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Contents:
How Silent the Silent Service? The Hide-Away Helo
Leadership-Management Training and Education
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Special Forces for Special Problems
The Fleet Nugget
Naval War College: The Right Stuff?
The Unobvious Lessons of the Falklands War
The Hell-for-Leather Jacket
Reeding, Righting, and Rithmatic
FFG-7s: Square Pegs?
Sealift
Guerrilla Warfare at Sea
U. S. Navy Sail Training Update
The Continental Strategy of Imperial Japan
“How Silent the Silent Service?”
(See R. Pariseau, pp. 40-44, July 1983
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Thomas J. Rossi, U. S. Naval Reserve—Dr. Pariseau’s thought-provoking comments on probable Soviet wartime tactics deserve serious consideration by our naval leaders.
He offers excellent recommendations for increasing survivability in an “out- shoot-and-outmaneuver” encounter. Upgraded attack trainer exercises will be a first step toward improving tactics. All other training opportunities should also be used. Annual weapons certifications can provide scenarios for exposure to evasion devices, decoys, and torpedo evasion. Preparation for overseas movement (POM) workups and other training periods should be geared to the wartime environment.
Dr. Pariseau’s recommendation to establish a “red submarine team,” similar to units operated by the Air Force and Army, is outstanding. Operational squadrons, assigned to both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, should be dedicated to a continuing development of Soviet tactics and the provision of “hostile” forces for at-sea exercises. Each squadron would be a “fleet-in-being,” similar to a deployed squadron which has no permanent units of its own. Submarines would be operationally assigned to each squadron long enough to allow for equipment modification and crew training, as well as to provide a significant return in at-sea services and exercises. The submarines should function solely as “red team” submarines, with the exception of maintenance
periods and annual certifications and examinations. ,
Naval leaders can use these exercise results to evaluate weaknesses in °ur strategy and tactics. “Friendly” submarine crews will benefit by exposure t° wartime conditions and Soviet tactics- Such experiences will likely have a sobering effect on all involved. I hope Dr- Pariseau’s analysis will receive the atten tion it deserves.
r
Commander Russell Buckley, U- Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Hoe (DDG-13)—As commanding officer of3 surface combatant, a Charles F. Adams class DDG with no helo capability. I aP plaud the attention Commander Sa y brings to the need for more helicopters a sea. But, while I admire the innovativ^ approach which the LPH-292 concep provides, I don’t believe it is the solution for the U. S. Navy. With the exception 0 the DDG-2 class, our problem is not 3 lack of facilities, but a shortage of he ' copters. And, while the DDG-2s do nee helicopter facilities, their age, shipkeeP" ing characteristics, and limited dec space argue for a solution other than the LPH-292.
The shortage of helicopters can n overcome by augmenting the LAMP fleet with a less-capable but smaller an considerably cheaper helicopter—-the
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• asP’ a Bell 206, or maybe one already use in the Army or Air Force. The ee s for more helicopters and for an alternative to LAMPS were made clear in exercise in which my ship recently Participated—Sea Eagle 83-1. Partici- ants included my ship, two Australian "7s, two Australian DDGs, several ^ustralian Karra-class frigates, one New ^ea and Leander-class frigate, as well as stralian submarines, service force "lps’ and patrol boats. The FFG-7s had elicopters on board—LAMPS were esurnably either too expensive or un- na^6, anc* DDGs and Yarras had 1 ,el*C0Pter facilities. So the New Zea- frj S^'P.’ HMNZS Waikato, a 2,500-ton the^ate W't^1 a sin§le Wasp helicopter, was ® only surface combatant with organic Vva1 Was the star of the show. The Wasp teci'US6<^t0 suPPort over-the-horizon deco \°n’-classification, and targeting to n uct visual search for snorkeling and torn'SCOPe~dePth submarines, to conduct s|jrPedo attacks, to spot for naval gunfire liv 0rt’ t0 ferrY passengers, and to de- a ,Jrr/.TlessaSes and parts. Had we needed edical evacuation or search and rescue 'ssiou flown, waSp was ready, he Wasp is not LAMPS, but it does fra ■ 6 3 n’Ce 'ncrease *n capability at a s ii°n l^e cost al,d space. Enough Pdlh ^e^C0Pters to outfit our DDGs and sl- he empty hangars on other classes of C'PS c°uld be bought for a fraction of the pp,,°j LAMPS. In two-hangar ships (the in option exists to put LAMPS
li °ne hangar and a couple of smaller he- opters in the other.
