Comment and Discussion

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icant sea power is in the Mediterra nean, and the Soviets' most powerm, naval force is arrayed in the north- This is simply not so. Of course, unt' the military forces of NATO are ac tivated, NATO is predominantly dor^ mant, save for small elements such as Standing Naval Forces Atlantic. OnC^e NATO is alerted, however, NATO s maritime forces in the North Atlanti Norwegian Sea (not counting assets committed to Commander in (■ n^,e Channel) are far more powerful an numerous than the NATO forces

Contents:

Requiem for the Sixth Fleet?

The Light Battleship

Drowning: The Things We Know That Aren’t So

Manning the Carriers

Leadership: Again and Again

Reorganization of the U. S. Armed Forces

Flight From Reality

The Navy as Neighbor

New Role for Mine Warfare

Arapaho Update

One Hornet, Two Stings

Diesel Boats Forever?

The Fleet Connection As I Recall . . . Designing the LST Leadership: Again and Again Leadership: Ours Versus Theirs Their Merchant Fleet Ticonderoga: First and Formidable Falklands of the North Send Her Victorious . . .

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

“Requiem for the Sixth Fleet?”

(See P. T. Deutermann. pp. 46-49, September 1982; B. L. Brown, p. 14, November 1982; R. L. Cobb, pp. 17-20, January 1983; J. Cable, pp. 80-81. February 1983 Proceedings)

Commander Joseph G. Procopio, U.S. Navy, Head, Strategic Analyses, Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces EuropelU. S. Commander Eastern Atlantic—One of the most compelling points made by Com­mander Deutermann is that dis­establishing the Sixth Fleet would per­mit strategic employments to drive deployments. In essence, strategic employment is the raison d'etre for Sixth Fleet deployment to the Medi­terranean today. The Sixth Fleet is lo­cated where it is for two principal war­fighting reasons: first, to provide an in-place, responsive capability during a conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact war to protect the sea and air lines of communication to our southern region allies and, where needed, to project power ashore; second, to present the Soviets with a nuclear force, albeit a secondary one, at their "soft underbelly.” Further, both of these warfighting options have a high deter­rent value which is important to main­taining the peace.

Another advantage cited in the ar­ticle for disestablishment of the Sixth Fleet is that it will permit us to mass ships in the Atlantic. A logical exten­sion of this argument would be to dis­establish the Seventh Fleet and swing Pacific Fleet forces around to join the massive force gathering between Eu­rope and North America. The author must realize that massing is not a so­lution in itself, and, further, that the location of the Soviet naval threat is not the sole driving factor in force al­location. The forces and situation ashore have an influence on force al­location, planning, and overall strategy.

Only one of the Navy’s missions is sea control: the other principal mis­sion is projecting power ashore to sup­port the land campaign. The latter has high intrinsic value in the European theater, particularly in the air power- starved southern region. This is not to say that sinking ships and submarines isn’t important, but we must not lose sight of the end we seek—not only crushing the enemy’s warfighting ma­chine, but. more importantly, foiling his strategy, and terminating the war on terms favorable to the United States and NATO. It does us little good to have the two opposing forces annihi­lated in a great sea battle if the en result is Soviet strategic success ashore. Strategy, not enemy force dis­position, forces us to view the Ian campaign in conjunction with the sea campaign.

Another perplexing argument made in the article is to abandon the Med­iterranean and thus force our allies to "get together.” Following such a P^o1 icy, shouldn’t we abandon the Nort (Eastern) Atlantic as well, and force the United Kingdom, France, I^ce land, Canada, Norway, West Ger­many, Belgium, Luxemburg, m^e Netherlands, and Denmark to ”g^{el t0}₍ gether” and solve the problem? I^sn this suggestion tantamount to adopt ing a “Fortress America” strategy without entangling alliances, or at leas the choice of which part of the am ance we will or will not support?

NATO, as now constituted, com­prises not only the central region na­tions, but also includes our southern region allies as well—the Italian. Greek and Turkish peoples. They view the Sixth Fleet’s presence in the Medi­terranean the same way the Centra European people view the U.S. Army and U. S. Air Force presence: that is­as the fundamental and highly visible sign of our commitment to their se­curity and the security of the Western world.   .

