine aims to defeat the ene
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The surface navy would then beg ^ truly think offensively, increasing contribution to our naval power.
Several problems remain wit SAG concept, though.
these groups of surface ships to o ^ fended against air attack? While it1 ,e
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a long-range surface-to-air missn tial remedies.
If the Navy dedicates its resour talents to these problems, they .c|es- (I solved. Commander Glaeser s a ^^3' along with others on the topic o ^giF j and strategic thinking, represent a^uJti I ning. We must continuously ree^ef]i 311
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Proceedings