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Even before the investigating team from the British Ministry of Defence assembled and published its findings on the Falklands, a river of ink had flowed on every aspect of that conflict. The flood shows no sign of abating.
The Falklands has rightly become the military writer’s lodestone. It is the most recent combat in which our principal ally employed a full panoply of modern weapons, some of them ours, in a convulsive tactical environment. Critics should approach the Falklands gingerly, however, because that complex event touched the heart of two disparate cultures’ politics, law, industrial sophistication, military philosophy, and psychology. Combat, though necessary and decisive, was only the tip of the iceberg.
A definitive history of the Falklands War probably awaits the declassification of British documents under the 30-year nondisclosure rule. Yet, much can be learned from this extraordinary episode in terms of the four dynamics of modem warfare: national will, logistics, operational skills, and technology. The study of the interactions among these factors—not analyses of individual engagements or weapon systems—will unlock the door to full comprehension of this unlikely war. Such a logical framework also provides force planners and tactical commanders alike clues to the mysteries of military success and failure. Historians using this method get a skeleton upon which to hang new evidence as it comes to light.
National Will: At war’s outset, in early April 1982, the Thatcher Government committed the United Kingdom and its resources to restore sovereignty over the Falklands. The government’s statements were bold and its intentions were made to seem irrevocable. By 12 April, a British naval blockade of the islands took effect with all that act implied. Simultaneously, a pervasive mobilization ensued in the United Kingdom that involved parliament, the opposition parties, the shipping industry, the media, the public, and the best military forces then in service. Oddly perhaps, in view of Argentina’s initiation of hostilities, no such broad mobilization appears to have occurred there. In retrospect, it seems that Argentina’s leadership possessed the desire to hold the Falklands but not the stubborn will that overcomes all difficulties.
In Britain, political leaders acted and spoke with near unanimity in support of the war. The Socialist opposition personified by Michael Foote was quashed and remained so for the war’s duration. In Argentina, considerable public evidence suggested that bickering among their top leaders had weakened an already rickety mechanism for making national decisions. Unequivocal intent was hard to detect, perhaps because the Argentine diplomatic apparatus failed to reach realistic conclusions about Thatcher’s obduracy. Or—knowing the worst—failed to convince their leaders about British military intentions and capabilities.
Public euphoria over initial Argentine military success proved only skin deep. Now it is almost certain that no national scheme ever existed for mobilizing the country’s assets for general war. By contrast, when Thatcher appeared in parliament dressed in black to announce the Sheffield's sinking, British will stiffened visibly and ubiquitously.
The lack of this vital chemistry in Argentina vitiated all its subsequent efforts to garrison the Falklands effectively, to resupply them, and to bring to bear against the British the high technology weapons that could have beaten them. Absent further evidence, it is probable that the lack of demonstrated fervor for combat at most levels of Argentine society and the stem resolution that permeated virtually all segments of British life foretold the war’s outcome.
Logistics: How could a European nation 8,000 miles from the battle scene evict a numerically superior and well- entrenched foe whose bases lay a sC 400 miles from the fight? Under ern gency regulations, the British G°ve' ment took over enough merchanttonn jra to support a two-carrier task force an ^ division-sized assault force at the en long logistics chain. This effort ceeded brilliantly, and necessari y Had it been interrupted or severely ^ gated, the combat forces would havi- no viable alternative sources of supp no matter how they improvised.
Arguably, the visibility of ®n!a.ter massive logistical effort showed than anything else its resolution to re the Falklands. Almost certainly- chain of support ships assisted meas ^ bly in keeping Argentina’s potent'3 ^ lies out of the fray. Throughout the■ ^ Argentina’s allies published be 1 editorials against British recoloniz ( of the Third World, but proffered conclusive military support. |.
Argentine military intelligence rW ^ culated Britian’s ability to deploy maintain a technologically intensiv ^ vasion force far from home under s^,s weather conditions. Worse, ^r®ejL.;son capability to resupply its own g3 with food, ammunition, and .-ca|ly ments of modern war proved cri inferior to the need. , ^ere.
Two points should be addressed ) First, the need for integrated *°M'on to support grows in geometric propot ^ the distance of the fighting f°rce0f home and to the technological inten j,eer the conflict. Second, aside frorn^
I ONDON TIME
be
M,^ected' tess weP publicized is the
mCy enc*i to seize ground from which aien COldc* not be expelled. Exhausted 20th n<>t missiles, still cap victory in the Bh century.
"'as dp«°ntraSt’ dle Argentine military
fance
Pen
CCp . C4L71111J. Ill IU1I1, UII2>
absorb KJnirHTcctcd each force’s ability to
cadcr h' ^ intent t>y their political size m ** tf’ght be useful to hypothe- their ! .at s°me armed forces—because of
suC|Slty t0 survive, the integrity of re- ,-V J'nks must be the combat corn- pan. 6r S firSt priority- 11 ,he fleet lacks to ^eeP rac^ars running or adequate mn f ° surface-to-air missiles, it * flee or get sunk.
that l>('rat'onat Skills: It is well known Ce . ae British infantry fought magnifi- ex,, Harrier pilots flew beyond
f0uahUst'On; t^le Boyal Navy stayed and . § t at sea longer than could rightfully
1. • --- VII p Ul/liv 1/.V.U 1,1 111^
Planum ,°f,- Defence’s jury-rigging of ^°uth '"at d'd n0t ex'st *or war 'n 'he tniah ^dant‘c> the innovative, some airc panicky’ refitting of British the ^ * W*t*1 'nB>ght refuelling gear, and comeXtemporaneous establishment of a Sys(niand. control, and communication an(] ?T' tkat included the prime minister ThC*osest colleagues. btorth'8 reor‘entati°n from the plains of Past prn ^uropc to the freezing bogs of beca adc*anB was made possible partly iac^:USe °P Mrs. Thatcher’s all-encom-
thoi
SubnT'' . *-AUcei, Kapier, and nuclear Pub|janneS—sto'e tke lion’s share of R0ckC1'y- the war remained a Knute a fnc game of fundamentals, to borrow and t' r* anal°gy- Tke side that blocked •[-, aC| cd hardest in the mud won. e arger point is that the British mili- lcal n an^ S3^e transfer of domestic polit- forei.,OVVer an<l only incidentally to repel in the')nnVaders' h had not seen combat Saw f0 • century. The role each force cty c !tself and the place in which soci- force. 11 exerted major effects upon each s combat ability. In turn, this self- to resJ ant* to use advanced weapons and thejr P°nd in combat to declarations of leari„_C?Untries’ intent by their political
fiever.S racture and place in society—can Matter 'rnportant military roles, no live 0r b°W crushing the political impera- °w many resources are lavished
upon them.
Technology: The naval side of the Falklands was won in a battle that was never fought, the engagement that would have pitted the British fleet equipped with SSNs against the hodge-podge of missile ships that comprised Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya’s foreign-built squadrons. The technological mismatch between the cruiser General Belgrano and the nuclear submarine Conqueror that sank her established the reality of Britain’s naval blockade. This victory secured the ground force’s logistical link, protected it, and gave the task force commander adequate opportunity to complete his military assignment. In fact, the General Belgrano'% defeat signaled the war’s
Despite the praise heaped upon missiles and submarines in the Falklands Conflict, the vital ingredient for victory remained the same as it has been for centuries: brave soldiers.
outcome, if not its duration.
The Falklands experience suggests several lines of inquiry about technology. First, modem war demands not only high-tech equipment, but also a sophisticated industrial society and an extensive logistical system to get sufficient weapons into play when and where needed. Without this backup from their own country, the valiant Argentine pilots acted in vain. Although they sank several warships, they could not overcome the dense technological base from which Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward rebuffed
the French-built Super Etendards and Exocets.
Second, the thesis that poor or unsophisticated nations can buy into modem warfare by way of cheap high-tech weapons may have less validity than previously believed. Perhaps only a few rich nations can afford the support systems and training establishments that high tech requires to win a multi-engagement war of any length or tactical complexity.
Third, the relationship between national will and high technology needs further emphasis. For example, the medium-range Sea Dart surface-to-air missile and the Sea Wolf close-in weapon system proved effective when operated in tandem against Argentine aircraft. When deployed separately, these systems worked markedly less well. Yet, owing to budget restrictions, the mainstay of British maritime air defense, the “Type- 42” destroyer, carried only Sea Dart. Consequently, Admiral Woodward faced the exigency of shielding the landing beaches, lines of supply, and the carriers much of the time with only two Sea Wolf-equipped ships.
The question posed here is: does a low-tech environment exist anywhere in naval warfare now? The proposition can be advanced that without a critical mass of high-technology systems, it is almost suicide to steam into harm’s way anywhere on the world ocean. Clearly, Argentina’s investment in naval forces was as good as no investment at all, at least as far as engaging European naval squadrons was concerned. Similarly, a $25 million buy of additional air-to-surface Exocets would have altered the war’s complexion radically.
There are two lessons here. First, that allocation of resources in the civilian political process can predetermine victory or defeat in a conventional war. Second, high-technology wars are necessarily wars of attrition. Tiny replacement parts, large ships, and people are consumed at extraordinarily high rates. British planners and tactical commanders acted on the realization that a high-technology combat environment demands great logistical depth. Argentine leaders failed to grasp this critical fact.
Of all the Falklands ironies, perhaps the most astringent is that our principal ally fought and won a war without previous planning against a foe, in a place, at a time, and for a prize that no reasonable man could have predicted. Randomness remains war’s cardinal trait and men’s valor is still its principal virtue.
Captain Kenney has served overseas in various assignments and frequently contributes to Proceedings.
Reflections on the Falklands
By Lieutenant J.V.P. Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy
f 3
achieve economies. The purchase 0 ^ new class of ships is spectacular a^ vote-catching; spending money on fuel is not as exciting. , f
The British were sharply reminds ^ the desirability of having armed l0r with a variety of capabilities not neC ^ sarily tailored to one threat. For a ves.'^ which was designed as an antisubm^
comma11 and the
ehted
be
The Royal Navy thus had reas°nattacK grateful for its efficient nuclear ,0l)
submarines and this classical eJP ^ of sea denial. The Veinticinco de .
“Type-42” guided missile destr^ the and other Exocet-armed escorts ?a -ept
Argentine Navy a force of sUbeen strength that the British might hav (0 forced to divert both carrier gt11 . feat deal with the threat, lest they ris' in detail. the
One of the fundamental lessons relearned during the Falklands Conflict was that armed forces are most efficient when they constitute an effective deterrent, not when they are employed to repel aggression. As far as the West is concerned, a military instrument has performed its function if it never has to be used. The toll in lives and the expenditure in national treasure required to resecure the Falkland Islands cost Britain more dearly than would all the canceled Naval Staff projects of the last 20 years had they been brought to fruition.
British strategic doctrine was gravely flawed, not so much in the insistence upon concentrating forces to aid NATO, but in the accompanying sublime confidence that Britain’s remaining colonies and dependencies would be safe. The withdrawal of forces from East of Suez has a precedent in the recall of the few remaining legions to Rome in the early 5th century. But the Romans were more
London deftly avoided second-guessing the tactical decisions of such on-scene commanders as Captain Lyn Middleton, skipper of the Hermes, left, seen conferring with two helicopter crewmen.
brutal and honest with their provinces than the British—the Romans told them to fend for themselves.
In the Falklands Conflict, the British Government acted immediately to restore control over the disputed areas. However, the suspicion remains that under any other prime minister of the last two decades the response would not have been so decisive, even if a military option had been considered. The Argentine expectation of a British demonstration of force as a face-saver, followed by negotiation and tacit acceptance of the fait accompli, might have been correct if the United Kingdom had any other prime minister than Margaret Thatcher.
