A prerequisite for limited war is the creation of a favorable international climate. In the Falklands War, this included the attitude of Western Europe. the United Nations, the Third World, and the Islamic bloc. A more vigorous diplomatic campaign and dispatch of more political delegations by Argentina, as well as a relaxation and improvement in its internal situation, would have helped put Britain on the defensive. Involving Latin American countries in its political offensive was equally necessary for Argentina. For instance, India managed to isolate Pakistan in 1971 through a perfect political and diplomatic campaign before its attack on East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. On the other hand, Egypt in 1973 managed not only to isolate Israel but to put it off guard. In both cases, alerting the enemy did not hazard Pakistan or Egypt at any major military disadvantage.
Argentina ignored the preponderant role that superpowers play in limited war. U. S. support proved vital for Britain. Argentina decided to fight alone and refused to compromise— trading two islands for one—even temporarily. Compare this to the compromise readily accepted by President Anwar Sadat after major reversals in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In military operations, as in politics, it is sometimes better to take one step back to advance two steps forward.
Occasionally, voices were raised in British Parliament and in the British press to extend the war to Argentina. This was a psychological ploy. An air or naval strike at Argentina was never a viable option because of military risks and the catastrophic diplomatic price. Thus, it is difficult to agree with Michael Howard in the Sunday Times (9 May 1982): "If one commits too many resources and uses them without regard to the political circumstances, the war may escalate into general conflict in which the original objective may be lost. . . .” To convert a limited war into a general war, it would be necessary to involve a superpower or a regional power. An extension in means does not necessarily change a limited war into a general war. For example, Israel’s war against Lebanon remained limited despite use of cluster bombs, F-I6s. and overwhelming military means.
In extending its sea area by some 1,500 miles, Argentina was faced with the problem of defending it with an aged and doddering navy. Argentina’s airforce was modern and plucky, but geography and terrain did not facilitate landing and takeoff for modern aircraft anywhere in the 1,500-mile zone. The Argentine capacity to defend the new frontier, therefore, posed military problems to which no satisfactory answer was readily available.
The British ability to defend its sea frontier 8.000 miles away was equally tenuous but workable. Two modern aircraft carriers, a large tanker fleet, a logistic support flotilla, and the Ascension Islands in the mid-Atlantic helped. The Argentine effort to sink the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible did not succeed. Loss of even one aircraft carrier would have gravely imperiled the British expeditionary force. If Britain had then extended the scope of the limited war into a more general war, it would have been faced with bigger military and diplomatic problems. Opening a new front when unable to cope with the original does not help. The cumulative effect produces more problems.
Hence, the Argentine tactical aim was to sink the Invincible and the Hermes. It seems the Argentine forces failed to launch a combined sea and air offensive for the purpose. Although one of the navy’s two modern submarines reportedly operated for a long period against the British fleet, she failed to inflict any damage on any vessel. It is possible that the age of the surface fleet and its reigning admirals began to tell on the youth and vigor of the submariners.
The British task force had three options: blockade the Falklands: use force to show Argentina that Britain meant business in the hope that a negotiated agreement would emerge; or reoccupy the Falklands through counterinvasion.
Blockading the Falklands and/or Argentina would have imposed severe strain on the task force and British naval and maritime resources. For the fuel alone, one tanker per ship per month would have been required. Operations in the worst sea area in the world and in severe weather would have compounded problems of rest, rotation, and maintenance. A prolonged blockade would have imposed a serious strain on the British defense budget.
It is uncertain if a blockade could have been effectively imposed. The Argentines were reported to have stockpiled supplies for 30 days and possibly 90 days. The Argentine 12,000- ton containership Formosa is known to have successfully run the blockade gauntlet. There may have been more ships capable of doing so. Despite obstruction to the airfield, reports of aircraft landing and taking off abound. Yet, it would have been difficult to meet the logistic needs of the Falklands entirely by air. Fifteen tons of daily food supply alone were required. The German experience of air supply to Stalingrad is an apposite example. The promised tonnage of supplies could never be delivered to the city, and the availability of supply and escort aircraft declined progressively as time went on.
Use of force did not overawe Argentina. The sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror was quickly avenged by the sinking of HMS Sheffield with a single Argentine Exocet missile air attack. Nor was the bombing of the Falklands any more effective in breaking the Argentine spirit until the British forces landed on the islands and had Port Stanley under siege.
Counterinvasion of the Falklands proved to be the only viable strategy for the British, and it was executed with considerable skill and finesse. For instance, in their opening moves—overtures as it were—South Georgia was occupied almost without bloodshed.
Land Strategy: The occupation of South Georgia, almost a month before the main landing of the British naval task force, was followed by persuasive psychological warfare: surrender posters. General Jeremy Moore’s invitation to talk to the Argentine commander on the radio, and a massive deception campaign regarding the actual landing site. These various moves may appear commonplace, but they were persisted in and proved effective. Argentine attention was made to focus on Fox Bay in West Falkland and Goose Green and Port Stanley in East Falkland. The landing itself took place at Port San Carlos and was virtually unopposed. Four hours of night work provided a four-mile bridgehead. But General Moore took another six days to consolidate about ten square miles of land—against no ground activity and periodic strafing by Pucara and Skyhawk aircraft. The general was well served in intelligence through satellite photographs and combat teams operating deep inside the Falklands.