Another point worth making is •ⁿ regard to Commander Deutermann ^s statement that “NATO's most sigm

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available in the Med. Supreme Allied commander Atlantic, for example, can commit all the non-Mediterranean de- P oyed Atlantic carrier battle groups Pms elements of British, Dutch, Dan- and Norwegian naval forces to the Lteenland-Iceland-United Kingdom '^jaP and beyond. Further, it is ex­pected that if France joins the fray, a ^arge portion of its navy will move to

^the north.

Lastly, it is fair to mention that in formal times the Sixth Fleet is not a ^ATO force but a national one, ca­pable of representing the United States ^ln an area vital to our economic and Political interests. The survival of 1s- j?el, the bolstering of Egyptian con- ■oence (and all that this latter achievement means to regional sta- apy), and the inhibiting influence ex­ited on a potentially dangerous (and 'Pcreasingly menacing) Libya all re- ‘luire a Sixth Fleet presence.

To remove that presence could well Pnravel the cloth of deterrence and chminate the best instrument we have °^r maintaining peace in the region. V,^Ccordingly, I come to the realization Pat the Mediterranean, probably more Pan any other area in the world, re- Jj^U|res the stabilizing and deterrent in- ^Uence of the in-place, modern U. S. Paval presence provided by the Sixth . ^eet- which is capable of making a ^ecisive difference if needed.

Light Battleship (BBL)”

Anderson, pp. 116-117, November M. C. West, p. 12. January 1983 “^r°ceedings)

‘The BB(L)”

Antoniotti, PP- 99-100, February ”2; a. Gurnee, p. 90, August 1982

Proceedings)

^ark Newton, Educational Coordi- ^,"^,°r/Curator, USS Massachusetts ^e,norial Committee—Gene Ander- _s?^{n s} Prescription for the light battle­. 'P (BBL) is an interesting option for e Use of main battery gun assemblies c'moved from Iowa-class battleships. ^ owever, it misses the point of the ^attleship concept. By definition, the Pfileship is a major fleet unit whose _n^rengths include long range, heavy Protection, well-developed systems Uundancy, and superior damage °ntrol capabilities. In essence, the mtleship must be able to engage and stroy most surface and shore tar- j. . ^w'th conventional fire while sus- ^lning heavy damage. Mr. Ander­son’s suggestion is the seed for the creation of a class of four short-range, lightly protected oceangoing monitors suitable for gunfire support in a lightly contested amphibious landing, for commerce raiding, and for port visits. Beyond these missions, it is not ap­parent that the BBL would be an ef­fective fleet unit.

Although the removal of the num­ber three main battery assembly from the Iowas may in absolute terms ap­pear wasteful, as Ensign Gurnee sug­gests in his August 1982 letter, these assemblies will be useful as spares. (Ensign Gurnee is correct when he says that the Iowas are gunships first, hy­brid carriers second.) It is significant that the memorial battleships Mas­sachusetts, Alabama, and North Car­olina have been carefully examined as potential sources for machinery and ordnance-handling gear which are no longer manufactured, and would re­quire an elaborate and expensive in­dustrial retooling to produce. Wrap­ping a light battleship around a spare part useful to the fast battleships would be a prime example of being penny­wise and pound-foolish. Additionally, the designation of replacement gun barrel liners for BBLs would deplete an already small number of these val­uable items from the number available to the 24 16-inch weapons on board the BBs—not to mention ammunition and propellant, which would need to be shared.

Another point to consider is the es­cort requirement for the BBL. Surely the reconstitution of the World War 11-type task force around a BB/CV core would pay greater financial and strategic dividends than using expen­sive escorts for a small, short-range big-gun ship. The BBL simply does not pack the gear to rate the assign­ment of scarce and critically expen­sive escorts.

In short, the light battleship could consume materials which are critical for the operation of fast battleships, require reassignment of escort ves­sels, and perhaps lead to another rocketing shipbuilding budget. While the BBL might be an effective combat platform in some unforeseen situa­tion, it would be more economical in the short run, and more technically effective in the long run, to use exist­ing—or projected near-term—sys­tems such as the B-52, carrier tactical air, and the cruise missile in these sit­uations. Delivery of well-aimed ord­nance on foreign shores or seaborne targets does not, at this time, require the design and construction of a light battleship.

