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Threatened by a militarily stronger Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s, England— which lionized the audacious Lord Nelson above all her sons—abandoned Nelson’s precepts and chose a defensive national strategy. What possible relevance could this have for the United States today?
ide 'n^ system) now being i ,nt Pagan’s 23 March
; undertaken as a result of Pres- bud > ‘'caSan s 15 March 1983 speech on the defense ber^f1 *S 0n*y a f‘rst steP- This review must be unencum- ^hj , the constraints of deterrence and arms control, rarj,C have proven inadequate. We should move tempo- fav ^ *rorn deploying more offensive missile power in t^tr deploying a complete missile defense system so kno ,ae United States cannot be coerced in a crisis, attaclc °Ut °r cr*PPieci 'n a surPrise or “limited” nuclear ]0n ’ 0r deterred by Soviet nuclear power. We can no
d0 r afford the grand delusion that our current offense- bo^ nant deterrent strategy deters, when we have lost fjn- suPeriority and parity in nuclear forces to the Soviet in ()ua' must provide for defense of the homeland first
n„c r rearmament program, then deploy more offensive ^ear forces
Warge system of defense should include: antisubmarine ear] ^ (ASW) forces; missile, air, and space defense; * y Earning, surveillance, and attack assessment sys-
tetnl
LUlllIUl, ullU LUllllllUlllLdllUlIo, till LI 1111C1
anj C£ fC3I); au forms of passive defense; civil defense; and „ , measures necessary to ensure the survivability
naclear
The United States is faced with very nearly the same situation today that England faced in 1935-37. Confronted by a rearming Germany and the pros- to another world war, England had to decide whether 0 allocate its scarce resources to strengthen its deterrent y increasing bomber production or to strengthen its dense against air attack by shifting production to a new ^aeration of fighters. Britain chose the fighters and a Vstem of air defense, when the keystone of pre-World fe^ ^ ®rhish defense policy was predicated on an of- theT C-°m*nant a'r deterrent strategy- The relevance for te . nited States is that we are in precisely the same stra- ^'c s'tuati°n as Britain found itself almost 50 years ago. ilv fnta’n changed the emphasis of its air policy temporary rom offensive to defensive because the balance of mil- ■ y P°wer, in particular air power, had shifted from Eng i to Germany; the threat of war seemed inevitable; the anc?'s allies as well as elements in the government and ade ,n'litary began to have doubts about the deterrent’s cial UaCy l° carry out British commitments; British offish .Were c°ming to fear the consequences of becoming n . eterred, as their population was undefended and the tack°n k£carne increasingly vulnerable to German air at- a anci technological developments had made defense ^nst homber attack possible.
'th the present technological possibilities offered for Stm tenses, the time has come for the United t0 es> as it did for England in 1936, to adjust its strategy Po]yeet t*le strategic current and projected military and fen 'Ca* situati°n- The technical review of strategic de- der^e Analogous to the review of air defense England un- 'Var°0*< in 1934 knowing the potential of radar as an early
c°mmand, control, and communications, and intel- ^Placement of these assets in the event of a prolonged tecgCar war. We appear to have no sense of strategic or urgency to determine whether the techno- aC;t(j ^ Potential is realizable. We are proceeding at an ref] ern*c research pace instead of at a pace which would c the fact that we are engaged, whether we realize it
or not, in a technological race with the Soviet Union to achieve a breakthrough in defensive weaponry which could negate the offense and offer the means of strategic defense of the homeland. In the postwar period, we have never viewed homeland defenses strategically. Instead, our offense-dominant strategy has militated against a serious consideration of strategic defense.
