This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Super Etendard; Super Squadron
Dr. Robert L. Scheina and Photos Courtesy of La Segunda Escuadrilla
On 4 May 1982, the Argentine Navy s Second Attack Squadron turned heory into fact when an air-to-surface AM-39 Exocet missile slammed into ne side of the British destroyer Slief- ht'ld— proving air-launched missiles cnuld sink ships in combat. In fact, ne squadron’s Super Etendard air- and their Exocet missiles had reCently arrived in Argentina, and the
flight simulators, and each received approximately 45 hours of actual flight time. Between August and November 1981, five aircraft and five missiles were shipped to Argentina. Nine more of each were to be shipped in the spring of 1982. The naval pilots began to fly the Super Etendards in Argentina during December.
On 30 March, two days before the
French ceased all military-related activity once hostilities broke out. Also, the remaining nine aircraft and missiles were not delivered.
fourth sank the Atlantic Conveyor (two missiles were fired); and the fifth attacked a large target, possibly a carrier (the last missile was fired). The last three missions were conducted without target-locating assistance because Argentina’s P-2 reconaissance aircraft had ceased to operate.
No Super Etendards were lost during the war.
Argentine Marines recaptured the Malvinas Islands, the commander of the squadron received orders to make the Exocet missiles operational. By this time, the pilots had accumulated approximately 90 hours of flight time each; but none had received any doctrine or tactical training in the use of the Exocet missile. French technicians were to have made the missiles operational in mid-April. However, the
^r§entines had to make the missiles Operational and develop their tactics ,hemselves.
I he Argentine Navy ordered 14 pPer Etendard attack aircraft from j. r;,nce in late 1979. The plan was to t)rm a ten-plane squadron with four ones in reserve. From November , until August 1981. naval pilots !lnti support personnel trained in Bri- ■inny, France. The pilots worked in
During the war, the Super Eten- dards flew five missions. Each mission was made up of two aircraft. The first was aborted; the second sank the Sheffield(two missiles were fired); the third could not locate the enemy; the
135
1 r<*eedini>s / March 1983
Designed and purchased to operate from the carrier 25 de Mayo, the Argentine Navy’s five Super Etendards flew from shore bases during the war. No. 01 aircraft was used for spares and did not fly any missions; thus its nose sits higher in the line-up, below, because its engine has been removed. No. 02 aircraft (bottom), which attacked the Sheffield, lands carrying drop fuel tanks.
136
Proceedings / March
Lieutenant Mayora (top, left) prepares for the 5 April 1982 attack on the Sheffield. Onlookers observe as No. 04 (top, right) is armed with an Exocet for the attack on the Atlantic Conveyor. Each pilot flew one mission; nine of the ten Super Etendard pilots are pictured—from left to right, Lt. Mariani, Lt. Barraza, LCdr. Agotegaray, Cdr. Colombo (Squadron Commander), LCdr. Bedacarratz, LCdr. Curilovic, LCdr. Erancisco, Lt. Collavino, and Lt. Mayora. No. 03 (left) is adorned with the silhouettes of the Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor.