Australia

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Imagine a nation as large as the contiguous United States. Completely surround that nation with water and provide it with vast interior regions that are inhospitable, if not uninhabitable. Populate this nation with only 14.5 million people. Give this nation island neighbors on the north and east and none at all on the south or west. Finally, place this nation well south of Asia and too far from Africa or South America to be considered close to either. Now, open your world atlas to “A” and examine Australia.

Geopolitical Setting: Were not Australia a con­tinent, it would certainly be the largest island in the world. Because its interior is so inhospitable, the population of Australia is concentrated in a few pop­ulation centers around the coast, with the larges centers, Sydney and Melbourne, in the southeast. In fact, Australia’s widely scattered coastal popu­lation centers make it a modern-day nation of city- states. These city-states are connected by modem rail, air, and road transport networks to move peo­ple and cargo, but the bulk of interstate commerce is conducted over the sea.

It is not just interstate commerce that makes the sea important to Australia. Being a nation rich m arable land and natural resources, Australia is a prime exporter of farm products, agricultural commodi-

fies,and minerals. Japan, forexample, imports nearly ^al1 its iron ore from Australia. Nations in the Middle East exchange their oil for farm animals and meat. •Australia is nearly self-sufficient in petroleum prod­ucts, importing only approximately 30% of its re­quirements.) The United States imports large quan­tities of strategic minerals, such as titanium, cobalt, ^and manganese, from Australia.

Although geographic separation may create iso- utionist tendencies, Australia reaches outward po­litically. It actively participates in both United Na- t'ons and British Commonwealth activities and is ^presented in major world political and trade or­ganizations. Australia maintains cordial relations with nearly all nations, and although its government nor­mally supports U. S. policy, it does voice any res­ervations it may have about it. In the South Pacific region, Australia is frequently regarded by its im­mediate neighbors (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomons, Fiji, and New Zealand) as an articulate spokesman for the rights of “island­ers.” In addition, Australia has declared a 200-naut- !^Cal mile exclusive economic zone, which brings it mto daily contact with such fishing nations as Japan, me Soviet Union, Taiwan, and South Korea. Aus­tralia also possesses territories in the Indian, Pacific, ^antl Southern oceans and has laid claims totaling 40% of the Antarctic landmass.

Hence, despite its geographic separation, Aus­^tralia’s trading requirements coupled with its con­^scious political activity precludes total isolation. As ^a result, Australia needs a defense that reflects its mternational position. Furthermore, being an island Uution, these defense requirements must attempt to balance the contradiction that while the oceans sur- ^lQunding Australia provide a defensive bulwark, they ^Can also act as an avenue for offensive actions from ^ar> enemy.

Historical Defense Considerations: Australian defense policy has undergone three distinct trans- mrmations. These three transformations have die­ted the nature of its current defense forces.

Until the outbreak of World War II, Australia was Protected by British imperial power. In return for mis protection, Australia contributed substantial ‘°rces to the British effort in World War I, and, until EMl, World War II. However, after the fall of Sin­gapore in 1942, British power in Asia slowly eroded. Britain suffered grievous losses at the hands of the ■Japanese and never completely replaced its forces m Asia.

. This loss of British protection did not seriously 'mpact upon Australia, however. The U. S. Army, Under the command of General Douglas Mac Arthur, Used Australia as a training base from which it ul- ‘mately was able to launch the final offensive against ■Japan. These Army forces, along with the U. S. Navy forces, which scored an earlier victory at the

Battle of the Coral Sea, also helped protect Australia from invasion by Japanese forces.

The strengthened ties with the United States con­tinued after the war and reached a zenith at the conclusion of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty in 1951. With this treaty, Australia recognized the United States as its close ally and ultimate protector.

The Vietnam War provided the catalyst for the last transformation of Australian defense policy. As U. S. forces withdrew from Southeast Asia, Aus­tralia sensed that the United States might end its active participation in providing protection. In spite of its ANZUS obligations, the United States made no overtures to alter this perception. Thus, Australia appraised its immediate geopolitical circumstances and commenced developing a defense policy more closely attuned to immediate threats to its national security.

This transformation has motivated Australian de­fense policy since at least 1970, irrespective of gov­ernment leanings. Although the ANZUS alliance still forms the foundation for Australian defense, the pact is no longer perceived as its ultimate structure. Self­reliance, rather than dependence on another major power, has become the key precept of Australia’s defense policy.

The Threat: Considering its lack of immediate neighbors, conceiving of a credible threat to Aus­tralia seems difficult—at least in the form of one nation taking overt action against it. But because it is a maritime nation, Australia could be threatened by any nation possessing military forces capable of interdicting its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) or other maritime resources or capable of attacking its overseas territories. Thus, the type, intensity, and duration of a threat dictates the sort of defense forces Australia needs.

For example, Table 1 describes a number of threats to Australia’s security and the types of forces re­quired to deter and overcome these threats.

One factor common to each of these threats is that any action—whatever its level of violence— must originate in the maritime sphere. This factor, more than any other, dictates the sort of defense forces required.

Although there has been heated debate in the Aus­tralian press concerning the size of the defense forces, there has been nearly unanimous consensus on their two purposes: deterrence—any threatening nation must perceive that the price for aggressive action against Australia is very high; and warfighting ca­pability—if action were taken, Australia must pos­sess defense forces prepared to take resolute action.

If necessary, Australia could request U. S. assis­tance through an appropriate section of the ANZUS treaty, but its defense forces should obviate this fallback contingency.

If need be to meet any regional threat on its own, Australia has capably built up its defense forces, including RAA helicopters, beached at Sabina Point, Queensland, during exercises, RAAF P-3Cs, important in the maritime interdiction role, and RAN U. S.-built Perth -class guided missile destroyers, similar to the U. S. Navy’s Charles F. Adams class.

Even though the subject of threats is of great im­port, an Australian Government has never needed to identify a possible threatening nation by name in order to justify an increased defense expenditure. It has been the primary objective, however, to en­sure, irrespective of threat, that the defense forces are kept sufficiently large and adequately prepared to represent a credible force capable of protecting national interests while maintaining a viable deter­rent effect.

The Royal Australian Army: Because of Austra­lia’s small population and geographic isolation from enemies, maintenance of a large army has been both demographically and politically infeasible. The Royal Australian Army (RAA) is organized around one infantry division with three brigades of two infantry battalions, 16 various regiments, and is supported by a call-up force of 31,700. Active strength of the army is approximately 32,000, making it the largest defense force in Australia.

Although the army possesses highly visible and technically advanced weapon systems, such as Leopard-II tanks, Rapier surface-to-air missile sys­

tems, and Bell helicopters, it does so in low nurn bers. For example, Australia has 103 Leopard- tanks—total.                                                 .

This factor does not relegate the army to solely visibility role. The RAA has capable antiterror forces and its own, albeit limited, organic air trans port capability. To a certain extent, the army is ^a ^ ready stationed close to any potential action in Aus­tralia (most likely in the north or northwest), tnu movement to any possible continental trouble sp could be accomplished with a minimum of ^e °^r„ Training for such contingencies is extensive, and nu rale is high. In the final analysis, the army cou fight an attacking enemy, but because of ^{its S}'^Z^ not for any protracted period. Although the RAA the largest of Australia’s defense forces, it is ¹ weakest in terms of operational funding and long term defense planning.                                            .

Thus, the RAA has been formed for last reso defensive purposes in wartime. It is structuic employ its limited but technologically advance weapons in a final coup-de-grace against an ^ene. that has already been disjointed and attrited duri s

Table 1 Threats to Australia's Security

Threats

Terrorist acts against offshore oil resources or illegal acts related to oceanic mineral resources or fishing zones

Sinking Australian merchant shipping vessels on high seas or in choke points/straits; sinking ships of other nations trading with Australia

Seizure of remote Australian overseas territories or isolated portions of continent itself

Nuclear threat to U. S. interests/bases in Australia without direct threat to Australian interests

Overt threat to Australian national or overseas in­terests by the Soviet Union, which may encompass any or all of the above threats           ________

Counterforces____________________________

Maritime surveillance and interdiction; mobile nav^a| forces with extended deployment capability; ^sP^eC‘ counterinsurgency forces; forces rapidly deploys to meet threat .