The British command system’s ability to stand the test of war so well was the result of a variety of factors, not the least of which was good communications. But the most important factor was that political direction remained unambiguous and that the government—and hence the Ministry of Defence—resisted the temptation of interfering on the tactical level. The similarity of Mrs. Thatcher’s small “War Cabinet” to Lloyd George’s in World War 1 and Winston Churchill’s in World War II is significant.
The British had a clear advantage in that the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, with the Royal Marine forces and Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command elements permanently under his direction, had experience in amphibious and joint force operations and the staff qualified to deal with them. In almost any other circumstance, the situation would not have been so clear-cut, and the operation of command so uninhibited. The mishaps which have so often attended the efforts of hastily constituted interservice commands over the last 60 years make the advantages of sound, permanent peacetime systems capable of conducting such missions coherently all the more obvious.
The Falklands Conflict demonstrated the requirement for an efficient reserve along with designated front-line units to be ready in all respects for operational deployment, together with all their support units.
An effective capability for the immediate use of armed forces can only be maintained by giving constant attention to the elements of material, personnel, and logistic readiness—weapons, training, and support. In attempting reductions in their defense budgets, Western governments too often look to these areas to
warfare (ASW) task group ship, with a small fighter force - ^ capacity to carry a commando tor s periods, HMS Invincible also Pr0^e most effective as an attack carrier- ^ losses of escorts and landing ships ^ onstrated that more attention mus ^ devoted to antiair warfare, whatever ^ predicted Soviet threat in the Norn lantic and home waters. ^
The maritime campaign higlmg^ the necessity for balanced forces. ( Argentine Navy failed because, wl ^ antisubmarine forces of adequate caP .n!, ity in weapons, numbers, and trai ^ the small task group based aroUI1i.|c at- Veinticinco de Mayo could not ns tacking British units. . jp
Although conventional submar111 ^ sufficient numbers could have even(s set up a blockade, the fast nuclear^^ were able to proceed to the South tic within days, allowing the Britis ^ emment to take decisive action a^o^. time when it was most necessary- ever, the importance of conventions . marines in blockade operations s not be denied, particularly w*ien,t|1pt can act as minelayers. It is also 1>UL-iae the situation, with weak antisubm forces and deep water close to the ^ tine coast, was almost ideal for 11a, submarines. Nevertheless, diesel -sll^(1g fines must find great difficulty m as. as a sea-denial force against a natl° sessing any measure of a modern capability. The deficiency must be up by surface forces and air assets-
Despite the submarines, howev ^ ,lt. British would not have been ab < tempt to gain control of the waters
Koyar
l -v missed the Furious, which was to
absence, but the Royal Navy
have. —_____________
Project66.0 CVA-Ol. The Furious and her If theC<J s's!ers were canceled in 1966. Wou,dSC„.Carr!crs had existed, Argentina 'fvasi ss,
Combat°md'ned w‘th AEW aircraft and been „ Ulr Patrols (CAPs), would have
'-'1 Cartnkl. o . ..
The pab-e °* dealing w*th any raids. Ianqjn ™isl1 conventional takeoff and rg ;CTOL) carriers have gone, but •”rnisqUlrernent remains for AEW plat- ttient (CaPabte of round-the-clock deploy- riecd f0m sb'Ps like the Invincible. The take0ff°r AEW in small vertical/short ’Panyth'<nd 'and'n§ (V/STOL) carriers is, digger mg’ more ur8ent than that of their ''iriali Slsters because of the relatively 9nd (. UlT|ber of fighter aircraft carried, s°UrcesC, ,resuhant husbanding of re- dojj, ’ btasty work in the United King° feed a radar system adapted for
!!^ands if ‘heir fleet had not in- of frj tae tWo carriers and large numbers in„ ®ates and destroyers, the latter prov- work emselves’ as ever, maids of all
teinf6 Carriers- together with the aircraft Uc Corcements from the modified Atlan- hcienTf6^0^ Proved themselves just suf- Was , or the task. The carriers’ value comrsidered to he such that the fleet farthelander WaS forced to keep his ships was r/° the east of the Falklands than air „ erwise desirable when providing
M ^ for.the invasion-
®r't‘sh pundits mourned the Ark
s Pr°bably not have attempted an class' °n Also’ the presence of two of the lOO ai^arry'n® between them more than tVaminCralt w'’h adequate airborne early likely u- assets, would most
t° Am UVe Preventcd the loss of any ship (AAWrUlnC a'rcratt- The antiair warfare Ployed escorts eould have been de- S°Und ’ l 01 in the approaches to Falkland »- • ’ but t0 ‘he west of the Falklands,
ned i patro le of
/nding^Tn,?
the rB„„. UL) earners have gone, the Sea King helicopter, carried in an ungainly dome lashed to the starboard fuselage . . . probably only a stop-gap measure.
The V/STOL carriers’ faults should not blind observers to their virtues. The carriers provided sufficient aircraft to protect the fleet’s high-value units and to attack Argentine land positions. Short of a full-scale CTOL carrier, ships like the Invincible and Hermes remain the decisive elements in above-water warfare. Forces which contain V/STOL carriers have enormous offensive and defensive advantages over those which possess no carriers at all. These advantages, provided only that the carrier supports an air group of sufficient size to sustain fighter protection and attack operations—between eight and 12 aircraft not including helicopters—cannot be underestimated.
The British fleet was a potent instrument of war, but it would have been more effective if close-in weapon systems had been fitted more generally. The Sea Wolf missile system was carried in only two ships of the first groups to move south. That it was not mounted in more ships was as much a result of the economies effected by a succession of governments as by any difficulties with development. Furthermore, although chaff is carried throughout the Royal Navy, apparently it was not fitted to any of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary or merchant units in the fleet train, despite being purely a defensive system.
The virtues of simple, lightweight, manually directed systems will have to be reconsidered. By 1945, the Allied navies, which had initially met the kamikaze threat by installing vast numbers of 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons on every upper deck space available, were turning more toward having larger weapons with more directors. In the U. S. Navy, this
The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Spartan—with four other SSNs and SSs—bottled up the Argentine Navy and demonstrated that, without adequate 4.S VT assets, a fleet is useless in modern warfare.
conception climaxed in the Worcester- class light cruisers and Des Moines-class heavy cruisers, with three-inch secondary armament. The Royal Navy followed suit with the Tiger class, and France completed the De Grasse and Colbert carrying 57-mm. weapons.
But the steady reduction in numbers of guns in favor of more sophisticated systems may have gone too far, particularly in view of both the cost and the top weight involved in the latter. For example, the “Type-42s” are being fitted with two twin 30-mm. and two single 20-mm. systems which, while unlikely to be as effective as Phalanx or Sea Wolf, at least provide a better defense than nothing at all, and at a relatively low cost.
With regard to the Argentines, their belated discovery of the inefficiency of their bombs in the low-level antishipping role should have come as a reminder of the necessity for constant testing of weapons under all conditions. World War 1 British gunnery officers must find a grim satisfaction in this parallel to the failure of the Royal Navy’s heavy shell at the Battle of Jutland.
1 foe,
eed,I'Rs / Junt, 1983
The training and morale of all the British personnel involved were of the highest standard because prior to this they had conducted regular exercises in conditions as closely approaching those of war as possible. It was on the ground where the differences between the British and Argentine units were most apparent. The Argentines had a cause which might have
In the wake of the Falklands War, HMS Illustrious brandishes close-in weapon systems and AEW radome- equipped helicopters. Two British V/STOL carriers—showing great mission flexibility—played a decisive role in the South Atlantic conflict.
been able to galvanize the soldiers had they both adequate leadership and any belief in their own capabilities against the British.
There were other examples of the advantage of thorough, realistic training. The British Sea Harrier pilots demonstrated considerable adaptability in adjusting their tactics to the vastly improved capabilities of the hastily fitted AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles. Similarly, the RAF pilots in their GR-3 Harriers were trained for carrier operations within a matter of days.
Resupplying the British forces at more than 8,000 miles was an enormous effort which put a great strain upon the RAF as well as on shipping. But it could not even have been begun had there not existed the stocks of ammunition and parts available to equip the original forces and replenish them after engagements. The Falklands Conflict showed that governments cannot rely upon having sufficient warning time before the appearance of a threat to be able to build up their war stocks of ammunition and spares. The number of missiles and shells British units fired during the first few days of battle is not known, but they must have constituted a considerable proportion of the ships’ outfits and probably more than the fleet train could provide within the time span.
The need for adequate reserve forces continues. The British substituted ships from the stand-by squadron, principally elderly Tribal- and Rothesay-class frigates, for some of those ships which had been withdrawn from their NATO commitments for use in the South Atlantic. While these units could not be described as first line, their preservation in an ade-
y Dr. Robert L. Scheina Photographs courtesy of the Third Attack Squadron
jj^Argentine Navy’s Third Attack Squadron
tack'd I* May> Argentine aircraft at- Navy’s Third Attack Squadron. This
In th IancI'ng at San Carlos. squadron flew eight aging A-4Q Skye vanguard of these attacks was the hawks, variant of the A-4B. During the
fighting the squadron sank the Ardent, possibly the Antelope, and damaged other enemy ships.
The A-4Qs flew from the carrier 25 De Mayo during the recapture of the Malvinas in April and the unsuccessful attempt to engage the British fleet in early May. During that time, the Skyhawks flew combat air patrol for the carrier task force, scrambling on nine occasions to confront unidentified targets—none of which proved to be the enemy. On 2 May, the Skyhawks (laden with 500- pound bombs) lined the deck of the carrier awaiting the order that never came to launch against the enemy. The lack of wind combined with the inability of the 25 De Mayo to close the enemy frustrated the desired attack.
Once the carrier returned to coastal waters to await a favorable opportunity which never came, the navy’s Skyhawks moved to Rio Grande on 9 May from which they operated throughout the war.
Flying from the mainland to the islands, attacks were carried out at the extreme range of the A-4Q even with drop tanks. Therefore, the aircraft did not have the potential to engage in air-to-air combat. They barely had enough time to drop their bombs and get out. Three A-4Qs were lost on 21 May in the first wave to attack San Carlos. This attack is recreated on the cover of the May Proceedings. Lieutenant (junior grade) Marques, flying 3-A-314, lost his life. The other two pilots shot down. Lieutenant Commander Philippi and Lieutenant Area, were rescued by Argentine forces. (See Philippi’s letter, pp. 111-113 May issue.) Two days later. Lieutenant Commander Zubizarreta was killed when he crash-landed at Rio Grande—the durable A-4Q survived.
From mid-April to the close of the war. the eight A-4s of the Third Attack Squadron flew more than 30 sorties. Three aircraft and two pilots were lost during the operation.
The Argentine Navy's French-built Etendard aircraft, firing their Exocet air-to-surface missiles from long ranges, scored many hits on British targets and with the press. But the Argentine Navy's A-4Q Skyhawks, pictured here flying over the naval air base at Ushuaia at the southern tip of Argentina, carried the fight to the British at mast-high ranges.
Contrary to many reports, the Argentine carrier 25 De Mayo sought out the British fleet. Although aircraft, weapons, and crew were poised for such an attack, very light winds hampered Argentine carrier operations. Following the decision to have the carrier return to port, the navy’s Skyhawks flew to land bases to launch attacks against the British. Following the 21 May attack on San Carlos, most naval Skyhawks exchanged their light gray paint jobs for camouflaged
i
i
■ * i
i
Argentine Navy and Air Force A~4s made repeated attacks on the British in San Carlos. The A-4s sank the Ardent, on fire above, and the Antelope. The naval Skyhawk pilots had their pictures taken at Rio Grande, a day before their fierce attacks on San Carlos: (standing left to right) Lt. (j.g.) Marques, Lt. (j.g.) Lecour, Lt. Oliveira, Lt. Cdr. Zubizarreta, Lt. Cdr. Philippi, Lt. Cdr. Fox, Lt. Rotolo, Lt. Benitez, (kneeling, left to right) Ens. Medici, Lt. Sylvester, Lt. Area, Lt. (j.g.) Olmedo. Although the navy lost three of its eight Skyhawks, it is rebuilding some and looking for replacement aircraft.
