Book Reviews, Professional Reading & Book List

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

to the victory.                                         ■

The essential character of the P ^ vate armies that played such a crucm role is described with awe. The • P^L cial Air Service (SAS) "protesting modestly at the publicity bestowe them, yet secretly gratified” and Special Boat Section of the Royal rines (SBS) “avoiding elitism. 4¹¹¹^ and modest,” turn out to be ^unC.°_e(j promising professional killers train to take on all comers—the farther aw^ from supporting forces the better, so it seems. Some of their activi ¹ are described in these books, but no firsthand. What part did they play ^c^_;i lowing the one-way mission by a King helicopter which self-<Je^strUC on Tierra del Fuego close by a Sup^e Etendard airfield? What were the th^r other British nuclear submarines a the lone diesel submarine doing? N ther book mentions them.

The Falklands War

Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater. and Peter Gillman, Editors. London: Andre Deutsch Ltd. and Sphere Books Ltd.. 1982. £7.95. Approx. $14.00. and £2.50. Approx. $4.40 (paper).

The Winter War: The Falklands

Patrick Bishop and John Witherow. London: Quarter Books, 1982. £2.95. Approx. $5.20.

Reviewed by Captain John O. Coote,

Royal Navy (Retired)

Considering the final outcome of the 11 weeks which followed General Leopoldo Galtieri's seizure of the Falklands by force on 2 April 1982. it is hardly surprising that the record has so far almost exclusively emanated from Britain. Within days of the first euphoric homecomings accorded to the 51 warships and 75 merchantmen and fleet auxiliaries in July, there were four instant picture books on sale, featur­ing the now-familiar color shots of HMS Antelope, frigate-turned-fire­ball; the mortally burnt-out wreck of HMS Sheffield wallowing helplessly in the van of the British task force; the Army’s logistic support ship Sir Galahad incinerating 40 Welsh Guardsmen; and two ships of the Ar­gentine fleet in their death throes: the cruiser General Belgrano and the sub­marine Santa Fe.

But it was not until November 1982 that the first eyewitness accounts ap­peared in the shape of these two books. If there are any plans to publish an official history, they are being kept under wraps and are not of immediate importance. After all. what happened off Jutland in May 1916 did not get published until seven years after the event. There are two officially com­missioned inquiries in the offing, but they will only be limited probes, one into the conduct of the government information services and the other asking why the cabinet appeared to have been caught flat-footed, in spite of persistent early warnings of Argen­tina’s intentions.

So, for some time, we will have to rely on the views of a handful of Brit­ish journalists who sailed with Task Force 319 and marched with the para­troopers and commandos. Inexplica­bly, no foreign journalists were in­vited along, and there were minimal facilities for transmitting television material. It is a tribute to the authors of both books that their objectivity shines through.

I find The Winter War the more im­pressive of the two, even if its scope is more limited. It was written by two young journalists, both of them born after the Korean War and at school while events in Vietnam led students to doubt or even despise Western mil­itary leaders. Neither had any expe­rience reporting wars, let alone fight­ing them; yet. they were caught up in the confidence and esprit of the many small elite groups which, taken to­gether, won the day.

In one strikingly evocative passage, we stand alongside the Harrier pilots of 801 Squadron in HMS Invincible as they suddenly realized what they might be in for during a hangar-deck me­morial service for two of their top pi­lots, presumed killed in a midair col­lision in the fog before D-day. The helicopter crews, or “farmers," as they were called by the “cowboy" fighter- pilots—shades of "Oklahoma”—had a less glamorous but equally critical role to play, flying thousands of mis­sions in vile weather and losing 20 of their limited number of aircraft.

