Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

Dyad: Less is More

Manning the Carriers

The Unobvious Lessons of the Falklands War

My Dear Canada

Naval War College: The Right Stuff?

An Old-Fashioned Modern War

The Soviet Navy: Changing of the Guard?

Leadership: Again and Again

Eight Wishes

Flight from Reality

ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in tke Proceedings.

“Dyad: Less is More”

(See A. C. A. Jampoler, pp. 65-70, April 1983 Proceedings)

Major General John C. Toomay, U. S. Air Force (Retired)—Captain Jampoler did a good job of describing the qualita­tive-quantitative nature of deterrence and the evolution of the Triad as our strategic deterrent. But his leap to the Dyad solu­tion was too precipitous. Deterrence is a complex entity, requiring much “think­ing through” and “piecing together” if we are going to understand what we are doing and conjoin the correct systems.

There are disquieting aspects concern­ing each of the current legs of the Triad. The Minuteman is vulnerable to an inter­continental ballistic missile (ICBM) strike. The bombers may be attacked by sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or by sabotage, or they may be inter­cepted before they can attack their tar­gets. Our current submarine force is in­vulnerable to attack; yet, the fact that there are so few submarines makes them catastrophically susceptible to a tracking threat, if one should become available. Furthermore, if a submarine or two dis­appeared, the cause might very well be ambiguous. What actions could we or would we take—and against whom?

With our Triad we sought to have inde­pendent survivability and penetration modes for each—so that the Soviets would have to solve six technology prob­lems and deploy systems for each which were qualitatively different. Because the longer range SLBMs are essentially the same as the ICBMs in their penetration mode, we achieved only five separate independent modes. Switching from a Triad to a Dyad reduces the number of these independent modes, greatly reduc­ing the overall problem of coping with the entire Triad. Simplistically, if the probability of dealing successfully with one independent mode is . 1, the probabil­ity of dealing with six is 10~⁶, but if the six is reduced to four or perhaps three, then the overall probability becomes 1CT⁴ or 10^-3. These are not large num­bers, but we want our country’s vulnera­bility to be much, much less than these.

When James Schlesinger was Secre-

ary of Defense, he acknowle g ^ solutions by both Soviet and ■ _ap. egic deterrents might make a > _Q[l\d iropriate. His concern was that w _by irrive at a Dyad by default, p_e :hoice. So Captain Jampoler _broUgh ight, but let’s be sure we think t thoroughly before we decide ^e

“Manning the Carriers”

(SeeC. R. Jones, PP-J2-93, D M. E. Duffy, p. 22, March 1983 trru rr S

Commander M. R. Goodwin, U- ^J' _S. Commanding Officer, USS M _the Tisdale (FFG-27)-The “Manmng^ Carriers” contribution has the P^,j_tneSs to delight readers for months.

IU UGligm                                       . n 1

Commander Duffy’s ready solu i March issue.

Zoons! Give every carrier

comma¹

ind"

>ost

ing officer (CO) five or six top department head officers to stan. ^_aVal watches. Roger, Out! Chief ⁰ j_nto

WdlLIlCS. IVUgCl, wui.                     Jjp

Military Personnel Command            .yt-

your pool of stashed 1110 P^oS             of

ment heads and pluck out an ex ^_ntrol so. (Don’t we do this in ^tl^anULfj^C_ts?) assistant and chief engineer bi ^a ^unit.V I can already hear the ^c ^ir stati°ⁿ jokes” in the ready rooms and

“Hey Ed, you got five U ^₀od ’    ’ but

clubs:

neycu, yuugun.- . ‘Got them yesterday,

_uui „,_wii __________________________  _ _duJ

for officer-of-the-deck d^u,‘^e* _vvith wouldn’t let my daughter g° one of them.”

ide^f

in

the

Come to think of it, ^<p°ⁿ. ^ ^os Duffy’s idea isn’t so bad. Wit p,* engineering, deck, combat, an _tak⁶

bridge—tomorrow, CO! Why i" the easy way out, save personne _readi' both communities, and bicrea ^_£[e ess? Leave the five or six 1 ,„_raftcnf'

they are and merely make the ahj* y/aV- rier (CV) a 1110 command. ‘"jeS- 1110 command opportunity ' _n ass^et the 13XX community gets bacK:                                                         _sbod'

to apply toward their senior oH ^ _taCticm

y tuwatu uivu                                                                       ’

[, and the CV gets the s^urtace _ught' _r.ift. The CO can “easily be ^ta^_rr re unique requirements offi'S          ,_s on

jplift. The CO can the unique requirements oi “'^Ppp,_cers tions by the “myriad of 13XX ⁰ board the CV.”

