The Sea of Decision

 

The world seems to have become an even more dangerous place since my essay, “The World­wide Soviet Threat,” was published on these pages in June 1981. A short, nasty little war, with ships sinking and men dying, has taken place in our part of the world, and the Soviet leadership is in the process of changing.

But 1 stand by the conclusions that 1 reached in that paper. The Soviets will (1) avoid nuclear con­frontation with the United States and its allies and, instead, (2) pursue a strategy of interdiction of the vital sea-lanes of the Western World.

A land conflict on the European continent seems unlikely since it would almost certainly turn into an all-out nuclear war. On the other hand, a war at sea is far less likely to trigger a nuclear escalation. A conventional or nuclear strike against merchant or naval ships at sea would not endanger the civilian populations and the cities. The confrontation could be maintained as a relatively limited exchange with­out unleashing all-out nuclear war.

To a certain extent, the Soviet Union has suc­ceeded in weakening the Western alliance. It has strengthened its strategic positions to provide proper support for the enormous fleet created by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. Now, with superiority at sea within its grasp, the Soviet Union is ready to interdict the vital sea-lanes that link the United States, Western Europe, and Japan with each other and supply sources for raw materials in a determined effort to break the allies’ will to fight and to destroy them as world powers.

Thus, it becomes absolutely vital that the Western powers keep the sea-lanes open. Western—it seems odd to include Japan when we speak of the “West"— industrial capacity must have the raw materials from sources all over the world. A long interruption in the flow of supplies would cause the breakdown of Western economies.

As everybody knows, the chief producing areas of vital raw materials for the industrialized Western countries and Japan arc the Middle East (oil) and Central and South Africa (minerals). Sea control, therefore, is essential today more than ever for the survival of Western nations. In contrast, they are confronted by a superpower which to a great extent is self-sufficient. In this respect, the Soviet Navy can fight battles of the most critical strategic im­portance in history, and fora very long period. Thanks to its fleet and network of bases, particularly in Af­rica, the Soviet Navy can deny the West use of the principal (and most vulnerable) sea-lanes, such as the Cape of Good Hope route (considered to be the most heavily traveled sea-lane in the world) and those linking the United States and Europe.

In the Middle East, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb are exceptionally vulnerable areas

in the Red Sea supply route that can be easily con­trolled. Persian Gulf sea traffic must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which could be easily blockaded.

Although Britain is enjoying a short breathing space in its concern with fuel imports because of the pios- perity resulting from the discovery of oil in the Nort Sea which, alas, most probably would be nulhne at the outbreak of a war, external supply will con­tinue to be absolutely critical for the security of th other NATO members and Japan.

About 90% of Japan's oil supply comes from th Middle East via the Indian Ocean and straits o Southwest Asia. Western Europe, particularly the continental powers, depends on the Middle East to 80% of its oil supply. Most of this oil is transported in tankers around the African continent. Some come through the Mediterranean Sea. In the event of con flict, the latter likely would be cut off on the hrs day by the Soviets closing the Suez Canal.

The United States, although in a less dependen position, still receives about 30% of its imported ° from the Middle East. Were access to this sourc denied. North Americans would face great domes ¹ troubles. This supply also flows along the Cape route- through the South Atlantic, and toward the Gun e Mexico. Part of the oil then goes through the P^an ama Canal to the West Coast of the United States.

As in the case of Suez, if an enemy were to close the Panama Canal early in a conflict, the oil wou have to be routed through the Strait of MagelU • We will return to this point later.

Strategic minerals essential for the war ind^uS must be added to the transport of oil; these miners come mainly from Central and South Africa and a shipped to the United States, Western Europe, an Japan. The United States receives a large amou^ of its mineral requirements via the Cape route, * eluding about 40% of its chromium from South A rica and 40% of its cobalt from Zaire. The wate of this route, let it be noted, wash Cuban beaches-

Thus, a complex system of sea-lanes weaves ¹ terdependency among countries. Historically. trol of this oceanic spider web has not been in ^ hands of the coastal nations. From Napoleon’s ti until some years ago, it was the United Kingdo which ruled the seas, making the Indian Ocean, ^ instance, a closed and secure sea for the ^bcn ,u_e its allies. Having retreated to the British Isles. • Royal Navy left behind a strategic vacuum wm the United States did not fill, thus permitting ^ta Soviet Union to do it. Now Soviet forces can deployed through all the oceans and seas of the wor

Soviet control of the oil from the Persian Gulf ® the minerals from South Africa would present a midable threat to the West. In addition to deptW the West of essential raw materials, the Soviet b

^w°uld absorb them, thereby increasing Soviet ^resources.

The Soviet Union’s naval expansion during the ast decade has been truly extraordinary. In peace- ^lme, Soviet naval forces show the flag to exert po- ^11Cal and diplomatic pressure; they are ready to carry ₀ut persuasive political work whenever and Herever needed. And if the Kremlin should sud- ^en|y order wartime operations, the Soviet Navy is ^a|so ready.

Admiral Gorshkov’s writings clearly reveal the Provisions for a war in which the interdiction of sea- ,^ancs has become progressively more important. In ^ls book. Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov shows ^a clear understanding of his fleet’s formidable strik- ^ln8 power, and of multiple ways in which it can be employed against the United States. Soviet naval ^CaPabilities range from the destruction of all enemy ^Sea traffic to the breakdown of economic and mili­^ary potential, by means of direct action from the ^Sea against critical strategic centers.

In Admiral Gorshkov’s book, the interdiction mis­sion appears to be less important than the employ­ment of the Soviet fleet against strategic nuclear systems. This is confirmed in an early article pub­lished by Gorshkov in the Soviet Encyclopedia, list­ing interdiction as the lowest priority of the Soviet Navy. By 1976. however, interdiction had advanced to second place within the tasks of the fleet, right after nuclear strike capability. Subsequently, in­terdiction has become the Soviet Navy’s top prior­ity, because of the fact that both great powers are reluctant to undertake an all-out nuclear war for fear

From around South America's Cape Horn and Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, merchantmen laden with oil and minerals enter the South Atlantic Ocean bound for industrial centers in the United States and Europe. These sea-lanes represent vital lifelines for the economic survival of the West; they are also an Achilles’ heel of Western defense strategy.

in the South Atlantic Ocean, a region overlooks’ by both superpowers—until recently.

These fleets have left behind the task of defending the Soviet Union's coastline as their primary m^|S sion. Fleet composition and deployments confirm this. Today, their offensive trident consists of:

►A balanced surface force of aircraft carriers, guide’ missile cruisers, and corresponding escort ships c‘ pable of facing U. S. carrier battle groups

►A large guided missile and attack submarine toi^^L

capable of becoming the most serious threat to t ^{L Wes}t                „ _jke

►Naval aviation equipped with “Backfire' stris aircraft which have a great radius of operation nn are capable of attacking from long ranges

If all routes among the United States, Wester Europe, and Japan are examined, one will find th^L; are almost, without exception, within the “Bac

The Soviet Navy could create a fifth fleet in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa. Whether it would contain such surface assets as this “Kresta-/I”-class guided missile cruiser or the Kiev-class VISTOL carrier, in the distance, is a matter of conjecture. But the new fleet would most likely include submarines—to carry out missions of sea- lane interdiction.

of retaliation. This shift suggests that the Soviets do not foresee a short war but, rather, see World War 111 becoming as lengthy as its two predecessors, which lasted, respectively, four and six years—a long time for the allies to conduct resupply by sea.

Moreover, the Soviet Navy, undoubtedly seeking superiority in all areas of sea power, is developing an operational capability intended to break the ties linking the United States with Western Europe and Japan. With a different force configuration than that of the U. S. Navy, but bigger in size and equal in experience, the Soviet Navy seems to have been developed in accordance with a consistent and har­monious scheme, designed to attack the sea-lanes of the world. But, as the Falklands War has dem­onstrated, however powerful a task force may be, if it does not contain enough platforms with which to operate sufficient numbers of strike aircraft, its survival may be quickly threatened, and it might have to abandon the theater of operations. Admiral Gorshkov's failure to consider this point properly may prove to be the Soviet Navy's greatest weakness.

The four Soviet fleets have exceeded their tradi­tional operating areas. The Pacific Fleet has ex­panded from the Sea of Japan to the Indian and Western Pacific oceans; the Black Sea Fleet has passed into the Mediterranean; the Baltic Fleet has deployed to the North Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean to shake hands with the Northern Fleet en­tering from the Arctic Ocean. Having increased their forces remarkably, the Soviets now plan to create a fifth fleet based in the Gulf of Guinea to operate

fire's” range. Its flight performance and equipm^et1 seem to have been specifically designed for a l°ⁿ^ range offensive role, with no other purpose than interdict the sea-lanes of the Western World. .

