China's SSBN in Perspective

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In mid-October 1982, the New China News Agency carried a significant, if jj'elodramatic, report from which the blowing excerpt is taken:

“ ‘Fire!’ the commander ordered.

“Holding his breath, the operator Pressed the button. Immediately a rumbling was heard from the launch lube, like the noise of fireworks shooting into the skies on a festive Then, the rocket was heard shooting out of the launch tube and through the deep sea with the force °f a thunderbolt.

“It broke out of the water and Hew into the blue skies. A water column several dozen meters high ^was pushed up and stood like a pa- Soda on the mirror-like surface of the blue sea. With the noises, the submarine shook slightly and quickly steadied itself again.”

. ^hen China announced in October ™2 that it had just completed a suc- ^ssful test flight of a submarine- aunched ballistic missile (SLBM), it ^ecame clear that the People’s Re­Public of China (PRC) was about to ^ecorne the world’s fifth nuclear power ^Wlth a sea-based deterrent force. The .^est was one of the last milestones in l °ⁿ8 developmental program; China ^as been working on a sea-based stra- ^e8>c second-strike capability for 25 y^eurs. The success of the SLBM test indicates that the first Chinese ballis- ^,c missile submarine patrol will take ™ce soon, perhaps as early as this Vear. The existence of a Chinese de­cent force at sea will complicate the ^'rategic calculations not only of the ‘ °viet Union, but of the United States as well.

The October 1982 SLBM Test: On October 1982, China announced that Would conduct “carrier rocket” tests etween the 7th and 26th of the month, impact in the East China Sea. ^s°utheast of Shanghai, some 130 naut- ^lca' miles off the coast. Ships and air­craft were requested to stay clear of a 35-nautical mile radius during day­light hours. No further announce­ments were made until 16 October, when Beijing reported that the test had been completed. There followed in the official PRC press several descrip­tions of the event, from which the fol­lowing picture emerges.

One missile was fired, from a sub­merged submarine whose class and type were not identified. The subma­rine was within sight of land, as the operation's command post was on a hill overlooking the launch point. Combatant ships performed range security patrols around both the launch and impact zones; "surveyor ships” in the impact area monitored the war­head's terminal flight with radar and optical devices, and received the te­lemetry signals transmitted. Other auxiliary ships stood by in both the launch and impact areas. Helicopters were active in both areas, although no payload pickup was reported as hav­ing taken place after impact.

Certain conjectures about the event can be made with some confidence. The launch platform was probably China's single “Golf”-class diesel- powered ballistic missile submarine (SSB). Several sources have reported that China launched a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub­marine (SSBN) in the spring of 1981 — the SLBM test gives further credence to such reports—but it is unlikely that the Chinese would hazard such a val­uable ship in what was presumably their first attempt at a sea-based SLBM launch. On the other hand, it is thought that the “Golf” was built and main­tained as an SLBM-associated re­search, development, test, and eval­uation (RDT&E) platform. Press re­ports indicate that the PRC “Golf” has been modified to permit a sub­merged missile launch; in her original design, the submarine had to surface

to launch missiles.

The “Golf’ is thought to be based in the Lushun-Dalian area, on Man­churia’s Liaotung peninsula. If the missile was launched from this area, its flight distance was about 650 naut­ical miles. There is no reason to be­lieve that this represents the missile’s maximum range, however. It is un­likely that the October launch was the missile’s first flight test. The Chinese are certainly prudent enough to have tested the missile from a launch pad ashore before attempting a subma­rine-based launch. This in turn sug­gests that a ground-to-ground SLBM flight test program has been going on for some time and has been successful.

The “surveyor ships" that moni­tored the impact were no doubt the two Yiianu’cmg-dass tracking ships that participated in China’s CSS-4 inter­continental ballistic missile (ICBM) flight test in the South Pacific in May 1980. The shipborne helicopters may have been the French-built Super Fre- lons observed during the 1980 operation.