,98-¹

T

p_ajk| ⁿ®^bv*^ous Lessons of the                                       But a U. S. Navy carrier doesn’t carry

($<?e ^ant*^s War”                                 limited-range vertical or short take-off/

ProceedJn^’ ^pp' ^50_57> ^AP^ril 1983                        landing (V/STOL) fighters, however use­

ful those have proven to be to the U. S. Arthur D R i-, ,    .                       Marines in their proper role of close-air

article on th 'VTri Admiral Turner’s support. The CV/CVN carries more than ^many perce f ^a Elands Conflict contains   80 high-performance aircraft in an air

°f which ar *7? cornrnents’ ^{not tbe} least            group-optimized for almost any foreseea-

^lraining _an,|⁶ *i* v'^{ews on tbe} value of               ble contingency. Because of their fleet’s

%ence. I_n th"¹!. 6 nCCd ^^or S^eneral intel-                lack of airborne early warning (AEW)

Unfortunat_e “p- alttj^{r area}’ ^{bc ecboes} the                    capability, marginal air defenses, and

‘^'■igenceic lri^tLaW°^{fIntelligenCe:}”                   ^minimal antisubmarine warfare (ASW)

t0 the cost of ^Vu Cd ln dlrect P^r°P^ortion                  effectiveness, the small British carriers

But there ° ^tain*ⁿg it.                              had to be stationed so far to the east of the

Admiral Turn '^S ,°^{ne sub}j^ec* ^{on wb}'^cb             Falklands that the Sea Harriers, pressed

ar>d that is ^{Cr se}®^ms to be dead wrong,             however inadequately into the role of

Navy’s aircraft' • r°^le °^{f the Royal comba[} air patrol (CAP) aircraft, could ^par from nrov' carners *^{n tbe} conflict.           only maintain an air defense station for

^s'zed, in_ .^ln® ^{tbe va}'^ue °f^sucb under-               about 20 minutes; it was not only the

Arable mini '^PPC ’ Und extremely vul-               Argentines who were operating on the

f^ave amDlv                  ^{tbc cvents seem} to                margins of their fuel reserves, at least

ted that, for a navy                                              until the ground strip was established at

to carry out policy San Carlos.

would be more of Remarkable though the British post- Admira/T" ^{30 asset}‘     conflict expedient of adapting a handful

deck carrier’ ^Urn^^r downplays the large-           of Sea King helicopters as early warning

eVer PTOvin S u° ⁶ *^{n SCa contro}* without         radar platforms may be, no one would

Subset of th⁸ pv ^CaSe' ^{Sea control is a}                         pretend that these have anywhere near the

^CaPabilitj_es 6 h ^{/CVN S broad menu of}                   capabilities of an E-2C. There is no way

[^ar less cost ffEreaS the minicarrier’ ^{a                                        10} equate the intercept abilities of the

L^{le of} not _m ^P h ^{CtlVC platform}’ ^{is ca}P^a'                      ^F*¹⁴> working with or without the E-2C,

have not tak ^6lSe' ^{He argues that we                                          with those of the Sea HaiT}ier, even with

labilities th ^{St6PS t0 diffuse antishi}P                              ^an AEW Sea King. The F/A-18 Hornet,

‘°^day the vast ^r°^{Ughout the fleet}’ yet                    ^now entering service, can perform any

destroy_{ers f} ■ maJ^onty °f our cruisers,                 role infinitely better than the Royal

Submarines ^ngates’. ^and nuclear attack                    Navy’s Sea Harrier or the Soviet Navy’s

missiles, andTh ^eq„^Ulpped with Harpoon                  “Forger.” The A-6 can deliver ordnance

'!^lth large numh ^CC' ^{wil1 be} equipped                      in all weather, whereas the air war in the

shiP cruise _m- ^b('^{rs ol} longer-ranged anti-               Falklands was limited to daylight hours

n®ar future AT^{65 (ASCMs})^{in th}e very                  in good flying conditions. The S-3 Vi-

