The Arab-Israeli Naval Imbalance

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The Arab-Israeli Naval Imbalance

By Clyde Owan

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J4 contributing factor to the growing imbalance between the Israeli Navy and the two major Arab navies is Israel’s Mark III Gabriel surface-to-surface missile and the commitment to modernization it represents. Since the installation in fast patrol pAk          boats of the first Gabriels in the 1970s,

*' ■HI                                successive models have grown in

Mtb^range, weight, and killing power.

Previous studies of the Arab-Israeli (in this con­text, meaning the forces of Egypt, Syria, and Israel) military balance have generally ignored the naval sphere. This is unfortunate, since these naval forces have undergone dramatic change over the past 20 years. During this period, shifts occurred in the balance of naval power. The Eilat's sinking and naval engagements of the 1973 War proved the combat effectiveness of missile boats and electronic warfare tactics. And Israel continues to show that a small country can develop and maintain a powerful and modern navy.

Despite inattention to the naval sphere, greater discussion about the Arab and Israeli navies needs to be generated. The capabilities of these navies have been upgraded; these countries are linked with different superpowers, and they are central parties to the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute. All are prox­imate to vital oil fields and strategic maritime routes.

When the Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian navies are examined, it can be seen that; (1) Israel has the preeminent force; (2) Egypt is in a state of transition but has the potential to become a key naval power; and (3) Syria has the least capable navy because Soviet assistance has not kept pace with changes in the Israeli and Egyptian navies.

Israel's principal combatants were a few obsolete destroyers transferred from the Soviet Union (1° Egypt) and Britain (to both Egypt and Israel). Mean­while, Syria’s only vessels of significance were thi ee ex-French “CH'-type submarine chasers which hat been commissioned in 1940.          .           .

Parity between the Arab and Israeli navies existe until the early 1960s. During the 1960s, the balance of naval power shifted—first to an Arab advantage and later to an Israeli edge. Soviet military assis­tance, the sinking of the Eilat, and the French aims embargo were key factors in shaping this balance.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union transferred ' Ko­mar”- and ”Osa”-class missile boats to Egypt ^an Syria. These craft were armed with active-homing “Styx” missiles. Armed with state-of-the-art weap­onry, the Arab navies thus gained the superior po­sition in antisurface warfare.

The net effect of the Soviet transfers, howevei- was to change the fleet composition of the Arab am Israeli navies and to make guided missiles the p*¹' mary weapon of antisurface warfare. To keep P^aC with the Arab acquisition of smaller and more ma­neuverable craft, Israel contracted with France to build 12 Sa'ar-class missile boats. And to enhance its offensive capabilities, Israel accelerated work on its Gabriel missile program.

In October 1967. an Israeli “Z”-class destroyei- the Eilat, was sunk by "Styx” missiles launcher

,^r°rn two Egyptian “Komars.” This incident, the "employment of ship-to-ship missiles in combat, ^VVas a milestone in naval history. Traditional mea­^SUres of tactical strength were reassessed, as small j^'ssile boats were now able to engage and destroy ^;lrger warships.

This incident clearly revealed that the balance of p^Hval power had shifted against Israel as it awaited ^lcnch completion of Sr/Tir-class boats and contin­ued work on Gabriel missiles. Realizing the accu- ^acY and destructive power of the “Styx,” Israel ^'nsequently sought electronic and tactical coun- ^ei'measures to protect its emerging missile boat fleet.

I he French embargo, subsequent to the 1967 War, °^{n ar}ms shipments to Israel spurred Israeli self-re- ^itlnce in naval production. The French embargo stung ^s,ael not only because France withheld delivery of • ^v° Sr/W-class boats (which Israeli agents later hi­jacked), but because France had been Israel’s pri­^mary supplier of arms.

The first vessel produced from this domestic' effort ^^as the Reshef. Larger than the Sa'ar class and lore seaworthy, the Reshefs were intended to meet ^Srael's increased naval responsibilities along the ' 'nai and in the Red Sea. Construction of the Re­began in 1970, and by the 1973 War, two had ^een commissioned.