The Historical Perspective: The SLBM flight test took place 25 years after the initiation of the Chinese sea- based strategic missile program. China and the Soviet Union signed an agree­ment on “New Technology for Na­tional Defense" in mid-October 1957. The agreement marked a major up­grading of the military relationship be­tween the two countries, and is re­ported to have included provisions for the transfer to China of a wide range of weapon systems which at the time were first-line Soviet equipment. In the naval sphere, the People’s Republic of China was to be given the technology to build ballistic missile submarines (the “Golf I”-class SSB, and possibly the “Hotel”-class SSBN), as well as nuclear-powered attack submarines (probably the “November” class), cruisers (probably the Sverdlov), de-

China is firing up its sea-based deterrent force. Pictured below is the PRC’s successful October 1982 test flight of a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Yuanwang-ctass tracking ship at right is one of two that likely monitored the firing.

stroyers (probably the “Kotlin”), and surface-to-surface guided missiles (the "Styx”). No doubt the technology for the Golf's SS-N-4 missile and its nu­clear warhead was part of this package.

Problems concerning command and control of China's new fleet arose be­tween the two countries in 1958. Of particular concern was the control over the “Golf’s” nuclear missiles. The Soviets insisted upon a combined na­val command in which they would have dominant authority, but the Chinese balked at this compromise of their na­tional sovereignty. The debate raged into 1959, but by the middle of that year the Chinese gave their final, neg­ative answer to the Soviets. Moscow promptly cancelled further transfers of advanced naval technology. The fi­nal split between the Soviet Union and China came in 1964.

The plans, and perhaps even com­ponents, for the “Golf” ballistic mis­sile submarine had already been trans­ferred to China by 1959, and the Chinese laid the submarine’s keel at Dalian Shipyard in mid-1962. She was launched in 1964, and began sea trials the following year. Only one unit was ever built. As the years passed it be­came apparent that the SS-N-4 had not been transferred to China when the Soviets abrogated the arms agree­ment. Until October 1982, the Chinese “Golf’ had never been known to have carried missiles of any type.

As early as 1960, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai reportedly said that China would begin building nuclear subma­rines by mid-decade: in 1967, he was quoted as saying that China was work­ing on a submarine nuclear strike force. Indeed, the lead unit of the “Han”- class nuclear-powered attack subma­rine (SSN) was laid down between 1965 and 1968, and was launched in 1972. In addition to being a valuable asset in her own right, the “Han” class (a Western designation, the Chinese class name being unknown) evidently was a vehicle for Chinese technicians to learn how to build the hull and nuclear power plant for an SSBN. A second "Han” was launched in 1977. Finally,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

according to sketchy reports, the first Chinese SSBN—with 12 missue tubes—was launched in April 1981-

The "Golf” is playing an important RDT&E role in marrying the missi system to a submarine launch P^la form. By the late 1960s. the submarine was reportedly engaged in missile-^aS sociated research and development work. The missile itself was not aval able at that early date; therefore, ¹ "Golf” was probably being used as platform for the development ot t missile tubes and ejection mechanisn that would be mounted in the SSB • The Chinese have had ample time ^ make required modifications to “Golf,” such as refitting the tubes ° submerged launch.

The October 1982 missile test thus marks the penultimate milestone o China’s “Long March” toward a sen based second-strike deterrent capa bility. Further missile tests from • ^c “GolF’ will no doubt take place. ¹ the final step before China has a jy ployable system will be missile tag tests from the SSBN herself. ..

The Strategic Implications: wm many of the Chinese SSBN program^ crucial variables are unknown ⁿ’^|!J site range, accuracy, and pay*⁰ ' submarine reliability and enduranc j

intended fleet size: effectiveness an

security of command and control- name just a few—it is by no rn^ea too early to postulate some app^are implications of this new strateg¹ system.  .

Surely the SSBN’s missiles will v targeted against the Soviet Union- least for the foreseeable future. Chm sees the Soviet Union as its primn strategic adversary. Chinese SSB ■ • undetected, with missiles aimed at Soviet targets, will provide Beijing ^wl^ a measure of assurance that M°sc° will think twice about starting a Sim

largets at risk are thus limited to "^e Soviet Far East, but are still sig- "■ficant—Khabarovsk. Vladivostok, ^etropavlovsk. and perhaps military

^0viet war. The submarine-based ^missiles will supplement the small but Presumably growing Chinese inven- “ry of land-based ballistic missiles. P'ⁿa can hardly be said to have a strategic "triad." Its best bomber is a ^CoPy of the Soviet Tu-16, which has ^ne‘ther the range nor the penetration eppability to hit many key strategic ^c,r8ets in the Soviet Union.