Strategic Defense Before 1945: Until shortly after World War II, the United States sought security against foreign attack through a series of fixed coastal fortifications guarding our coasts, harbors, and naval installations. Although considered the first line of defense, it was not until the 20th century that the U. S. Navy achieved the capability against major naval powers to defeat an enemy fleet at sea. From the time of the Monroe Doctrine to the Civil War, the Royal Navy provided for U. S. seaward defense because U. S. and British policy interests coincided. Fixed coastal fortifications were long thought to be superior to shipboard guns, and a manpower-cheap and economical way to thwart landings, buying time until ground forces could arrive at an enemy landing site. This policy was made obsolete by airpower although extensive coastal fortifications continued to exist until after World War II, when the United States first became seriously vulnerable to direct attack from overseas. In contrast, the Soviet historical experience consisted of regular land invasions from the tenth century on, including two in this century, resulting in a traditional preoccupation with the problem of defending the homeland. The U. S. preoccupation with strategic defenses, on the other hand, stemmed from a unique combination of factors, not the least of which was that there were no serious land threats and coastal fortifications were defensive in nature and did not threaten anyone. Coastal defenses offered a means for avoiding war, by making the cost of invasion so unattractive as to discourage it altogether or, failing that, to make any invasion as difficult and costly as possible.
In contrast to this peacetime doctrinal heritage of strategic defense complemented by small light mobility forces, wartime U. S. military doctrine from the Civil War on espoused an offense built around mass armies and fleets. By the end of World War II, the conflicting doctrines of continental defense in peacetime and the wartime preference for the offense collided.
The Nuclear Age and Strategic Air Bombardment: The nuclear age has ingrained in the United States a view of war beginning with a nuclear Pearl Harbor against our cities and/or our nuclear forces. This is an emotion, and deterrence—prevention from action by fear of the consequences—is a response to an emotion. It is neither a strategy nor a solution to the problem of war. We urgently need to address the problem of nuclear war in a strategic and military manner, considering all alternatives. This preoccupation with surprise attack still dominates U. S. national security policy. Because of the awesomeness of nuclear weapons, a basic tenet of U. S. nuclear strategy became “the next war had to be prevented, i.e., deterred, not fought.” This view, expounded by Bernard Brodie in
45
lmBs / June 1983
his book The Absolute Weapon (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), coincided with the strategic bombardment school of air enthusiasts who saw in nuclear weapons and heavy bombers the means for the first time to execute successfully the objectives of strategic bombardment that had so eluded them during World War II. Thus was bom the idea of deterring war based on an offense-dominant air and later missile strategy.
The U. S. Air Force adopted a deterrent strategy based on threatening unacceptable damage to an enemy’s urban and industrial base should the United States be attacked, even though military targets were also to be attacked. An opposing view to this concept was best expressed by William Borden in his book There Will Be No Time (MacMillan, 1946) in which he argues that the best way to deter war is to be prepared to wage it, and that the enemy’s military forces should be the primary target, not the urban and industrial economic infrastructure. Moreover, Borden
envisioned the need for civil as well as active defense^ The United States and the Soviet Union took divergen paths in the race to develop the means of delivering nU clear and thermonuclear weapons. In 1946-47, the uni States decided to concentrate on jet-propelled bombers, whereas in 1945 the Soviets decided to upset the balanc
of power by perfecting intermediate and intercontinei
ntal
range missiles, and bypassing bomber delivery except a an interim measure. We interpreted what was to the So ets a stop-gap measure as reflecting our own decision
concentrate on bomber delivery of nuclear weapon^ Thus, we deployed an extensive air defense again*
threat which never materialized in the magnitude antic* pated. Other reasons for not deploying or considerings
tegic defenses were that air defense and missile
technology were still in their infancy against high-sP® intercontinental threats, and the problems of defen i against such threats seemed overwhelming, continuing myth that “there is no defense.” Finally, there was ^ view prevalent in the Air Force that the best defense wa
good offense, and that it was uneconomical to sPe'
Weapons often drive strategy. In the late 1940s, the U. S. Navy favored targeting nuclear weapons against military targets. With the development of Polaris and Poseidon— better suited to attack soft area targets than hardened military targets—the Navy moved to support a counter-value deterrent strategy. The Trident IlII’s capabilities may force the Navy to return to its counterforce views of the 1940s.