With the exception of the initial Soviet transfers, Z¹⁰ bulk of naval development prior to the 1973 War ^ ^as pursued by Israel. Ironically, Soviet transfers ‘ⁱ⁽J the net effect of propelling the Israeli procure- ^Cr,t of missile boats and the production of guided issiles. Why did the Arabs not react to the flurry °‘ Israeli naval development?

A combination of factors seems to account for _r/^ab complacency. First, the Arabs—unlike Is- ‘tcl—lacked the technological and industrial infra­structure to engage in sophisticated naval research ^and production. Instead of developing such capa- ¹ ‘ties, Egypt and Syria remained exclusively de- ¹ endent on the Soviet Union for the maintenance ^atlt| modernization of their fleets.

.. Second, the destruction of Arab air and ground ^0|ces in the 1967 War forced naval interests to be U^ven lower priority. Air and ground forces had to be rebuilt and reorganized, particularly since the areas of contention were the Golan Heights and the Sinai.

Third, the Arabs did not perceive the extent to which the balance of naval power had shifted against them. The Eilat incident was the only direct naval engagement prior to the 1973 War. While this inci­dent manifested the temporary Arab naval advan­tage, the Israeli fleet had since undergone significant change with the addition of Sa'ar- and Res lief-class boats, Gabriel missiles, and electronic countermea­sures (ECM) for antimissile defense.

From a quantitative standpoint, the naval balance in 1973 appeared to be against Israel. On the eve of the October War, Israel’s attack fleet was composed of two Reshefs and 12 Sa'ars. Egypt had 12 “Ko­mars” and six “Osas,” while Syria had six “Ko­mars” and three “Osas.”

Yet, from a qualitative perspective, the naval bal­ance differed. Because Israel chose self-reliance in naval production and maintenance, the Israeli Navy developed a more thorough degree of naval expe­rience and expertise. Building, testing, and repairing naval assets and weaponry promoted invaluable un­derstanding of naval warfare. Such understanding engendered the superior technology and tactics which shifted the naval balance in Israel’s favor. Proof of this shift could be found in the Arab-lsraeli naval engagements of the 1973 War.

From the outset of the war. the Israeli Navy took the initiative in all significant naval operations. These engagements are of considerable importance, as they mark the first combat employment of electronic war­fare against cruise missiles.

The Israeli Navy launched offensive missions along the Egyptian and Syrian coasts in order to transfer

the battlefront to the homelands of its enemies. At first, Syria and Egypt met the Israeli challenge with their missile boats. But the Israeli Navy, through antimissile ECM (chaff), evasive maneuvers, and point defense fire, overcame the “Styx” menace— no Israeli missile boats were hit. The Israelis then proceeded to demonstrate the deadliness of their semiactive-homing Gabriel missiles; eight Arab mis­sile boats were sunk by Gabriels and naval gunfire.

Both Egypt and Syria were forced to concede control of their Mediterranean waters to Israel. De­spite repeated Israeli naval operations against Syr­ian and Egyptian coastal installations, neither Arab country (beginning on the fifth day of the war) de­ployed its surviving missile boats against Israeli ves­sels. Israeli naval superiority was particularly acute along the Syrian coast, where Israel continually pummelled Syrian oil tanks, refineries, and port fa­cilities from the sea. Confronted by Israeli domi­nation along its coast, Syria, apparently fearing an Israeli amphibious assault, moved two brigades from the Golan front to the coastal plains.¹

The Arab naval retreat should not be ascribed to timidity or lack of fighting will. Short of suicidal missions, the Arab navies had little choice but to conserve their assets. For while both the Arab and Israeli navies were equipped with ship-to-ship guided missiles, only Israel held an antimissile capability. This capability proved to be the decisive element in missile boat engagements. Just as the Eilat sinking was a landmark in demonstrating the value of ship- to-ship guided missiles, so were the 1973 naval bat­tles compelling evidence of ECM effectiveness in the evermorc-complex realm of naval missile combat.

Surely, the tide of the 1973 War was not turne at sea, and there is no evidence that major decision* on the Sinai or Golan fronts were affected by navu engagements. Yet, ominous implications could b^L drawn by both Arabs and Israelis from the navn activities of the October War.

Despite its supremacy in missile boat engag^e' ments, Israel was also confronted with a long-rang^c naval blockade. During the 1973 War, Egyptian de­stroyers interdicted shipping through the Bab c Mandeb (some 1,200 nautical miles from Sharm ^c Sheikh). All of Israel’s missile boats were deploy^ in the Mediterranean, and Israel did not challenge this blockade. But because Arab states lined key routes along the Mediterranean and Red seas, I^s rael—after the war—had to develop plans to ensure its access to the outside world.                     ,

For the Arabs, it was apparent that their nave forces were ill-equipped to meet the Israeli threat- Unless the Arabs rectified this naval imbalance, the’) would clearly be hampered in their ability to defen¹ their own coasts. This in turn could expose the¹ homelands to an amphibious assault, as well as bring into question each Arab regime's ability to defen its people. However, the fact that these reality were evident was one matter. Whether and to wfi^a degree the naval imbalance would be addressed ^vva’’ quite another issue.

Today, as in the past, the Arab and Israeli navU-j remain the smallest branch of each country’s arme forces. Yet, in the years since the 1973 War, *'^lC fleets of all three navies have been upgraded vvn the addition of new missile boats and missiles. EgYP broke its military relationship with the Soviet Unio'¹

The Egyptian and Israeli navies have new missile boats entering service: the Otomat-armed Ramadan class (far left) is Egypt’s newest missile patrol boat; the Aliyah class, left, is armed with Gabriel and Harpoon missiles and carries a helicopter.

^an<J sought diversity and self-reliance in military Procurement. Syria maintained its dependence on he Soviet Union, which pledged further naval arms ^ransfers. Israel continued its naval research and Production. Its crews benefited from training on ^c°mputerized simulators, and its missile boats were ^a^tipted to carry a helicopter for over-the-horizon . TH) targeting. Although changes are under way ^ln the Syrian and Egyptian navies, the balance of ^naval power tips in Israel’s favor because of the ^S|gnificant lead Israel maintains in tactical doctrine.

Syria’s missile boat fleet has already more than ^a°ublcd since the 1973 War. The Soviet Union re­placed Syria’s wartime losses and later transferred ^dn additional nine missile boats. At present, there ^are six “Komar”- and at least 12 “Osa”-class boats

the Syrian fleet. These represent the backbone of ^ae Syrian Navy, a force composed of 2,500 officers and men. The Soviet Union, in the mid-1970s, also ^ransferred two “Petya-I’’-class frigates. Each is ^CcHiipped with three torpedo tubes and hull-mounted

sonar.

The Soviet Union remains the principal arms sup- !“^ler to Syria. In 1980, both countries agreed on a 20-year “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.” ^ntong the capabilities the Soviets pledged to strengthen and develop” was the Syrian military. ^PProximately 2,500 Soviet advisers are reported

⁰        in Syria.²

During the summer of 1981, Syria practiced, with ae Soviet Union, defensive maneuvers against an ^clrnPhibious assault.³ In October 1981, it was an- tounced that Syria would receive four “Nan- ^uehka”-class corvettes from the Soviet Union.⁴ In Previous transfers to the Third World, these 900- °ⁿ vessels have been armed with one SA-N-4 and °^Ur“Styx” missile launchers. However, none have Wt been delivered to Syria.

'ⁿ terms of both personnel and assets, Syria has ae le_ast modern and smallest force. From a quali- ative perspective, Syria’s naval order of battle has ^not been significantly upgraded since the original ^ransfer of “Komars” and “Osas.” Syria is not en­gaged in naval construction and is not known to have ^C,c9uired antimissile countermeasures, such as chaff A' Jamming, for defense against Israeli missiles. As

¹        underscore its low priority, the Syrian Navy is L°t even a separate branch of the Syrian armed forces,

^Ul part of the army.

The priority given to Syrian air and ground forces can in part be attributed to the proximity and vul­nerability of Damascus to Israeli forces. In addition, Syria may be willing to accept an inferior naval po­sition vis-a-vis Israel, under the assumption that the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet will protect Syria's coastal waters from Israeli incursions. It is not known whether the Soviets have privately agreed to such a maritime defense of Syria, but Soviet failure to defend Syria could cost the Soviets a toehold in the Mediterranean and leverage in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Given the pattern of Soviet military assistance, the Soviets will work to maintain dominance over the Soviet-Syrian military relationship. By so doing, the Soviets can perpetuate the dependence of Syrian forces and avoid being dragged into a Middle East confrontation, especially when Soviet priorities might lie in other regions. Thus, the Soviets will carefully limit the transfer of naval tactics and technology, and it is unlikely they will transfer the highly sen­sitive equipment required to counter the antiship missiles in Israel’s arsenal to this Third World navy. The Soviet Union, however, can be expected to transfer additional missile boats to replace Syria’s aging “Komar”- and “Osa”-class boats.

Syria’s isolation in the Arab world and the pre­carious control held by the Assad regime have nar­rowed its sources for direct military assistance. Yet, military dependence on the Soviet Union could be lessened should the Assad regime be replaced by nationalists who legitimize their claim to authority through a program of Arab unity and denunciation of foreign domination. Under such conditions, fi­nancial aid from such oil-rich countries as Saudi Arabia could help Syria diversify its sources of mil­itary equipment. The Syrians have approached Western arms producers in recent years but have not reached any arms agreements. Of course, the Soviets would stand to lose a Mediterranean base and leverage in the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is there­fore likely that a pro-Soviet faction would be armed to prevent this loss. Direct Soviet intervention so close to Israel, Arab oil fields, and Southern Europe would run the risk of superpower confrontation.

Of the three countries surveyed, Egypt easily has the largest navy. The Egyptian fleet contains more than 140 vessels which are manned by a force of 20,000 officers and men. Unlike the Syrian Navy, the Egyptian Navy is a separate branch of the armed forces.

Egypt no longer maintains a military relationship with the Soviet Union. Because of Soviet unrelia­bility and heavy-handedness, the Sadat regime ter­minated the Soviet arms monopoly in 1974. Since then. Egypt has diversified its sources of arms and is developing its own arms industry.

Two prominent examples of this orientation are six “October"'- and six Ramadan-class missile boats. The “October" class was constructed in Alexan­dria. The Sadat regime secured funding for its con­struction from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir­ates, and Qatar. The “October" class, whose construction was based on the hull design of the “Komar,” carries two launchers for the French/ Italian Otomat surface-to-surface missile. The Oto- mat is an active-homing missile with an effective range of 32 nautical miles versus 21 nautical miles for the “Styx." Fitting of the weaponry and radar was done in Britain by Vosper-Thornycroft.

The 350-ton Ramadan class is the largest and most modern missile boat currently in the Egyptian fleet. Built completely by Vosper-Thornycroft, the Ra­madan class is fitted with four Otomat missile launchers. Like the “October," it is equipped with advanced Marconi radar systems. Six Ramadans were ordered, and completion of the deliveries is expected shortly. With these additional missile boats and the Otomat, the offensive naval capabilities of Egypt will be improved.

Egypt has been given permission to buy U. S. Harpoon missiles. These could be outfitted on future Egyptian purchases. Egypt is also expected to order 12 Westland Commando helicopters.⁵ These could enhance Egypt's antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

Despite these additions, the Egyptian Navy has some notable weak points. Arab financing, which made Egypt’s missile boat purchase and construc­tion possible, was slowed by the Camp David Agree­ment. And most of Egypt’s Soviet-built submarines, ships, and small craft are in a very low state of readiness because the Soviets no longer provide spare parts or maintenance. Yet, Egypt and its navy should be carefully observed in the years ahead—both arc in a state of transition. For example, Egypt is now integrating antimissile ECM into its missile boat force.

Egypt holds centrality in Arab politics, and under the Mubarak regime, rapprochement with the Arab world is under way. Saudi Arabia has agreed to finance Egypt’s purchase of Mirage jets,⁶ and the future financing of Egyptian purchases is possible. The Egyptian Minister of Defense has expressed the desirability of such financing in exchange for Egyp­tian maritime defense of Saudi coastal interests, e.g.. the major Red Sea oil facility at Yanbu.⁷

The Egyptian Navy will press for new craft, since the large number of aging ex-Soviet vessels will soon need to be retired. Egypt has expressed interest in Lnpo-class frigates and A^o.vm-class submarines. In July 1982, the Spanish press reported that EgyP¹ had placed orders for two Descubierta-class frigates and six Kormoran-class fast patrol boats.

In February 1982, Egypt acquired two Chinese- built “Romco"-class submarines. These subma­rines will enhance Egypt's capabilities and will allow the Egyptian Navy to be deployed over a larger par of the region. Although these submarines do not represent the latest in technological advances, in the short run, these subs and Chinese naval production represent a less costly alternative to expensive Western naval production. Financial strains could encourage Egypt to purchase hulls from China and procure naval weaponry and electronics separately from the West.

Finally, Egypt is developing the capability ^t0 produce armaments. Its eventual goal is to become a regional center of production and maintenance- While the focus of Egyptian production has been on air and ground forces, the technological skills and industrial infrastructure generated by these ettoi ts will be applicable to naval expansion.         .

The Israeli Navy, composed of 6,600 officers an men, continues to adapt and modernize its fleet- Because Israel is able to maintain and expand an already high-quality fleet, the balance of naval powei remains in its favor.

Israel’s missile arsenal has been upgraded since the October War. Beginning in 1978, Israel has fitter its eight Reshefs and six of its Sa'ars with Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles. Purchased from the United States, the active-homing Harpoon has a po­tential range of more than 50 nautical miles. Mean­while, both the Reshef- and the original Sa'cir-cla^sS boats, of which there are 12, are being fitted with a more advanced class of Gabriels. In this newer gen­eration, the potential range of the Gabriel has been increased from 14 to about 20 nautical miles. .

In 1980, a more advanced version of the ResnG was commissioned. Israel has three of these 488- ton vessels, which are called the Aliyalt class. Bun in Haifa and armed with Harpoon and Gabriel mis­sile launchers, two of the Alivahs are also equipP^c|‘ with a Bell Kiowa helicopter—designed for hot¹ ASW and OTH missions. The third vessel (know¹¹ as the Romat) is equipped with additional gun ^al" mament in place of the helicopter pad and hangm- Israel also has purchased three British-built Gw' class submarines. These submarines, commission^ in 1977, enhance Israel’s coastal defense, survei - lance, and ASW capabilities. Syria has no submu­rines. Egypt, as noted, has recently acquired two "Romeo’’-class submarines from China. But its othe¹ 12 ex-Soviet subs (six “Romeo" and six “Whiskey class) have been difficult to keep operational Be­cause of their age and the termination of Soviet maintenance.

Israel is now in a better position to challenge fu­ture blockades. The first generation of Reshefs (Sa'ar- . ,^s) has proven its long-range capability by trans- '^tln8 from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea via the Dibraltar-Cape of Good Hope route. The Resliefs ^w5^re stationed in the Red Sea, but with the return ^e Sinai to Egypt, they were redeployed to the Mediterranean.

details of Israeli naval operations during the in- ^^asion of Lebanon have not yet been released. But ^rom open sources, it is evident that Israeli am­phibious forces successfully performed landings to encircle Palestinian troops along the Lebanese coast. The training techniques of the Israeli Navy are a point defense missile to counter antiship missiles; 103-ton missile attack boats (Flagstaff II hydrofoils will probably be used to replace some of the original Sa'ar-class missile boats); and an 850-ton corvette. (It is believed that this ship will be armed with Ga­briel, Harpoon, and antisubmarine rocket launch­ers. This vessel may serve as a command and con­trol ship to aid Israeli missile boats in target acquisition. Targeting information would be sup­plied by an embarked helicopter.)

Israel has yet to obtain minesweepers. In the 1973 War, Israel was unable to draw oil from the Abu Rodeis oil fields because of mines planted by Egypt in the Straits of Jubal. The continued absence of

GRUMMAN AtROSPACt

Mtich more advanced than those of the Arabs. For Simple, Israeli officers and crews now have access ^computerized simulators. These simulators, man- ^ufcictured in Israel, provide training in ASW, anti- ^Sl|rface warfare, and electronic warfare devices. To ^Ate, neither Egypt nor Syria has such capabilities.