107
The Falklands and the Long Haul
By The Honorable Neville Trotter, Member of Parliament
who
Commodore Michael Clapp,
effect a divisional headquarters
itual
When the decision was made in 1966 by a Labour Government to scrap the British attack carrier force and concentrate defense resources on NATO, it was said that never again would Britain operate alone or without land-based air cover or from support facilities. Yet, it was just this task which the fleet faced one year ago. It took several weeks for the ships to reach the operating area, and the nearest available airfield was nearly 4,000 miles away at Ascension Island. While it is generally recognized that the Falklands are a long way from the United Kingdom, the distance can perhaps be best put in perspective by mentioning that both Tokyo and Singapore are nearer to London than is Port Stanley. Despite the immense problems caused by operating so far from base, the logistics of the expedition were a major success story.
The initial land force which sailed within four days of the Argentine invasion consisted principally of 3 Commando Brigade, which was used to operating on its own away from the United Kingdom and practiced in taking with it all its necessary stores. The brigade kept loaded and ready to sail a war reserve capable of sustaining them for several weeks. Its logistic regiment was to provide the nucleus for the ashore support of the whole force.
The British Army has, for many years, maintained a “spearhead” battalion ready to move overseas on very short notice. This duty is undertaken in turn by each of the U.K.-based battalions. It was coincidental that, at the time of the invasion, the spearhead happened to consist of a battalion of the Parachute Regiment, while preparing for the duty was another battalion of “paras.” Both these units went south in the first wave with the commandos, and because of their allocation to spearhead duty, their equipment and stores were already loaded on pallets at their depots.
Although 5 Infantry Brigade, which later joined Task Force-317, was earmarked for operations outside NATO, it was not as self-contained as the Royal Marines, and in particular, did not have its own logistic regiment. This deficiency is now being corrected for the future as a result of the Falklands campaign.
The whole operation benefited from the experienced logistics organization which exists in the United Kingdom. Not only do the Royal Marines go to the Arctic in Norway annually, but forces up to brigade strength also exercise regularly in Denmark, while annual exercises practice the large-scale movement of men and stores to West Germany. The people concerned in the logistics organizations knew what they were doing and were amazingly speedy in getting things going, although no long-distance exercise on this scale had taken place since 1970 when, after a year of planning, 20,000 men were moved by sea and air to Malaysia. For the Falklands campaign, no preconceived plan was available. One of those engaged in the planning process said that perhaps this was just as well, for if such a plan had been called for as a peacetime exercise, it could well have been considered impossible.
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse established a logistic support cell at his headquarters at Northwood. This was a triservice organization headed by the tore logistic coordinator whose task was <j coordinate replenishment planning an all logistic requirements for the ta force. It proved a great asset and a mos successful management tool.
commanded the amphibious landing a San Carlos, also controlled the force o gistics throughout. He flew his flag in 1 ^ assault ship Fearless, which played ' vital role in the whole operation, remain ing the land force headquarters throug
out the fighting. The Fearless became •
as tne numbers ashore built up to an even ■ figure of 9,600 men. Her 36 radio circm dealt with up to 3,500 signals a day- A particular feature of the opera1'1’ was the role played by the ships of Merchant Navy and the outstanding operation between them and the R°a Navy. A new acronym came into u STUFT—ships taken up from trade- Some of these ships were chartered, others were requisitioned—the in applying where the owners would ot wise have been liable for nonperfo ance of their normal voyages.
BOYAL
STUFT ships were stuffed with military supplies to support British forces in the Falklands. Here, a trawler transfers supplies to a “County”-class guided missile destroyer at South Georgia.
1983
With only ten miles of road available for transport, the British logistics chain depended on limited helicopter support, and the backs of British soldiers. The Royal Marines referred to their newfound sport of hauling loads up to 120 pounds as “Yomping.”
niove
tak*16 t*1C S*1'PS were notified of the tinC0Ver on the same day as the Argen- l 6 mvasion. There was tremendous trust an(jWcen the owners and the government, un hnancial terms were not agreed P°n until the fighting was over. The ^nipaign clearly showed the need for aver<|hant sh'Ps ar|d their crews to be th31 able in an emergency. Without Plac*' t*1C °Perat'on could not have taken
The Canberra shortly
'-day world i
a ,c°mrnandos two days later, converted fQ Quipped with two helicopter plat- hns. The non-union Pakistanis nor- bj* I'' Worhing in her engine room had to anded and were then replaced by j *?n members from Cardiff, who were as aCt ^ernen's! She found herself used a(an assault ship in the original landing can Carlos, and a new nomenclature lux'10 *nt° being: LSLL or landing ship lj0UrY liner. The Queen Elizabeth II, a Wever, was regarded as too prestigious gad^et’ 3nC* merr,hers of 5 Infantry Bri- QeC’ having been carried on her to South °rgia, were transferred there to other 'Ps for the voyage to San Carlos.
Was ^0rtb Sea oil field support vessel p S Used to provide maintenance and re- 0u|rs' Much of the work had to be carried m very rough seas, and the achieve- Wan s were outstanding. Improvisation
to he
at times required—e.g., spoons had
used to weld stainless steel on the
estroyer Glamorgan
imaged
when she was by a shore-launched Exocet.
Sh
and rjtUrneclt0 duty as did the six frigates he
Th> destr°yers damaged in air attacks. Whu ^nv‘nc‘ble remained operational gas 'Kr en8'ne room staff replaced a divturbine, and on the frigate Avenger e ers changed a propeller at sea. The ^gtneers on the elderly Hermes had to s. Y out a full boiler cleaning while on '°n in bad weather.
Almost the whole of the civilian- manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) sailed south, and they transferred stores, ammunition, and fuel to the fleet on some 1,200 occasions. The tanker Olmeda refuelled the two carriers and their escort group 93 times in May, being topped up herself five times in that period, during which she supplied 30,000 tons of fuel and oil.
One unusual feature was the small number of vehicles taken south. Two brigades would normally seek to take with them some 3,000 vehicles, but only 300 were dispatched to the Falklands. For, with only ten miles of roads in the whole of the islands, logistics were to depend on helicopters and, in no small measure, on how much the individual soldier could carry on his back. Indeed, the marines’ phrase “yomping” (used to describe carrying mule-sized loads of up to 120 pounds over the island) introduced a new word into the national vocabulary.
The helicopter lift available to support the advance was limited by a number of factors. Many squadrons were committed to providing constant ASW patrols to
counter the threat posed by the Argentine submarines. Much effort went into flying stores between ships and to the shore. Nine helicopters were lost when the Atlantic Conveyor was hit. Only a few could operate over land in the dark, and there were 15 hours of darkness a day. Flights were frequently affected by the severity of the weather. Despite depending on afloat support and maintenance, however, reliability remained high.
So much specialized equipment is now mounted on vehicles that those taken had to include workshops and command vehicles needed for their contents rather than their mobility, and they were deployed around the island by sea. Even the versatile Landrover was unsuited to the wild trackless terrain, and only the Scorpion and Scimitar light tanks and the Snowcats of the Royal Marines had freedom of movement.
For most of the marines and paras, it meant a difficult march with heavy loads in appalling weather from San Carlos to Stanley, some units covering 85 miles. Bogs, creeks, and great stone runs of boulders had to be crossed, while the
presence. The airstrip normally pi-0' supplies only to the U. S. civilians
vides
man'
Vulcan flight to the Falklands invo being airborne for 16 hours and ret, the use of ten tanker aircraft w * ’ among them, had to make 18 so . Much of the tanker support was ProfvlCi for the Nimrod maritime patrol *°r.e which mounted frequent sorties into South Atlantic, on flights sometimes * ing more than 18 hours, double their pability, before in-flight refueling * so speedily introduced. The tanker
Warships like the Glamorgan (left) and Broadsword (center) needed— and soon got—STUFT support in the front lines: witness the Stena Sea- spread and Contender Bezant in Falkland Sound.
tufted grass twisted knees and ankles. It was almost mid-winter; rain and snowstorms were driven horizontally by high winds with sub-zero temperatures.
Criticisms of the slow speed of the land operations are hardly justified. The land advance was dictated by the logistics problems rather than the Argentine defenses. With no facilities at San Carlos, it is hardly surprising that it took five days to build up the base before the breakout could begin. The 5 Infantry Brigade in the second echelon did not arrive at San Carlos until ten days after the original landing and then had to be taken forward.
Nobody knew how long the operation would take, so supplies for three months were dispatched. Because store ships took between three and four weeks to arrive off the Falklands, it was necessary to keep the logistics pipeline flowing by sending a growing number of ships. By the end of the campaign on 14 June, nearly 700,000 tons of fuel had been dispatched, while civilian shipping had carried south some 100,000 tons of freight. The supply depots had dispatched one million operational ration packs and 12 million normal meals. Apart from the vast quantities of essential stores sent south, it was possible to fit in items donated to the task force, including crates of New Zealand whiskey, a considerable quantity of specially brewed beer, and even strawberries and cream.
The only critical shortage in the campaign proved to be tents, because the bulk stock of them was lost when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk. The loss on this ship of all but one of the Chinook heavy lift helicopters prevented units of 5 Infantry
Brigade being airlifted forward, and the heaviest casualties occurred on 8 June when an RFA landing ship carrying the Welsh Guards forward was destroyed by bombs with 50 killed.
The captains of the two carriers reported that at no time were their ships short of anything, and none of their Harriers was grounded for lack of spare parts. The Hermes returned home after 108 days at sea with the crew still eating steak. The Invincible, returning later, remained at sea for 166 days.
Apart from the task force, there were 11,400 Argentine prisoners to be fed. While the Geneva Convention provides for prisoners receiving pocket money, it was not surprising that there was a lack of facilities to spend it, although some, fortunate enough to return home in the Canberra, were able to spend their pounds on sweets in the ship’s shop.
From the earliest stages, it was realized that there would be a vast ongoing problem in providing accommodations for the forces in a community whose capital normally hosted a population of a little more than 800 people. A town of new huts to shelter 3,000 men was sent south and provisions were made for part of the garrison to be accommodated afloat. After the recapture of the islands, high priority had to be given to lengthening the runway so that C-130s could establish a service from Ascension Island. This alone required the transportation by sea of 6,000 tons of materials and 5,000 tons of engineering plants and stores, together with nearly 1,000 members of the Royal Engineers.
A major problem in the logistics support was the transfer of stores from bulk afloat to the shore, bearing in mind that there were no port facilities at San Carlos, which remained the logistics base until Port Stanley was freed. In the first five days after the landing, despite the very determined Argentine air attacks, 12,000 tons of stores were put ashore
without loss. Ultimately, 30,000 t(jn were landed there. Even with Stan ^ recaptured, hardly any facilities w available at the port which normally only an occasional small cargo ship * was now faced with a merchant fleet n mally requiring the facilities of a naaj harbor. It was thus necessary for the tas force to take with it all its own port faC1^ ties in terms of moorings, lighters, other requirements. jn
Ascension Island proved invaluab c the campaign. The island has no natl inhabitants and had no British naima ning a tracking station. A Royal NJ ^ captain was immediately dispatche take command, and a major base ^_ soon established. Royal Air Force (R ^ involvement rapidly mounted anu RAF group captain later took over ^ command. More than 5,000 person ^ and 6,000 tons of stores were flown in ^ this forward base, mostly to join the ta force by helicopter. The RAF moun 600 cargo flights from the United dom and, including helicopters, were 400 air movements a day at wba normally one of the world’s quietest fields.