ten IVen l^at the DDG-2 class has only hep °r S° ^ears °t service remaining, a Colc°Pter facility can be provided more ^-effectively by installing a helicopter sta L,°Ver t^e fantail—no hangar, just (jonchions supporting a deck with tie -pp. ns to secure a lightweight helicopter. tha'S a'ternat>ve will also add less weight u ,n LPH-292 and allow for contin- ha USe fantail- The Fijian Navy
^.s mstalled helicopter decks on ex-U. S. ren®SWeePers, and deep sea tuna boats fctilarly carry exposed helicopters. cLet s find some way to get more heli- J ers to the surface combatant force.
be
mould 1
llnmg object or philosophy must be
defined. Is the purpose of leadership and management training to develop an organizational structure, to train an individual to be a better human behavioral specialist adept at human relations, to develop the leader’s inner confidence and personality, to prepare the student to spend a lot of time in subordinate-follower relationships, or combinations of the above?
Further research is required to help crystallize the elements of leadership and management. For example, despite the extensive research by clinical psychologists into personality traits and behavior, there has been little research done on leadership characteristics or behavior. With the importance of self-image and self-esteem on effective leadership, research by clinical psychologists may assist personnel psychologists in developing valid leadership and management personality traits, as well as in establishing a framework, or benchmarks, for predicting tomorrow’s leaders.
Further research is required to determine whether leadership and manage-
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ment concepts and techniques can be taught, and, if so, which, if any, of the existing training programs are successful. The complexity of leadership and management theories must be reduced. Hopefully, such research will provide insight, focus, and direction on future leadership and management training efforts.
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“Tactical Nuclear Weapons”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 125-126, July 1983
Proceedings)
Captain Linton F. Brooks, U. S. Navy, Deputy Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—Norman Polmar has provided an excellent summary of current Navy tactical weapons developments, along with a good synopsis of the advantages of modernized weapons. Those of us who have been urging the Navy to revitalize its interest and capabilities in the nuclear area can only welcome his report. But, by concentrating almost exclusively on weapons, Polmar risks misleading the reader on what is most important in the efforts to restore a Navy capability to fight in a nuclear environment. Weapons are not the whole story.
Few naval officers believe that the advantages of U. S. use of tactical nuclear weapons outweigh the disadvantages of Soviet use. Still fewer believe that the enormous political consequences of such use will not make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for the political leadership to grant permission for initial U.S. use at sea. Hence, many of us have ignored tactical nuclear weapons. This attitude is dangerous, and its reversal is the most important task in the revitalization of Navy nuclear capabilities. This attitude ignores that the choice between nuclear or nonnuclear war at sea belongs not to us but to our adversary, who is widely credited with an extensive capability in naval nuclear weaponry. By discounting the possibility that we would wish to use nuclear weapons, we ignore those steps necessary to allow the U. S. Navy to operate in an environment where our opponent has used them. Improving our ability to operate in such an environment may be more important than any steps we take to ship. The Navy is implementing Pr0" grams which can prevent weapons which miss a particular ship from inflicting unacceptable damage on other ships. As part of the renewed attention to nuclear matters directed by the Chief of Nava Operations James D. Watkins, the Navy is refining and institutionalizing procedures for nuclear weapons effects hardening. The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class will be built from the keel up with a substantial degree of nuclear hardening- The Ticonderoga (CG-47) class also incorporates significant hardening to nuclear weapon effects. Hardening existing ships is more difficult. Blast hardening is Pr0' hibitively expensive, but limited hardening to the potentially devastating effects of EMP on electronic equipment is feasible. The Navy is concentrating on hardening selected mission-essential equip' ment. This may provide an especially high payoff, since, under certain circumstances, electromagnetic pulse effects can cover hundreds of miles.
The EMP radiation effects simulator allow us to subject ships to an EMP pulse under controlled conditions. This ne'V facility will be available in 1987 and wil allow full-scale testing of large ships- A parallel test program exists for aircral using Air Force facilities and equipment- The A-7 and F-14 have been tested, and the data are being analyzed.