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CN THE R0C1S

“Drowning: The Things We

Know That Aren’t So’’

(See N. C. Venzke and D. S. Smith, pp. 111­113, December 1982 Proceedings)

Peter H. Plocher, Editor, Great Lakes Region Newsletter, and YMCA Scuba Instructor—Let me extend my appre­ciation to the authors on a very timely and extremely well-written document. Those of us who are involved in water- related activities are cognizant of the many drownings which occur each year and are aware that many could be pre­vented if more attention were paid to water safety. As an example: a two- year old playing on a boat dock with no personal flotation device and no nearby supervision! This article should be published in every publication which deals with sports, water sports, boat­ing, and in Reader’s Digest, Good Housekeeping, etc.

Lieutenant Commander Michael E. Duffy, U. S. Navy—Commander Jones discusses a point that should be of pri­mary importance to the carrier (CV) battle group-oriented Navy of today. However, his attempts to solve the problem mistakenly create another. Thus, his subsequent solution is un­realistic. The carrier CO, the most highly'burdened CO of the battle group, heartily deserves the best officers in the fleet in key positions on his ship. The starting point of assignment should be second-tour 1110 department head lieutenants or lieutenant command­ers. These officers should be assigned with the intent of being used primarily as underway officers of the deck (OODs) serving two vital purposes. They would provide the CV CO with an experienced bridge watchstander as well as resident sources of surface warfare training for the 116X officers assigned to the CV. An assignment of four or five of these second-tour de­partment heads to the CV would pro­vide the CO with one less headache in training an OOD in the basics. It would further improve the CV’s tac­tical ability to make use of and un­derstand the actions of the screening units. Furthermore, it would assist in solving the age-old problem of true co­ordination between the bridge watch team and the combat information cen­ter (CIC), which is intensely magnified on a CV. This tightening of the bond between the CV CIC surface module and the bridge is essential. In fact, one of these second-tour department heads assigned to the CV could be assigned the billet as the surface module offi' cer, cementing this relationship-

The benefits to the CV are obvious in gaining an experienced bridge watchstander: this should be one or the professional prerequisites in this officer’s assignment to the CV. The unique requirements of flight ope^ra" tions can be easily taught to this proj spective OOD by a myriad of 13XX officers on board the CV from CO to navigator to assistant navigator. The benefits to the 1110 lieutenant or lieu­tenant commander are also signifi­cant. An 18-month tour on board a CV will be an invaluable experience for his next sea tour as XO on board a screening unit. He will be able to im­part to his wardroom exactly what is happening on the CV bridge and High¹ deck, and he will be able to take ad­vantage of the many services that he has seen available on the CV from op­erational, personnel, maintenance, etc.

Thus providing four or five 111® lieutenants or lieutenant commanders would significantly assist the CV CO and, at the same time, benefit the II" community. It is a mistake, however, to try to create a 1110 CV community- The ensigns assigned a CV must and do currently get reassigned to a sur­face combatant. To do otherwise is ^a total failure to acknowledge the war­fare training these officers need.

It is unacceptable to create a com­munity of carrier department heads ot 1110 officers and lace this to prospec­tive surface XO and CO courses and assign equivalencies in this regard. "fie very inception of the training of a 11^|l) officer is to ultimately aspire to com­mand, and this is done via the suc­cessful XO tour. The replacement of the CO/XO afloat billet by a CV de­partment head job just does not cut it.

Certainly, taking measures to im­prove officer manning on a CV is in the best interest of our battle group Navy, but detracting from the H*® traditional path of assignment as XO and CO is not the way. The assign­ment, however, of that split-tour de­partment head to the CV as a pro­spective OOD with the prerequisite that he be an above-average, tactically able individual just may be appropriate, and the entire battle group community would benefit.

