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argets at risk are thus limited to "e Soviet Far East, but are still sig- "■ficant—Khabarovsk. Vladivostok, etropavlovsk. and perhaps military
0viet war. The submarine-based missiles will supplement the small but Presumably growing Chinese inven- “ry of land-based ballistic missiles. P'na can hardly be said to have a strategic "triad." Its best bomber is a CoPy of the Soviet Tu-16, which has ne‘ther the range nor the penetration eppability to hit many key strategic c,r8ets in the Soviet Union.
The targets threatened by the SSBN ePend upon a combination of missile r‘in§e and submarine missile launch Pomt. Here, certain assumptions must Corrie into play. The demonstrated range of the new SLBM is some 650 nautical miles. Initial tests of missile systems rarely extend to the full designed range, however, so the SLBM’s "each is probably a good deal longer.
Is not unreasonable to imagine that ne missile’s range may be compara- J®to such early SLBMs as the Soviet ■ S-H-6 m0(j | (i .300 nautical miles) 0rthe U. S. Polaris A-l (1,200 nautICal miles).
The missile’s launch points will no ^ubt be limited to the Western Pal c region for the foreseeable future.
1 is unlikely that Chinese SSBNs °uld patrol in the northern Indian cean in order to reach targets in So- ',‘et Europe or Central Asia. Ex- remely long transits would be involved, by way of Malacca or one of "e Indonesian straits, and it would be iificult to give prompt aid to a sub- "'arine with an emergency so far from 0(ne. Thus, patrol areas in the north. est Pacific. Philippine Sea, or Yel- ow Sea are indicated. While close to orne and fairly secure, the Yellow )ea is shallow and heavily traveled. ar|d may be judged unsuitable for SSBN Patrols.
targets along the Sino-Soviet border. China need not threaten the entire Soviet Union with destruction in order to establish an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression (although the CSS-4 ICBM can reach Soviet Europe).
China’s SSBN fleet will be small. Nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles are extremely expensive, and China is a poor country. It is remarkable that China has opted to develop an SSBN force at all, and the fact that it has done so indicates that Chinese strategic planners consider a sea-based deterrent essential to national security. It is difficult to say how many SSBNs the Chinese feel will constitute a deterrent force. Three or four should be sufficient to maintain one on station at all times, but if SSBNs were deployed only in periods of tension, fewer would be adequate. In China’s case, it would be a mistake to mirror-image U. S. or Soviet SSBN deployment posture and doctrine.
There have been few public Chinese statements regarding planned SSBN doctrine, but a classic second-strike doctrine is suggested. In the first issue (February 1979) of the new PRC naval professional journal. Jianclwan Zliislii, an article on nuclear submarines contained the following passage:
"In a future nuclear war. even should all other missile bases be destroyed, guided missiles on (nuclear) submarines could still deliver an effective second strike on the enemy. . . . Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and attack submarines have already become the basic force in modern fleets, and they have also become an important indication of a country’s naval power."
The Soviet Pacific Fleet will have to take the Chinese SSBN threat seriously. In peacetime, intelligence collection against SSBNs and their operations will assume a high priority.
Strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against the Chinese SSBN force will be added as a key mission in wartime and in fleet exercises. Soviet ASW assets will have to divide their attention between the Chinese and the U. S. submarine forces.
Can the United States ignore the advent of a Chinese SSBN force, or safely assume that it is a favorable strategic development? When China began its SSBN program in 1957, it had only one target in mind—the United States. As the program proceeded following the Sino-Soviet split. China adopted a dual-threat strategy—both the United States and the Soviet Union, with the United States usually ranking first in Chinese eyes. This formulation persisted until 1971. at which time the "Golf" was performing missile R&D and the "Han" prototype nuclear submarine was nearing completion. The dual-threat strategy was put in abeyance with the diplomatic opening to the United States in 1971-72.
One interpretation of the recent evolution in the Sino-Soviet-U. S. relationship. however, is that China has decided against leaning toward the United States and is reverting to the dual-adversary posture. Should China once again come to consider the United States a potential strategic threat, it will have an SSBN force with which it can patrol the Eastern Pacific. For the first time in the Sino-U. S. strategic relationship, the Chinese Navy would be in a position to strike U. S. territory. Thus, the advent of a Chinese SSBN force is clearly an important strategic event, for the United States, as well as for the Soviet Union.