^Ship munition ^t0 aircraft-delivered anti-             king on board the CVs/CVNs, combined

pairing _th_e ^S’ '^{he probIem is on}e of                             with carrier and escort-borne SH-3 heli-

^me<U, like L SyStems now in develop-                  copters, provides a range of ASW capa-

availabl_c, _Hk^aS'^r Maverick, or already                    bilities well beyond what could be

lp§ the assets" f ^arpo?^{n n}°l in spread-                     handled in a non-catapult-equipped mini-

thc fleet in • °^{f aerial} delivery around                     carrier—without compromising the

^formance ^a!h^Craft °^{f inherc}ntly lower                    larger aircraft carrier’s ability to perform

ace°mmodated ^{an th}°^{Se which} can be her other missions.

, 1° the Fair| °? ^{a ,ar}ge-deck carrier. None of the above is intended to deni­ed two small^{2 S C}°^nflict’ ^tbe E^r‘tish            grate the Royal Navy, its magnificent pi-

0.000 tons ,] CaiT'^{ers tota}ling less than                   lots, or its fine aircraft. But, in the Falk-

PlUtn, some ₃₀^1S_R^PlaCement. At a maxi-               lands, those men and machines were

apd RAF j j_a . ^Koyal Navy Sea Harriers            pressed into services under conditions for

f’ uyed o_n k₀ ?^r aircraft were de-                     which they had not been intended, from

^°^uld want f^{r tbem}' Assuming anyone               ships that were barely adequate for the

. 'Eties to that" ^restr'^{ct tbe} Navy’s capa-             task. The Royal Navy may have con-

• S. Navy „^CXlcnt’ ^a single 80,000-ton                    trolled the surface of the sea around the

Q°^re than 15o^aiu.^{er COldd} accommodate            Falklands, but it did not, as implied by

(jf^ition cost of .^arr'^ers’ ^{at a carr}ier ac-                Admiral Turner, control the skies above

». ’"'o 19,800 t ^C/^{S t}*^{lan lw}’^{ce tbe} P^r‘^ce                or the depths beneath. At no time did the

umerou_s d_ct. °.ⁿ '^nvinc,ble-class ships.       two “sea-control” carriers establish con­, ^at the econom* 6 *^tud*^{es bave} shown        trol of the air above the islands, while the

e 'n carrier d ^sca*^{e are} inescapa-                            Argentine submarine San Luis apparently

s Proportion⁰1l8n’ ^lberC'^{s no wa}y t°                      operated with near impunity in the vicin-

niaUer ship ³ ° clfectiveness in a                         ity of the fleet and its carriers for an ex­

The Falklands Conflict, then, is a poor example to cite in support of emasculat­ing the Navy’s capabilities through the acquisition of expensive, sub-optimal sea control aircraft carriers. If there is one technological lesson of the fighting which comes through loud and clear, it is that the large-deck carrier remains the best solution to the broadest spectrum of sea power requirements.

“My Dear Canada”

(See J. L Byron, p. 124, March 1983 Proceedings)

Commander J. A. Keenliside, Canadian Forces, Supreme Allied Command, At­lantic Headquarters—Commander By­ron’s mixture of fact, half-truths, and fantasy reflects his ignorance of Canada’s naval role both nationally and in NATO.

Commander Byron suggests that sub­marines “would seriously threaten any enemy force entering” Canadian waters. However, he conveniently fails to sug­gest how diesel submarines would counter an air/missile threat in these wa­ters or how they would counter modem nuclear submarines in deep unrestricted waters.

Does Commander Byron believe that submarines alone can address all of Can­ada’s naval requirements? The present shortfall of escorts for reinforcement and resupply shipping would not be helped by an all-submarine Canadian Navy. Again, the air threat must be considered. Diesel submarines cannot perform national tasks such as fishery protection, economic zone protection, and drug interdiction.

Does Commander Byron think that any nation would build a particular force merely to provide training platforms for a neighboring country? While it is agreed that some diesel submarines are required for antisubmarine warfare training, he is grasping at straws when he suggests that this should become Canada’s role.