Anticipated naval developments include: a supcr- ^s°nic antiship missile which will be able to avert Antimissile missiles, will be highly maneuverable, ^ar>d will be able to distinguish decoys from targets;

The Shimrit guided missile hydrofoil may further tip the Middle East naval balance in Israel's favor. With a 45-knot speed and armed with four Harpoon and two Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles, she represents a further development in missile boat warfare.

ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES

The superiority of the Israeli Navy was apparent in its unchallenged operations during the Lebanese campaign. If another Arab-1sraeli war should break out, Israel may seek to control the Suez Canal and the Red Sea with its missile boats, some now armed with a point defense missile like the one above, and Gal-class submarines.

minesweepers, apart from the relinquishment of the Sinai, may reflect the Israeli belief that the length of wars it may be involved in will be short, since Israel expects: (a) to defeat its enemies swiftly; and (b) that the superpowers will eventually intercede to limit the scope of damage.

Although media attention centered on Israeli air operations in the recent conflict in Lebanon, the Israeli Navy also had several key missions. These missions fall into three categories: offensive, defen­sive, and deterrence.

Israeli missile boats operated offensively through shore bombardment of Palestinian positions. Israeli vessels also supported amphibious landings along the Lebanese coast. By operating off Lebanon, the Israeli Navy provided flank defense for Israeli ground forces and represented a deterrent against possible Syrian naval action.

As in 1973, the Israeli Navy suffered no losses. But in the 1982 Lebanon campaign, there were no ship-to-ship engagements. And the inferiority of Pal­estinian shore forces, coupled with the devastation wrought by Israeli air strikes and ground artillery, eased the task of the Israeli Navy. Yet, it should be noted that the Syrian Navy, the only navy with the potential and the inclination to challenge Israel s. refrained from hostilities. While the degree of Syrian military commitment to the Palestinian cause '^s questionable, surely the memory of the October War debacle entered into Syrian naval considerations. Thus, the most impressive naval action of the L^e" banon operation may well be the absence of Syria¹¹ activity. The apparent unwillingness of the Syrian Navy—unlike its air force—to become even mini­mally involved, would seem to reflect the Syrian belief that challenging Israeli naval superiority woul have been foolish and futile.

While another Arab-Israeli war does not app^ea' imminent, basic issues remain unresolved. If a fourth war occurred, what possible role might each navy play—assuming the superpowers avoided direct intervention?

Syria's naval options will remain few. Because Syria lacks amphibious capabilities, Israel will be able to concentrate its ground and air assets on the Golan front. If Syrian ground forces were to moun an attack from southern Lebanon, Israeli units worn have to be diverted to counter this threat. In supP°^r of such an operation, Syria’s missile boats couk intercept Israeli craft attempting to land troops on the Lebanese coast.                      ,

The superiority of the Israeli Navy, in terms o its personnel and craft, makes any Syrian naval op­eration very risky, particularly since such an op­eration would leave Syria’s coastline exposed. R^c" duction of these risks could be accomplished through a Pearl Harbor-type operation against Israeli vessels at Haifa or, assuming rapprochement, throug¹ Egyptian successes against Israeli vessels in ^t*^1L Mediterranean.

Assuming that Israel had offensive naval options- the Israeli Navy would operate aggressively again^s Syria and, if necessary, Egypt. In either case, Isra^e would seek to transfer the battlefront to the home­lands of its enemies.

Syria, because it would have the least capably navy, would be attacked first, as Israel would seek to remove swiftly the Syrian Navy as a variable- Israeli naval operations would follow those of the’ 1973 War in which the Syrian Navy and coasta installations were quickly decimated. In this way- Israel would again raise the specter of an amphib'- ous assault. Furthermore, if Syria were the sole en­emy, Israeli missile boats could provide flank sup­port to ground operations in southern Lebanon agai^nS Syrian forces. Should Egypt be a party to the con­flict, the Israeli Navy would operate on two fronts-

In the Mediterranean, Israel would seek contro over the Suez Canal. A task group of GW-class subs and Israeli missile boats could proceed to Port Sun- in order to block the canal by sinking ships an laying mines. Israeli subs and missile boats coulu also be used in support of a paratroop/amphibious

Proceedings / March