Both authors marched with the ground forces which triumphed. Pat­rick Bishop went with 42 Commando (Royal Marines) on the left hook of the northern route via Mount Kent, while coauthor John Witherow fol­lowed the Guards into Port Stanley from the south after the holocaust o Bluff Cove. Their record is strict y personal, but they seem to have bee curiously enriched by the experience- The subtitle of the best-selling ' H. Falklands War is “The Full Story- At a length of more than 125,000 wort by 24 members of the contributing team—John Witherow is credited a being one of them—it is a much mom ambitious work. In the character its sponsoring newspaper, it tends be overwritten and padded out w> chance interviews with secondary characters in the drama. But the ne spread by its contributors is so wt and authoritative that much of the hind-the-scenes action is broug sharply into focus. For instance. ¹ nail-biting diplomatic efforts to ^ave armed conflict compounded by P° ¹ ical hesitancy in London and Bueno Aires form a unique record. Indec ■ it consumes a large part of the boo • The landing at San Carlos Bay ^ta. ^e place after 185 pages of preliminaries leaving only a quarter of the book cover the foot soldiers’ contributio

Defin

alvv,

ho_Us

a8o_n

onous

r . ^rves than on regulars. The authors .. ^Is>e interesting questions about how ^e economic problems of the 1980s,

^YLockheed P-3C Orion

145

Around the world, the P-3C Orion is renowned as an ASW system. But it is far more. It is, in fact, the most flexible weapon system in America's inventory.

It can handle seven missions critical to sea control. Take the vital role of over-the-horizon targeting. The P-3C has the advanced systems needed for pinpoint targeting: search radar; ESM; infrared; secure data link, voice and Teletype communications —and an integrated onboard computer to correlate and display data in real-time.

The P-3C can target for other aircraft or ships. Or it can take care of the target itself, firing Harpoon missiles. That's cost-effective flexibility. And it takes only 1% of the Navy's procurement budget.

Both books are also sadly deficient 'id^¹ Scribing the sheer scale of the hoc logistic and repair facilities, ■tnout which the operation would ^liVe aborted. The planning and exe- j- ^l0n behind all this monumental ef- ^0rt does not get so much as a nod.

But we must be grateful for what ■ ^{e now} have on the record: two thrill- 8 action replays.

C' •

_s;;^ⁿ ^^oote was a Royal Navy submariner who

the

le sible

♦ I       J ^tlllCU 11 lilL

jj^at have always s

Aconi7ino rp’ holjj

^ ^yiewers to continue the process. As °^relli Barnett has pointed out, Brit- is left in the 1980s a little like the Pdernan whose reduced circum- l₁|^drices have forced him to abandon ^s great house except for one small ^ln8. which is still habitable. At no _t ^lnt have decision makers felt able ^abandon the whole crumbling edi- i p ior a smaller, tidier, more modern Gliding.

r,Aⁿ this stimulating little book, p 'Chester and Wilkinson attempt to ^^r°vide at least the plan for such a ^ home. They argue that British de- "se policy should be recast with a f_o'^v emphasis on maritime and air ^rces, a reduced continental deploy- ₀j.^ePt of troops, and a restructured set urrried forces relying much more on ^rese:

th

^roc<*din_RS / March 1983

|J h the high unemployment and en- °reed “leisure” for many, especially young, might be turned to good ^to increase the manpower directed ⁰ the nation’s defense effort. It is _t ^ear 'i¹³¹ they would like to see a re- ^rn *° conscription, although they ^c°gnize that this would create as ^a_rⁿV Problems as it would solve.

^ ne problem with the Chichester/ ra i-'nson thesis, for all its claims to g .tpalism, is that it falls into the old ^tr;ip of trying to do too much j!,, ⁰⁰ i'ttle. Trident remains; in- the authors call for a Vulcan- I j^^et] air-launched cruise missile th • ^ force to provide a national _r j?^ller capability, too. This seems jI* ucr generous; is there really a dis- f ^ncti°ⁿ between theater and strategic yj'ces in the British context? The con- _r 'ntional posture called for also seems <1 her expensive, despite the recom­_p ^c!’^tleci restructuring of forces, or ask' ,PS CVen '^3ecause °f it- One is left l_r ^ln8 where the barracks are to come l ¹¹¹ l°^r the increased number of home- ‘^ed personnel, especially for those fPloyed from Germany. As Brit- _N^{n s} Minister of Defence, Mr. John _vjUtt. pointed out after his recent re­bringing home the Rhine Army _c°^uld incur substantially increased ^sts because of the need to build new ^C •p?^rnrna(i^ati°ns for it. g . he book’s centnil thesis is that _S(,"^a.in should indeed withdraw a sub- „^antial portion of its forces from the Urt ^ntlnent. The authors follow in a long ^e ol Britain’s blue water strategists t_r. ?. It^ave emphasized its maritime u "ions and interests and have de- m°^recJ the “Continental Commit- 1^ ^ent. rhe trouble with all of them re ^S | ^{en {}hat they have only partially lu t ^l^^e'^r history. Only once in the . ^S *hree centuries has Britain not gone

Orion

the ASUW system

is also Orion the C³ system.