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are
the
set unconventional forces in motion the same people least likely to have familiarity and conviction to do so- Moreover, unconventional warfare en tails a high amount of risk, not just phys)
cal risk, but professional risk. In other
be
for
operations, a favorable outcome can assured with predictable frequency
the
nuclear capability is training and awareness. With the myriad of problems inherent in the day-to-day operations of a widely scattered fleet, with the important challenges of preparing for conventional war, and with the difficulty most of us have envisioning a nuclear war at sea, it has been natural for the Navy to place limited emphasis on preparing for nuclear conflict.
New weapons and improved surviv-
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ability will be of no value without increased professional understanding of operating in a nuclear environment. We have made some steps in this direction. Seminar war games have been conducted for a number of flag officers in command positions to help them appreciate tactical nuclear considerations. Training courses have been altered to include specific areas of nuclear readiness. Work is in progress to create a valid method of including nuclear considerations in fleet exercises. Plans are afoot to improve our tactical documentation for operating in a nuclear environment. Underlying all of these steps is the CNO’s strong conviction that we must not let this area fade from importance.
“Special Forces for Special Problems”
(See M. E. Haas, pp. 110-112, July 1983
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Roger L. Crossland, U. S. Naval Reserve—Major Haas’s discussion of the growing need for unconventional warfare units is as accurate as it is out of step with the cadence of current U. S. military wisdom. Currently, few U. S. military leaders picture unconventional warfare units in a strategic sense but instead relegate such units to use as exotic tactical auxiliaries.
Unfortunately, our military system— despite leadership well-versed in the Clausewitzian relationship of military means to political ends—seems unable to shift its operational settings from longterm “smash” to short-term “finesse.” Sadly, our attitude toward unconventional units is disturbingly similar to that of the tum-of-the-century British Navy toward submarines, “Ungentlemanly upstarts! They didn’t get us to the position of power we hold today, so who bloody well needs them?”
We need them. The benefits of unconventional warfare as an alternative to conventional warfare are too compelling to ignore. Unconventional operations apply a small amount of force directly 10 the conflict’s center of gravity, which is efficient and economical. Unconventional warfare units are small and quickly mobilized. Rapid application of limited, sophisticated force can be used to keep conflicts from lingering and growing- Unconventional operations are invariably tied to the element of surprise, an surprise is short-lived. We are a country
impatient for results, and unconventiona warfare operations maintain momentum- If war is politics pursued through other means, then the political impact of the method must be taken into account. Discriminating in its attack, brief in its execution, and positive in its ability to influ ence opinion, the unconventional warfare operation offers significant benefits to the combatant who realizes a victory can h won on the battlefield and lost elsewhere- If the benefits are clear, why didn ■ unconventional warfare units play a sl=’ nificant role in, say, the recapture of the Pueblo, or of the Mayaguezl Old atti tudes die hard. Our system encourages able military leaders to seek the billets which give them responsibility for ever increasing amounts of men and materie > discouraging them from seeking rcsp<>n sibility for small operations. Conse quently, those people most likely to rise to positions of responsibility sufficient t° the side with quantifiable superiority, hu unconventional warfare does not place i*s faith in the superiority of numbers. Un conventional warfare puts its faith ,n qualities rather than quantities, relying l'n surprise and elan.
U. S. unconventional warfare is a/j much a question of leadership style as ' is of tactics and strategy. The Hollo'-'-11) story of an enterprise over-managed an emasculated using techniques more ap propriate to conventional warfare. Is1 one was willing to roll the dice unless hs was assured command and control rU^ berbands were attached, capable of Pu ling the dice back into the can at mid-rol ■ Unconventional warfare requires delegat ing greater responsibility to junior p^ pie, and that bucks the current trend. Tho benefits of unconventional warfare are
^owever, the risks are great, too, they cannot be hedged, onditions today demand that we have Pecial forces for special problems.” It encouraging that over the past three piars a renewed emphasis has been uon building and training such wh \ ^ rema*ns to be seen, however, to 6t^er We ^ave t*le v'SK,n and fortitude c°mmit them in time of crisis.