Lieutenant Commander Muller is currently stationed in Washington. L). C.. and is the author of China as a Maritime Power, to be published by Westview Press in August 1983. His article. “The Missions of the PRC Navy.’* was published in the November 1977 Proceedings.
^ Case for a V/STOL Brazilian Naval Air Arm
Eduardo Italo Pesce
The introduction of vertical/short ,akeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft °n Brazilian warships could open a flew era for Brazilian naval aviation. r1! least one small carrier, with an air , lr)g made up of V/STOL aircraft and elicopters (plus other helicopters op- Cra,ing front frigates and corvettes) may well prove to be the most cost-effective option for maintaining a sea-based aviation capability in the 1980s and beyond.
Today, the Brazilian Navy maintains a modest aviation capability, centered on an ex-British Colossns- class light fleet carrier and her air group. The Brazilian carrier Minas Gerais (A-l I). ex-HMS Vengeance. was laid down in 1942. launched in 1944. and first commissioned in 1945. After service with the British and Australian navies, she was purchased by Brazil in 1956 and completely rebuilt. Recommissioned in I960, she
went through a second modernization in 1976-79.
The 19,890-ton Minas Gerais carries an average air complement of 15 to 17 aircraft: six to eight Brazilian Air Force-manned Grumman S-2E Tracker antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, four to six Sikorsky SH-3D Sea King ASW helicopters, and three Aerospatiale/Helibras HB-350 Es- quilo utility helicopters operated by the navy. She is manned by 1,300 officers and enlisted men, including the air group.
The Brazilian Navy lost its fixed- wing aircraft to the air force in 1965, and now operates only helicopters. Such division of control seriously limits shipboard air operations and should be corrected in the future. In June 1982, the minister of the navy declared that the fleet had a need to operate its own fixed-wing aircraft.
In the Brazilian Navy, aviation technical matters are dealt with by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Shipboard air operations are the responsibility of the
The S-2 Trackers are the only type of fixed-wing aircraft which operate from the Brazilian Navy’s only carrier, the World War 11-vintage Minas Gerais. This serious naval air deficiency could be remedied by building VISTOL carriers.
naval air force, a type command within the fleet, which controls all aviation components in the navy. The naval air force shore headquarters is at Naval Air Station Sao Pedro d'Aldeia (near Rio de Janeiro), the Brazilian Navy's only air station. This base houses the Naval Air Training Center, four helicopter squadrons, and a Brazilian Air Force liaison-observation flight. These units are equipped with 45 helicopters (13 more are on order) and six fixed- wing light aircraft.
Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron One (HS-I), with four Sikorsky SH-3D Sea Kings and four Agusta/Sikorsky SH-3Hs on order, is assigned to the Minas Gerais. Helicopter ASW Clearance and Strike Squadron One (HA- 1), with nine Westland WG-13 (SHA- 14) Lynx light ASW helicopters, operates from the six Niteroi- class Mk-10 frigates. Helicopter Utility Squadron One (HU-1) has six Westland Wasps (with six other helos on order) for ASW duties on board destroyers, plus eight Aerospatiale AS-350 Ecureil (locally built as the HB-350 Esquilo) and eight Bell 206 Jet Rangers for utility duties. Three Aerospatiale AS-330 Pumas are on order.
Three UH-12 Esquilos are assigned to the carrier for plane guard duties, while two others are attached to the Naval Research Institute. Three UH-4 Jet Rangers form a permanent helicopter detachment in support of the Amazon Flotilla. For pilot training- Helicopter Training Squadron n (HT-1) operates nine SHA-11 Jeti^.a. (
gers. The 2nd Liaison-Observation rl'g of the Brazilian Air Force—with t Piper/Embraer Seneca I Is and 0 Neiva T-25 Universal fixed-wing aircraft—is attached to the naval air fore •
Two squadrons, with 13 Grumma S-2A/E Tracker ASW aircraft, are a^ signed to shipboard operations a form the 1st Carrier Air Group- 1st Squadron, with eight S-2Es. available for operational deployme ■ while the 2nd Squadron operates S-2As for carrier qualification or P lots. The aircraft come under na control once on board the earn- When not deployed, they revert to ^ force control and are based at ban Cruz Air Force Base in Rio de Jam-"
Shipboard and land-based man''1" elements of the Brazilian Air For are part of the Tactical Air Comma". Twenty-one land-based maritime a ^ craft are operated by three squadrom • equipped with Embraer EMB-111 95) Bandeirante maritime aircraft a Lockheed RC-130E Hercules aircra^ for reconnaissance and search-a rescue duties.