Finally, if diesel submarines are as good as he thinks, why is the United States “about to go out of the diesel sub­marine business?” It would appear that his infatuation with diesel boats is cloud­ing his judgment about the requirement for any navy to have, within its budget and the resources of its country, a bal­anced maritime force to meet its full scope of commitments.

The charitable offer of some old, worn-out submarines is respectfully de­clined. After all, nobody asked him.

James M. Sullivan, Vancouver, British Columbia—Seems it takes a world con­flict before Canada can show the flag

tended period.

tively few naval officers on t e ^_c.

-                                    •      - Goiieg^

deliberately

uveiy icw uavai                                _ae !

Newport is that Naval War Col^g^ ulty assignments are as

_______________  fViP stu

avoided as are the assignments to . dent body. The fact that ^on^^t“"’_tn brag

11 S-^^a'

■donel Edward V. ^Ba^^aW’„d Mari^ne ne Corps, Special Assistan             g_ecre-

orps Aide, Office of the Ass

■ce, Marine Corps-, _faC, ard.” As a Naval War Colleg _{Jd b}e

mber, Commander Jackso

offi^cerS

anywhere (or on its own coasts for that matter), and only on the ships that were built during the war, as this capability is soon abolished as the ships are sold to others or to the breakers.

The Canadian Government officials have the same idea now as they had after World War II with naval and merchant ships: get rid of them and let someone else carry the load—only the next time there may not be another chance at gath­ering another fleet.

After being in the navy during World War II, then on merchant vessels after, and seeing the bottoms sold from under me—I know of what I speak.

Commander Byron is 100% right when he says that Canada’s effort in the naval defense of North America is nil; we no longer have a merchant fleet to carry sup­plies to our north if that is the case, nor a navy to protect it.

It is one thing to have all the fish boats become the eyes of the navy and air force (as was done in World War II on the west coast) and quite another to have ships or submarines alongside those who would venture into our waters, so they know of your presence wherever they may be.

“Naval War College: The Right Stuff?”

(See J. E. Jackson, pp. 71-77, April 1983

Proceedings)

Commander Thomas B. Buell, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Does the Naval War College have the “right stuff?” asks this article, whose title is borrowed from a popular book about astronauts and test pilots. The confusing title aside, the arti­cle does contain welcome news for those who advocate the worth of senior service colleges and the advanced professional education that they offer. The impetus has come in recent months from the Chief of Naval Operations, who, in an encour­aging development, has bestirred the Navy Department to make better use of the Naval War College. The naval service will be the better for it.

Yet, although the article tells much about the college’s reaction to its new visibility, too many things have been left unsaid. Inconsistencies and ambiguities in senior officer educational programs remain, as reflected—probably uninten­tionally—in the article itself, which is not unlike an upbeat public relations bro­chure with glowing assessments of the institution’s programs. And while it does identify problems, often in passing, it does not come to grips with the hard-core issues that so urgently need resolution.

The author accurately identifies the central dilemma: the short supply of top- quality students, a problem as old as the War College itself. The proposed solution is to advertise a curriculum with incen­tives that prospective students cannot re­sist, a program that is relevant to the Navy’s needs; makes a naval officer a better performer after graduation; pro­vides a faculty and physical facilities ade­quate to support the program; and pro­vides an experience that will be “helpful” in subsequent tours.

The contradiction is that these criteria are no more than platitudes that could apply to any number of Navy schools and courses of instruction. Why then is the Naval War College special? No one seems able to supply an answer. Its mis­sion statement is so broad and so vague that it can be interpreted many ways by many people, and the result is confusion. Furthermore, these four criteria could have been said about the college at any time during the past decade, and yet our very best commanders and captains, es­pecially those wearing dolphins, avoided the college in the past. Why should things be different now?

Meanwhile, through this article the college is out recruiting much like a church that is seeking converts by offer­ing programs intended to attract prospec­tive members. But until those outside the church doors are convinced that attend­ance is synonymous with eternal salva­tion, the pews will never be filled. Simi­larly, until naval officers can be made to believe that college attendance is neces­sary for promotion, they will stay away from Newport as before.

The issue is not so much with the Naval War College, but rather with the Navy, which is still without a profes­sional education policy with any teeth in it. As a matter of comparison, the Army is not the least bit squeamish in stating its dogma: a prerequisite for selection to general rank is attendance at the Army War College (or its equivalent). A similar policy for naval officers aspiring to flag rank is unlikely.

The article does say that by 1984 the Navy Department will require from 55 to 75 post-command commanders and cap­tains to enroll annually in the ten-month course. What does this figure really mean? It would have been illuminating to have included the percentage that these numbers represent within the total pool of post-command officers. Given the aggre­gate of ships, squadrons, and equivalent shore commands in the Navy, it cannot be too large. The article also failed to say whether a significant number of submari­ners can be expected to enroll. The an­swer is probably not. A pessimistic con­clusion is that it will be business as usual

as to student assignment practices- _t0 The author apparently is sensiti ^ criticism that war colleges can  ^

“single-service oriented.” T is                _{0

problem at Newport, we are S understand, because only 41% °             _e

ulty are naval officers. Given                  ^

than half are either civilians or .^_gr. other services, the curriculum y ^ ence is not “single-service orien e thereby should satisfy those cri  .^_e(j

want the service colleges to be so as to lose their identity. On the c ^ students at the Naval War Co j_oeS serve to learn about what the ^a best: naval warfare.       therela'

The more plausible reason tor ^ ^

faculty are civilians is nothing ^_avv about because it confirms tha ^ ^ _ul)j- continues to rely upon those ^oU .j_cj_ng. form to do the Navy’s strategic _g(j to The naval officer is thereby re the role of advisor to             allege

civilians.   Indeed, the Naval           g_ervice>

President, Rear Admiral ^JaI?^eS_course °^f was quoted as saying that ^{1 e}    . ■

instruction prepared naval o ¹ _cboos- to serve as executive advisors ^jijtary ing and supporting fu^tur® ,_icy and forces.” Hence, when the    _meinber^s

Strategy     Department ^faculty           _n be^ttef

teach how military officers . _{n a}nd appreciate their role in the i° policy

execution of national secun ^^ ^ t their explanation will still be, _{an a}n­do much.” I am still waiting i „_The swer to the question I P°^SC _liary l9^ Education of a Warrior ( ^a _will we Proceedings, pp. 40-45). get our future strategists?

irps suae, ujjicc yj - „_rnndR^ese ^ ry of the Navy (Manpower  _p0inW^d

fairs)—Commander Jacks                   _rUdde^r

t the rejuvenation and eh^anS _e I# ders which the Naval War   ₀f m^s

badly needed. However,                         _stat^eS

mments needs correcting-                     _sjtion^s

at “only 41% of the facu S j_be r£ e filled by naval officers ", '_the aining 25% are officers from_Coas ir Force, Marine Corps,          faculty

Illl/V* ____  ^ ^

linded that Marine Corps ^otI'^_ved as naval officers and ^haV® _repub^|lC; l since the founding o ⁰

(Continued on p *

Proceedings

Comment and Discussion

(Continued from page 20.)

“An Old-Fashioned Modern War”

(See T. J. McKearney. pp. 117-120, November 1982; C. E. Zartmann, p. 87, February 1983; T. L. Clancy, p. 92, April 1983 Proceedings)

Commander Marshall Van Sant Hall, U. S. Navy—Mr. Clancy characterized the Argentine seizure of the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands as “purse snatching.” As a former exchange officer (afloat) with the Argentine Navy, I have a less superficial view of Argentine policy.

The North American ethnic memory of colonialism is a lost part of our culture. Other Americans, namely Latin Ameri­cans, do not have to speculate at length about Argentine motives nor do they have to ponder deeply U. S. behavior during

the conflict. From their perspective, ac­cumulated exasperation explains one and unprincipled national self-interest ex­plains the other.

Mr. Clancy sees the conflict through British eyes. As members of the Western Hemisphere community, we should be more circumspect. The Falklands issue contains dangerous North-South antago­nisms. We must also remember that we have compromised our credibility as a mediator. As soon as it became apparent that we could not broker the conflict away, we took sides. This placed us in the difficult position of combating a new kind of colonialism (communism) in Central America while we abetted the old kind of colonialism in South America.

ilar to that held during the Stalin er

the 1930s.                                    mtion^aS

There is a much simpler exp ^a _naVjl to what is going on in the Sov>^e g₀gg_S

be-

ivz w            to                          —                   „

leadership, something that • hints at in his article. He comp

ninis di in tuuvit-. ** attacks on Stalbo, hence Gorsh o j^_onjd ing similar to those made ^aS^alIJ.^s, j_s rule- Brezhnev in the last months o