As early as 1976, former U. S. Chief ot Operations (CNO) Admiral James L. Holloway recognized such a challenge when he said that U- ' fleets should have the necessary defensive streng to repulse land-based aviation attacks, and that t w construction of long-range aircraft armed with at>^ tiship missiles (e.g., the “Backfire”) posed a th^|C‘ which could quickly develop and extend to aim A any place on earth. The United States now has largest and best aircraft carriers in the world equipP^e with long-range weapon systems effective enOtU to persuade “Backfire” bombers of Gorshkov “super navy” that they should keep their distance-

According to some authors, the virtual paralys in the development of weapons for U. S. Navy ^sLl | face combatants must be attributed to its unilate attachment to aircraft and aircraft carriers as ¹ fleet’s primary offensive weapons. In recent ¹ cades, the role of U. S. surface combatants has bee limited to antiair and antisubmarine defense with ¹¹

^aPparent consideration of the fact that these ships NPght have to fight on their own—without air cov­^erage. It is a fact that U. S. naval forces are smaller than those of the Soviet Navy. Not counting the several hundred coastal and inshore patrol craft, the Soviet Navy still has 271 surface vessels. In Gorsh­kov’s opinion, it is essential for the most powerful surface navy of the world to “offer the states de­P^ending on the Soviet Union a decisive support and ^to control the sea-lanes of the world.” In fact, the Soviets are quite capable of accomplishing both mis- ^s'°ns. For the U. S. Navy, with weaker and less uurnerous forces than the Soviet fleet, a strong re­quirement is for warships to be capable ot operating ^ar*d surviving without air support.

Meanwhile, through permanent vigilance of all the °^ceans by spy ships, reconnaissance aircraft, and Satellites, the Soviet Union has under observation ^^very warship or task force at sea of the United Scutes and its allies. Their movements are being sys- ^lernatically tracked in all weather and all seasons by ^sUrface ships and submarines, often armed with the capability to destroy their quarry.

Once hostilities are initiated and the war at sea ^sPreads, Western naval forces will not be able to ^c°Pe with the Soviet offensive against their sea-lanes.

the recent CNO of the U. S. Navy, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, said, “The U. S. Navy has ^not enough units to defend the sea traffic all over Ihe war theater conformed by the main oceans and I^Gr associated seas.” The Indian Ocean sea-lanes nave become the Achilles' heel for the industrialized ^c°untries, as these countries become increasingly ^Pendent on raw material imports from that region, khe Indian and North Atlantic oceans will attract ^lhe most attention of the great powers, and they will become the principal theaters of the battle for the ^seas.

Tension in the Indian Ocean from naval escalation the superpowers will have repercussions in the b«uth Atlantic Ocean—free of tensions until now.

As an important traffic route of supplies and raw materials for East and West, the South Atlantic will acquire vital strategic value for the powers fighting in the Indian Ocean. Thus, it will eventually become the critical theater as was the North Sea in World War I or the Mediterranean in World War II.

The Soviet Union is well aware that the South Atlantic will be the “Sea of Decision” in World War III. Nothing but that realization accounts for the Soviets’ increasing presence in the zone, their strengthening of bases obtained in Western Africa, and their overt intention to create a fifth fleet based in the Gulf of Guinea. The United States is lagging behind in this theater; U. S. efforts have been mainly directed at the Indian and Southwestern Pacific oceans, where it has succeeded in developing an adequate strategic position and has the necessary forces for a rapid deployment. Responsibility for the North Atlantic devolves almost entirely upon NATO.

In the face of global strategic commitments and given the extent of the Soviet threat, the U. S. an­swer will not be complete until a system of alliances is established to create a multinational force with geographic positions that enable its navies to effec­tively defend the waters that extend from the At­lantic corridor between Brazil and West Africa to the Strait of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope.

The ports on the Brazilian coastline, those in Rio de la Plata (Argentina-Uruguay) and the Chilean insular complex in the area ot the Strait of Magellan to the South—together with the South African ports at the opposite oceanic side—constitute the stra­tegic positions where such a force should be sup­ported. Given the limitations of the U. S. Navy to simultaneously confront several Soviet naval threats on a global level, the forces of the riparian states already mentioned could be combined with certain U. S. naval units, precluding a major diversion of U. S. naval forces.

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Chilean residents of Punta Arenas are accustomed to the sight of U. S. warships during annual UNITAS exercises. Should they someday witness sinking merchant vessels, the belated message will be terribly clear: UNITAS wasn't good enough, and the United States—along with its South Atlantic Basin allies—failed to defend the commercial sea- lanes against Soviet attack.

Such an alliance would ensure the defense of the oil and mineral routes passing by South Africa and of the communications lines through the Strait ot Magellan and the Drake Passage. Most probably. Western maritime traffic will have to be redirected through both these passages in the event that the Panama Canal becomes neutralized by the enemy. Such neutralization of the Panama Canal would compel the West to divert an important part of the South Atlantic traffic bound to the industrial centers

, ifiancc Basin’s riparian ^aa

consider the mutual advantage of forming an ah— j

of the U. S. West Coast toward the Southeastern Pacific.