REVISTA MARiTIMA BRASILEIRA
When the Minas Gerais is deco missioned at the end of this decade‘ shipboard conventional fixed-Wi aircraft will be phased out, helicopters as the only form of s 'P
i. . ->—« | |||
|
|
| __ ... ..1 |
v'ISCci aviation. Since no more conditional takeoff and landing carriers e Planned, all shipboard aircraft— .. Cn if rotary-wing only—will be in hands of the Brazilian Navy by l9*> at the latest.
'hher than helicopters, vectored- rUst V/STOL aircraft are the only . Metical type of V/STOL design now Service, although a variety of other ^figurations are being vested. The r,tish Aerospace Sea Harrier, pow- ( ^d hy a Rolls-Royce Pegasus vec- red-thrust turbofan, is the one truly
navalized Western V/STOL design in operation. As for the other V/STOL configurations, the tilt-rotor type is the most promising. Bell's Tilt-Rotor, a modified version of the XV-15 experimental V/STOL aircraft now Hying, is being considered for a number of naval roles.
Apart from the classical fighter and attack roles normally attributed to fixed-wing aircraft, shipboard V/STOL aircraft are being considered for missions such as over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting for ship-launched missiles.
electronic warfare, airborne early warning (AEW). and ASW. Advanced V/STOL designs have an enormous development potential, but state-of- the-art equipment should not be overlooked.
It has been reported that the Brazilian Navy plans to replace the Minas Gerais with two locally built small carriers, or sea control ships, with a complement of V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. But three carriers are needed if one is to be available for deployment at any time. The question is whether the Brazilian Navy can afford three carriers—even of small size.
No matter how many ships are involved, one thing is almost certain: a completely new design will probably be developed by the Bureau of Naval Engineering to meet the specific requirements of the Brazilian Navy. Perhaps it would be less expensive to build an off-the-shelf foreign design, but a political decision was made that all future classes of warships, with the exception of submarines, would be locally designed to reduce dependence on foreign know-how.
A small V/STOL or helicopter carrier of austere design, with a full-load
►One training squadron of six rier T.4 twin-seat variants, for ational conversion of pilots ^
► One composite squadron ot j
Embraer/Piper EMB-810 Seneca twin-engine utility aircraft for l,ais duties HS)
► Three helicopter antisubmarine t
■ : AS-33^
Should Brazil’s naval air arm continue to be denied the use of fixed-wing aircraft, it could still build a viable force with such helicopters as this naval version of Aerospatiale’s Super Puma, armed with antiship missiles.
displacement of about 14,000 tons, gas- turbine propulsion, moderate electronics, and close-in defense armament, should meet the requirements of the Brazilian Navy for a sea control role. The flight deck could have a moderate-angle takeoff ramp forward, allowing V/STOL aircraft to carry a heavier payload, and the hangar should be large enough to accommodate 14 aircraft. A larger air complement could be carried by parking aircraft on the flight deck.
The composition of the air group could be either helicopters only or a mix of V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. As a V/STOL carrier, the ship would have an ASW primary mission, with limited air defense, surveillance, and surface strike capabilities. As a helicopter carrier, she would be an ASW vessel, with a secondary surface strike role (in the form of helicopter- launched, air-to-surface missiles). If necessary, she could ferry a marine landing team for short distances in an emergency situation. A small V/STOL carrier could not be built for less than $750 million (U. S.), while the helicopter carrier version would cost about $500 million (U. S.).
The air-capable navy concept outlined here would also require that frigate-sized surface combatants, as well as amphibious warfare and logistic support ships, be equipped to carry helicopters. In a way, the Brazilian Navy is already doing that". Many classes now in service, from destroyers and frigates to river patrol craft and survey vessels, can accommodate rotary-wing aircraft. A new class of small frigates (called corvettes), the first of which have been ordered, also will carry ASW helos. In the future, any ship large enough to carry a helicopter is expected to have at least one.