Maritime interdiction; self-contained escort f°^rC^’ interoperability with potential allies and/or other fected nations; forces rapidly deployable to m^e threat

Maritime surveillance and interdiction; rapidly^ ployable naval and ground forces for counterot e sive; naval carrier air assets to supp counteroffensive

Full-scale mobilization of Australian forces to sup port the United States (assumes ANZUS provisio invoked); large maritime forces for self-protec • following threat of nuclear attack All forces required; U. S. assistance assumed

Proceedings / March P®

J^ts approach to Australia. This strategy does not appear unrealistic, given the current defensive ^c,rcumstances.

t , V^U R°y^al Australian Air Force: The Royal Aus- ^'a >an Air Force (RAAF), though a small compo- ^cnt ot the defense forces, possesses or will possess _s^0rne of the more modern and advanced weapon Astems in any nation’s inventory. Because of its ^all numbers, RAAF aircraft are often assigned ultip|_e—_aru] potentially contradictory—missions, evertheless, the RAAF is a highly motivated or- anization, well prepared and trained to respond to ^l|A treats to the nation.

he RAAF fighter force is currently organized °^und the French-built Mirage-111 aircraft, origi- ^a y purchased by Australia to counter the per­ceived threat of Indonesian Air Force “Badger” bomb­ers. The Mirage is an old but venerable aircraft and has been well maintained in its many years of service to the RAAF. RAAF Mirages are capable of Mach 1.4 speed and can operate in a wide range of altitudes with excellent weapons-carrying capability. Service life for the Mirages has been extended until after 1985 to compensate for the later-than-planned de­livery of the ordered U.S. F/A-18 Hornet aircraft. Attrition of the Mirages has been accelerating. Al­though the aircraft are not now unsafe to fly, from 1984 to 1986, Australia will have a reduced capa­bility with the Mirages and with only a few Hornets having entered the active fighter force.

The projected F/A-18 buy is pegged at only 75 units; however, a definite long-range bomber threat

Melbourne with either a U. S.-designed, Spanish- U'lt, sea control V/STOL carrier or a U. S.-built ^shlP not unlike the USS Guam (LPH-9). So serious this decision for the Fraser Government that for ^he first time, perhaps a serious, credible threat would ave to be identified to justify such an expenditure. ‘Ven the budgetary and political considerations in- olved, it appears unlikely, however, that HMAS elbourne will be replaced. The government is, owever, signaling its intention to expand its force _s .FFGs by building up to four similar follow-on ^h‘Ps in its own shipyards. Moreover, the “Oberon” _m. marines will soon be equipped with the Harpoon ^lssile system, significantly increasing the offensive ^aPabilities of these platforms. _t Nevertheless, the RAN suffers its difficulties. The ndency not to replace the carrier robs the navy of _tj ^c flexibility inherent in taking its air to the mari- ^e sphere. The navy’s Fremantle-class patrol boats f ^{c s}'°w, overweight, and carry no surface-to-sur- ^Ce missiles in a region where those weapon sys- _n ^rn.^s abound in the much smaller navies of Indo- ad r^{3, Sin}§^aP^ore’ ^and Malaysia. The FFGs, in her *°ⁿ’ ^were P^urchased without helicopters. The p_c ^1CoP^ter ultimately chosen for the FFGs will de- Us ki’ ^l° ^a 2^reat extent, upon obtaining one that is j_s ^{a on} the frigates, the follow-on carrier (if there °«e), as well as being usable by the RAAF. De- thi' ^{C tlle cost savin}8^s resulting from a larger buy, ^s may be a difficult order to fill. Moreover, the

follow-on FFGs were to be constructed in Austra­lian shipyards, which are unfortunately plagued with labor unrest. If this unrest continues, the Australian Government may be coerced into canceling its plans to build its own ships, opting instead for purchases from the United States—but at a lesser magnitude because of the increased costs.

Finally, the RAN is east coast-oriented, with its fleet headquarters and nearly all ships stationed in Sydney. Even though Indian Ocean deployments have been more or less continuous since 1980, they are indeed quite difficult to support or command and control from Sydney. Development of the Stirling Naval Base (near Perth on the west coast) and the homeporting there of a DDG and two FFGs (with attendant support vessels) will help increase expo­sure in the Indian Ocean region. Unfortunately, as is the case in most of the Western democracies.