The targets threatened by the SSBN ^ePend upon a combination of missile ^r‘ⁱⁿ§e and submarine missile launch Pomt. Here, certain assumptions must ^Corrie into play. The demonstrated range of the new SLBM is some 650 ^nautical miles. Initial tests of missile ^systems rarely extend to the full de­signed range, however, so the SLBM’s "^each is probably a good deal longer.

^Is not unreasonable to imagine that ne missile’s range may be compara- J®^to such early SLBMs as the Soviet ■ S-H-6 m₀₍j | (i .300 nautical miles) ^0rthe U. S. Polaris A-l (1,200 naut­^ICal miles).

The missile’s launch points will no ^^ubt be limited to the Western Pa­l ^c region for the foreseeable future.

¹ is unlikely that Chinese SSBNs °uld patrol in the northern Indian ^cean in order to reach targets in So- '^,‘^et Europe or Central Asia. Ex- ^remely long transits would be in­volved, by way of Malacca or one of "^e Indonesian straits, and it would be iificult to give prompt aid to a sub- "'^arine with an emergency so far from ⁰⁽ne. Thus, patrol areas in the north­. ^est Pacific. Philippine Sea, or Yel- ow Sea are indicated. While close to orne and fairly secure, the Yellow )^ea is shallow and heavily traveled. ^ar|d may be judged unsuitable for SSBN Patrols.

targets along the Sino-Soviet border. China need not threaten the entire So­viet Union with destruction in order to establish an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression (although the CSS-4 ICBM can reach Soviet Europe).

China’s SSBN fleet will be small. Nuclear submarines and ballistic mis­siles are extremely expensive, and China is a poor country. It is remark­able that China has opted to develop an SSBN force at all, and the fact that it has done so indicates that Chinese strategic planners consider a sea-based deterrent essential to national secu­rity. It is difficult to say how many SSBNs the Chinese feel will consti­tute a deterrent force. Three or four should be sufficient to maintain one on station at all times, but if SSBNs were deployed only in periods of ten­sion, fewer would be adequate. In China’s case, it would be a mistake to mirror-image U. S. or Soviet SSBN deployment posture and doctrine.

There have been few public Chinese statements regarding planned SSBN doctrine, but a classic second-strike doctrine is suggested. In the first issue (February 1979) of the new PRC naval professional journal. Jianclwan Zliislii, an article on nuclear submarines con­tained the following passage:

"In a future nuclear war. even should all other missile bases be destroyed, guided missiles on (nuclear) sub­marines could still deliver an effec­tive second strike on the enemy. . . . Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and attack submarines have already become the basic force in modern fleets, and they have also become an important indication of a country’s naval power."

The Soviet Pacific Fleet will have to take the Chinese SSBN threat se­riously. In peacetime, intelligence col­lection against SSBNs and their op­erations will assume a high priority.

Strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against the Chinese SSBN force will be added as a key mission in wartime and in fleet exercises. Soviet ASW as­sets will have to divide their attention between the Chinese and the U. S. submarine forces.

Can the United States ignore the ad­vent of a Chinese SSBN force, or safely assume that it is a favorable strategic development? When China began its SSBN program in 1957, it had only one target in mind—the United States. As the program proceeded following the Sino-Soviet split. China adopted a dual-threat strategy—both the United States and the Soviet Union, with the United States usually ranking first in Chinese eyes. This formulation per­sisted until 1971. at which time the "Golf" was performing missile R&D and the "Han" prototype nuclear sub­marine was nearing completion. The dual-threat strategy was put in abey­ance with the diplomatic opening to the United States in 1971-72.

One interpretation of the recent evolution in the Sino-Soviet-U. S. re­lationship. however, is that China has decided against leaning toward the United States and is reverting to the dual-adversary posture. Should China once again come to consider the United States a potential strategic threat, it will have an SSBN force with which it can patrol the Eastern Pacific. For the first time in the Sino-U. S. stra­tegic relationship, the Chinese Navy would be in a position to strike U. S. territory. Thus, the advent of a Chinese SSBN force is clearly an important strategic event, for the United States, as well as for the Soviet Union.

Lieutenant Commander Muller is currently sta­tioned in Washington. L). C.. and is the author of China as a Maritime Power, to be published by Westview Press in August 1983. His article. “The Missions of the PRC Navy.’* was published in the November 1977 Proceedings.

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Eduardo Italo Pesce