In order to implement the V/STOL air-capable navy concept, two alternatives should be considered. In the "best case” alternative, the concept would be pursued in its full version, with shipboard V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. In the “worst case” alternative, that is, if the Brazilian Navy is not authorized to operate V/STOL aircraft, only helicopters would be used.
In either case, the Brazilian Navy would need three small carriers if one ship is to be available for deployment on short notice at all times. The naval air force also would have to provide ASW helicopter detachments for about 20 frigates and corvettes, utility helicopter detachments for about ten other vessels, and aviation support for the fleet marine force.
Each alternative deserves close examination. In the "best case,” each carrier would operate an air group of 14 to 16 V/STOL light attack aircraft and ASW helicopters, depending on her assigned mission. The V/STOL type would be the Sea Harrier (or AV- 8B derivative), while the ASW helicopter would be the AS-332 SuperPuma, now under development by Aerospatiale to replace the Super- Frelon. If a tilt-wing shipboard V/STOL aircraft is successfully developed, it could be included in the air group later. This aircraft would give an AEW capability to the ship, and augment the ASW capability provided by helicopters.
By 1992. the Brazilian Navy would require a maximum of 36 fixed-wing aircraft and 91 helicopters to provide air groups for three small V/STOL carriers. The naval airforce would be made up of the following aircraft and squadrons:
► Three fighter/attack squadrons (VFA) of eight Sea Harriers apiece for shipboard fighter, attack, and reconnaissance duties
squadrons of ten Aerospatiale Super Puma or Westland-Aglis EH. 101 ASW helicopters apiece i service on board the carriers
► Two helicopter antisubman
clearance and strike squadrons 0 Westland/Aerospatiale WG-13 Ly light ASW and surface attack helic ters apiece, for duties on board ates and corvettes or(
► One helicopter combat sUE^30
squadron of six Aerospatiale A6- Puma helicopters for marine assa and transport duties 0f
► One helicopter utility squadron
15 Helibras/Aerospatiale HB-3- quilo light utility helicopters f
► One helicopter training squadro ten Esquilos for pilot training o.u a
The Sea Harrier V/STOL a,rc,‘|s has a Ferranti Blue Fox radar an^5 armed with two Aden 30-mm- S r and four Sidewinder air-to-air ^ siles. During combat patrol, it canflS on station for 90 minutes after a I of 100 nautical miles. When atta5. ,|e ships with two Martel or Sea air-to-surface missiles, it has a n hi radius to the launching point o - nautical miles. For reconnaissa missions, the Sea Harrier’s range 450 nautical miles. .a.
The WG-13 Lynx light ASW ^ copter can classify and prosecute ‘
iderwater contact, operating in any ^eather from small ships, with an entrance time of 90 minutes (half the spent hovering). It has a Ferranti ,aspray radar, is armed with two
be a
(ab,
trmed with two Mk-46 torpedoes
°ut 2.5 hours endurance at a 100- ^autical mile range); with two AS-39 ,( Xocet antiship missiles, it will have search endurance of about 3.5 hours at a 50
Pi -
ma will be able to attack a target
from
nautical mile range. I'he Super ill be able to attack a target a range of about 200 nautical
c°ast, and on such strategic is-
ands as Fernando de Noronha and rf'ndade.
*he kind-based maritime compo-
Table 1
Carriers | Fixed- Wing | Helicopters |
| |
3 | Squadrons 5 | Aircraft 36 | Squadrons 8 | Aircraft 91 |
2 | 4 | 28 | 7 | 81 |
1 | 2 16 | 6 | 73 | |
time
Se;
k-46 ASW torpedoes, and can be led with sonobuoys, magnetic ttomaly detectors (MAD). or an ' 18 dipping sonar. For surface at-
s:!ck’ it can be armed with four Sea ' ktia antiship missiles.