The Fleet Nugget”
p" M- N- Pocalyko, pp. 70-74, July 1983
“breedings)
Poe7] ^ 'Zander Linde—Lieutenant for h- 0 ^eserves a hearty “well-done” read *S SUPer^ article, by far the best I’ve f0ln leadership forum during my (herJ|anc*'one'half years as a member of caval Institute and as a reader of Pro- tho ‘n^S Navy could use a few
p^more officers with Lieutenant a yko s intelligence and dedication. lead'S rernarhs on the necessity for a eser to know and respect his men are in ,?Clal|y relevant. It was my experience the ? .Navy 'hat neither the officers nor terC . f Petty officers showed much in- t|efjSt ln their men as individuals who had an(jlnite attitudes, motivations, interests, show^°a*S ^efhaPs *f my seniors had and n ®reater concern for me as a person niieh °|l ^USt 3S someone filling a billet, I Prid 1 °°*C *5ac*c on my naval career with and CfaiX' fondness, instead of bitterness tho rustration. Even worse, there are feeliSanCiS other people with similar ko,ln8s. Hopefully, Lieutenant Pocaly- chan 3rt’c*e wih help bring about a
c<o?„'nander J- R- Ry°n’ U- S- Nav>
11 funding Officer, Patrol Squadro "nth rCat* Tieutenant Pocalyko’s essa com *jr£at enthusiasm. He seems to gras shin^ Ctg^ the principles of good leadei vored nC*- suh°rdinate development as fla j w‘th a junior officer’s perspective r0o VV°U^ hke each member of my ward See ■to have a copy of the essay and alsi bran 'h mc'ucIed in each division am is c" °fficer’s notebook. If a reprintin; Possible, please provide cost figures
Hd
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Comment and Discussion
and specialization obtained as the in vidual’s assignments, interests, and a ity dictate. Performance and the needs
ticket'
colleges, but this should not be
ild
service personnel requirements, but s
fice it to say that the extraordinary gr°
sub-
larg£
“Naval War College: The Right Stuff?”
(See J. E. Jackson, pp. 71-77, April 1983;
T. B. Buell, E. V. Badolato, p. 20, June 1983; R. N. Griffin, pp. 86-87, July 1983; J. E. Jackson, pp. 83-86, August 1983 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Fitzgerald, U. S. Navy, Professor of Strategy and Academic Assistant of the Strategy Depart-
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ment. Naval War College—To answer Commander Buell’s final question: our future naval strategists are “alive and well” and working hard at the Naval War College (NWC).
The rejuvenation programs at NWC begun by former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, reinforced and expanded by the current CNO Admiral James D. Watkins, and ably described as “any place where naval officers gather” by Rear Admiral James Service, President of the NWC, are developing the future military leaders. Commander Buell needs to reread carefully Commander Jackson’s article and fully understand the efforts of those within the Navy to make the NWC “the crucible of strategic thought.”
I shall respond to each of Commander Buell’s specific criticisms.
Too Few Top-Quality Students: There are approximately 250 commands at the commander and junior-captain levels in the U. S. Navy which change commanding officers every 12-24 months. These officers are the Navy’s top performers who should attend the senior war college. Ongoing CNO initiatives will ensure 65% attend the NWC at either the full course or an abbreviated course of 6-12 weeks duration. Unlike its sister services, the Navy’s peacetime forward deployment requirements are similar to its needs in wartime. Commander Buell should be greatly encouraged by the continuity of effort by Admiral Hayward in his last two years as CNO and by Admiral Watkins at the beginning of his tenure. This concerted long-range effort is paying off.
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annual rewriting as courses and curricu change. Commander Buell should reJ. the NWC catalog for clear description^, the core curricula which provide an in sive statement of our mission.
Lack of a Navy Education Policy ‘r ^ requisite for Flag Selection: Althoug might cite numerous Secretary of 1 Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Ope' ations, and Chief of Naval Education Training instructions which describe Navy’s many-faceted education progra and goals for the officer common> r there is no lockstep program or p0"^ which may be viewed as the “stairway the stars.” Rather, the Navy’s empha^j is on “performance” leading to increas responsibility with the required educa
the service permit the flexibility neC.e sary to meet our operational rec> ^ ments. A desirable goal is to have majority of the Navy’s flag office18, have attended junior and senior ser
punching exercise. Flexibility s*1°U(j0 allow those whose assignment paths not match up with service college tun to reach flag rank. Attendance at a se ice college should be a plus, but n attendance should not be a minus.