“Leadership: Again and Again”

(See H. G. Rickover, pp. 129-130, October 1982: J. W. Leverton, K. W. Estes, C. O. Triebel, J. J. Noel, and T. Rishel, pp. 14-21, December 1982; J. E. Greenwood, G. S. Jenson, J. Caldwell, and C. N. Myers, p. 88, January 1983; W. P. Casada, L. Wheaton, and W. W. Bowers, pp. 83-84, February 1983 Proceedings)

Midshipman William G. Spincola, U. S. Naval Reserve—Mr. Triebel claims there are . . too many arti­cles on leadership by young officers . . . In fact, he suggests that junior officers should not . . be in a hurry to make a pontifical public statement on the subject of leadership.”

Although leadership articles in Pro­ceedings could tend to bore old salts such as Admiral Rickover or a civilian like Mr. Triebel, these articles are still indispensable to junior officers and midshipmen. How else would future naval officers learn about new lead­ership concepts or rediscover old ones? Indeed, one should expect to see lead­ership articles in Proceedings.

Leadership, synonymous with the Navy, is aa art and science that all naval officers must master in order to be proficient in their profession. Ac­cordingly, Proceedings does an out­standing job of providing discussion of ideas on leadership. Despite Mr. Triebel’s assertion to the contrary, one cannot have read ”... too many ar­ticles on leadership . . written by naval officers, young or old. Mr. Trie­bel may not be interested in these ar­ticles, but a “blue suiter” cannot read enough of them.

“Reorganization of the U. S.

Armed Forces”

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 68-75, January 1983

Proceedings)

Brigadier General Alonzo J. Walter, Jr., U. S. Air Force (Retired)—Com­mander Byron’s sophomoric treat­ment of selected aspects of the broad spectrum of service roles and mis­sions does little more than muddy the water. He arbitrarily assigns missions to land and sea forces, then proceeds to fragmentize those missions essen­tial to control of, and warfare in, an arena vastly larger than land and sea— space. Just as I would find it pre­sumptuous of an airman to pontificate strategy for land and sea warfare, am appalled that a submariner s pat­ently parochial treatment of air power should receive scholarly acclaim.

Since World War I, no lesson ot warfare has been more profound than the emergence of air power as the prime source of power projection and com bat capability. Indeed, a major portion of the U. S. surface fleet and some submarines exist to support the air plane, not the reverse.

Want to streamline our armed forces? The formula is: add one rea air force and subtract three air forces dominated by surface and subsurface thinkers. The tragedy of the Nationa Security Act of 1947 was that it ^a' lowed perpetuation of four separate airforces. We are paying an enormous price in duplication for this flaw. .

Commander Byron unfairly cusj¹ gates the existing structure for jom operations. He should be afforded the opportunity for service on a joint stall- He will undoubtedly be surprised by the high levels of cooperation and ca pability that exist.

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Disbursing Clerk Sec ond Class ^'⁽J’ ard Hartmann, U. S. Naval ^ serve—The F/A-18 Hornet could n° replace the F-14 Tomcat or vice ver^sa’ In an actual combat situation it is j^e. sible that all available F-14s could engaged with hostile enemy ^a'^rC5,’Lj as could all of our escort vessels. W ¹ does a carrier have left in this situati⁰^ besides its own close-in weap‘ systems?       _se

Let’s suppose that a few of

enemy aircraft get through our

“Flight from Reality”

(See G. H. Miller, pp. 44-48, December 1982: P. M. McCarthy and E. J. Bender, pp. 18-20, February 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Colonel K. L. Thompson, U. S. Marine Corps—Rear Admiral Miller states:

“The United States has ne­glected its own merchant marine to the point where foreign-flag ships manned by foreign crews transport 95% of U. S. foreign trade. More­over, the U. S. State and Defense departments have shown no appar­ent understanding of the classic role of a merchant marine manned by one’s own nationals, in foreign pol­icy, trade development, and na­tional defense.”