Argentine ground troops never counterattacked the bridgehead. In fact, no counterattack is recorded throughout the land fighting. Argentine ability to move troops and stores by helicopters was minimal. Lack of fuel, maintenance, and enterprise may have been the cause of this inability. Yet, some counteraction could have been taken by moving troops on the ground. Brigadier General Luciano Menendez appears to have landed in Port Stanley, amassed considerable numbers of men. weapons, and equipment, and then found it impossible to employ them. He had no coherent plan for defense—temporary, normal, or protracted. He drew a close ring around Port Stanley, established garrisons at Goose Green and Fox Bay, and waited. The garrisons were not linked. Each was to fight its own battle independently. No delaying action was planned; in the terrain of the islands, a defending platoon could have halted an advance for days. Nor was action planned for after the landing of the British. General Menendez seems to have given no thought to the battle, its manner, or method. The internal security process did not prove a good school to train for war.
The distance from Port San Carlos to Port Stanley is about 50 miles. According to after-action reports from the Falklands, it should have been possible to move on foot in the boggy ground at about two miles per hour and at most places at the brisk pace of four miles per hour. British troops had the advantage of a helicopter lift facility. Yet, the ground troops took six days to establish the bridgehead, 14 days to travel a distance of about 44 miles—of which at least 40 miles consisted of almost an unopposed march—and another four days to prepare for the final assault on the night of 13 June 1982. The rate of advance averages to about three miles per day. That General Moore's sluggishness has been adversely commented upon is not surprising.
There were only three minor set- piece battles: Goose Green. Mount Longdon. and Mount William/Tumbledown Hills. All were battalion-level night attacks, characterized by careful British planning and methodical phasing. Full use was made of all available firepower, including those of tanks and helicopters. The attacks at the tactical level were, by and large, frontal, although two-pronged advance and. in the final phase, use of brigade attacks did create a feeling of imbalance in the Argentine commander’s mind. Defenders simply sat in trenches and fired. There is no record of patrol actions, spoiling attack, or harassment. It appears that the enemy was overrated by British commanders. The logistic problems, considerable as they were, also cast a much larger shadow than was warranted. In their earlier battles, the British marines had surrendered much too easily; they could have withdrawn to the mountains to continue fighting after the Argentine landings on 2 April 1982. This experience may have made the British commanders more cautious.
Naval Strategy: The British nuclear submarines succeeded in keeping the aged Argentine fleet locked up in ports. The employment of Argentina's two modern submarines, the Salta and San Litis, could have been more enterprising, especially when used independently of the surface fleet but in conjunction with the air arm. The inability of the Argentine submarines to show anything for their endeavors must be rated as a failure.
The British fleet, despite worsening weather and Argentine air attacks, played a full role. Unfortunately, radar picket ships, ordered to give early warning, were the first to go down. The gun lines took a heavy toll of determined air attacks. The absence of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) was seriously felt and only marginally improved upon by provision of Nimrods. Ship design, antifire facilities, and use of aluminum and plastic cable (which allegedly were the cause of major fires) have been criticized.
The need for an effective antimissile missile was acutely felt by all ships. A combination of Sea Dart and Sea Wolf did not save ships from determined attack and consequent loss. The Sea Wolf, traveling at twice the speed of Exocet, appears to have fared better.
The British task force commander’s tactics were flexible and enterprising. He took considerable risks throughout the campaign. In typical naval tradition, no request of the land force commander appears to have been ignored. Note the dispatch of LSTs Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad without escort to Bluff Cove and their consequent damage; naval readiness to divide the ships time and again and then station them in Falkland Sound despite a tardy build-up; use of Sea Dart independently as well as in combination with Sea Wolf; and the willingness to send ships carrying Sea Wolf away from the aircraft carriers. For victory on land, the Royal Navy paid a heavy price.
Air Strategy: In the air battle, the British preoccupation was to achieve and retain local air superiority. This was not always possible. The Argentine aircraft attacked regularly and in strength, even though each attack was seriously contested. Relative losses are not known. Reportedly, Argentina appears to have lost between 70 and 116 aircraft, and of the original 28 Harriers, only half are reported to have survived. The slow speed of the Harriers appears to have been a handicap in air-to-air battle. The Mirages and Skyhawks held their own against land- based and shipborne antiaircraft missiles and other munitions. They developed new low-level tactics of approach and attack with considerable success (i.e., flying in radar dead areas, low-level flight on sea, adroit combination of Skyhawks and Mirages). The use of small arms in the antiaircraft role proved remarkably successful. A Sea Dart missile costs $300,000. The British naval task force experimented with an air ambush, and the Argentine Air Force showed flexibility by rapidly regrouping and changing the direction of attack. The greatest failure was inability of the Argentine ground forces to take advantage of air force performance for offensive action. The Argentine Air Force successfully disputed local British air supremacy, but its inability to sink the Hermes and Invincible must be counted as a serious failure.
Conclusion: The Falklands War showed a developing country and regional power disputing the sea and air superiority of a former world power. Argentina attempted to gain territory by force where there was every possibility of substantive concessions through peaceful means. In the process, it created a role for Britain. Britain found much to praise in its armed forces and a renewal of faith in the government of the “iron lady.”