of'
scarce resources on the defense, when only a strong ^ fense could deter. This view is still propounded by * *® ^
Force and Navy today. However, this was not always
nnon. I« f Un IH/IAo Mr. i 71 , fhp Air
case. In the late 1940s, the Navy opposed the Air^
concept of urban-industrial targeting (occasioned by ^
scarcity of nuclear weapons), favoring the use of nuc weapons against military targets and a strategy whic
eluded
acje - a'r defense and strong conventional forces. A dec- Air FCr t^C ^'r Porce and Navy views were reversed. The °rce became the proponent of countemuclear,
c°unt 7 me proponent or countemuclear
becau^ *°rCe’ anc^ counter'ni>btary attacks, and the Navy, f>°lar'S/P °1 the yield/accuracy characteristics of the area t'S oseidon which was best suited for attacking soft CePt s'86'"' n°W ^avore<^ tllc counter-value deterrent con- °f the T*106 thC ^avy may Possess the on,y modernized leg to reth’ Trident I and II, the Navy may be forced
*nk its current views on nuclear strategy and deter-
rence current views on nuclear strategy and deter-
late lQ4ACeptS’ P°ssib,y returning to the views held in the
m1940s'
With crC<!Ver’ t*le Army and Air Force were in competition rivai h^r °^er *n *be mid- and late 1950s in developing rrient w- *St*C m'ss**e defense (BMD) concepts. This argu- rniSsio a?,muted as both services engaged in a “roles and ProariinSv battle over missile defense. The Army ap-
Jhe late
- -- ■ —* ....wui.w uviwnuv. 111V l VI 111J tip-
Nike-Zeus, was a terminal/point defense, while concept, Wizard, was an area defense.
0ffens',lUC ^Os and 1950s were given over to large-scale thl^c COmPetltion, although both the United States terns 6 ov*et Union deployed extensive air defense sys- fenSe n began BMD development. The Soviet air de- ing mcfiStern ^aS ^asted t0 tb's day, consistently undergo- Soviets ,ern‘zatmn and upgrading. As it turned out, the sive ajS better reason than we did to deploy the exten- Phasisr e*ense system that they did because of our emas exte°n- ^orr,bers. The U. S. air defense system was not able re SIVC 3S ^ov'et system, but consumed consider- sources and was extensive by our standards.
vertiM^v and Missile Defense: It was not until
rp„. . A evidence from fiArmnn pnoinppre ;irul
, . ________________ incontro-
rePatri-^feV,<^ence ^rom German engineers and technicians ^nited ^rom the Soviet Union in 1952 convinced the r°ckets 3teS l^at Soviets were developing long-range
^es’gn thand We exPer*enced a breakthrough in weapons able>> • 3t aP°wed an H-bomb to be placed on a “reason- kaUistiSlZe^ roc^et, that we restarted the intercontinental I947 a ni'ss'*e dCBM) program which was halted in the (jn-1 ^le same time that ICBMs looked feasible, both devejor,C ^tates and the Soviet Union undertook BMD fenseSvment ^MD systems, until the Site Dc-
'stics- thtem 0^tbe 1970s, shared two common character- P°int dei-e^ Were a*l designed for city defense, not hard- ense or defense of military targets; and they were
all terminal or point-defense systems. (Some work was done and continues to be done on area, mid-course, and boost-phase systems, but the technology was not available then to make such systems feasible, although eventually the exoatmospheric interceptor of the Safeguard system could reach out 400 miles. Space-based BMD over the last 20 years has always held a fascination for U. S. defense planners, but the cost was exorbitant and/or the technology unavailable to make it feasible until possibly now.) This required BMD to be accompanied by a civil defense program. Thus, by the end of the 1950s, the classic dialectic struggle between the offensive and defensive was joined as both Soviet and U. S. nuclear strategies and their respective weapon systems capabilities began to interact. It is interesting that while they were working to develop ICBMs and deploying an interim bomber force, the Soviets were spending more than half their nuclear force budget on strategic defenses. Today, the Soviet Union is spending about 30-40% of its defense budget on strategic defenses, whereas the United States is spending less than 5% of its strategic budget on defenses.