Too Few Submarine Officers in . dance: This is a somewhat valid c cism—a representative mix of each ^ fare community is needed in both faculty and student body. I shall not 6 into detail in describing the submari iWtl1
and education requirements of the marine community have precluded numbers of officers available for N assignment. However, the situation improving—officers are currently signed with a firm commitment » |
Admiral Rickover’s successor, ^dm1 Kinnaird McKee, to increase these nu11 bers in the future. M
Too Few Naval Officers on the p College Faculty: I take serious excep11 to this criticism—his conclusion and facts are wrong. The latest Officer D'st bution and Control Report analysis ot core curriculum instructors indicates 5 are Navy or Marine, but of more imp
bombs in World War II. We found out t ^ hard way that in order to sink ships on must fill them with water. .
Having been closely involved in tryUk to make an operational vertical take and landing aircraft for the Navy years, I am well acquainted with problems of payload and range. Twen; years ago, we said we needed a ten-
one thrust-to-weight ratio to do a
tance is the way the Navy, other services, and civilian faculty are used. A similar methodology is employed by all three departments at the NWC: highly qualified lectures, extensive reading and writing, and frank discussion in seminar. This methodology is keyed around the seminar and the writing requirements. Vigorous discussions moderated and guided by the faculty moderator teams are the key to the NWC learning experience. In most cases, the team is a civilian and a military faculty member, providing academic and operational expertise to ensure the seminars are not “an earnest exchange of misinformation” but that they seriously examine all sides of the issues. The NWC curriculum is demanding and ties the major study areas together, which accomplishes the CNO’s succinct direction: “Fight smart.”
“The Unobvious Lessons of the Falklands War”
(See S. Turner, pp. 50-57, April 1983; A. D. Baker, p. 19, June 1983; W. 1. Milwee, J. D. Cox, H. R. Del Mar, pp. 76-78, July 1983; G. E. Miller, pp. 92-93, August 1983 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I find it strange that both Admiral Turner and Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt confuse the size of the carrier with her mission. Admiral Turner’s statement that our large carriers are just meant for the projection of power shows that he has never had the job of operating a carrier task force that has many other missions. “Sea control” and “power projection” only confuse the issue. Control of the sea will belong to the force that controls the air. It has never been a question of the size of an aircraft carrier, but of the payload, performance, and range of the aircraft involved. Weapons make a warship, and aircraft are the carrier’s weapons. In this day of precision, long-range, guided weapons, small is not “beautiful” when it comes to aircraft carriers. As is true with all warships, it is not size but sensors and weapons that will influence the battle.
Admiral Turner’s statement that there would be some doubt about our employing two carriers in the Persian Gulf if the Iranians were to bomb the Saudi oil fields indicates his lack of perception as to the employment of such forces. It certainly would not be necessary to put two carriers (or even one) in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf is no place to operate such ships. As to his statement about making battleships impervious to bombs, there were very few of ours or others sunk by
decent
mission with adequate payload an range. These figures are still valid toda;’ and Admiral Turner’s claim that the tec nology is here to do the job is just not so- I have no argument that an air-capaD Navy is a must. The modem jet eng1 has made range and payload even too important than in the past. This n caused the battle area at sea to be tho^ sands of square miles compared with small range of World War II. His coin ments on the loss of the Sheffield eva^ the issue of adequate area defense as w as close-in weapon systems on the sWr Even if the British had had five of carriers, they would not have been able prevent the Sheffield's sinking.
I enjoyed the article and want to sa) the Naval Institute is doing a fine joh bringing the thoughts of naval officerS the fore and in providing a place t°r dialogue on such matters.
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The Hell-for-Leather Jacket”
p-901 Juiy 1983
<Ret"'a'i^er ^ Teirnan, U. S. Navy Sarcan't believe that Lieutenant iackt i*S Worry*ng about his leather the 6 ^ en sh°uld be shouting from lowrtr°Ps against those who don’t fol- °Verorders of “the officers appointed
officers don’t always make cal ec‘s'°ns, but, lacking moral, ethi- Itave °r /e®a* constraints, subordinates Pubf *1 t0 adhere to and to support is ^ lh°se decisions. The alternative cave the organization. thanac,, °* discipline will defeat us faster °ffie ^ °PP°s’tion’s missiles. Senior sion erLSh°uld refrain from making deci- Serv,S , d° not directly advance their Unif'Ce S m'ssion- Uniforms ought to be °n th^’ *5Ut 'eadler jackets are a ripple s°-c M Storm't°ssed seas of the Navy’s Wo ?,ed nniform regulations. They fnrr^ more accurately be called non-uni- 0rm regulations.