Unfortunately, this is only one more manifestation of U. S. unwillingness or inability to heed philosophers such as George Santayana, when he wrote: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Two examples of thalassocratic ap­preciation of “the classic role of a merchant marine” are found in the writings of the U. S. Navy’s Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Royal Navy’s Admiral Sir Herbert Rich­mond. Admiral Richmond, in his work on the Royal Navy, The Navy As An Instrument of Policy 1558-1727, said of the rise of the Dutch seaborne empire:

“The Dutch were now becoming a most powerful maritime state, a formidable rival in that struggle for trade and power which was begin­ning. They, no less than the English and no less rightly, regarded the fisheries as the nursery of their sea­men, the foundation of their wealth and of their power at sea. . . .Na­val supremacy and commercial prosperity were linked up with the herring buses in the North-Sea.” Mahan, in Sea Power in its Rela­tions to the War of 1812, wrote:

“The general movement of mar­itime intercourse between coun­tries is commonly considered under two principal heads: Commerce and Navigation. The first applies to the interchange of commodities, how­ever effected; the second, to their transportation from port to port. A nation may have a large commerce, of export and import, carried in for­eign vessels, and possess little ship­ping of its own. ... In such case there is a defect of navigation, con­sequently upon which there will be a deficiency of native seamen; of seamen attached to the country by ties of birth or habit. For a maritime war such a state will have but small resources of adaptable naval force; a condition dangerous in proportion to its dependence upon control of the sea.”

Although 1 don’t agree with all that Admiral Miller writes, his is but an­other voice in a growing litany. If the United States is to reassume its role as the preeminent maritime power, we must show a greater willingness, as Santayana said, to “remember the past” and profit from it.

“The Navy as Neighbor”

(See A. C. A. Jampoler, pp. 50-56, September 1982; M. S. Perry, p. 30, December 1982 Proceedings)

Commander Robert C. Whitten, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Jampoler’s article described well the Navy’s efforts to construct badly needed housing at Naval Air Station, Moffett Field. This housing, recently approved by the city council of neigh­boring Mountain View, California, may never have been approved had it not been for some inside help. I refer to the efforts-of one of the council mem­bers, Commander Angelo Frosolone, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), who for a long time was the lone vote for Navy housing. His continued support finally paid off. Electing members of the Naval Reserve to boards of local government is a valuable means of gaining local support for naval pro­grams that impact on the civilian community.

“New Role for Mine Warfare”

(See C. F. Home, pp. 34-40, November 1982; T. J. Smith, p. 21, February 1983 Proceedings)

“Arapaho Update”

(See J. J. Mulquin, pp. 103-106, January 1983 Proceedings)

Captain William C. Oelirle, U. S. Na­val Resen’e (Retired)—I read with great interest the steps that the Navy is tak­ing to improve our mine warfare awareness and capabilities. I was par­ticularly encouraged by the discussion of the craft of opportunity program (COOP). I was, however, somewhat disappointed that Admiral Horr>^e omitted or perhaps is unaware of ^a great potential asset to the COOP con cept—namely, the Arapaho, a con tainerized heliport which can be quick y installed on board commercial con tainerships.

Unfortunately, funding for Arapan® is on again-off again. Since three COU units have been established and Nava Reserve nucleus crews are being trained, it seems logical that at h’^aS three Arapaho systems should be au thorized, built, and deployed as quic ly as possible to provide hands-⁰ and possibly wet environment tram (WET) deployments of a mine ^war^ fare-capable Arapaho system. From cost standpoint, Arapaho could S^|V an  immediate—24-hour—mobilj²³^

tion capability as well as a peacetmi training asset unparalleled by any ternate low-mix design.       ^

Some of the “bean counters, ^aa alysts, and others involved in the bu geting process should also reevalua the mine warfare mission and part' ularly the role that the Naval R^esefV should play in this vital warfare area- “One Hornet, Two Stings”

(See R. E. Stumpf. pp. 115-119. September 1982; J. C. Lacouture, November 1982.  •

Hanley, December 1982 Proceedings)

wuwujr till N. I til l          lllivmgn V'—

and escorts, and the close-in ^weaP°u_l;

cannot handle them; that is where______

F/A-18 will play a very important ro ° ^ intercepting those few planes w*¹ get past our defending screen. It ^sCL highly unlikely that, while we are der attack, we’ll be launching ^ F/A-18s for an attack mission °ⁿ °p/ enemy. Instead of thinking of tn^e . A-18 as a better fighter than the r~ ^ or the other way around, why not I upon the F/A-18 and F-14 as comp mentary air assets?             ,gi

(Continued on page ⁰

Comment and Discussion

‘Diesel Boats Forever?”