ICBMs became the primary Soviet threat in the 1960s, which caused U. S. strategic defense priorities to shift from air defense to missile defense. The latter then became synonomous with strategic defense. Ironically, U. S. BMD development and deployment was retarded by those opposed to BMD; they argued that U. S. BMD technology lacked the ability to overcome the U. S. offense. While this was true, the opposition failed to see that it was the Soviet offensive threat, not a U. S. one, that the U. S. BMD program had to overcome. By attributing advanced characteristics of U. S. offensive systems to the Soviets, which was not the case until very recently, a considerably successful action was fought against BMD deployment from the outset. While there were valid technical reasons that early BMD systems were not adequate to cope with the threat, the major opposition to strategic defenses was a belief that the objectives of such a strategy were incompatible with deterrence and arms control theories—mutual deterrence/assured destruction—which viewed defenses as provocative. The fact that BMD had to be accompanied by a large-scale civil defense program did not help matters either, since civil defense was viewed as destabilizing by the mutual deterrence advocates.
The U.S. public, as measured in surveys over the last two decades, has consistently expressed a belief that the government has deployed strategic defenses, including missile defenses, to guard the country; the respondents were in favor of civil defense measures but thought Congress was opposed to civil defense. Congress, on the other hand, has consistently expressed the view that civil defense is either impractical or the American public was opposed to it! Indeed, a vociferous, influential group of arms controllers, defense strategists, and scientists have
l,n8s / Juno 1983
had a disproportionate influence in fostering opposition to any kind of civil defense measures on the grounds that it is useless to try to protect people in the event of a nuclear war. It is ironic and tragic that we have allowed the emotional arguments, and twisted and distorted logic of deterrence—that defense is bad, but offense is good—to leave us without strategic defenses. Many of the same people who argued against strategic defenses in the past are currently in the forefront of the nuclear freeze and unilateral disarmament movements. More disturbing are the arguments and themes they are using—those of the Soviet peace, nuclear disarmament, and disinformation campaigns of the late 1940s, which the Soviets later used in their neutron bomb, Pershing II, and cruise missile campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Mutual Deterrence and Arms Control: In the early 1960s, the theory of mutual deterrence was postulated in this country. Proponents of the theory argued that greater stability in the U. S.-Soviet strategic balance would be achieved if both sides were mutually vulnerable to each other’s secure second-strike capability, i. e., if each side offered its populations as hostage to the other in order to deter nuclear war. Mutual deterrence depends on some undefinable combination of finite military capability and political will to be credible, and thus to influence Soviet perceptions in order to deter them from taking any action inimical to our interests that might lead to nuclear war. This theory presumed the Soviets had an interest in avoiding nuclear war and thus had a common interest in subscribing to mutual deterrence and being satisfied with nuclear parity based on an offensive capability.
Throughout most of the nuclear era, U. S. and Soviet views of nuclear war and the forces both sides acquired to support those views and their respective strategies have been radically divergent, a fact only conceded in the late 1970s at official levels of our government. The U. S. forces which were procured well before the latest generation of Soviet forces have typically had more capability than our declaratory policy has credited them with, but their existence has always been justified on the basis of a deterrent strategy. In the 1980s, while it is still possible for the United States to destroy Soviet society in terms relevant to our values, the preponderance of nuclear power has shifted from the United States to the Soviet Union. The U. S. view of deterrence remained remarkably consistent, although our rationalization of our forces and their capabilities changed at different times as the Soviet nuclear buildup continued. Similarly, our views on the nature of nuclear war remained unambiguous and consistent until 1974 when a series of changes in our employment policy began to occur, shifting our views from the simple, spasmodic holocaustic view of a nuclear exchange to a
When polled, much of the U. S. public was in favor of civil defense measures, including shelters such as this, but thought Congress was opposed to civil defense. Yet Congress has consistently expressed the view that civil defense is either impractical or the American public is opposed to it.
complex, protracted war notion in which survivability* endurance, reconstitution, and simultaneous military oper ations were emphasized.
48
In contrast, the Soviets have held that war is a continua tion of policy and that nuclear weapons, while more povV erful than conventional explosives, are still weapons an can be used. The Soviets believe nuclear war is wageab e and winnable. The Soviets, like ourselves, recognize early that nuclear weapons brought about a qualitati''1- change in the nature of warfare—that the opening phase o a conflict might be the only phase before war termination- This conclusion led the Soviets to place a great emphaslS on preemption because the existence of nuclear weapons creates the possibility of their use. This is a view t United States subconsciously understands but wants deny. Thus, the United States has consciously sough1 to prevent this understanding from becoming a reality m maintaining a high-nuclear threshold to ensure nucle' weapons are not used early, complemented by a deterre strategy which threatens unacceptable damage to an gressor. Ironically, a high-nuclear threshold coupled to nuclear-deterrent strategy is contradictory, because high-nuclear threshold robs the deterrent of its credibility’ since it suggests an unwillingness to use nuclear weapo[ ■ initially and requires large, capable standing convention air, land, and naval forces to meet any aggression. 1 ^ Soviets, on the other hand, reject as irrational the threat nuclear war if it leads to suicide. The presence of strateg defenses allows a reconciliation between reality and t U. S. vision of nuclear war on a strategic plane rather tn an emotional one without having to adapt to the Sov* view of nuclear war. Strategic defenses not only contr ute to deterrence, they can repulse an attack, shield t 1
t0 me and> protect the offense, and provide an opportunity re8a'n the initiative, rather than conceding it to an ne^y as a deterrent strategy does. ti0 UtUal deterrence is also referred to as assured destruc- later was called mutual assured destruction cred'h? ThC term l assured destruction”—which is not hin t* h t0 thC Soviets because they do not believe the e lted States is prepared to commit suicide—came to be the°Jleous|y equated with U. S. nuclear strategy despite both 3Ct that °Ur tarSet‘n8 and operational plans include ev c°untemuclear and counter-military targets. How- criteria" for assured destruction—40-70% indus- c destruction and 25^40% population fatalities—were ciaiSidered by many defense analysts, experts, and offi- e S as the minimum needed for deterrence because it was Sa a*ed w'th what the United States perceived as neces- sUr hT modern societal destruction. While the term “as- 0Ure, destruction” was used as a short-hand description of plo eclaratory policy, it was never a strategy nor an em- for^01611* policy- However, the concept was also used as a icyCe hZin8 ciateiaa> i-e-> to determine acquisition pol- ev , tae need for new offensive nuclear weapons was n)a,Uated against the marginal contribution they would de et° the numerical assured destruction criteria. Inci- itito f ’ the critcria for assured destruction as translated Used °rCe leVels and caPahilities—i. e., the Triad—were St as a floor above which anything was negotiable for f0re C8IC Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) purposes. Thereat’ tbe strategic objective to be protected by SALT was Sic df destructi°n- The Soviet preoccupation with strategy t efense was dismissed as an aberration or as an inabil- hay0 escape from their historical experience. The Soviets fen 6 a'ways favored a balance between offensive and de- ‘1Ve nuclear forces.
work, were easily and cheaply countered, would accelerate the arms race, and would prevent meaningful arms control. These arguments, combined with the offensive- dominant Air Force doctrine dating to the earliest days of air power and the strategic bombing experiences of World War II, mutually reinforced one another to prevent the deployment of strategic defenses.
The United States unilaterally withheld deployment of BMD from 1965 to late 1967 in hopes of persuading the Soviets to accept mutual deterrence and not to deploy a BMD for reasons of arms control. Even though the United States decided to deploy a BMD in 1967 (Sentinel), and later altered its mission in 1969 to ICBM defense (Safeguard), it was never seriously prepared to deploy missile defenses since it was prepared to give them up in SALT. Later, we even dismantled the one BMD site that we were permitted by SALT, perpetuating the view that strategic defenses are undesirable.
The arguments marshaled against developing or deploying BMD were also used against deploying civil defense programs, and are also being used today against the development of beam-type weapons for defense even before the feasibility of such weapons is discovered. The objective, opponents of BMD argue, is to preserve mutual deterrence through mutual vulnerability, not to find a defense against ICBMs. A variation on this theme occurs in the opposition to the United States developing antisatellite weapons, and a means for protecting our own space assets from Soviet antisatellite weapons, because this would add a new dimension to U. S.-Soviet arms competition by carrying military operations into space.
Conclusions: The U. S. rearmament program must not reaffirm and sanctify for another generation the bankrupt strategy of deterrence and the current approach to arms control that leaves the country without homeland defenses, making our population and cities deliberately vulnerable to Soviet attack, while the Soviets have extensive air and civil defenses plus an operational missile defense site around Moscow. The United States must not base its arms control efforts on the theology of mutual deterrence, which depends on some undefinable combination of military capability and political will to influence Soviet perceptions in order to deter them from taking any action inimical to U. S. interests. But today, deterrence is not mutual. The Soviets have shifted the nuclear balance and conceivably as far back as 1976 defeated our nuclear strategy. We are more vulnerable to attack because we did not
*VC|
edi"Rs / June 1983
an aUtUa* deterrence was also viewed as consistent with rCnt s control regime based on a finite offensive-determ 0rce- ft was thought that if the technological develop- and f°^ tbe °ffense could be kept ahead of the defense, c0nt' °^ense was restrained, then the offense would Prov*nUe l° ^eter without a new round of offensive im- idenff121115 3 race defensive systems. Defenses were d6pi1 led as provocative and destabilizing because their re]a(<)'yIrier|t would upset the mutual vulnerability/hostage adval0nSfl'P which was central to mutual deterrence. Any ual nnta®e which protected people or increased the resid- anat.Umber °f offensive weapons left after an attack was fflink'6013 t0 the advocates of mutual deterrence. This cated'nf= coincided with the arms control theory that advo- bMD Prevendn8 tbe deployment of strategic defenses, in t(l ln Particular, in order to preclude a new dimension rencee, ' 8.-Soviet arms competition. The mutual deter- valu and arms control theories combined to denigrate the theoe stra(egic defenses, whose value is not based on Werg but on military fact. However, while the theories ent__tTlutually reinforcing, the policy reality was differ- Untii thtrategy and arms control policy from'the late 1960s WLjch 6 Presenf have tended to travel on divergent paths, ady0 ■1S 'nconsfstent with sound strategic planning. The Provo3.teS °f mutual deterrence argued that defenses were cative, destabilizing, not cost-effective, would not
Officer in 1970. In 1975, he became Nuclear Policy Advisor in ^g( which he received the DoD Meritorious Service Medal for his w°ranj
deploy our defenses, even when they were available, on the theory that mutual vulnerability was less provocative to the Soviets than attempts to defend ourselves. According to the deterrence theory, our security depends on Soviet goodwill and intentions, while there are no limits placed on Soviet armaments because they do not subscribe to mutual deterrence. U. S. unilateral restraint, coupled with a misplaced belief in arms control and a massive, decade-long Soviet military buildup, has left us vulnerable to a Soviet attack and incapable of defending our homeland. There is little we can do except admit the errors of the past while there is still time and prepare to meet the Soviet threat head-on by building strategic defenses, much as England did against Germany in the 1930s.
One of the arguments opponents of strategic defenses make is that the deployment of a system of strategic defenses is equivalent to the adoption of a first-strike strategy, i.e., one side might be tempted to launch a surprise attack and rely on its system of defense to counter the other side’s retaliatory strike. This is where the logic of deterrence and present-day arms control theory leads! While this logic may make sense to the opponents of strategic defense, it belies the traditional American disdain for initiating wars of aggression. Because of our historical experiences and beliefs regarding war, no one would seriously believe that the U. S. deployment of a strategic defense system signifies the adoption of a first-strike strategy. This would be counter to our moral, political, religious, and cultural beliefs.
Despite the arguments against strategic defenses, there are a number of reasons why strategic defenses do contribute to a deterrent strategy. First, penetrating defenses can be so costly in terms of resources and forces so as to make the effort not worthwhile. The multi-billion dollar penetration aid and multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) programs for ICBM and sea-launched ballistic missiles to penetrate Soviet missile defenses is an excellent example. Such programs are not cheap, nor were the technical solutions easy. Second, defenses cause great uncertainty for the conservative offense planner as to the effectiveness of his resources to accomplish their objectives. Third, defenses exert virtual attrition on the payloads of the offense by forcing either defensive systems and penetration aids to be carried at the expense of warheads, or warhead yields to be reduced as the number of weapons are fractionated to increase penetration. Strategic defense provides a military option which is initially defensive, does not require immediate or hasty offensive counteraction, and preserves the offense for future use. Finally, there are some who view defenses as a way out of the moral and religious dilemma posed by an offense-dominant deterrent doctrine.
Defenses are intended to make any attack extremely costly, repel an attack, and preserve or protect a target in order to allow its essential functions to continue to perform even when damaged or under attack. The value, vulnerability, and priority of targets in terms of their worth to the defender and his strategy must be carefully assessed, and only those targets essential to the success of the defender’s strategy or which can defeat the attacker’s strategy are defended. Damage is to be expected. But what
rates of attrition can be expected to deter and if deterrence fails what active and passive measures will, under con • tions of damage, allow a target to function or survive an the initiative to be resumed by the offensive? If the offense in the nuclear age cannot be sure of success or absolute decisiveness in its initial attacks in the presence of e fenses, then the defense may well have contributed to e terrence in a manner uniquely different from an offense dominant or offense-only deterrent. The latter two ma -e the deterrent credible only if the attacker believes they wi and can be used. If the attacker thinks he has a way 0 neutralize the deterrent, the deterrent no longer deters- Whereas in the presence of defenses, the attacker mus assume there will be no hesitancy to use the defenses- complicating the issue of whether to attack in the t> place. In a deterrent strategy where defenses are preset^, they are there to be used, whereas the offense is there so will not have to be used. Our inability or unwillingness ^ think about strategic defenses in such a systematic way left us with few options as the strategic balance shifts n ward the Soviets, the credibility of our deterrent is wea ened, and deterrence may no longer be mutual. while, we are buying more offense to restore the strate^ balance eroded by the massive Soviet buildup, i e., fense begets more offense without necessarily increas our security. Strategic defenses were rejected not on s^ tegic grounds but because they did not conform t0 , theories of mutual deterrence and arms control w themselves have proved invalid.
The time and circumstances have come when a rec ^ sideration of the value and role of homeland defense^ needed, for political as well as strategic reasons. Our nerability to attack must be reduced and our homelau^ defense considered if the United States is to meet threat of Soviet power in the 1980s and 1990s. We negate the Soviet nuclear threat. This can only be 0 ^ with strategic defenses, including early warning and a ' assessment systems placed as a buffer between the bo offensive threat and the modernization of our often forces. .tjcai
The national security establishment and our po11 leadership must take the possibility of war seriously n withstanding our belief in deterrence. In face 0 growth of Soviet military power and the race for a tec ^ logical breakthrough in directed energy weapons, seT^{Si consideration of strategic homeland defenses is the ^ step in examining our security strategically and not tionally as it was for England almost 50 years ago-
Dr. Adams received a Ph.D in political science and internationa tions from the University of Pennsylvania. He entered the State 6 ment’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs as a Foreign Service ^ fice of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy^ nuclear strategy. He is currently Director, DoD Contract Stua,L. nse. Management Support Services in the Office of the Secretary of De _,t He is also Adjunct Professor in the National Security Studies ^ Graduate School, Georgetown University, and Instructor of 0f Strategy at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and an Ballistic Missile Defense (American Elsevier, 1971).
50
Proceedings / Juntl