There were up to 17 RAF Victor tan ^ ers based at Ascension, and they P*ay ^ vital role in supporting the flights to south. Of the hundreds of sorties. 0 six were aborted for technical reaS|',ar) One of these occasions led to a vt bomber having to land in Brazil- ^ ^
- ’ ;d
as au8nicnted by hastily converted Vul- and C-130s and some Victors rap- y worked up to provide a long-range 0 Hgraphic and radar reconnaissance CaPability
Jhe bulk of the Royal Navy’s Harrier erce sailed on the two carriers with oth- unt'?rr'V*n® °n the c'v'**an a*rcraft ferries f * ^ Sea Harriers were available. A er 14 RAF Harrier GR.3s supple- ti^ntec^ the force, being fitted for the first aj e Sidewinders. Some of the RAF ** also went south on the ferries, but Wh SfCC^ their arr'val others flew the ref° ?• ^'stance with frequent in-flight cUe lng’ only calling at Ascension. Any atncern felt by RAF pilots about landing Sea for the first time must have been fjn |C ^an made up for by their relief at the ^ carr*ers at aH in the wastes of 4 q ')uth Atlantic after a flight of nearly ]’ miles. No aircraft of any sort was
Louring any of the long flights. n‘he RAF's c-130s carried out 44 S ts to the South Atlantic to drop stores
to the task force. One individual was also dropped to replace the commanding officer of 2 Battalion, Parachute Regiment, who was killed at the head of an attack at Goose Green. Plucked from his desk in Whitehall, after flying via Ascension, he dropped into a stormy ocean to be picked up in the middle of the night by a frigate and taken to his battalion. These flights to the south required two crews to be on board and being airborne for up to 28 hours and ten minutes, establishing a world endurance record for the Hercules, which had also to be fitted for in-flight refueling for the task.
The logistic support mounted by the helicopters ashore was invaluable, in particular being the only way of moving the artillery and ammunition. The one RAF Chinook to survive the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, despite accidentally landing in the water at the start of its operations, made an outstanding contribution. It carried up to 81 passengers instead of its normal 42. On other occasions, the
Chinook carried in one load three 105mm. field guns, 22 gunners, and their ammunition. In the last stages of the campaign in preparation for the attack on the defenses outside Port Stanley, the 30 field guns fired nearly 16,000 shells. To anybody who has visited this quiet settlement, the firing of 20 shells per inhabitant into the hills outside the town must bring home the almost unreal nature of the whole campaign. By the time of the surrender, some of the field guns were down to only six rounds of ready ammunition. But, as one staff officer put it, there were enough shells in the pipeline to blow up the whole island.
The logistic skills of the British proved to be an essential part of the campaign.
A Conservative Member of Parliament since 1974, Mr. Trotter specializes in defense and maritime matters. He is an accountant by profession and served as a Royal Air Force officer, 1955-58. He went to the Falkland Islands in 1980, spending ten days in company with the Argentine Navy.
British Style
By A- D. Baker III
the^rf ®r’t'sh use of merchant ships in lreat a^an^ Islands Conflict has been sati C<* 3S a remarkable case of improvi- VvJ°m H°w applicable the situation in •98? ®r'ta'n found itself in late April Worth W°U^ he to the United States is hay stU(Jying: Would the U. S. Navy a p6,10 scramble so furiously to assemble g,S(Cel to provide the necessary afloat lo- ms support for such an undertaking? e British acronym “STUFT” (ships eha n ^rom tra(le) applies to 59 mer- Plov11 S*1'*3S anc* fishing trawlers em- Isla^t British during the Falkland
n°tab|S <“or|d>ct. Some of these ships— Hev ^ *°ur Scandinavian tankers— IslelP 'he waters around the British the r^ers’ however, participated in Co» , '^hting. Only one—the Atlantic perpef’or—was lost, but many others ent PnTle(i nobly in the midst of persist- the h r®ent'ne air raids or in the face of ostile South Atlantic climate.
Who tBese ships, five were trawlers NaySe crews were replaced by Royal 'nto h erS°nne*’ they were commissioned s^eg6 R°yal Navy and used as mine- refe ^£rs anc* "despatch vessels,” a term gent?"^ t0 use in local ferrying of ur- s0t) ^ needed supplies, spares, and per- ter ,e ' "fhe other 54 ships were adminis- (I^PA hy the Royal Fleet Auxiliary N[av }' Britain’s equivalent to the U. S. CMSC) M'litary Sealift Command
On 4 April, an Order-in-Council signed by Queen Elizabeth authorized the Department of Trade to requisition any British-flag ship and her contents, regardless of her location or actual country of ownership. In practice, it proved necessary to requisition only 26 of the ships; sluggish Western economies had produced a glut of merchant hulls in Europe. None of the 24 tankers required for the South Atlantic operations had to be requisitioned. Actually, more tankers were acquired than were needed, and by 20 May, nine had been returned to their original owners.
The requisitioned ships included the five trawlers, all of the liners and roll- on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) cargo ships—except the chartered Atlantic Conveyor, which had been laid up for about a year, and the small Contender Bezant—three salvage tugs, two North Sea oilfield support ships employed as emergency repair vessels, and several of the cargo ships. Often ships had to be requisitioned in order to relieve the owners of legal obligations to parties who had chartered the vessels.
The only pure containership acquired—and she was requisitioned well along into the conflict—was the self-sustaining Astronomer, which was used to ferry helicopters and to act as a helicopter maintenance depot. Containerized cargo was not usable for the simple reason that there are no pier cargo-handling facilities at either Ascension or Port Stanley. Every one of the 9,000-odd men and roughly 30,000 tons of material which came ashore in the Falklands during the conflict arrived in or was slung beneath a helicopter—or in the open well of one of the small number of landing craft present.
Compensation for shipowners was the same, regardless of whether the ship was requisitioned or chartered, and was based on Britain’s “Compensation (Defence) Act of 1939.” Owners were to be paid a “reasonable sum” for loss of use at bareboat charter rates plus the expense of running the ship (including insurance and maintenance) and the expense of damage repairs, or full current value if the ship were to be lost. In addition, inconvenienced third parties were to be paid off, and foreseeable losses to the owner for losing the ship for up to six months were to be paid. This latter point caused some difficulty. Some owners claimed compensation based on loss of expected business from customers who would—it was said—no longer use their ships because of the uncertainty of whether British ships would be available to meet commitments in times of crisis.
The rates paid were well ahead of the prevailing figures in Europe: $11.50 for the larger tankers per deadweight ton per month (about 40% above the market rate); $14.00 per ton per month for smaller tankers, which were considered ideal as possible replenishment assets. By mid-May, the British Government was paying about $10 million per month for tanker service in support of the Falklands Conflict.
Compensating Cunard for the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor caused some problems and raised the issue of insurance in such situations. The insured value of the ship was about $7.7 million—but the replacement cost for the ten-year-old Ro-Ro is nearly ten times that amount. Cunard initially appeared to be favoring a South Korean shipyard contract, but pressure from British shipyard worker unions caused the replacement vessel to be ordered in England—with the government picking up the $25 million added cost.
Crew costs for the merchant ships were also significant. Civilian crew members were paid a bonus of 150% above their regular wages for any service south of 7° below the equator and west of 0° longitude. Of course, there were injury and death benefits to be paid as well. Royal Fleet Auxiliary personnel, as employees of the government, received the same bonus, but only when within 200 miles of the Falklands or South Georgia. Since RFA personnel were present on nearly all the STUFT ships for liaison and communications purposes, inevitable morale problems arose over pay differentials.
While foreign crew members were re placed by eager British seamen in the merchant ships, foreign crew members remained in the Royal Fleet auxiliaries which participated in the operation.
Ships Taken Up From Trade During the Falkland Islands War.
(Note: “H” in Use column indicates equipped with helicopter pad)
Gross Registered (GRT) or Deadweight
Name |
| R/C* Type | Use | Tonnage (DWT) | Owner |
Astronomer | R | Container Ship | Aircraft transport & repair (H) | 27,867 GRT | Charente |
Atlantic Conveyor | R | Ro-Ro/Container | Aircraft transport & supplies (H) | 14,946 GRT | Cunard |
Atlantic Causeway | C | Ro-Ro/Container | Aircraft transport & supplies (H) | 14,946 GRT | Cunard Sea Containers, Ltd- |
Contender Bezant | c | Ro-Ro/Container | Aircraft transport, vehicles & supplies (H) | 11,445 GRT | |
Canberra | R | Cruise Liner | Troopship (H) | 44,807 GRT | P&O |
Queen Elizabeth II | R | Cruise Liner | Troopship (H) | 67,140 GRT | Cunard |
Uganda | R | Cruise Liner | Hospital ship (H) | 16,907 GRT | P&O |
Baltic Ferry | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Troops, stores, ammo (H) | 6,455 GRT | Stena Cargo |
Elk | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Heavy vehicles, ammo, helicopters (H) | 5,463 GRT | P&O |
Europic Ferry | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Helos, vehicles, ammo, fuel (H) | 4,190 GRT | Townsend T horesen |
Nordic Ferry | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Troops, stores, ammo (H) | 6,455 GRT | Stena Cargo |
Norland | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Troops (H) | 12,988 GRT | P&O /N] 7 Union Steamship O'"- |
Rangatira | C | Ro-Ro Ferry | Engineers, vehicles, equipment (H) | 9,387 GRT | |
St. Edmund | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Troops, vehicles (H) | 8,987 GRT | Sealink |
Tor Caledonia | R | Ro-Ro Ferry | Vehicles, equipment (H) | 5,056 GRT | Whitwell & Co. |
Avelona Star | R | Freighter | Provisions (H) | 9,784 GRT | Blue Star |
Laertes | R | Freighter | General supplies | 11,804 GRT | China Steam Nav. |
Lycaon | C | Freighter | Ammunition, supplies | 11,804 GRT | China Steam Nav. |
Strathewe | ? | Freighter | Supplies, landing craft | 12,598 GRT | P&O |
Geestport | c | Refrig, cargo | Provisions, stores (H) | 7,730 GRT | Geestline |
Saxonia | c | Refrig, cargo | Provisions | 8,547 GRT | Cunard |
Alvega | c | Tanker | Base storage tanker | 57,372 DWT | Silver Line n Ocean Transport/P&u |
Anco Charger | c | Tanker (special) | Auxiliary support tanker | 24,500 DWT | |
Balder London | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 33,751 DWT | Augustsson |
British Avon | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 25,620 DWT | BP |
British Dart | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 28,488 DWT | BP |
British Esk | c | Tanker | Convoy escort oiler | 25,905 DWT | BP |
British Fern** | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 25,905 DWT | BP |
British Ivy** | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 20,977 DWT | BP |
British Tamar | c | Tanker | Convoy escort oiler | 25,498 DWT | BP |
British Tay | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 25,650 DWT | BP |
British Test | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 25,641 DWT | BP |
British Trent | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 25,147 DWT | BP |
British Wye | c | Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 25,197 DWT | BP c ner |
Corona** | c | Chemical tanker | Tanker (UK waters) | 7,960 DWT | Backman & Sonn (Swedish Flag) |
Cortina** | c | Chemical tanker | Tanker (UK waters) | 10,700 DWT | Backman & Sonnet (Swedish Flag) |
Modifications were necessary for a ships which deployed to the South Atlan tic and were carried out with amazing speed and skill. The more complic^ conversions—the large containers *P conversions for helicopter and Harrie transports and work on several cross channel ferries—were carried out at t Royal Navy dockyards at Portsmout • Gibraltar, and Devonport. The Gibra t dockyard turned the Uganda into a hosp1 tal ship in seven days.
ted
fuel
ln8 equipment.
CQ ae 19 ships intended to operate heli- Pters received more extensive modifi- 4 K)ns. Plans for each installation were
Typical modifications to nearly all the s ‘Ps involved adding replenishment-at- S^a equipment reinforced to take 16-ton esses, additional communications gear deluding military high-frequency sets an MariSat terminals) and, where eeded, fresh water evaporators, and •pXtra diesel fuel and fresh water tankage. (W° °f the British Petroleum-owned pikers, which had recently been charred for underway replenishment (Un foe^ duties in a NATO exercise, were fit- ,out with over-the-stem underway re
prepared by the Admiralty Ship Design office at Bath. The helicopter decks were then prefabricated (even to the extent of painting on the helicopter landing spots), and the improvised decks were then quickly installed in the shipyards. Vosper Thomycroft, which modified the Canberra and Queen Elizabeth II, even sent a team of volunteer workers with the Canberra as far as Freetown to finish a second helicopter deck while she was en route to the South Atlantic.
Modifications to containerships to transport aircraft grew more elaborate, yet the work continued at a rapid pace. Where the Atlantic Conveyor had rows of standard 40-foot containers stacked three high along the sides of her upper deck to act as windbreaks for the helicopters and Harriers parked there, the Contender Bezant had the containers stacked two- high and then roofed over with a light, portable structure to form a hangar 48 feet wide by 17 feet high running roughly half the length of her upper deck aft. Incorporated in the hangar wall were several standard liquid cargo container cells to act as fuel tanks. The Atlantic Causeway and Astronomer had similar hangars near their bows.
Gross Registered
fame | R/C* Type | Use | (CRT) or Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) | Owner |
Eburna pSs° Fawley** danger** | C Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 31,374 DWT | Shell |
C Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 18,377 DWT | Esso | |
C Tanker | Tanker (UK waters) | 37,797 DWT | Westfall-Larsen | |
P(°n Toronto ■ 3- Walker** Ulninetta** °n°nman** tt!i^ Eagle Hga Polaris** | C Tanker | Water tanker | 25,498 DWT | (Norwegian Flag) Canadian Pacific |
C Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 30,607 DWT | Canadian Pacific | |
C Tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 14,951 DWT | Cunard | |
C Chemical tanker | Auxiliary support tanker | 9,176 DWT | Rowbotham Tankships | |
C Tanker | Base storage tanker | 54,490 DWT | Kingline | |
C Tanker | Tanker (UK waters) | 8,200 DWT | Johannsen (Swedish) |
British Ships Taken Up From Trade During the Falklands Conflict
Gross Registered
!ris Br‘tish En,erprise Hi | R/C* Type | Use | (GRT) or Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) | Owner |
R Cable ship | “Despatch vessel” (H) | 3,873 GRT | British Telecom | |
R Oilfield support | “Despatch vessel’’/diving | 1,500 GRT | British United | |
Stena lnspector Wi'.!a Sec,sPrcad Irish’^ SeQhorse lshrrian yalyeman Iceman c Helena 0rdella*** arnella*** Junella*** °rthella*** "icr*** |
|
|
| Enterprise |
C Oilfield support R Oilfield support R Oilfield support R Salvage tug R Salvage tug R Salvage tug C Passenger/cargo R Stern trawler R Stern trawler R Stern trawler R Stem trawler R Stem trawler | Repair/diving support (H) Repair/diving support (H) Mooring tender/tug Salvage tug Salvage tug Salvage tug Mine countermeasures support (H) Minesweeper/“Despatch vessel” Minesweeper/“Despatch vessel” Minesweeper/’‘Despatch vessel” Minesweeper/“Despatch vessel” Minesweeper/“Despatch vessel” | 9,000 GRT 6,061 GRT 1,599 GRT 686 GRT 11,598 GRT 686 GRT 3,150 GRT 1.238 GRT 1,207 GRT 1,615 GRT 1.238 GRT 1,478 GRT | Stena Stena Wimpey Marine United Towing Co. United Towing Co. United Towing Co. Cumow Shipping J. Marr Ltd. J. Marr Ltd. J. Marr Ltd. J. Marr Ltd. British United Trawlers |
*R •
*''Conufliss°nCt* °r c*1artercc* ‘‘Returned to owners between 16 and 20 May and not listed in the Falkland Islands Campaign White Paper.
0 JeliVcr prc'™eJ as Royal Navy ships with Royal Navy crews. Note: Although not listed as official ''STUFF' ships. Ocean Fleet's Myrmydon and Sapele were used a rtcated huts and stores, and Cedarbank carried a cargo of airfield matting; they, and a number of the STUFT units, arrived post-conflict.
113
Many ships made use of commercial “Portakabin” portable structures to increase their accommodations for personnel; these even incorporated such “luxu-
This page: The containerships Contender Bezant and Astronomer were modified to transport and support aircraft; Uganda was converted to a hospital ship at Gilbraltar. Opposite page: the luxury liner-turned-troopship Canberra underwent ten aerial attacks without being hit; St. Helena was one of the few STUFT to be armed; Baltic Ferry, shown off the East Falklands, had her vehicle deck reinforced for helo landings; Norland stands out from Portsmouth loaded with troops, passing the decommissioned destroyer London. All photos Royal Navy unless otherwise credited.
ries” as hobby areas and lounges. To cater to the increased numbers of people on board, such galley items as additional dough-mixing machines and deep-fat fryers were added, and extra sanitary facilities were improvised; a topside swimming pool in the liner Queen Elizabeth II became a shower room.
Little of this work had been preplanned. All that existed prior to the crisis were ten-year old sets of plans to modify the Uganda (which had been built in 1952 to act as a troopship if needed) and the ten British Petroleum “River”- class tankers. Even these plans had to be modified, since replenishment rigs had changed in the interim.
Some ships needed few modifications to act as naval support auxiliaries. The 3,150-ton supply ship St. Helena became an instant mine countermeasures support ship for the two “Hunt”-class mine- hunters sent to the Falklands by virtue of her cargo fuel and water capacity, refrigerated storerooms, and accommodations for 130 passengers; a small helicopter hangar and flight deck were added over the stem, and four 20-mm. antiaircraft guns were installed. The 3,873-ton British Telecommunications cable ship Iris was requisitioned, not to lay cable, but—because of her shallow draft and large helicopter facility—to act as a “despatch vessel.”
The ships chartered or requisitioned were selected with considerable care, both for availability and for suitability. Roughly four ships were inspected for each one that was actually “taken up.” Of course, there were plenty of surplus tankers, but ships capable of transporting troops and military vehicles were in shorter supply. Because of Britain’s island location, the country is served by large numbers of passenger and vehiclecarrying oceangoing ferries. These made
114
r,k ISp* | Md L |
| n |
'®Ks |
|
| |
Hill |
|
|
|
1 RFF |
|
|
|
est ferri,
P®ateri^an ^'^00 tons °f munitions, landii
r requisitioned) of the China Steam Company were two of the
to ' ‘'-4U1
foa^gation
acn se^"Urdoading general cargo ships
fe„.Ulredi they had such Soviet defense- mature •
niceties as water washdown sys-
tern:
7^a transPorts for the South Atlantic.
vice ^'rSt t0 ta*cen was a standby ser'
WerUnit’ tbc Europic Ferry, and the rest th e,,Caosen to minimize the impact on the 1Cav^ traff'c between England and thjsC°nt*nent. Altogether, seven ships of s type were reqUjsitionecj from sjx dif- ,.6nt owners. The Elk, one of the earli-
lng area to deliver her cargo. traeestIine» whose refrigerated fruit Vi,aasl1°r,s were in full and profitable use, a n • °nly f°r the Geestport, to serve as Caorovisi°ns ship. The Soviet-built Ly- °therant* ^aertes ^he first chartered, the c0nt ’ arm°red cable trunks, and damage Wasr° centers. The tanker Anco Charger difpea*en f°r her ability to transport 42 little 6nt k'nds of liquid cargo at one
"To
of up for the Royal Navy’s lack
str0y °at rePa*r facilities, such as de- fieid F ten<^ers or repair ships, two oil- from *uPP°rt ships were requisitioned and S,!Cna’ U.K. The Stena Seaspread chant 'na Inspector carried mixed mer- geitcy an<^ navai crews to provide cmer- Siena yCPa'rs and diving services. The ^ni[cetfSprea^' arr'ving 'n the South vice in lrst’ performed herculean ser- Providing emergency repairs to
the many naval ships damaged in the Argentine air attacks. For related duties, three salvage tugs—including the
11,598-ton, 20,000 horsepower Salvage- man, the most powerful tug on the British registry—were requisitioned from United Towing.
A fleet of nearly 60 ships was “taken up,” modified, and sent on military support duties in only a few weeks time. Indeed, nearly all of the ships were in service by mid-May. Equally important, they performed extremely well. Although there were shortfalls in the number of crewmen—particularly in the deployed tankers, which found it difficult to conduct refueling-at-sea operations with crews of less than 40 men—and some friction between civil crew and Navy personnel, the ships did the jobs assigned.
Facing page: Laertes was one of two Soviet-built hulls the British pressed into Falklands service; the fruit carrier Geestport received a flight deck; Stena Seaspread (“Type-21” frigate HMS Ambuscade [F-172] alongside) took on the dual role of repair and salvage ship; Yorkshireman, nudging steam ferry Rangatira at San Carlos, was one of three salvage tugs deployed to the South Atlantic. This page: British Avon was one of ten “River”- class tankers chartered from British Petroleum; the valiant Wimpey Seahorse was fitted out for rescue, salvage, firefighting, diving, and towing.
for what But we
deserve our admiration
can
beef
merchant marine. Nor would sufficient shipyard facilities to
we
ierf<
ifications had to be made to sever
it is*
Mr. Baker has written on naval subjects cr*'1*, . . . .... .l . Cnn ish eo*1* . r-nH
Five British stern trawlers, commissioned into the Royal Navy as minesweepers, return safely to Scottish waters in August 1982.
The 45,000-ton liner Canberra steamed more than 31,000 nautical miles with her merchant crew of 77 officers and 377 crewmen, and survived ten aerial attacks while operating within San Carlos waters. Not one crewman or soldier on board was injured. From the commercial standpoint, the ship, after returning 4,200 prisoners to Argentina, sailed home for a refit and reentered commercial service on schedule in mid-August. Other ships had similar experiences.
Are the experiences of the British in the South Atlantic applicable to the U. S. Navy? The lesson would seem to be that our planning has, for the most part, left us in a good position. At the same time, programs exist which should provide a greatly increased rapid deployment lift capacity, not only for the Marine Corps, but also for the Army and the Air Force.
Under the Rapid Deployment Force concept, the Military Sealift Command already maintains a fleet of 17 combat- loaded near-term prepositioning ships, most currently at Diego Garcia. These ships represent a cross-section of the types of liquid and dry cargo ships the British were forced to hurriedly acquire for the South Atlantic operation.
In the near future, the SL-7 class will complete conversion to vehicle cargo ships to provide a greatly enhanced rapid deployment capability from the continental United States. Contracts recently signed will provide 13 T-AKXS (auxiliary cargo ships) convert-and-charter ships to improve the capabilities of the force currently at Diego Garcia. Programs are also in hand for such follow-on support types as the T-ACS (auxiliary crane ship) to offload military cargoes from the large numbers of non-self-loading cargo carriers in the U. S. Merchant Marine, and the T-ALS (auxiliary lighter ship) to carry barge-loaded military cargo. A “T-AVB” is planned to provide advanced maintenance support for Marine helicopters—a duty analogous in concept to that intended for the Astronomer in the Falklands, but the U. S. ship will be far more capable.
To provide fuel and other liquids to the fleet, Congress has appropriated the funds for the first of the Henry J. Kaiser class (T-AK-187) to begin replacement of older existing Military Sealift Command fleet support replenishment oilers. New tankers are also being built and programmed to replace older transport tankers, as well as MSC transport oilers and merchant tankers now under charter.
The Navy believes that the best way to provide hospital ship services is to have ships permanently assigned to that function, rather than having a shipyard performing a makeshift conversion, as was done to the Uganda. Accordingly, two hospital ship (T-AH) conversions have been included in the shipbuilding program. Both should be operational by 1986. In addition, a 1,000-bed, rapidly deployable medical facility has been developed to serve the Marines.
Beyond these operational ship programs, there are the 29 ships of the Ready Reserve Force in upgraded readiness status to provide backup sealift. The Navy’s program objective is to increase this force to 77 ships (61 dry cargo/16 tankers) by fiscal year 1988. The ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet are being cycled through shipyards by the Maritime Administration to keep them in a five-to-ten day state of readiness for emergency service.
Assault troop and vehicle-carrying requirements are met in the U. S. Navy by a force of more than 60 major amphibious warfare ships. To keep this force at the peak of readiness and capability, new ships—i.e., the LSD-41 class—are on order, while the programmed LHD-1 class will combine features of the heli
copter-carrying LHA and LPH designS a versatile package. , ^
Salvage and rescue are pertorme regular Navy, Naval Reserve Force’ MSC ships, and a new class ot sa v ships is now under construction. .
In short, the U. S. Navy woU^eet have needed to acquire the type 0 ^
Britain “took up from trade" because^ ships we would need for a situation^^ the Falklands are readily available will be soon. Certainly, there are *eS. ns to be learned in the types of modifica ,s_ performed. We might, for instance, ^ cover that some of our plans are too ^ orate. But, even here, we mustreine ^ that we have to plan for the long while for Great Britain the goal was ^ and the end to a great extent foresee ^ Thus, the dockworkers, ship ^ep'r(T]and merchant seamen, and sailors of ^
achieved in so short a time. dui , ^
also take considerable comfort t necessity for what they did has ^ largely foreseen and planned for jn However, there are negative a^ada of the Falklands lessons. A large ar ^ afl(j ships was needed in order to rega secure a fairly limited objective- been estimated that several huntin' ^ (0 chant ships might be needed in °r^e£jed sustain U. S. troops if they were .^sia- in a distant area such as Southwes ^ These ships do not now exist in ^ve
. • ,i a
modifications on even as limits as the British accomplished, if sU^| undred units in a short time. Clear y- ^gf the interests of the U. S. Navy 0e improved health in our merchan and shipbuilding industries.
,-riod1'
cals around the world. He is the English Ji uentc of Combat Fleets of the World and is a tributor to Proceedings.
Falklands (Malvinas) Campaign: A Chronology
Samuel L. Morison
the
most recent battle for the Falkland Is-
the capture w 100 during
evening of 1 April when 80 Argentine
the=*e ^aW'nas, begins at 2100 during
In the early morning of 14 June 1982,
ands ended. This was a conflict of many mgnificant combat events: the first use of nucIear-powered attack submarine j. N) to sink a combatant; the first kill r vaunted Exocet air-to-surface lssile; and the first employment of ver- m^hort takeoff and landing aircraft
While much has been published about jj s conflict, many accounts seem to be ased on questionable “facts.” Set forth p's a chronological guide to the 1982 fo ant*S (Malvinas) Campaign, which CUses on miltary matters.
April
(•2: ‘Operation Rosario
7^n'nianC*()s fr°m the destroyer Santisima \‘n‘dad (a Sheffield [“Type-42”] class) °n East Falkland Island. Ashore to pajj°se them are 68 members of the the 3IK*S R°yal Marine garrison under 03(X)O,Tlrnan^ ok Major Mike Norman. At split'-0*1 ^ April, the Argentine force assio mt° tW0 Patrols. The first patrol’s i’arr n["ent 's t0 se*ze the Royal Marine Caacks at Moody Point; the second is to Ure Government House. The first patrol arrives at the barracks at 0530 and finds that Major Norman had earlier ordered the Royal Marines to withdraw from this position. The patrol proceeds to Port Stanley. The second patrol reaches Government House at about 0500. The commander of the patrol requests the Royal Marines to surrender. The British refuse, and the fighting begins. The Argentine patrol commander is killed and two of his men are wounded. Earlier, at 0200, 2 April, ten Argentine frogmen come ashore near Cape Pembroke Lighthouse, from the submarine Santa Fe (ex- USS Catfish [SS-339]), which sits at the mouth of Port Stanley harbor, to prevent the entrance to the harbor from being blocked by the British. At 0630, protected by the Santisima Trinidad, the Argentine LST Cabo San Antonio approaches Port Stanley harbor. Amphibious vehicles (LVTs) land, carrying approximately 350 marines, followed by about 250 marines and 279 army and air force troops. The force proceeds to Government House. At 0800, more Argentine troops land at Port Stanley. Seeing the approaching reinforcements and realizing the hopelessness of the situation, Governor Rex Hunt orders all Royal Marines on the island to surrender. The Malvinas (Falklands) now are under Argentine control. The British suffer no casualties; the Argentines have five killed and 17 wounded (includes South Georgia operation, see 3 April entry).
2: At 0925, Governor Rex Hunt formally surrenders the islands.
2: Almost immediately, Argentina begins ferrying in supplies and reinforcements, mainly from the Comodoro Rivadivia Air Force Base.
3: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 502, by a vote of 11 to 1, with four abstentions. The resolution calls for immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands.
3: Beginning at 1200, Argentine forces land at Grytviken, South Georgia. Opposing them are 23 Royal Marines under command of Lieutenant Keith Mills. An Argentine Puma helicopter under the protective cover of an Argentine Navy Alou- ette helicopter lands troops. The same Puma, on a second trip, is hit by ma- chinegun and rifle fire and shot down after discharging its troops. The Argentine frigate Guerrico, of the French D'Estienne D'Orves class, then sails into the harbor. The Royal Marines on shore take her under fire with a mortar, scoring hits, including one in a fuel tank below the waterline, one on the Exocet launcher, and one on the gun mount. She is forced to retire. After a two-hour fight, the Royal Marines surrender. The British have no casualties; Argentines’ figures are included in 1-2 April entry.
3: Eighty-six Royal Marines and British civilians taken prisoner during the Falklands seizure are released in Montevideo, Uruguay.
4: Taking full responsibility for the crisis. Lord Carrington (British Foreign Secretary), Richard Luce (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), and Humphrey Atkins (Lord Privy Seal) resign from the British Government. Mr. John Nott, Minister of Defence, tenders his resignation to the Prime Minister twice, but it is refused both times.
4: Queen Elizabeth 11 approves the order to requisition merchant ships.
4: The first British merchant ships are requisitioned: the liner Canberra (at a cost of $175,000 a day) and the shallow draft roll-on/roll-off ship Elk. The Can-
Orders are barked on the bridge of the Argentine LST Cabo San Antonio as Rear Admiral Carlos Busser of the Argentine Marine Corps (far left) prepares to lead the main invasion force ashore at Port Stanley.
15: The Argentine press reports tha the Soviet ship Akademik Knipovich an another unidentified Soviet ship Pay jj port call at Ushusia, Argentina. Bot ships are equipped with sophisticate electronic gear and were reportedly e route to the Antarctic. .
21: The Atlantic Conveyor sails for m South Atlantic; she eventually carries ^ Royal Navy Harriers, four RAF G •
four
other
Edward Harbor where her 83-man
and seven passengers abandon ship as
she
King
Argentine casualties.
atche1
d
berra is loaded with 1,950 men of the 3rd Parachute Battalion, and the Elk is loaded with light tanks and other vehicles necessary for an invasion.
5: A Royal Navy task force, formed to retake the Falklands and South Georgia, begins to leave harbor with HMS Hermes, the flagship, in the lead. Under the code-name “Operation Corporate,” the mission of the task force is simple: “to repel an attack on British People and territory and to restore British Administration.” The air wing of each carrier is as follows;
Hermes: 846 Squadron: 6 Sea King helicopters; 826 Squadron: 12 Sea King helicopters; 800 Squadron: 6 Sea Harrier strike aircraft; 899 Squadron; 6 Sea Harriers; 706 Squadron: 4 Sea King helicopters.
Invincible: 801 “Black Death”
Squadron: 5 Sea Harrier aircraft; 820 Squadron: 10 Sea King helicopters; 899 Squadron: 3 Sea Harriers.
5: Argentina continues to shuttle supplies and troops to the Malvinas. The Argentine Marines who participated in the seizure of the islands return home.
6: The European Economic Community (EEC) votes to embargo Argentina. The major principals in this ban are
ARAMADA ARGENTINA
Lieutenant Commander Hugo Santil- lan of the Argentine Marine Corps surveys the recaptured Malvinas Islands on 2 April.
France, Switzerland, Belgium, West Germany, and the Netherlands.
6: Argentine Army reinforcements to the Malvinas (Falklands) are reported to be conscripts who have been in service less than two months.
6: Concerned by the Argentine success in the Falklands and its fear that Argentina will press the Beagle Channel dispute, Chile moves forces south in response to Argentine actions.
6: Peru offers to lend some of its Mirage fighters (without pilots) to Argentina. (Aircraft were supplied but never saw action.)
6: The Soviet Union offers aid to Argentina. The Argentines say they “will refuse until the last possible moment.”
7: The EEC export ban goes into effect.
7: The Ministry of Defence, Whitehall, announces that HMS Illustrious, the second of the Invincible-class carriers, will be accepted in September 1982, an acceleration of the contract delivery date by about one year. (This is later advanced by three more months; the ship is commissioned on 20 June 1982. On 2 August 1982, HMS Illustrious and two escorts sail for the South Atlantic to relieve HMS Invincible.)
7: The British Government announces a 200-mile war zone area around the Falklands effective from 2300, 11 April, and states that any Argentine ship or aircraft in the zone will be treated as hostile.
7: The Chilean Navy’s operational squadron moves south.
7: Some 6,000 Argentine troops are now estimated to be on the island.
8: Major General Mario Benjamin Menendez is sworn in as the first Argentine Governor of the Malvinas. Port Stanley is renamed Puerto Argentino. (Darwin is later renamed Belgrano.)
8: The Argentine icebreaker Almirante Irizar, part of the original invasion force, serves as a Falklands supply ship and later will be a hospital ship.
12: British 200-mile blockade zone around the Falklands goes into effect (0500 Greenwich Mean Time).
14: Some 10,000 Argentine troops are estimated to be in the islands.
14: The requisitioned containership SS Atlantic Conveyor begins conversion into an aircraft transport ship at the Naval Dockyard, Devonport. This is, in part, an example of what the “Arapaho” conversion concept is designed to do: enable a navy to quickly convert any large, Batdecked ship to operate as a “semi-aircraft carrier.” (She is followed by her sister- ship, SS Atlantic Causeway, and the con- tainerships SS Astronomer and SS Contender Bezant.)
Harriers, six Wessex helicopters, Chinook helicopters, and various supplies. .
21: British reconnaissance teams tto ^ the Special Boat Squadrons (SBS) an Special Air Service (SAS) land on 0 tuna Glacier, South Georgia Island, m snow storm with up to 70-knot win s After 24 hours, they withdraw.
23: The British Government an
nounces that any Argentine ship °r & craft representing a clear threat to_ British fleet in the area will risk an aP propriate response.” . j
23: British reconnaissance teams a in South Georgia again as weather con tions improve.
24: A British Sea King helicopter- w^ three crewmen, crash lands on the so em tip of Chilean territory. The hehc° ter is destroyed and the crew mem are recovered ten days later. .
25: At 0630, British Wessex helic°F ters catch the submarine Santa Fe °nn surface, as she is departing GU'1VI. ( Harbor, South Georgia, having dropped off reinforcements and mail- is attacked and hit, destroying her wa tight integrity, thus preventing diving- 1000, she is attacked by two Lynx e copters from HMS Brilliant and wasp from HMS Endurance and hit by an aa^ ship missile. She manages to make
floods and settles to the bottom near Edward Point, only her sail remain' - above surface. p.
25: Shortly after 1600, with nuva‘y’. port, Royal Marines invade South gia; the Argentine garrison cap|tu shortly after 1800. Thirty-eight Arg^ tine civilians, the entire 137-man Art- tine garrison, and the crew of the •> ^ Fe are captured. There are no Brim
27: The Royal Navy, having Pat(f the holes in the Santa Fe and pumpey ^ out, moves the submarine with the a tug Salvageman from King Edwa^ Point to Grytvikcn Jetty. During _ move, with Argentines manning the trol, a Royal Marine shoots and ki *|y Argentine crew member he mista thought was about to scuttle the s*11P'js 27: A British commando force a
;§ln operations, flee; TfC Argentines attacked the British Canh W° Argentine Mirages and one SQ„°erra are shot down. HMS Glamor- fromh HMS Arrow receive damage air raj^mb splinters during the Argentine
itarj Ar§entina calls up 80,000 of its mil-
y reservists.
fires .' Argentine submarine San Luis a ]arn Unhnown number of torpedoes at n°rthgCrtarget being tracked by sonar of fau? tbe Falklands. Possibly because d°esy w*ring, the submarine’s torpe- teratta !SS tbc‘r target. The British coun- escapg^ After 20 hours, the submarine
M " d be Argentine aircraft carrier 25 de is unahi°^erat'n® north of the Falklands, Edtish f t0 *aunch its Skyhawks against a rier b • °rCe estirnated to include a carded; CCause °f insufficient wind over the force "rh *°ng ran8e from the British 2. . le Argentine force retires, toward wh'le steaming at ten knots
cojnp. lbe southern tip of Argentina, in 225 ,>d|y w'tb two destroyers and some Argen,l es southwest of the Falklands, the iJSs P/ne tTU'ser Genera/ Belgrano (ex- ,Qenix |CL-46]), is hit on the port
n East and West Falklands to carry out
rec°nnaissance.
a?! The British task force, with Rear niiral John “Sandy” Woodward com- 2nd,ng> arrives off the Falklands. mil L,Argentina declares a 200-nautical eff° b °C^ac*e zone around the Malvinas 0rectlve immediately. Any British ships hn,d,'liCru*t 'n dle zone w'h be regarded as
30*e 3nd attackcd-
}jaj After Secretary of State Alexander UnjfS. attemPts to -mediate fail, the grif,e Sta'es publicly supports Great Pose*"1 Resident Ronald Reagan im- agaiS .economic ar|d military sanctions grj nst Argentina and promises Great tr°0psn ad aid short of committing U.S.
sion°- I,1C British impose a total exclu- Zone around the islands.
May
is m V16 brst British attack on Falklands hifih^ C^a s*ngle Vulcan bomber in a 10 oJrVe* run °n Port Stanley Airfield at b0L. *eet’ dropping 21 1,000-pound aircr f <“>ne bomb E'ts the runway. (The ref ‘j1 staged from Ascension Island and m0r!Cd. seven times in flight.) Three and t raids’ one on Goose Green airfield usjnon Port Stanley airfield, follow ^incibt ^aiT'Crs irom the Hermes and
coni': SAS and Special Boat Squadron and n"CntS kom HMS Onyx, helicopters beo;!mal1 boats Iand in the Falklands and
side by two U.K. Mk-8 torpedoes fired by the nuclear-powered attack submarine Conqueror. The ship immediately begins to settle and, by 1620, has a 21° list to port. By 1650, the list increases to 52°, putting her entire port side underwater. By 1700, with only the wrecked bow of the ship visible, the cruiser sinks. Three hundred and sixty-eight Argentines are killed, and an undetermined number are wounded.
3: The Argentine tug Alferez Sobral (ex-USS Catawba [ATA-210]) fires on a British Sea King helicopter. The Sea King calls for help and is quickly reinforced by two British Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles. The Lynx helos each fire two missiles. One missile strikes the bridge and kills the entire bridge watch. Two days later, the Alferez Sobral limps into Puerto Desado, minus her bridge and being conned from after steering. The Alferez Sobral suffered eight dead and eight wounded. (Some reports indicate that the Comodoro Som- ellera [ex-USS Salish (ATA-187)] may have been involved in this action and was sunk.)
3: The luxury liner Queen Elizabeth II is requisitioned, at a cost of $225,000 a day, by the Ministry of Defence for use as a troop carrier.
4: Sea Harriers from the Hermes and Invincible attack Port Stanley and Goose Green airfields. A Vulcan bomber also attacks Port Stanley airfield. During these raids, the first Sea Harrier and pilot are lost.
4: The British survey ships (AGSs) Hydra, Hecla, and Herald are declared hospital ships (AHs) under the Geneva Convention.
4: While serving on a radar picket station, some 20 miles away from the British task force, the destroyer Sheffield, Captain James Salt commanding, is hit by an Exocet AM-39 missile fired from an Argentine Super Etendard aircraft some 20-23 kilometers from the target. It penetrates at an oblique angle, a few feet above the waterline. The warhead does not explode. Internal fires start, fueled by, among other things, diesel fuel in the ready service tanks and the missile’s remaining fuel. After three hours, fires are hard to control because of a loss in fire main pressure as well as all generating power. (Reportedly, no evasive maneuvering was undertaken because the missile was not seen until it was four seconds from impact.) The crew fights the fire for five hours until concern that the magazines are about to explode prompts the order to abandon ship at 2000. (Reports that all the Sheffield’s radar and ECM gear had been turned off because the ship
The Argentine tug Alferez Sobral’s bridge (cut away and placed on blocks, above) was hit by a Sea Skua missile, killing the entire bridge watch.
could not transmit on Skynet system without shutting the other emitters prove false. A second Exocet, fired at the same time as the first but at a greater range, runs out of fuel and falls into the sea.) British casualties are 20 dead and 28 wounded; Argentine casualties are none.
4: The Associated Press announces that the British carrier Bulwark, which was paid off more than a year ago for disposal and currently lies at Portsmouth Dockyard, is to be reactivated for further service. The dockyard is authorized to employ 500 men, seven days a week, on around-the-clock shifts to make the ship serviceable for duty. The Bulwark’s ultimate mission, after the Falklands are retaken, will be to serve as a barracks ship for the 2,500-man garrison associated air crews and support personnel of the squadron of Phantom fighters and Nimrod AEW aircraft to be stationed at Port Stanley. In addition, she is to serve as an airfield for small planes. (After examining the aircraft carrier, British authorities determine that the Bulwark is in too poor of a material condition to be returned to service.) In addition to the aforementioned, a naval squadron of two submarines and three frigates will also be stationed in the Falklands.
6: Two Sea Harriers apparently collide in severe weather while conducting combat air patrol over the task force and are lost. Neither pilot is recovered.
7: Great Britain extends its total exclusion zone to 12 miles from the Argentine coast mainland.
7: An Argentine air raid, composed of Mirage aircraft, is driven off by Sea Harriers before the Argentine aircraft get close enough to the task force to drop their bombs and fire their rockets.
7: In a nine-hour flight, six Sea Har- riers/GR.3 Harriers—refueled in flight —fly from Great Britain to Ascension Island.
HMS Antelope’s delayed death came when an unexploded bomb on board blew up during an attempt to defuse it. She broke in two, and sank the next day.
9: A Royal Navy task group, consisting of among others, HMS Bristol, HMS Bacchante and an Amazon (“Type-21”)- class frigate, departs Portsmouth to reinforce the South Atlantic squadron.
9: Two Sea Harriers attack the Argentine fishing trawler Narwal with bombs. The ship had been shadowing the fleet and was considered by the British to be on an intelligence-gathering mission. A Royal Navy boarding party discovers that the ship was commanded by an Argentine naval officer and carried naval instructions and electronic gear. Thirty prisoners are taken, of whom 14 are wounded. (One man later dies.) Despite British efforts to save the Narwal. she sinks.
10: Including requisitioned ships, the Royal Navy task force and its support element now number 88 ships.
10: The badly damaged Sheffield sinks while being towed to South Georgia.
10: British ships shell East Falkland Island. At the same time, British aircraft attack Port Stanley.
10-11: British ships continue shelling the Falklands.
11: HMS Alacrity encounters the Argentine Isla de los Estados in the Falklands Sound off Port Howard. When the Argentine ship refuses to heave to, the Alacrity sinks her with gunfire. (The vessel was carrying fuel to Argentine garrisons in the Falklands.)
12: Two waves of four Argentine Air Force Skyhawks make a low-level attack on HMS Glasgow, which had been bombarding Port Stanley airfield. In the first wave, two A-4s are shot down, one crashes trying to avoid a missile, and the fourth escapes. During the second wave, a Skyhawk hits the Glasgow with a 1,000-pound bomb. The bomb passes through the ship without exploding. (Temporary repairs are made, and she returns to duty.)
12: The Queen Elizabeth II departs for the South Atlantic carrying 3,200 men of the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards.
13-14: HMS Antrim, a “County”- class guided missile destroyer, is damaged by Argentine aircraft.
14: The Soviet Union, in its first major public statement on the Falklands War, calls the 200-nautical mile zone illegal and states that British charges of Soviet complicity in the crisis are “provocative and absolutely untrue.”
14-15: One hundred and twenty Royal Marines and an SAS party raid the Argentine base at Pebble Island, destroying 11 aircraft, blowing up a large ammunition dump, and further damaging the base.
15: The last operational Argentine P-2 Neptune experiences an avionics failure and is grounded. This eliminates the Argentines’ long-range reconnaissance and targeting capability. Argentine Etendard air attacks must now rely on target vectoring from the Port Stanley radar.
16: British Harriers sink the Argentine Coast Guard Cutter Rio Carcano and damage the Argentine transport Bahia Buen Suceso.
21: At 0340, a force of British ships, led by HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, land 2,500 troops on East Falkland Island at Port San Carlos. The troops meet only minor resistance which is quickly suppressed on one of four beaches. The beachheads are quickly expanded and consolidated over a ten-square mile area, and the invasion force then increases to a total of 5,000 troops. One Sea King crashes while ferrying SAS troops from HMS Hermes to HMS Intrepid, killing 21 men. Two British Gazelle helicopters are shot down. One of four crewmen survives. With the invasion, the Argentine Air Force comes out in force. Air raids are made throughout the day, resulting in the loss of 12 Argentine Mirage aircraft, five Skyhawks, and two unidentified helicopters. In addition to the helicopters mentioned, the British lose one Sea Harrier.
21: During the invasion, five
destroyers/frigates serve as a fire support group. One of them, HMS Ardent, Commander Alan West commanding, is hit by two 500-pound bombs, which knock out the ship’s major systems. She is hit by
more bombs. Intensive efforts are n' ^ by damage control parties to contain t0 fire. However, the fires cause the s f 22 be abandoned; shortly after, she sin s, of her crew are dead and 30 woun ■
21: HMS Argonaut is hit in the engj ^ room by two 1,000-pound bombs tha ^ not explode. (The bombs are late fused by an ordnance disposal team. ‘ after temporary repairs, the Argonau ^ turns to duty.) HMS Antrim is hit ; bomb which fails to explode. n
21: British commandos make rai Goose Green and Belgrano. One tine Puma helicopter is destroyed, ^ 800 Argentine troops are pinned do preventing them from reinforcing San Carlos. .ey
21: Sea Harriers attack Port Stan and Belgrano. One aircraft is shot 1 by a Blowpipe missile. ,jn
21: As British ship casualties mou the Falklands, ships from the s,arV0ll squadron at Chatham begin reactiva ^ as do some frigates recently placed on'• disposal list. Ships’ transfers are celled. (The “Tribal”-class frigates and Gurkha recommission on 9 AU& and 27 July respectively; the R°^eSoJi$ class frigate Berwick rejoins the flee1s August. The Tartar of the “Tribal c and the Falmouth of the /?o//i£Say reentered service on 17 July and 23 AP respectively.) . air
23: Argentine Air Force continu ^ raids on beachhead at Port San Ca^o( Six Mirages and three A-4s are ■
down’ . British
23-24: During a. - raids on the .
forces off Port San Carlos, HMS , lope, Captain Nicholas Tobin commit ing, is hit by two 1,000-pound b° s which lodge in the engineering ^y. without exploding. Further, an A-4 ^
hawk hits the ship’s mainmast ^ crashes. Taken into San Carlos watcrS(1I-<J' emergency repairs, a Royal Engineer 0 nance disposal team boards the Anti ^ and attempts to defuse the bombs. 11
r y>
but
remains on station.
in thCSS 3 ^>orn'3 explodes, blowing a hole s'^e fr°m the waterline to 6 ' hilling one man and wounding tcamrCn!ijintier °f the ten-man disposal boart * . s exPiosion ignites fires on nallv u tCr several hours, the ship is fi- tWo j d, an(f°ned. She finally breaks in 24th3n S'n*cs 'n lhc early morning of the
loset A Sea Harpier from HMS Hermes crash P°wer shortly after takeoff and
24s;killing ,he pilot-
their * <Cr^ent'ne air raids continue; 18 of down - awks and Mirages are shot
Gobi ^STs Sir Lancelot and Sir 24,!<7/.{are hit in an air attack. actn' i 6 Br*tish Ministry of Defence 3jj tlcpi0Ct* jCS tde *oss °i f"lve Harriers of
gentt Argentine National Day; The Aran al?6 ^orce ^aunches 72 planes in fleet °Ut atternP’ t0 smash the British
it r", Broadsword is hit by a bomb
25* Wf U1 aldlion. north* nf !fe serving as a Picket ship panv, •, est Falkland Island, in com- enZ lth HMS Broadsword, HMS Cov- destro3 S,,effield-class guided missile e°nirr/ej’- haiptain David Hart-Dyke three | ng). is attacked at 1800 by IV|jr °w'flying Skyhawks, escorted by facc-t S • t llC Coventry's Sea Dart sur- the p: ° 3Ir "'issilc battery shoots down the wrS‘ tW° P*anes’ hut the third plane in three a,V® £ets through to score hits with cause ’ "'h-pound bombs. The bombs start ^fVere darnage and flooding; fires ■ the Coventry lists 70° to port in 15 minutes and by 1830 is upside down. She sinks shortly afterward. Of the 200-man crew, 19 are killed and 23 wounded. (The third plane got through because after the first two Sea Dart salvos, the twin-armed Sea Dart launcher’s loading system broke down. While the launcher was reloaded, the armored hatches protecting the magazine from the weapons motor blast stuck in an open position, thus negating the firing circuit. A “volunteer” had to leave the superstructure and close both hatches by hand before a firing circuit could be reestablished. This done, two Sea Darts were fired, but the doors kept jamming in the open cycle. This cut rate of fire by more than 75%, leaving the Coventry virtually defenseless to the third Argentine plane.)
25: While conducting flight operations in company with HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes north of West Falkland, the Atlantic Conveyor is hit by two Exocet AM-39 missiles fired from two Argentine Super Etendards that approach from the east. The missiles are believed to have been intended for one of the aircraft carriers, but because of a chaff barrage and active ECM, the missiles’ radar-homing sensors broke their lock and homed in on the next thing they could find—the Atlantic Conveyor. The converted contain- ership is hit. After fruitless attempts to extinguish the fires, the ship is abandoned. Lost is the much needed cargo for the final assault on Port Stanley, three Chinook helicopters, and six Wessex helicopters. British casualties are 12 dead (including the Atlantic Conveyor’s captain) and an unknown number wounded.
27: The British Ministry of Defence announces that 109 British personnel have died in the war.
27: Argentine air raid on San Carlos beachhead kills four Royal Marines and wounds 20.
27: A Harrier is lost over Port Stanley. The pilot ejects safely.
28: Goose Green and Darwin, at the head of Choiseul Sound, are overrun and captured by British forces. The attack is led by the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. Of the 1,650 Argentine garrison at Goose Green, 250 are killed or wounded and 1,450 are taken prisoner. Of the 1,000-man garrison at Darwin, 100 are killed and 900 wounded or taken prisoner. The Argentines also lose four Pucara aircraft. The British forces suffer 12 killed and 31 wounded.
28: At Goose Green, Lieutenant Jim Barry and two soldiers move forward to accept the surrender of Argentine soldiers waving a white flag. The Argentines open fire, killing Lieutenant Barry and the two soldiers. In return fire, most Argentine soldiers defending the “School House” are killed.
29: The Argentines fire their last air- to-surface Exocet at a large radar blip. (Some reports indicate that the missile hits the hulk of the Atlantic Conveyor, and causes her to sink.)
29: A Sea Harrier is lost in a shipboard-related accident.
30: A Sea Harrier crashes into the sea after being hit by ground fire while attacking Port Stanley.
30: The British secure Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet.
31: An RAF Vulcan makes an attack on Argentine installations at Port Stanley.
31: This date, or later in the week, the British task force is reinforced with the arrival of three guided missile destroyers, four frigates, and two nuclear-powered submarines.
June
1: An Argentine C-130 is shot down 50 miles north of the Falklands by a Sea Harrier.
1: A Sea Harrier is shot down by a Roland missile.
2: The British seize Argentine positions seven miles north of Port Stanley.
5: The British establish a forward air base at Port San Carlos.
6-12: Four GR.3 Harriers arrive from
Tricked by electronic countermeasures, two Exocet missiles fired by Argentine aircraft veered away from HMS Hermes and instead bit the cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor.
Bahia Buen Suceso is also capture
ed-
S. section of Jane s
and is editor of the U. Ships.
England. To make the flight, mid-air refueling is required.
6-12: British ground forces are reinforced by troops transported to the South Atlantic on board the Queen Elizabeth II. Total British ground forces are now about 8,500 men.
6-12: On her return voyage to England, the QE-II carries survivors of the Coventry, Ardent, and Antelope.
8: The frigate HMNZS Canterbury is transferred to the operational control of the Royal Navy for service in the Indian Ocean. This is done to free HMS Amazon for deployment to the Falklands. Administrative control remains with the Royal New Zealand Navy. The only caveat to this transfer is that the Canterbury not be employed in the Falklands.
8: While off-loading supplies and troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade at Bluff Cove, seven miles south of Port Stanley, RFA Sir Tristram (LST) and RFA Sir Galahad (LST) are attacked by four Argentine Skyhawks escorted by two Daggers. The Sir Tristram had just finished off-loading troops and supplies while the Sir Galahad was just beginning. Numerous hits on the Sir Galahad in the engine- room and berthing spaces start fires and secondary explosions from ammunition, forcing the crew and troops to abandon the ship. Fifty troops and five crew members are killed and 57 (11 of the crew) wounded on the Sir Galahad. The Sir Tristram, anchored 400 yards off the beach, is also hit—two bombs cause fires which are shortly controlled. In view of the danger of new attacks, the Sir Tristram is ordered abandoned. Two of Sir Tristram’s crew are killed and an unknown number wounded. (Argentina loses at least seven Mirages. The burnt hulk of the Sir Galahad is towed to sea on 24 June and scuttled. The Sir Tristram is first used as an accommodation ship in the Falklands, then later is towed home for repairs.)
8: A British LCM (9) is sunk in Choiseul Sound by Argentine aircraft.
8: Pine Bluff and Fitzroy are seized by British forces. (This operation started when the British were told, in a 5 June phone call from a telephone on a commercial line, that there were no Argentine troops at the two aforementioned places.)
8: During an Argentine air attack on San Carlos Bay, HMS Plymouth is hit by three bombs—one of which bounces off the pylon mast before hitting the deck; one passes through the ship without exploding; and the fourth explodes, causing fires which are quickly extinguished. Five men of the crew are wounded. (The Plymouth retires to South Georgia where she receives repair services from the M/V
Stena Seaspread. The ship returns to duty within four days.)
9: While steaming a northerly course, some 450 miles north of the Falklands, the tanker Hercules (98,827 tons displacement), Captain Henzo Battagliarini commanding, flying a Liberian flag, and owned by an Israel-based company controlled by Americans, is bombed by an Argentine C-130 aircraft. The aircraft conducts two bombing runs, by pushing the bombs out the cargo door. Damage is light, and the tanker retires with a 7° list.
11: Radio intercepts of communications between General Menendez, the Argentine commander on the Falklands, to his superior, Commander, South Atlantic, based at Comodoro Rivadivia indicate that Argentine troop morale is low. The garrison likely will not be able to withstand a British attack.
Major General Jeremy Moore, commander of British ground forces in the Falklands, holds the formal instrument of surrender that ended the Falklands War on 14 June 1982.
11-12: The first phase of the attack on Port Stanley begins. Led by 42nd Commando (Lieutenant Colonel N. F. Vaux, Royal Marines, commanding), 45th Commando (Lieutenant Colonel A. F. Whitehead, Royal Marines, commanding), and the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Hew W. R. Pike, British Army, commanding), British forces attack three Argentine positions five miles from the capital. After a night of stiff fighting, 3 Parachute Regiment takes Mount Longdon, 45 Commando captures Two Sisters, and 42 Commando captures Mount Harriet. The British lose 25 men and 72 are wounded;
1,800 Argentine troops are taken pnS oner. a
11-12: HMS Glamorgan,
“County”-class DDG, fires a Sea missile at an Argentine land-ba Exocet MM-38 missile while conduct! 6 fire support operations for 45 Comma0 in its attack on Port Stanley. ^en,jve Sea Cat misses, the captain takes eva* maneuvering, by attempting to turn a from the missile at a sharp angle to p sent the smallest target possible, missile hits the weather deck and a part of the superstructure and exP 0 ,er The ship’s hangar, the Wessex helic°P inside, and Sea Cat missile launcher^ the port side of the hangar is destroy ^ The fires are extinguished after 1 ^ hours. Casualties are 13 killed an wounded. (The ship receives repairs ^ the M/V Stena Seaspread at South L gia and returns to duty in 36 hours.
^ 11: An RAF Vulcan makes what tu out to be the final bomber attack on
Stanley. ^gT.
12: The British prison ship M/V land delivers 1,051 Argentine PO s repatriation to Montevideo, Uruguay-^ 13-14: During the second phase o attack, the British seize Wireless Rj Mt. Tumbledown, and Mount Wi 1 After meeting stiff resistance, the Arg.^ tines are dislodged at a cost of 20 r>rl killed and 17 wounded. Exact Argen casualties are unknown, but heavy- ^ 13: The Argentines conduct two raids. One Mirage is shot down. o() 14: At 0859, all Argentine forces the Falklands formally surrender to ish ground forces. The British ^ 10,600 POWs at Port Stanley and an ditional 1,500 in the West Falklan^ After the surrender ceremony, Gen ^ Moore sends a message to London w says, in part: “. . . The Falkland Is ^ once more under the government ue ^ by their inhabitants—God Save Queen.” nd
14: The Argentine Military Com g at Buenos Aires announces a de cease-fire on the Falklands, efteC 1500.
14: As British forces occupy P°rl(r0| ley, the Argentine Coast Guard P^yai boat Islas Malvinas is captured by a ^ ^
boarding party from the crew ot .,ir Cardijf, a Sheffield-class DDG. Q^^js- prize is later refurbished and c0,1\[ViS sioned into the Royal Navy as Tiger Bay for use in offshore patrol o[> ations.) The Argentine naval tramp
Mr. Morison is employed by the Navy Dep'. ftiinl