In addition to the great importance of the southern Chilean passages already mentioned, it is relevant to call attention to the significance of the Falkland Islands, situated 280 nautical miles from the Argen­tine coast in the South Atlantic. Their position con­trols the eastern approach to the Strait of Magellan; the Falklands also offer projection in a geopolitical sense toward the northeast and the area of the Scotia Ridge to the south.

In relation to the recent Anglo-Argentine conflict for possession of the Falklands, it is not the intent of this paper to analyze either the juridical principles underlying the posture of each of the litigant parties in the light of international law, or the United Na­tions rule, or the legitimacy of their respective causes in the Falklands Conflict.

To Argentina, the Falkland Islands represent a geographic objective that can help the country meet its political goal of becoming a world power through the consolidation of. an Argentine presence in this archipelago, the Georgias, and the South Sandwich Islands. This was one of Argentina’s objectives in last year’s war with Great Britain—control of the eastern portion of the great sea arc that provides access to the Drake Passage.

If these islands, with their broad maritime pro­jections, were placed under Argentina’s sover­eignty, even without considering the potential oil riches said to exist on the continental shelf, Argen­tina would increase its power status because of the islands’ strategic importance in the event of any political-military negotiation at the international level. From the viewpoint of geopolitics, mastery over these extensive maritime spaces would confer a higher world ranking upon the Argentine naval forces.

In its occupation of the Falklands, Argentina fol­lowed the philosophy of a “limited objective” war. The first stage consisted of a strategic offensive in­tended to conquer and consolidate Argentina’s mil­itary forces across the geographic objective. Argen­tina believed that such an offensive would not enrage the United Kingdom. This assumption proved to be wrong. The second stage performed by Argentina was to isolate its objectives from the British naval forces. The Argentines adopted a strategic defensive plan designed to discourage British counterattack or, failing to do so, erode the British effort so se­verely as to break their will to fight.

But Argentina did not exploit the favorable con­ditions it had created during the first phase of the operation, and its naval forces did not attack the military sea lines of communication represented by the large logistic support train deployed by the Royal Navy between Ascension Island and the Falklands. Also, Argentina failed to launch major counterat­tacks with its fleet and secondary attacks with its submarines, missile corvettes, and fast attack craft.

Such actions were feasible, and operations should have been undertaken to destroy the British task force attempting to recover the islands.

After the torpedo attack against the cruiser Gen­eral Belgrano (4 May 1982), we know of no othei Argentine surface naval operations. In the face o the British submarine threat, the fleet withdrew t° shallow waters or to its ports.

This decision was probably adopted for the so purpose of cutting the surface fleet’s losses an thereby being able to employ it in a subsequent stage-

Finally, this conflict was the first one in which th tactical long-range air-to-surface Exocet missile was employed in its AM-39 version. The missile’s sue cess was a true tactical surprise, probably to bo sides.

Brief reference has been made to the Falkland¹⁵ Conflict because it demonstrates the importance a tributed by both combatants to the political-miK^tay significance of these islands in the world strategic balance. Recently, the United Kingdom has deve oped its own defensive power in the South Atlan by stationing significant military forces, particularA a squadron of Phantom fighters, on the Falklands themselves. However, the logistic support for thes^e forces confronts the British with a continuing P^r° lem of vulnerability.                                        .

From a political point of view, the Falklands ”^a demonstrates the need to consolidate common i*j terests within an effective system of alliances. * lowing the West to confront the Soviet naval thr^ea on an international level. It is easy to imagine l unfortunate consequences that could arise from a ' conflict among the Western nations, and the con sequent exploitation by the Soviet Union to obta supremacy over geostrategic positions as import* as those in the South Atlantic. Perhaps the greates weakness of the West is that it allowed such a con flict as the Falklands to occur.  . .

But the Falklands Conflict did occur, and Leon¹ Brezhnev did die, and we must face the world as is with only the slight hope of correctly predict"¹- an unpredictable future.

Thus, the United States must seriously considc^ the need to defend the South Atlantic, and it mns

among the South Atlantic             .._K---- . _y

neighboring states—among them Chile—so that joining our resources and opening our ports to ships of allies, we will be able to create a na^ power capable of confronting the inevitable Sovi challenge.

Admiral Merino's most important ship commands in the Chil®^a Navy were the corvette Papudo, transport Angamos. ^a _ ₀f stroyers Riveros and Williams. In 1963, while chief of ^sta the fleet, he participated as commodore of the antisubmar force in UNITAS exercises with U. S. Navy units. In 197— ^ miral Merino reached his navy's highest sea duty position appointed Commander in Chief and Naval Judge of the fl^et ■