. * he AS-332 Super Puma ASW hel- .^opter will have all-weather capabil- -• radar. MAD, dipping sonar, and "nobuoys. For ASW missions, it will
miles
jc kk|e HB-350 Esquilo light utility hel- °Pter can be armed with rocket or achine gun pods, as well as wire- mded air-to-surface missiles. The AS- s°Puma helicopter and the EMB-810 eneca II light utility aircraft do not ‘‘rry armament.
ij,|Ce helicopters are Aerospa- i a ® designs, they could all be made js °razil by Helibras. The Seneca II °ne of various Piper light aircraft hes built under license by Embraer. l 11 / V/STOL aircraft would not be bufl in Brazil.
1 he composition of this air arm em- asizes sea control, rather than power Action. The number of transport j U utility helicopters seems to be small c°niparison with the other types of ‘ rcraft, but it would be adequate to I^PPort a brigade-sized fleet marine ti ant* Perform logistic support du. s- In addition to their primary mis- n- ASW helicopters can easily per- rm search and rescue duties and other UPPort roles.
., 'he number of carriers were less ijan three, the number of VFA and ^ squadrons would be reduced. The 'ual number of aircraft required to small carrier air groups is listed n Table I.
(. Additional aviation support facili- o s "shore would be required. A sec- fa 'rnava* air station and smaller air the l'es woultI neet*to he huh' along nent of the Brazilian Air Force will probably be equipped with an ASW patrol version of the Embraer EMB- 120 Brasilia. Land-based maritime aircraft should be required to work in closer cooperation with the fleet.
In the “worst case” alternative. V/ STOL aircraft would be deleted, and each carrier would operate a complement of ASW helicopters, with secondary surface strike capabilities. Each HS squadron would operate 16 helicopters. If the number of carriers were less than three, one or two HS squadrons would be eliminated, and the number of aircraft would be proportionately reduced.
Fixed-wing utility aircraft would continue to be manned by the Brazilian Air Force. Perhaps civilian-licensed light aircraft owned by the navy could be used for liaison duties instead.
The use of airships in ASW and patrol duties by the Brazilian Navy is worth considering. The same could be said about remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), or smart drones, for such missions as reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and airborne early warning (AEW). The air force might object to the use of airships, but RPVs are unmanned and. because of that, there would be no obstacle to their introduction.
The cost of this program is perhaps the most difficult aspect: the entire Brazilian defense budget in 1979 was about $2 billion—only about \% of the gross national product.
The technical aspect should not be overlooked. The only time a V/STOL aircraft was flown in Brazil was in 1973. when the Harrier was demonstrated at the International Aerospace Exhibition. On that occasion, the aircraft also operated from the flight deck of the Minns Gerais, in order to demonstrate its potential capabilities as a shipboard aircraft. The Brazilian Navy would have no qualified personnel for the maintenance of V/STOL aircraft. The air force could offer some assistance. but it also has no experience with this type of aircraft.
The V/STOL air-capable navy concept in its fullest form (three small V/STOL carriers and associated air groups) would be a tremendously expensive enterprise for a country with a $2 billion defense budget, and the chances for its implementation are very slim. But one of the options presented here might well be selected by the Brazilian Navy.
A less expensive proposal is to have two carriers and three air groups, and perhaps three full crews. Each airgroup would include a VFA and an HS squadron, or a reinforced HS squadron. In either case, a couple of light utility helicopters could be added. Greater at-sea time for each carrier, without the need for a third ship, could be achieved by rotating the crews and air groups between the ships, with a period ashore between deployments. The two-ship, three-crew system (similar to the U. S. Navy's blue and gold crew system used in nuclear ballistic missile submarines) has been successfully employed by the U. S. Coast Guard with its “PoIar"-class icebreakers.
Whatever alternative is adopted, it will take time to implement such a plan. Acquisition of aircraft would be relatively fast, since all types are proven designs, but construction of the platforms would be a lengthy process. If a decision to go ahead is made this year, it would take about nine years to build one small carrier: three years to design the ship, three from keellaying to launching date, and three for fitting out. so that the lead ship of the class would be ready for sea trials in 1992. Considering the lack of experience of Brazilian yards with this kind of ship, even these estimates may be optimistic.
Mr. Pesce is an instructor of English at the Rio tie Janeiro State University's Language Laboratories in Brazil, and a founding member of the Brazilian Center for Strategic Studies. Mr. Pesce's “The Brazilian Naval Modernization Program” was published in last year's International Navies Issue.