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 35-43, December 1982; K- G. Schact and G. Hart, pp. 25-28, February 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Mike Wilson, U- S. Navy, Commander, USS Gud- Seon (SS-567)—Commander Byron ^lrr>plies that every dollar spent on the construction of a fleet of diesel sub­marines is a dollar removed from the nuclear submarine program. His statement,¹'. . . we need nuclear sub­marines, not a replacement fleet of d'esel boats” is only a half-truth.

The nuclear submarine may indeed °^e the most cost-effective platform ^w,thinthe U. S. Navy, given her speed, Versatility, endurance, and surviva- .nty. I do not know of any subma- J'mer who would subtract a single dol- ^llr from our nuclear submarine construction program. So the ques­tion is not should a diesel fleet replace our nuclear submarines, but rather should diesel submarines be built in addition to nuclear submarines?

Byron’s myths are just that, myths. He claims the diesel submarine de­stroys her own detection capability while maintaining her batteries through snorkeling. True, snorkeling does de­grade one form of a sub’s detection capability, namely sonar; yet, at the same time, she maintains other detec­tion means. Her visual detection ca­pability via highly sophisticated peri­scopes and latest state-of-the-art electronic detection equipment are but two. The high-speed, deep-transiting nuclear submarine denies herself both visual and electronic detection capa­bility, and, at the same time, reduces her acoustic capability because of in­creased flow noises.

Just how detectable is the snorkel mast? Both visual and electrical means of detection require line-of-sight ranges. These ranges allow the snor­keling submarine to detect threat plat­forms at greater than their detection ranges.

The case of a diesel submarine being more detectable in deep water is in­deed a fact—it is for any sea platform. Deep water affords convergent zones channeling sound, which is detectable at longer ranges.

Forward basing is a way of life even for our nuclear submarines. The op­erations in the Indian Ocean plus our other commitments around the globe would not be possible without Diego Garcia, a forward base. Forward bas­ing is a necessity within the Navy, nu­clear and nonnuclear, if we wish to respond decisively to potential prob­lem areas.

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Byron questions the lack of involve-

ment of diesel submarines in major fleet exercises because of long distances. This practice is not so much a lack of capability as it is a time compression of major fleet exercises. In an effort to conserve fuel and fit large exercises into an already tight at-sea training schedule, fleet exercises are con­ducted in minimal time consistent with design objectives. There is also a greater role for the direct support sub­marine during fleet exercises, not a task well suited to the diesel submarine.

Ideally, there are two issues that should drive our submarine construc­tion policy. The first is the nature of the war we will fight, and the second is how well suited the platform being built is to wage this type of war. Our nation now imports, via the world shipping lanes, more than half the raw goods necessary to fight a protracted war. In a conflict with the Soviet Union, the Soviets will deploy their fleet to our very shores in an attempt to stem the tide of material goods into our country. The diesel fleet can com­bat this threat, while the nuclear sub­marine force, along with our carrier battle groups, takes the contest to the Soviet home front.

Given unlimited funds, we should build both nuclear and diesel subma­rines; however, fiscal considerations require the commitment of funds to only one type of submarine, and it must be the nuclear submarine. The choice must be based upon the best buy with limited dollars, not myths.

Lieutenant Mark E. Capron, Civil En­gineer Corps, U. S. Navy—Com­mander Byron makes a convincing ar­gument for an all-nuclear submarine force. But we should be alert to new technologies.

Researchers at Texas A & M Uni­versity have recently developed a pro­cess to produce hydrogen and oxygen from water. Full-scale production may drop the price of hydrogen to the equivalent of dollar-a-gallon gasoline. An economical source of hydrogen and oxygen does not immediately imply a safe, silent closed-cycle power plant. However, it does open some exciting possibilities.