N*mander WiUiam S. Carlson, U. S. at0rf °et'red)—I have been a naval avi- or years, and I wear my gold
wings with the same pride today as 1 did the day I received them. I wear my leather flight jacket with the same pride—whenever and wherever 1 please, as I no longer worry about the marine at the gate. People recognize the jacket as the mark of a naval aviator. I have introduced myself to strangers wearing theirs and have made friends. There is a great bond of friendship in naval aviation.
“Reeding, Righting, and Rithmatic”
(See C. W. Taylor, pp. 106-108, December 1982; D. G. Primeau. p. 29, July 1983 Proceedings)
Leslie A. Bothman, Guidance Counselor, Union Hill High School, Union City, New Jersey—The military must communicate to the public school systems what verbal and mathematical skills are desired in both basic and advanced training programs for enlisted personnel.
It would be cost-effective and most productive for a committee of personnel drawn from various training commands to be assigned liaison responsibilities with the major school textbook and test publishers.
Articles by military professionals concerning specific needed skills should be submitted on a regular basis for inclusion in the journals of the National Council Teachers of English, National Council Teachers of Mathematics, and the American Personnel and Guidance Association.
In addition to tours in education- related billets, a committee of military training personnel should request to address state, regional, and national meetings of the associations and also the National Education Association to articulate what skills are required by the military.
“FFG-7s: Square Pegs?
(See B. R. Under, pp. 38-43, June 1983; T. S.
Sher, pp. 14-18, September 1983 Proceedings)
Captain J. M. Purtell, U. S. Navy, Project Manager, LAMPS MK-III Weapons System—Commander Linder’s analysis fails to appreciate the full mission spectrum and the ship multiplier effect of introduction of the LAMPS MK III and the tactical towed array system (TACTAS) which are currently in production. He is also not aware of how soon we will see LAMPS MK III in the fleet.
The LAMPS MK III system completed operational evaluation (OpEval) in February 1982 with success in both antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiship sur-
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veillance and targeting (ASST). In ASW alone, the test ship (FFG-8) was able to conduct operations effectively over an area nine times greater than any previous shipboard system. In ASST, the FFG-8 was able to display in the combat information center, in real time, the surface picture to a distance exceeding 100 miles while exercising an effective classification and over-the-horizon targeting capability. These operations were conducted in a variety of locations against an array of targets. The capability was demonstrated in hot and cold weather with much of the five-month OpEval conducted in sea states of up to five; about 25% of operations were at night. More than 1,000 landings were accomplished. With LAMPS MK III and TACTAS, each FFG-7 will be a formidable surface combatant able to accomplish more than many older frigates.
Commander Linder’s timetable for fielding LAMPS MK III is pessimistic. All components of the ships and air subsystems are in full production and some have been delivered. The first LAMPS MK III fleet readiness and training squadron, HSL-41, stood up in January 1983. Both the shipbuilding program for the FFG-7s and LAMPS MK Ills are delivering ahead of schedule.
A caption states, “early ships of the class must be lengthened for these systems [LAMPS MK-III and the recovery assist securing and traversing system]— and this isn’t likely to happen.”
The alternative to which he refers simply moves obstructions such as a capstan, bitts, hatch, etc, from the flight deck to a step-down extension of the stern which overhangs the water but which does not lengthen the hull at the waterline. This is relatively easy to do and does not affect the number of FFGs which will become LAMPS MK III ships. All FFGs in the active duty forces are programmed for LAMPS MK III fin stabilizers and TACTAS. These conversions are being funded on schedule.
The FFG-7 class is receiving the finest, and longest range, sonar capability available in the mid-1980s. The U. S. surface fleet will need the maneuvering flexibility to exploit TACTAS and for launch and recovery of the SH-60B. The worst place to assign this ship, after those installations, is to carrier plane guard. I’m sure Commander Linder’s recommendation refers to the early configuration FFGs which do not have any LAMPS assigned.
