Friends and Allies

They may take a while to sink into our conscious­ness. As yet, even Britons are hardly sure what these lessons are, if their forces did what they were asked to do, and if they have pride in them and in themselves. Britain is looking for a reason to con­tinue to support them more strongly and for assur­ance that the Falklands Conflict was not a unique affair which will not happen again for another hundred years. Hence, is there any need for British forces to prepare for gunboat diplomacy, and what over­seas interests have they to protect?

Britain feels tremendous pride in its armed forces and is not likely to allow its navy to suffer. The nation itself, however, is going to force some changes, and as it learns, so are the teachings of the Falklands widely applicable to others.

► Not only Britain, but many other nations, have interests far wider than those of the confines of the NATO sea area or of their own home waters.

► Friends and allies who are united by the treaty within NATO and elsewhere in pursuit of the same purpose, that an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all, may well not have the same com­mon interest beyond the bounds of that treaty.

► The overwhelming superiority of advanced tech­nology allowed a few nuclear attack submarines (which may or may not have been there) to bottle up the entire Argentine fleet in its harbors and coastal waters.

Since World War II, virtually every empire has dissolved with the growth of the independent Thir World. Some overseas interests and possessions re­main, notably in France and Britain. French inter­ests lie either in areas which are fully represente in its Parliament or in places which have achieve independence but may still rely on France for ex ternal defense. British interests are somewhat sim­ilar to the French. The two nations are concerne in the West Indies, the South Atlantic, the Red Sca­the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. Each firm* that others lay claim to the same interests—Gua- temala to Belize; Spain to Gibraltar; Ethiopia an South Yemen sit uneasily on either side of Djibouti- and so on. Difficulties could arise almost anywhere and at relatively short notice, just as they did in tn Falkland Islands.

A majority of the disputes may not be of funda mental importance in themselves, any more than t loss of the Falkland Islands would have been more of a blow to British pride than a cause of signifies^ economic loss. Britain’s response in the Falklan is nevertheless strongly indicative of the Free World determination to defend people who rely on it >° their own freedom. Could it not come to their m when pressed, how much would anyone believe ¹ determination to fight for its own existence and fre^e dom within the NATO organization?

wide. Many nations—far more than ever before-^ now depend on seaborne trade for their livelih°° and existence. The world’s merchant fleets tow total some 680 million deadweight tons—eight tim<^ their size at the end of World War II. Approximate 38,000 merchant ships now carry 3.6 billion metfl tons of cargo every year, and the figures are s growing.

The ownership of those fleets is spread wide y

The occasions on which such actions may ^L needed in the future are nevertheless minimal. *^e • if empires and overseas possessions have dissolve ■ other interests have expanded tremendously woi

of

^always. Consider such mineral concentrations lv' ■   ^world’s known reserves of chromite

_r ^ln8 in Zimbabwe and South Africa and 99% of the ^Cservcs of platinum lying in South Africa and the

^Iags of convenience of Liberia and Panama contain ^m°re than 28%; NATO, including the United States, ^ntains about 39%; Japan almost 10%; the Soviet ⁿ'°n just more than 3%; and the remaining 20% ^c°vers a variety of other flags.

• he world has become increasingly involved in ^a'^s trade, such that most nations are interdependent economically. Yet, it is not only that their econ- ^nies depend on this trade to maintain their stan- ^ai'ds of living, but industrialized nations are fun- ^arnentally dependent for supplies such as oil and ^s°nie vital minerals for life itself. In many instances, ^an interruption of trade may cause no more than a ^cniporary economic embarrassment; in others, it ^c°uld cause a whole nation's economy to come to ^a complete halt.

Oil nnd certain minerals are fundamental to many Economies and livelihoods. Japan imports 98% of ¹ £ oil, Western Europe 74%, and the United States ¹ out 35%. Although there are other sources of en­ergy, oil remains, and will remain, a necessity. The nited States has succeeded in diversifying its sources . ^suPply so that it is not too deeply dependent on ^anV one source; Japan has not. with 65% of its im- coming from the Middle East and Arabian Gulf; j. ^es,ern Europe takes 46% of its total consumption °m the same area. Indeed, the whole Middle East ^aad Arabian Gulf area is vital and has greater known serves than the rest of the world put together. Minerals are another, but similar, matter. West­er¹ Europe is much more dependent on vital mineral J'Pplies from overseas than is the United States, noughu. S. dependence is growing as technology ^Vances and brings in more and more sophisticated °cesses. To quote an incomplete list, Western Eu- _ofP.^c depends on foreign imports for 90% or more , ds supplies of copper, tin, manganese, cobalt, ^r°me, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, nickel, ^aaadium, antimony, titanium, zirconium, and it °^sPhor. The United States is also dependent for rnanganese, chromite, and much of its bauxite. Sometimes it is possible to diversify the sources ^suPply as the United States does with its oil. But

Soviet Union. These areas show that it is not only the seaborne trade itself which could be at risk but also its sources of supply—no matter how hard we may try to diversify them.

Some of the threats to that trade and its sources are beginning to be apparent today. More than 70 ships are still trapped in the Shatt al-Arab as a result of the Iran-Iraq war; a Japanese tanker was near- missed by bombs near Kharg Island in the Arabian Gulf last June, while Greek and Turkish ships were hit. Recently, Iraq declared a total exclusion zone in the Gulf, while Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Piracy, both on the high seas and in the harbors, affected some 80 oceangoing ships in 1981, generally around Nigeria and the Malacca Strait. Shipping has to pass through many narrow choke points, where outside threats can be maxi­mized—the Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Cape of Good Hope, the Malacca Strait, and Sunda Strait. As yet, none of those threats has really materialized, but is that not one message of the Falk­land Islands—that threats can arise at very short notice and quite contrary to the normal forecast?