Consider a small submarine about 12 feet in diameter and seven feet long, which is about 6,000 cubic feet. Stored as a liquid or at 10,000 pounds per square inch, 1,500 cubic feet of hy­drogen and oxygen could generate 1,000 horsepower for 50 hours. Spher­ical pressure chambers for personnel may permit an operating depth below 3,000 feet. Such a submarine could screen surface ships, freeing some nu­clear attack submarines for indepen­dent operation. It could operate from surface ships or converted old nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

A microsubmarine, manned or drone, maybe three feet by 20 feet, could serve as a remotely powered sensor or weapons launch vehicle- While the control ship or submarine moved slowly, the wire-controlled mi­crosubmarine could send or receive messages, launch weapons, or pee' above or below the thermocline. Fue stored in about one-third of its volume could generate 200 horsepower f°t eight hours. If it were made smal enough to be airlifted, it could perform rescue and reconnaissance opera­tions. If it were made fast enough. ¹ could serve as a silent messenger among nuclear subs, surface ships, an aircraft.

We cannot afford to rest on estab fished arguments; the rapid pace ° technological change forces us to con tinually reevaluate old assumptions-

“The Fleet Connection”

(Sec R. Boyle, pp. 57-61, September 1982-

C. Weikel, p. 33, November 1982; C. W.

Bond. p. 84, December 1982; J. H Osborn.

pp. 21-22, February 1983 Proceedings)

Captain Theodore F.Davis, U. S. (Retired)—Mr. Boyle’s article has brought earlier warnings about Navy research and development (R & ^ problems into focus. We are, how ever, in a crisis now, and I was a wit ness to the decay which began in the ¹⁹6°s.

The Department of Defense (DoD

is largely to blame for fragmentation

of Navy R&D. In 1966, DoD briefly reviewed some of its procedures. M^r- Joe Pontone had been ordered by Sec retary of Defense Robert S. Me Namara to investigate the 100% ^SV^C cess rate of the submarine under-icc sonar suit.

DoD’s main question was “Why at[1]- some R&D efforts successful an some failures?’’ My main question was “Why me?" I had been in charge ⁰ providing a reliable under-ice sonar to submarines in I960 as a comrnande at the submarine type desk in the Bn reau of Ships (BuShips). At the time of the investigation, I was on the Sub marine Forces, Pacific (SubPac) staf •

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As Mr. Pontone learned, authority and flexibility were important to our rate of success. In the process o building a sonar for under-ice su marines, I first consulted known ex­perts at Navy Electronics Lab (Nb in San Diego. Scientists and techm cians there told me what was needed a frequency modulated sonar.

With the help of the sonar technics people in BuShips, a company on Long Island called EDO Corporation, NEL s scientists and technicians, and a com mander submariner from the subma rine type desk, we had a team.

The sonar suit was developed an built in one year, and in 1960, it guide the USS Seadragon (SSN-584) under ice on a historic transit from Rc>^lts mouth. New Hampshire, to Pearl Hu^r bor, Hawaii, by way of Baffin Ba>- the Northwest Passage, the Arc i Ocean, and Bering Strait.        _

Mr. Pontone reminded the Secre tary of Defense that a contract "^/a^ not signed until after the Seadrag⁰' docked in Pearl Harbor. This rna EDO nervous, but the people the had faith in the type desk naval co ^ mander who assured the corporatm it would get paid—and it did.

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Institute had the oral interview co ducted in 1975 and has published ft set the LST story straight.

the

“As I Recall . . . Designing th^e LST”

iSee J. C. Niedermair. pp. 58-59. Novem^ 1982 Proceedings)

Russell F. Sandberg—In 1978, Niedermair and I discussed the efts on the Navy of the secretaries of fense invoking aircraft industry-W procurement procedures and ^c struction methods, and other's P° cies, which have resulted in drawn out periods of time between sign concept and procurement of tual construction bids from the ship yards. John stated that, prior to retirement, he was alerted to be r^ea for a visit to the Pentagon to desefl how the preliminary design of a ^vV j ship was done. John was never invd^e to the Pentagon—a great loss to Navy and our country.        |

It is fortunate that the U. S. Na^v‘

We better restore authority at t working level and flexibility to R procedures before Mr. Boyle's seen ario for collapse unfolds further.