Nobody asked me, but …Nuclear Officer Manning: Fix It Now!

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We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody lis­tens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our “Nobody asked me, but . . .” column.

Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $50.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having got­ten it off your chest.

Nuclear Officer Manning:

Fix It Now!

In spite of a dormant economy and a flat, if not declining, civilian nuclear power industry, the Navy has continued to lose nearly two- thirds of its nuclear-trained officers in each year group by the end of their department head tours. The re­sultant unfavorable sea-shore rota­tion has adversely affected the mo­rale of those who have remained, which likely will negatively influ­ence career decisions.

The nuclear officer shortage was originally generated, and then main­tained, by two decades of restrictive and arbitrary accession policies. The increasing numbers of officer resig­nations were first officially denied and then subsequently blamed on a host of external factors. The person­nel spigot never provided sufficient accessions to compensate for losses. The increased financial incentives, which were sold to Congress as “the solution.” proved to be mere “band- aid” palliatives which were insuffi­cient to stem the personnel hemorrhage.

The record number of accessions into the front end of the nuclear training pipeline in 1982 can offer lit­tle, if any, immediate relief. The se­rious shortages which currently exist are in senior afloat billets and cannot be filled by a bumper crop of en­signs who will not reach division of­ficer assignments in the fleet until late 1983.

Ironically, several excellent solu­tions have been available for years, but under Admiral Hyman G. Rick- over each was consistently vetoed within the Division of Naval Reac­tors (NR). With a new director at NR, the Navy now has an opportu­nity to implement new approaches and to correct the short- and long­term officer manning problem in the nuclear fleet, with no reduction in reactor safety. In fact, safety and technical expertise may well be im­proved as a result of the concurrent rise in morale and professional per­formance made possible by an in­creased inventory of nuclear officers.

The following administrative ac­tions should be implemented immediately:

► Rehabilitate the vast pool of “po­litical refugees” from the Rickover years. Many talented, highly moti­vated, proven submariners’ applica­tions for nuclear training were re­jected by Admiral Rickover. Many of these officers are highly regarded within their present warfare commu­nities and are available for nuclear training. Other experienced nuclear- trained officers have been discarded in the midst of their nuclear careers for failing to complete successfully some phase of training. The decision to abandon these officers was often highly subjective and sometimes counter to other performance indica­tors. The causes for the rejections of officers in both of these groups should be carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In many in­stances, these officers could receive the appropriate training and then proceed directly to department hea or executive officer assignments on- nuclear ships.

► Implement a career pattern to a - low general submarine officers (GSOs) to proceed to command ot nuclear submarines. By providing nuclear training opportunities subs quent to a successful GSO depart­ment head tour, the Navy can use these proven performers’ experien and skills in commanding officer a executive officer positions. This tyP of career pattern has been used e ' fectively to obtain nuclear aircrat carrier commanding officers and e ecutive officers from our top aviators.

► Encourage more direct inputs from officers in all communities, ¹ eluding staff officers at the 0-1 through 0-3 level, for nuclear trai ing and subsequent afloat assign­ment. Although this avenue has been previously advertised, it has been effectively blocked by arbd¹.^ weighting policies within NR, ^wl1 emphasized collegiate academic grade-point average over pertoi- mance in the fleet and commandi officer recommendations.

► Establish an expanded limited duty officer (LDO) nuclear progr*¹ similar to the LDO aviation prog^r‘ which was established in 1980 to ^a sist with the pilot shortage and to enhance upward mobility lor en­listed personnel. Nuclear LDOs could fill a greatly expanded role • manning both afloat and ashore ⁿ clear junior officer billets and ^0 ^ considerably enhance senior enU motivation and performance. Cut. rently, some enlisted personnel d^l ify as engineering watch supervi­sors—the senior enlisted watch- station in a nuclear plant—duru¹® j their first enlistments, and arc >^a j_r with professional stagnation for remaining tours. Many ot these

96

Proceedings

/ .l«n^c

fkn?^{rmers are} choosing not to reen- m i f.^cause °f restricted upward

ali/™^m°^te *^e8'^s*^at'on to institution- _nu ® ^CUrrent financial incentives for nar ^eu“^r °fhcers to ensure pay com- wrabdity vis-a-vis the civilian ^sector.

_be^S_t^e^^ra' additional measures can p_rn^ ^{en t0} improve the long-term si h-p^S10na* climate and career de- a ility of the nuclear Navy, revi-

retenlf ^m°^ra'^{e and} improving

_Co|T^^an8^e ^e selection process for the^f ^8r.^aduates. Remove NR from acc ^{Se ec}t'°ⁿ process, establishing ti_0n^eS|^S!Pⁿ Procedures along tradi- the r '^{neS unt}*^er the cognizance of son ?^mmar|der, Naval Military Per- douh?f Command (NMPC). It is he n ^U' ^l^^{at ora}' interviews would dy ^ecessarY in the revised proce- n_Uc|^S' Actual performance in the the Q ^{lr tra}'ⁿ'ⁿ8 pipeline should be tor j_n^Perat'^ve quality assurance fac- b_ase .^stea(i °f arbitrary prejudgments d_Uc| °u short oral interviews con­i' _F ^eu by civilians at NR.

' ^lni|nate NR concurrence on af­

loat personnel assignments. Reestab­lish NMPC as the sole agency for personnel assignment and distribu­tion within the nuclear Navy. Until NR is removed from the process of determining who is going to be as­signed to each commanding officer, executive officer, or engineer bil­let—even to most operational post­command assignments, including squadron commander—the ultimate allegiance of most ambitious nuclear officers will likely lie with NR in­stead of the Chief of Naval Opera­tions. This unusual relationship has had an extraordinarily demoralizing effect on many nuclear-trained line officers who resent the presence of a technical bureau at the top of their real chain of command.

► Restore ‘‘pride and professional­ism" in the nuclear Navy by using the normal selection board process to rid the fleet of the senior nuclear officers who have consistently squandered assigned personnel as­sets. Send a ‘‘signal to the fleet” by passing over those officers with a history of poor personnel manage­ment and retention.

► Reestablish career patterns out­side the “strictly nuclear path" within the submarine force and sur­face nuclear Navy. Emphasize oper­ational performance, personnel man­agement achievements, and successful shore tours as well as material/engineering assignments as the milestones to flag rank. For ex­ample, most nuclear flag selectees have had either no joint service ex­perience or have been permitted to count their tours at the Department of Energy (Naval Reactors) as the equivalent. Broadened career pat­terns can offer additional incentive to remain in the Navy to those nu­clear officers who are competent en­gineers, but whose greatest talents and interests lie in areas outside strictly propulsion plant matters.

These measures are proposed as a pool of ideas from which various op­tions may be selected for implemen­tation. Some progress has already been made since the beginning of 1982. But additional steps must be taken as soon as possible if we are to man the U. S. nuclear fleet through the 1980s.

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