Many nations have an interest in this trade, some with their own merchant fleets directly involved in it and some indirectly through the use of flags of convenience. It is, however, as much a fallacy to believe that they all have the same deep interest in preserving seaborne trade, as it is to believe they share the deep U. S. interest in Israel or the French interest in Djibouti or the British in Belize. Each nation is guided by its own direct self-interest, which may be overlaid to some extent by idealism and love of peace, but independence still remains paramount.

As previously stated, many nations tend to rely on the United States to keep the world's peace for them. The Japanese, despite their virtual total re­liance for oil on the Middle East, make little effort to send their fleet out of home waters. Their only apparent reaction to recent Iraqi near-miss bomb­ings of their tankers at Kharg Island was to put a temporary stop order on other tankers visiting the same area. What world reaction has there been to the Greek containership Good Luck being bombed in the Arabian Gulf in June, or to the more recent Iranian and Iraqi threats, or to the Liberian-regis­tered supertanker Hercules being bombed by the

Argentines? NATO itself has much of the same ten­dency within its own confined area, although Europe is bound closely with the United States by treaty.

But the United States, despite its power and wealth, has too small a fleet to spread worldwide. It is put­ting pressure on Japan and Europe to increase de­fense spending, to reduce the U. S. load. The 15- carrier fleet is still some years away, but even when it comes, what will it be able to achieve? First of all, it will defend U. S. interests. But it by no means follows that, outside of NATO and its other treaty obligations, those interests will be the same. There are many areas where both the United States and another nation may have a deep interest, both peace- loving; but both with quite different end objects in mind and perhaps totally divergent.

U. S. intervention may not always be welcome. As in the Arabian Gulf—today’s hot seat—although there is considerable feeling that U. S. power is there ultimately to preserve peace and the flow of oil, there is equally considerable resistance to such power ever being used (except as a last resort, since su­perpower intervention generally leads to peace on the superpower’s terms, which may not always co­incide with those of the nation which it is aiding). The United States has widely diversified its oil sup­plies and does not have the same deep interest in the Arabian Gulf as do other nations. U. S. interests are much more concerned about peace and the pro­tection of its investments than it is in oil in that area, and although the two differing points of view may often coincide, it is not likely that they will always do so with the same end purpose.

Lastly, if the United States does decide to inter­vene, what about the Soviets? With the huge growth of the Soviet fleet, the United States must always bear in mind that American involvement could also involve the Soviets. Although the United States gave material support to Britain in the Falklands Conflict, it could not have gone to Britain’s aid more directly without considerable concern as to the Soviet re­action. Would the Soviets then have come to the aid of the Argentines? Would that have escalated the whole matter beyond the relatively low-level affair that it turned out to be?

The message is absolutely clear that, despite U. S. power, there are many inhibitions on its use. More­over, although U. S. interests may coincide in war with those of Europe, when in the NATO sea area, outside it they do not always do so.

It necessarily follows that the many nations which have interests worldwide must be prepared to de­fend them themselves. On many occasions, their interests may coincide with those of others, and they may be able to act in concert, but this will not always be true. Nevertheless, nations must endeavor to act together since no one—not even the U nited States— has sufficient power to keep peace in its own inter­

ests worldwide. Nor is it only NATO which has sue an interest, but the whole peace- and prospeiity^- loving Free World.                                           ,

As Sir James Cable has emphasized, a visible ant powerful presence which tends to dampen conflicts before they begin is an important defensive tool, is arguable whether the presence of a single Bntis frigate before the event would have prevented t ^e whole of the Falkland Islands episode. If it is to c effective, however, it must be clear that that fng^a is the harbinger of greater and effective power whic could be ably brought to bear if there were troub e.

Many nations, small as well as large, now have

effective power which they can wield close to home-

However, there is no point in trying to fight or even

threaten such a foe without at least the same stan

dard of technology; a superior technology will save

lives. The nuclear attack submarines which bottle

up the entire Argentine fleet did so because the A

gentines had no way of dealing with them—no P°^s

sible counter. The missiles and aircraft which sn

down some 60% of the attacking Argentine aircra

helped to minimize the British losses and ensure 11

success of their operations. Antisubmarine wartai

equipment kept the surface forces safe from su

marine attack.                                                .

the

The absence of airborne early warning, en ¹ contrary, without a doubt contributed significant y to losses at sea. In short, advanced technology . needed to deal with a wide variety of relatively nor problems as much as it is needed to deal wi a sophisticated enemy such as the Soviets. There no money-saving solution in building cheap ship for the one and expensive for the other; nor in lying on allies to provide an essential component one’s forces since they may not in the event be a to assist.                                                                     . -f

As Sir James says, it is hard to imagine a sign¹ icant strengthening of the Royal Navy without co responding reductions in other aspects ot the ^c fense effort. Should the British Army come out Europe to leave more money for the surface flee • Should that surface fleet operate further overseas the detriment of its support for NATO? If the Fa ^ lands Conflict has revealed nothing else, it has sho the magnitude of the problem and how it appl>^es 'j¹ only to Britain but to every nation that has an ¹⁰ terest in the sea and seaborne trade. Every ^nat’°_{ individually should defend its own—wherever t may be.

Captain Roger Villar left the Royal Navy in 1974 after served as Commodore (Intelligence). He has recently comp ^c six years as naval adviser to British Aerospace Dynamics to take up more extensive writing and consultancy. He is naval consultant to Jane's Weapon Systems and correspon to Lloyds List. Captain Villar has contributed previously ¹⁰ Proceedings.