And a whole lot more.

Eu

^•'ng monument to this strategic folly. P ^a time when the Supreme Allied ^cmmander, Europe (SACEur). is ar- ⁿg tor a greater commitment of re- ^Urces to continental defense at the _t, locational level, it seems odd to be _tj ^lng about unilateral force reduc- _s( 0 that might have a gravely de- _a ^a Sizing effect on the European bal- W'il- P°^wer- Chichester and 'k'nson argue for Trident as a sign to | ^r!^,ain ^s continuing determination tj_e ^{e en}b itself; a renunciation of “in- hcndent” nuclear capability, they

r°Pe, and the United States is the

The P-3C Orion is the only naval aircraft fully equipped to handle long-range antisurface warfare missions. Its ad­vanced sensor systems seek out and classify hostile ships, and its six Harpoon air-to-surface missiles can deliver a deadly blow to targets up to 60 miles away.

But neutralizing surface threats is just one of seven sea control missions fulfilled by the P-3C. C³ is another of its vital sea control tasks.

In this mission, the P-3C employs its secure voice, data link and Teletype systems. They are tied in with the Navy's Tactical Data System and enable the P-3C to communicate with other aircraft, ships, submarines and land bases. It uses its onboard computer to refine information and pre­sent it to decision makers aboard the aircraft or in distant locations.

The P-3C-—it's the force multiplier that takes only 1% of the Navy's procurement budget.

^^Lockheed P-3C Orion

»‘'y. ^w°uld be an unfortunate signal to °scow. How much more so would ^{e a} significant reduction in the North- p^fn ^^rmy Group? What would be the ^ranco-Russian reaction to an in- ^rease j_n West Germany’s Bundes- " strength? What of the signal to "tain’s European partners of its ommitment to Europe’s welfare? One d ^Spects that more than Foreign Of- ^Ce ^ogma was behind the European ^j-'ority so evident in the last 15 years dense decision making, a priority recently repeatedly reaffirmed by Th ^0tt’^{eVCn a}^^{ter t}*^1C F^alklands ^War- ^^ere is an air of schizophrenia about ^e book; the writers are clearly sup- jl ^r,ers °f the current government, yet ey argue lor a diametrically different whey. Mr. Wilkinson is in a partic- _n ‘ | y embarrassing position as he is ess than Mr. Nott’s parliamentary _te^IVclte secretary. The authors’ at- dpts to make party political points -ally detract from the objectivity their analysis and lead them into SgJ⁷""' ^awkward justifications for Con- f₀r^V.^at'^Ve defense cuts and criticisms p Labour defense expenditures. In _Wj^L ’ ^0ne could do a study such as this |_iti ^h !^lttle- 'f any, reference to the po- 'ed complexion of the government. def> ' ^^ottom I>^ne in every postwar ab'|^{0nSe rev}'^ew has been Britain's in- _tu ^{1 ll}y to pay for its desired force pos- ^c- Every government has wanted u ?^{re m}en. ships, aircraft than it has _s ^leved it could afford. Apart from ^ me rather optimistic ideas of NATO ^mdardization, the authors do not to grips with the economic con- j, S^u®nces of their prescriptions. For i_s.^ls ^^ar from likely that even the ex- _no'ⁿ8 Program, which the authors de- (j ^{nce as a} temporary aberration, can to L^Usta*^neci- Something else is going _r , ^ave to go in the next five years, _f - than Britain’s forces looking for ^ fields to conquer around the had ^C ^ worldwide role has always a t .^Its attractions for a country with y edition of imperial responsibilities.

^e • it has always had to be balanced th^{a,nSt comm}itments closer to home, _a ^a. ^were more pressing in the final _e ^a y^s'^s- As Britain withdrew from the T(y^lre’ ^S° ^^{le neec}* ^{to sus}tain NA- iti p^{S new strate}gy of flexible response mi             forced the redeployment of

Mine laying is but one of seven sea control missions that the P-3C Orion handles. It carries up to 12,000 pounds of mines. And its search radar, Omega navigation and inertial navigation systems enable it to place the mines with pinpoint accuracy at choke points.

In another of its sea control missions, surveillance, the P-3C's great range and endurance are indispensable. Its turboprop engines use fuel sparingly at low altitudes, where many surveillance missions are flown. This enables the P-3C to fly missions up to 16 hours in duration, travers­ing huge expanses of ocean and using its onboard com­puter to sort and correlate data points.

The multi-talented P-3C Orion takes just 1% of the Navy's procurement budget. Seven missions for 1%—that's cost-eff ecti veness.

n_e ^Ca '^Is conventional effort in the ^w theater. It was not that the threat _Ch^^red^; it was that Britain had to °se its most important commit- ⁿ*s, Chichester and Wilkinson fall

^{n 0 l}^^e fashionable trap of contrast­ing the current strategic situation with ^at °f NATO’s early days when the ^maJor threat was seen to be European, ^not global. Actually, British policy­makers have always viewed the threat ^as global. Hence, they have been ex- femely reluctant to make inevitable |'^nd necessary withdrawals. Never- ^{e ess}- those withdrawals had to be •hade; alternative courses of action. I’nch as a refusal to play a full part in ₍.^e f^ront line of Europe’s conven- ^lonal defense, seemed less attractive, ^anjf still do. Moreover, the general ca­pability of Britain’s Europe-oriented ., ^rce^ fo intervene "out of area" when ^{e s|}tuation demands has just been ore than amply demonstrated.

!^onS ^as they discount the polit- ... bias, American readers will find ^ls book an interesting illustration of ntain’s current dilemmas. They will !^nd puch that is attractive in the book’s l'₀^eS'^S 8^reater support for U. S. ef- rts to counter the extra European ^reaT but what of the opportunity _t°^sts °f force reductions on the Con- '^nent at a time when the United States ^ants the Europeans to do more? Much Britain's uncertainty might be dis­puted by a clear lead from the U. S. ^0vernment on how the United States °uld like to see Britain’s defense _t°^sture go in the next decade. Sus- auTing Britain’s independent nuclear pmhitions, calling for aid in the Indian th"²³¹¹' ^{and as}f^<‘ⁿ8 f°^r more men on y^C^-ontinent may all separately be in l ' N interests in one way or another. ^at they put a strain on the British ^{c e}nse budget that it cannot sustain. ^{s Wa}s shown by the government's action to recent leaks about possible _r,^ar,s to cut the welfare state beyond ^c°gnition, even a Conservative gov- ^rnment does not have the same de- * °f latitude to cut social programs y ^a Republican administration in the ⁿ'ted States. Major increases in de- r_L>^nS.^{e ex}P^enditures beyond those al- ₀f k ^a®^{reed and} safe-guarded are out me question. If one part of Britain’s °sture is stressed, something else will War-^{10 re}duced. Chichester and 'Ikinson have helped define the °blem; can we have some realistic p'dance as to the sort of ally the States would like?

In over-the-horizon targeting, the P-3C employs its search radar, infrared, ESM, and acoustics systems. Its on­board computer integrates them all, providing pinpoint targeting for surface ships firing at targets beyond their horizons. The P-3C also serves the same role for other air­craft and submerged submarines.

Should the need arise, the P-3C can engage in another of its seven sea control missions—antisurface warfare.

In ASUW, it uses its own targeting systems, or those of another aircraft, to direct its six lethal Harpoon air-to- surface missiles. These missiles can neutralize a hostile vessel up to 60 miles from the P-3C.

That's mission flexibility and cost-effectiveness, all for less than 1% of the Navy's procurement budget. That's the P-3C Orion.

v^^Uilte °f Aberdeen and London universi- j_e ^S,' ^^r- Grove is Deputy Head of Strategic Stud- _ni0 ‘¹¹ 'be Britannia Royal Naval College. Dart- Ki.,¹¹ , ■ he was an exchange professor at the U. S. ^Val Academy. 19X0-81.

as alliances, the stationing of ter^^S ?k^poad’ ^ar,d direct military in- _sj ^Vei¹’i°ⁿ. heightened the political sniticance of arms sales. Broader cooperations, such as the East-West the £^et.it^|on, nuclear proliferation in _rj_L bird World, and regional rival- ^Urther complicate the question, ho ]• ^nove|ty in Pierre’s study is em- ca ^IC^ 'ⁿ ’he notion that the signifi- _[rij.^Ce °f arms sales lies neither in the _Co ^{1 ar}y impact, nor in the economic if, ^Secl^uences, but in the political di- _ar(,^nsion- ’ⁿ his words, “Arms sales nati * ^rometer of politics among

do

With its great range and advanced, secure systems, the P-3C Orion is the most flexible Navy command, control, and communications weapon system available to com­manders throughout the Free World.

The P-3C's secure voice, data link, and Teletype sys­tems enable it to communicate with ships, other aircraft, land bases, and submarines through the Navy's Tactical Data System. The P-3C's onboard computer correlates and presents tactical data to decision makers aboard the air­craft. Or the P-3C relays the data to distant commanders.

C³ is just one of seven sea control missions the P-3C performs. Its exceptional endurance, advanced sensors, and potent antisubmarine and antisurface ship weapons also make it ideally suited to convoy protection.

This mission also underscores the P-3C's cost-effective­ness. A handful of P-3Cs can sweep huge stretches of ocean, coping with both submarines and surface threats.

The P-3C Orion —a flexible and invaluable asset that takes only 1% of the Navy's procurement budget.

Orion the C system

* he Global Politics of Arms Sales

Andrew J. Pi_erre p_rj_nceton, NJ:

'ncetor, University Press. 1982. 353 pp. ^3>2o-95 ($18.85).

^ev'ewed by Stephen Aubin

is^ Global Politics of Arms Sales . ■^ln many respects, a seminal work. _s ,^{e dut}hor has attempted to fit arms j_tj ^es 'ⁿ’° the scheme of global pol- _Cu ^S’ thereby filling a vacuum which _w"^r|^;nt|y exists in strategic literature, si |! ⁶ 'ⁿ’^ensc emotions exist on both pi es °’ the policy question. Andrew Wh'^u ^^US acceded ^a P^os*tion from _c 'v¹ ’he phenomenon of arms sales ^CTh 6 adecl^uate|y discussed.

^ he decline of traditional instru- _su^^ats °i reassurance and diplomacy,

troor

_uo ^e dismisses the conventional     

^ ⁰¹ that arms sales are integral to the ^ ^^estern economies, lowering enh ^C°^sts ’^or defense items and thus _t0ri^ancing the industrial base. On the tj_Q ^rary- foreign policy considera- cer ^{S 3re a} ^^{ar more} important con­ey ⁿ' ^^ccording to Pierre’s statistics, both r^^ranCe’ ^which has sold arms for son ^0rc'Sⁿ Policy and economic rea- _no ^s: ^would not suffer significant eco- t,_c ^lc damage if arms sales were to ’h■i[^Cp^LICCd' l~l^e acknowledges, though. o_r:, ’’^rance has become too export­ed in its defense industry. Wh'|^an^ ^^ave decried the sale of arms _a ^{1 e a}dvocating total disarmament _0ry⁰ⁿ£ nations. Although noble in the- _Vo- ’his argument has often been de- (jj_s. °’ ^a practical approach toward ab|'^irtnament’ ^{ol even towa}rd a not- cu ^C_>^reduc’ion in arms. Pierre has fo- to'll ^UP°ⁿ various regions in order att'> ^Ustrate ’he obstacles present when ₀,,^e,^rnP’iⁿg to reduce the quantity and ^qUJ^lay of arms sales, cn ^Crta'ⁿ regions will continue to see Petition between the superpow-

Books of Interest

Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor

NAVAL AFFAIRS

Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea

Hannes Jdnsson. Hamden. CN: Archon Books. 1982. 240 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. lnd. $34.00 ($30.60).

An Icelandic ambassador examines the four fisheries disputes between Iceland and Britain from 1952 to 1976. He concludes that the so-called Progressive doctrine, which defines a 200-mile economic zone, has achieved wide acceptance, largely as a result of Iceland’s stand. Moreover, he argues that Iceland’s willingness to enforce its own 200-mile limit despite the rulings of the International Court of Justice dem­onstrates the continuing preeminence of state sovereignty. Though concerned pri­marily with the substance and machinery of international law, the book also covers naval operations in support of, or in vio­lation of, that law.

IIMAS Melbourne

Timothy Hall. Boston. MA: George Allen & Unwin. 1982. 223 pp. Illus. lnd. $19.95 ($17.95).

The Royal Australian Navy's only postwar aircraft carrier has had a controversial ca­reer. Twice she was involved in collisions with escorting destroyers, one Australian and one American. This book provides useful case studies of these collisions, not only of the dangers inherent in flight op­erations, but of the political element in al­lied exercises. Hall finds the destroyer cap­tains at fault in both instances and makes a strong case that the Melbourne's captain did all he could to avoid collision. Never­theless. the carrier's commanding officer was cashiered in both cases—the second time, according to Hall, to placate the Americans.

The Navy in New Zealand: An Illustrated History

Gram Howard. Wellington, England: A. H. &

A. W. Reed Ltd.. 1981. 170 pp. Illus. lnd.

Price Unknown.

This heavily illustrated volume chronicles New Zealand's naval history from 1769 when James Cook first landed there to the present. The emphasis is on operations of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) in World War 11. but there are several chap­ters on the postwar years as well. The au­thor makes a special effort to record the RNZN’s peacetime contributions. As the foreword by Rear Admiral J. F. McKenzie indicates, this account is published at a time when New Zealand's navy is at a cross­roads in its own history.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Among Lions: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Battle for Jerusalem

J. Robert Moskin. New York: Arbor House. 1982. 401 pp. Illus. Maps. Append, lnd. $16.95 ($15.25).

Calling it "the most important battle in urban warfare since . . . Stalingrad." Rob­ert Moskin details the three-day battle in 1967 between Israeli and Jordanian troops for possession of Jerusalem. Moskin cov­ers the background of the decision making for both sides and (he international impli­cations of the war as well as the fighting itself, which is reported in some detail. His account is very personal, drawn largely from interviews with participants. Personal acts of heroism and bravery abound, leading Moskin to comment on (he irony of the holy city being the center of such a bloody struggle.

Closing the Circle, War In the Pacific:

1945

Edwin P. Hoyt. New York. Van Nostrand Reinhold Company. 1982, 240 pp. Illus. Bib. lnd. $14.95 ($10.95)

This is the final volume of Hoyt's trilogy of the war against Japan (the first two were Storm Over the Gilberts and To the Mar­ianos). It covers the last two months of the war and focuses particularly on Admiral William Frederick Halsey's carrier raids against Japan. As with all of Hoyt’s books, it is written in an easy, readable style, but it is an account culled exclusively from pre­viously published histories, offering no new information or interpretations. The stan­dard source remains Samuel Eliot Mori- son's Two Ocean War.

0 The Miracle of Dunkirk

Walter Lord. New York: The Viking Press. 1982. 323 pp. Illus. Maps. lnd. $17.95 ($14.36).

Several recent histories of the Dunkirk evacuation have emphasized the Royal Navy’s contributions and attacked the "myth” that the rescue of the British Ex­peditionary Force was largely the result of the participation of British civilian volun­teers. In this new offering. Walter Lo returns to the earlier (heme and claims t Dunkirk was an example of an army ■ cued by its people. Relying on oral m views as well as archival sources. E° uses personal anecdotes and a lively ^vVI ing style to create a vivid portrait fully ^c sistent with the patriotic tenor of that su mer of 1940.

Modern Combat Aircraft and Insignia

Andrew Kershaw. New York: Arco                          ^

Publishing, Inc.. 1982. 125 pp. Illus. lnd. - • ($6.25).

This short paperback depicts more than f>- fighters, attack aircraft, bombers. P^atIV reconnaissance, and multirole planes service today, ft is illustrated with 1401¹¹ ^ color photographs, cut-away drawings, a several pages of insignia. This is a han reference for anyone with an interest aviation.

Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814

Gunther E. Rothenberg. Bloomington. IN-, Indiana University Press. 1982. 219 pp. W^us' Maps. Bib. lnd. $18.95 ($17.05)

As Professor Rothenberg points out, tl’^e Austrian Hapsburgs were the most det^e mined and implacable of Napoleon’s c° tinental adversaries. In this fact-filled a count, the organization, tactics, persona ties, and morale of the Austrian Army. ¹⁷ ' 1814, is detailed by one of the most knov^ edgeable and prolific of Napoleonic sch<^ ars. Rothenberg also touches upon the I* litical, economic, and social factors tlf molded Austrian society, its army, and * attitudes of its commander, the Arched ^L Charles.

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War

Harry G. Summers. Jr. Novato. CA.: Presidj¹ Press. 1982. 225 pp. Bib. lnd. $12.95 (SU-⁶ ''

This analysis of the Vietnam War was orte inally published more than a year ago use at the Army War College and the C¹¹¹¹ mand and Staff College. Colonel Summery a faculty member at the former instituting relies heavily on the principles and instgⁿ _ put forth 150 years ago by Karl ^Vl’ Clausewitz to explain why. despite Ad¹ ^ ican logistic and tactical triumphs, we cod not win the war. The reason, stated simp -

_Cla(. ^e foreword, is that "a lack of appre- ‘ ion of military theory and military stra- fnil't- ^eSP^eCi^aHy *^^e relationship between to a f^{y slra,e}gy and national policy) led Hi aul,y definition of the nature of war." _a '• ^r5.^ason for republishing the book with in i^Vli'^an P^ress'^s to aid the general public ⁿ erstanding that relationship.

Operation Chastise: The Dams Raid, ^tP'e or Myth

p^etman. Boston. MA: Jane's M_a ^sh'"8 Company. 1982. 218 pp. Illus. ^ps- Append. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).

■Pan ®^r'tish bombing raid against Ger- ₀f .T ^s dams has become a classic account (l_a ■ ^e triumph of individual ingenuity and Alli'ⁿ? 'ⁿ ^oeld War II. After the raid, the _C| ⁶ Propaganda machine trumpeted the erevv^{rneSS and} *^,ravery °f British bomber the ^{S Wko} "skipped" their bombs over tl_)a(^Water t° crack the mighty masonry dams Inth P^rov'^^ed Germany's electric power, hur ,^lsdeta"ed history, a professorat Sand- ^child ^eXP*^a'^ns that far from being the brain- dev l °* ^{an eccen}'ric band of aerial dare- _Sy_s(\^s' fo^e operation was the result of a _efr ^ernatic and wide-ranging government ^r ■ Either way, the story is interesting.

^^art.^ered in Hell: The Story of the l-.._t^lrican North Russian Expeditionary °^rce> 1918-1919

<C!i^G°^rd°ⁿ- Missoula, MT.: The

I9jji 1 ^ Historical Society and G.O.S.. Inc..

' -¹-<» pp. Illus. Bib. SI l .95 ($10.75) (paper).

•heTt ¹*]^{an          13} ■ soldiers died fighting

j_ani[.Army between August 1918 and PI ^ary 1920. Rather than attempt a com- edito ^lstory this "vest pocket war," the n_1ClJ^<*^ls gathered together the memoirs and th_e orabifia of many of the participants in a_ry p ^nier>^can North Russian Expedition­like ,°^{lce to} Provide a sense of what it was a_CCo° "quartered in hell." The text is f_ac ^foamed by numerous photographs, ^com'. ^{C re}P^r'ⁿ*^s of handbills, and a few ^emporary documents.

Pj.

L_egj^^acret* Warriors: Japan's Suicide

l\'nK u/,

Sad_a. „ ^arncr and Peggy Warner with Cdr Nostr- ^JMSDF (Ret.). New York: V; Mans A ^Reinhold Co., 1982. 370 pp. Illus _s ' Append. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

p_eri^C|y there was no more terrifying k_a,'^{Ce in} World War II than the k a_Uth_o^{attacks in} 'ate 1944 and 1945. those*-⁵ °* ^lk'^s thorough study exai men ‘?^ttacRs front the perspective ol gets - i ^r>art>cipated on both sides: at is es:^ndas Projectiles. The Japanese > e_st hectally intriguing. Indeed, the g sigh, ^0ntr'h^u*i°ⁿ °f *h'^s volume is thi choio',- °^^ers '^nt0 'he historical and eou|_U^8lCal underpinnings of a society cin-,i ^adoPt suicide squadrons as a i Weapon of war.

Protecting our merchant ships in a major conflict will demand great range, endurance, speed, advanced sensors, precise navigation, secure communications—and potent antisubmarine and antisurface ship weapons. Those con­voying requirements add up to the P-3C Orion.

Mine laying is another of the P-3C's seven sea control missions. The P-3C carries up to 12,000 pounds of mines.

It uses its search radar, Omega navigation and inertial navigation systems to place the mines accurately and seal choke points.

Convoying and mine laying, plus surveillance, OTH-T, C³, ASUW and ASW—that's the P-3C, the most versatile airborne weapon system in the Navy, the biggest 1% in the Navy's procurement budget.

Lockheed P-3C Orion

YA3C                                 ORDER FORM

U.S. Naval Institute

Annapolis, Maryland 21402

Qty.                                            Book Titles

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

With Shield and Sword: American Military Affairs, Colonial Times to the Present

Warren W. Hassler. Jr. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1982. 462 pp. Maps. Bib. lnd. $29.50 ($26.55).

The revival of interest in U. S. military his­tory in recent years has been evidenced by the publication of a number of thoughtful surveys that attempt to explain the unique­ness of America’s paradoxical attitude to­ward war. In this ambitious volume, a se­nior scholar revives the traditional view that the United States has been typically unprepared for war in peacetime and there­fore has had to improvise in times of crisis. He illustrates this tendency in a survey of American wars from colonial times to Viet-

BOOK ORDER SERVICE

Prices enclosed by parentheses are mem­ber prices. Members may order most books of other publishers through the Naval In­stitute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) Please allow for delays when ordering non-Naval Institute titles. When air mail or other spe­cial handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the mem­ber. Books marked 51 are Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked B are Naval Institute Book Selections. For further in­formation about these books ( H.53), call (301)268-6110. ext. 30 or 31. For informa­tion on the other books, call ext. 32. Use the order form provided in this section.

nam that is well written and compelling.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Polish Crisis: American Policy Options

Jerry F. Hough. Washington. D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1982. 80 pp. $5.95 ($5.35) (paper).

In this Brookings staff paper, a political science professor at Duke University ex­amines the development of the political and economic crisis in Poland. The military crackdown and suppression of Solidarity on the one hand and Poland's burgeoning debt on the other put the United States in a very delicate position. How hard can America push on these issues without pro­voking an even greater crisis with inter­national dimensions? Hough's view is cau­tious but optimistic, and he emphasizes that the very existence of the crisis points out weaknesses in the Warsaw Pact community.

Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions, and Problems

Uri Ra'anan. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp. Editors. Hamden. CN:

Archon Books. 1982. 351 pp. Tables, lnd.

$32.50 ($29.25).

Eighteen authors contributed to this col­lection of papers originally presented at a conference held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in April 1980. The chapters cover both the theoretical and practical problems associated with power projection and range from historical over­views of the 19th-century Pax Britannica to the threat of Soviet airborne forces in

the 1980s. Several chapters concern L■ naval forces, including contributions iTO R. James Woolsey, Michael Vlahos, <>ⁿ Alvin Cottrell.

Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning

Richard K. Betts. Washington. D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1982. 318 pp. TubR^s . lnd. $24.95 ($22.45) (hardcover). $9.95 <S»-^y- (paper).

This analytical study begins with a surprise attacks in past wars, including r * Harbor, the North Korean invasion. ^aa the 1967 and 1973 attacks on Israel. U author of this study then goes on to exp the various risks and benefits derived >^r0 surprise attacks and assesses these fac *- primarily in the context of a NATO- ¹ saw Pact confrontation in Europe- ^ principal theme is that surprise ^atf^aC work less because of intelligence tau^lllL than from political naivete.

The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy

William J. Lewis. Cambridge. MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 1982. 471 PP- lllus. Tables, lnd. $29.95 ($26.95).

This volume is chock-full of data about ^ history, organization, training, equip!¹¹⁶ uniforms, and insignia of the military ^{,0I C} of the Warsaw Pact countries. iriclLic i ^ the Soviet Union. Photographs depict ^ various types of equipment from trucks missiles: maps indicate unit disposit'⁰ _ and a color section in the appendix e provides details of uniforms and insig^nl‘

-i

Insignia Items (Specify color/size if necessary)