The low-mix frigate with these state- combatant, projecting her capability f'ar beyond the horizon.
“Sealift”
(See J, L. Holloway, pp. 28-37, June 1983- »• O. Miller, pp. 103, September 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Michael AdarrlS' U. S. Coast Guard—I take excepti°n there exists a real national need and p110 ity for what amounts to blatant and °Pe subsidy of a U. S. Merchant Mar1^ which is unable to compete effectively > the modem world economy. As a t payer, I object to providing funds to segment of the business c°mniun'J which, for whatever reasons—high laD
costs resulting from unionization inefficiency—cannot maintain
without begging for my money.
Further, I am disappointed in the r ceedings for either failing to see ^ choosing to ignore that it allowed its cellent, respected, and normally ‘ c0 mercial-free” editorial content to beco fouled by this blatant lobbying effort-
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Guerrilla Warfare at Sea”
ft? F- J. Glaeser, pp. 40-47, August 1983 r°ceedings)
authlan ^r‘ec^man’ naval analyst and f0r °.r * applaud Commander Glaeser
mo 'S Cal1. ^or su^tler tactics, for much gre^ lnte,|tgent use of our assets, and for tic 2 T re^ance on silencing, both acous- onr' electronic. What bothers me is his abl H'i'H® statement that, for the foresee- oum UtUre’ we w>ii be outnumbered and <50 Sunned by that enormous, superior Mo 'f1 ^av^' *h;tt is an overstatement, tiv 1 ^ov'et fleet consists of rela
wC ^ srnall coastal craft, which we 0a d be unlikely to meet on the open jnan' Moreover, the Soviet fleet is split c *Ucb a way that we are unlikely to en- s(rnter more than a fraction of its total Nor would 1 want to defend the we!m l^at we are outgunned. Soviet 0uraP°n systems differ in character from en S . and we should recognize differ- a,Cs without being overawed by them. ^i.(ny°ne conversant with the Soviet (hjw'h read the first few paragraphs of fad article’ reJect them out of hand, and to read the series of valuable com- (h nls.'vhieh he offers. One might argue 0f ’ Since 1945, we have had the luxury * S®a sanctuary, and that this unnatural
•aim led t0 °Ur current fa'hngs. Cer- fre we have been able to operate ajfe ^ °ff enemy coasts, emphasizing as I ° ®round tactics. However, as long thr Can remember, there has been a real Su^at far out to sea: a combination of ers nJ^r'nes an<f missile-carrying bomb- 5qS' .Now we can expect to face a global 0|.V|et fleet, which still consists largely bo /^marines and missile-carrying ^mbers. Would Commander Glaeser sVe Us concentrate instead on the few ^et surface combatants?
[y do know that before 1941 the U. S. the'7 WaS entirely 100 cavalier in treating Japanese as a naval threat, and that notPaid heavi|y in 1942-43; that we did asUse our forces nearly as intelligently fi .^e might have; that we were far too ^tactically. Recent issues of the Protact' 'SS have carried tlle call for more lcal thinking and training. Am I cor
rect in placing Commander Glaeser’s article in this category?
We know, too, that there is far too little interest within the U. S. Navy in Soviet tactics, as opposed to Soviet hardware. Given an appreciation of Soviet dependence on off-board surveillance and control, stealth and deception are extremely profitable U. S. counters, yet neither seems to receive the attention it deserves. Commander Glaeser seems to be suggesting something of this sort, albeit not in the vein I would prefer.
Tactics and tactical thinking make a wartime navy. We are being brought back up from the material slump of the 1970s, and we should not poor-mouth what has been done, particularly by the Reagan Administration. We are still by far the most powerful blue-water Navy in the world; we will suffer if we are unwilling to use that superiority and to accept combat losses. However, we do not have enough of an edge to be able to tolerate gross tactical stupidity. That should have been Commander Glaeser’s message.
“U. S. Navy Sail Training Update”
(See R. D. McWethy, pp. 115-118, February 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Richard Strout, U. S. Navy (Retired), President, Leading Edge Marine Development—I recently had the pleasure of sailing with the officers and men of the U. S. Naval Academy’s sail training vessel Astral, and I must heartily concur with Captain McWethy that “the return on investment [in this program] ... is high.” As a professional consultant for sailors and as a Navy Vietnam veteran who has had some misgivings about our peacetime Navy, 1 was very impressed by the dedication displayed by the midshipmen and by the enthusiasm, talent, and experience of the officers on board the Astral.