One can easily see the curren ,_ace as a jockeying for position, not ⁰ Th‘^s Gorshkov now, but when he ¹ ,_u(jjng would explain many things* ¹ why Gorshkov could be attacke ^ ^ the naval press, while at the ^s:a’_n ^_on, receiving a second Order              „_val of"

the Communist Party; and why -

been

fleers would argue that the na^y ^Hi- overemphasized within the So ^

minutes ot aerial swash­buckling, starring the flying aces of “Our Fighting Navy”.

• Dec. 7th: Oscar winner John Ford’s classic and bloody record of Pearl Harbor and the first Carrier attack in history.

• Battle of Midway: Academy Award Director Ford's immortal documentary. The air assault of Japanese bombers and the battle with Attack Carriers cost the enemy 28 ships and 300 aircraft.

• Black Cat*-: Catalina PBY Night Bombers; slow, ungainly sea birds. Tough planes and men taking on Jap Zeros and Heavy Cruisers. A handful of cantankerous PBY’s against overwhelming odds.

• Carrier Action - Korea: Aboard the Valley Forge oft Korea. Aerial action with WW II Cor­sairs and AD Skyraiders sharing the scrap with F9f Panther Jets against enemy Migs. Rare footage of torpedo attacks on N. Korean dams.

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“The Soviet Navy: Changing of the Guard?”

(See R. C. Suggs, pp. 36-42, April 1983

Proceedings)

Vernon D. Bashaw—Having read Dr. Suggs’s article, I am convinced that something is going on within the Soviet naval hierarchy. But I am not convinced that it signals the end of the Gorshkov-era in the Soviet Navy.

Dr. Suggs sees that a well-planned se­ries of attacks have begun against Admi­ral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov in the form of criticisms of an article by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, a man who may not even exist. Gorshkov’s opponents are said to be young submariners who disa­gree with the conservatism in the navy.

The evidence provided, however, does not support a view as extreme as Dr. Suggs’s. Critics of Stalbo’s article pre­dominantly argue that he has overempha­sized the Navy’s role, a strange argument for any naval officer to make. Further­more, Dr. Suggs tries to make the debate into a dispute between “conservatives” (such as Stalbo and Gorshkov) and “young innovators.” The term conserva­tive does not work. Gorshkov has been the prime force behind the modernization of the Soviet Navy. The notion of the navy’s proper role as one of interconnec­tion with the ground and air forces is sim­

tary structure. This sounds lik^e _sec0re ³ impress nonmilitary leaders to _one s top position, not the way to se<^c        And

position among other naval 'f^^ginin? if this is merely part of a '

if³

it tms is merely pan u. ** . _see position,” we will have to wai _rea‘ change in leadership will mean _eSpe- change in Soviet naval P^raC*l^J’s c^'

cnange in ouvici „a.u. r . _v „ dally given the fact that Gorsh past rent critics have defended hinn ¹ for and have served under his lea long periods of time.                                                  , _of an ^c{i'

It is too soon to mark the en

Leadership: Again and ^8^

(See H. G. Rickover, pp. 129-130

1982; J. W. Leverton, K. W. ^Estes’/3l, Triebel, J. J. Noel, T. Rishel, PP- ¹ _s December 1982; J. E. Greenwoo , gg, Jenson, J. Caldwell, C. N. Myers. £>1, ^ January 1983; W. P. Casada, L.                                                                            \V- '^J'

W. Bowers, pp. 83-84, February Spincola, J. A. Palmer, pp- 26,                      » q

1983; J. L. Byron, D. R- Putnam, •

-26, April 1983; M- * _May

Rickover, pp. 22-               . -_r—

Joenks, J. E. Heg, J. W. Stratton, P 1983 Proceedings)

Captain James H. Patton,

Navy—As most recipients °> ings, I’ve spent a considerable ^ gn­ome reading through one a ' _e v>e^ other concerning leadership- . better than others, of course, ^a _on n­all resulted in further pro-an ^ [H°^s sponse from the most junior   _seni0

senior of readers. One of the m

Hint

of

Proceedings