I met up with the boat in Bermuda, where I had just completed the Marion- to-Bermuda Race. In my time on board, 1
had the opportunity to talk with the midshipmen about their cruise (Annapolis- Bermuda-Halifax, Nova Scotia-New- port-Stamford-Annapolis). Each person believed he or she had acquired experience, knowledge, and confidence which could not have been acquired any other way. Fifty midshipmen a year participate in the program—a worthwhile number.
In response to Captain McWethy’s note that “ . . . [Astral] is a splendid training platform . . . However, the Astral is difficult to maintain, and she is for sale,” my impression of the Astral is that it would be hard to find a better platform for teaching. The Astral's size, her layout, including “overcrowding” (19 midshipmen, two enlisted personnel, and four officers) encourages teamwork, cooperation, and that respect for privacy in cramped conditions which is essential at sea. Her appearance creates marvelous esprit de corps. All of this creates a positive, stimulating environment for learning. The attitude demonstrated on board the Astral is worth the expense and trouble which her maintenance requires.
The Astral should continue to perform as the Navy’s ambassador and as a motivator of midshipmen for many classes to come.
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‘nought th 3 War wb'ch they knew, and C°Uld not ^aPanese also knew, Japan •ionai co„Wln' What aPPeared as an irra- P°intofiUrSe °b action from the stand- militarv .now'edgeable U. S. civilian and 'heir Jan ea(*erS WaS not Perceived so by 'nabilitvPa.nCSC counterparts. This shared "cut's J° understand a likely oppo-
^illinpn CrS^CCt*Ve’ anc* bence a^so his
stujy h^SS '° bght, merits continued U. § (, ecause of its implications for ’Soviet relations.
The Continental Strategy of Imperial Japan”
(See C r d
/>ro^^)eyn0 ds’ pp- AuSust 1983
PrOmkeH^k' C'- W°”e--- Clark Rcyn()lds
s°n of th b^'did not deliver, a compari-
Irnneri-i] f cont>nental” strategies of keynol l fPan and the Soviet Union, of |m_ S dld Present a detailed analysis and 20ihnU '*aPan s strategy in the 19th drew freen'uries, but the “lessons” he ily truc°H ^at ana|ysis are not necessar- penai > e noted, for example, that Im- WhoSe .af,an was dominated by its army, landed ■ lcers were drawn from Japan’s 's not ,unst°cracy yet the Soviet Union the RP?mAmated by the Red Army, and drawn r Army’s officer corps is not Which r.0ln 3 se8ment of Soviet society keynolrTS1SPib>roduction or technology, adoptio S a|tr'bated the Japanese Navy’s Mjbordj11. °' a sea'denial strategy to its
c°ntinemd!i°? l° the JaPanese Army’s must th • v strategy. So also, he implied, to the R a V'Ct Navy remain subordinate Same h Cia Army- dbe effects are the Red Ar,,Ut the causes are different. The Soviet N y ^°eS take Precedence over the 'bat the ajVy’ dut not f°r the same reasons 'atperiai ]Sjl/>ancse Army dominated the
htifilarid^i’ Reynolds should have used as a hjstUr'n8 the Hundred Years’ War ^tglish °riCa' Para'lel. when successive tary cm°narchs waged fruitless mili- areas ofpPai«ns *° gain control of large and comrance- English maritime power Tud0rs pCe bloss°med later, under the Imperil ,e^n°lds correctly argued that strategy aPan did press a continental closer to in'1 reasons why it did so are tagenets ,u°Se Wb'ch motivated the Plan- influenc ,i Un *° 'be factors which have ion\ r 6 'be Baders of the Soviet Un-
ImSKni8t Party'
ern instil .Pan was a mixture of mod- ditional Utlons (such as its navy) and tra- t°ms ’ anachronistic practices and cus- P°liticja f Astern diplomats and stand tl ■ °Und very difficult to under- America *S- 'ack °f understanding led War H ,nS’ m 'be years just before World ness ’ '’ underestimate Japan’s willing-
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