Book Reviews, Professional Reading & Book List

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Defense. Washington, DC:

^s- S6.50 ($5.85)

Printing Office, 1983. 107 pp.

^{VleWed h}> Norman Polmar

°f Defense Caspar Wein- ond _eti-^{as a} best-selling book in this sec- Thi_s j_s !f^lon Soviet Military Power. sp_ee(s ^{e most} graphic and, in some re- Par_e(j V^{most S0}Phisticated statement pre- the (j_Cf°^r ^^ongress and the public when Mr r ^budS^et'^s P^ut forward.

Soviet ^e'^nber8^er describes the intensive Picture ^Weapons buildup in words and ^cUs_Sj_Qn^S' ^ special interest are the dis- ^s'rik_e ^S °* ^{tbe new} long-range Soviet Tupolev Blackjack; the With a . ^sea'Munched cruise missile l2,5oo^rUn^^e nautical miles; the

rnissiie !°ⁿ- ‘Krasina”-class antiship fine

at two shipyards.’

1 '“wuoir (i

‘Krasina”-class ___________________ _r

Marine r^Cru'.^{ser; and} “^{a new} attack sub- tion it ^lch] will begin series produc-

“Soviet Space Systems,” which is a new and fascinating section not contained in the first edition, opens with a dramatic artist’s view of a Soviet orbital antisatel­lite (ASAT) weapon firing at a Western satellite with a multiple-pellet blast. The report notes that “the Soviet quest for military supremacy has expanded into space.” During the past decade, the So­viet Union has launched four to five times more spacecraft per year than the United States, and during the past few years, the Soviets have annually placed in orbit ten times the U. S. payload.

Here—as elsewhere in the report—the space section goes on to address the how and why of the Soviet space effort. As impressive as his numbers and details is a drawing comparing the new U. S. and Soviet space launch vehicles. Although the U. S. space shuttle may be more flex­ible than the planned Soviet booster rock­ets that are illustrated, the three Soviet vehicles include one with almost half-

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again the space shuttle’s lift-off thrust, while one Soviet vehicle can lift four to five times the shuttle’s payload to an alti­tude of 180 kilometers.

Mr. Weinberger does point up short­falls in the Soviet program, which “re­flects some technological weakness in the area of [satellite] longevity and flexibil­ity.” And, like many presentations of this type, a direct Soviet-U. S. compari­son is given mainly when it serves the purpose of Mr. Weinberger’s message, as do the charts on air defense interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), theater nuclear missiles, etc. The Soviet Union is clearly ahead in all of these cate­gories and can be expected to remain so. However, there are no comparisons of, for example, Soviet and U. S. aircraft carriers or amphibious lift capability. Still, the message clearly pervades that the Soviets have military supremacy in many areas and are seeking it in others.

While the Soviet Union is deploying more weapons in most categories than the United States, the Soviets are also pursu­ing the goal “of world leadership in sci­ence and technology,” according to Mr. Weinberger. In a section entitled “Re­sources and Technology,” details are given of the expansion of the Soviets’ indigenous technology base as well as the acquisition and assimilation of Western technologies. Again, the numbers are impressive: the Soviets have more people engaged in research and development than in the United States, with a higher percentage engaged in military efforts, and more Soviet engineers are graduated annually.

In this section, one finds what may be the report’s most important message. Using electronics as an example, Mr. Weinberger notes, “The Soviets are be­hind the West in overall capability, but

President Reagan receives the second edition of Soviet Military Power from Secretary of Defense Weinberger. This sophisticated update includes a new section on “Soviet Space Systems.’’

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^Cdi,

^ln8s / June 1983

79

are about equal in terms of electronics used in deployed weapons.” The West, and especially the United States, may be ahead in research and development and even in available technology in some areas, but the Soviets certainly seem to be on a par or leading in many deployed weapons technologies. This, coupled with the high Soviet weapons production rates and their prolific rate of deploying new weapons, makes Soviet military power a most awesome force in modem political and military affairs. The Soviets can be expected to continue to have more SAM launchers at sea, to operate more ship days out-of-area, and have more an­tiship cruise missiles. The deployment of Harpoon will give the U. S. Navy a nu­merical advantage by 1985 in antiship missiles with ranges out to 60 nautical miles. However, the Soviet Navy will continue to have many times the number of longer range antiship cruise missiles.

Soviet Military Power’s presentation is impressive, with colorful globes and maps, relatively good black-and-white photographs of Soviet weapons, well- done charts and tables, and very impres­sive artists’ concepts to open sections, which include the ASAT, a drawing of the second “Oscar”-class missile subma­rine fitting out at the Severodvinsk Ship­yard, and the vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft carrier Minsk in a float­ing dry dock. The report’s language is a little more sophisticated than the previous edition’s, which in parts seemed intended for schoolchildren; this year the ship and aircraft photos have not had the identifi­cation numbers carelessly retouched. Yet, one finds on page 5 that the new “Krasina” displaces 12,500 tons and on page 58, she is 13,000 tons; the nuclear cruiser Kirov is listed at 23,000 tons on page 55 while the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Military Posture statement, published at almost the same time, gives the battle cruiser a displacement of 28,000 tons, the same number published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The biggest problem with Soviet Mili­tary Power will be that those persons generally against an improvement in the U. S. defense posture will probably ig­nore it and those in favor will most likely quote it as a bible. Those who read it ob­jectively probably will conclude that Soviet military power is increasing, in opposition to what much of the public has come to believe from segments of the American press and several members of Congress. One observer has noted that last November an article in The New York Times questioned the significance of the Soviet T-80 tank with the headline “Nonexistent Tank.” Soviet Military

Power has a full-page photo of the tank and notes that more than 1,900 have al­ready been produced.

Mr. Polmar, a regular Proceedings contributor, is an analyst and author in the defense and naval fields. He is the editor of the Naval Institute’s Ships and Air­craft of the U. S. Fleet and Guide to the Soviet Navy. Mr. Polmar reviewed the first edition of Soviet Mili­tary Power in the February 1982 Proceedings and the Soviet rebuttal Whence the Threat to Peace in the November 1982 Proceedings.

Korea: The Untold Story of the War

Joseph C. Goulden. New York: Times Books, a division of Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1982. 650 pp. Maps. Illus. Ind. Bib $23.99 ($21.59).

Reviewed by Lieutenant DeLancey Nicoll III, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)

Joseph C. Goulden has written an im­pressive and important book, which is indispensable reading for anyone with an interest in the Korean War.

Korea: The Untold Story of the War re­states the history of those times from a new viewpoint. The author had access to documents, transcripts, and like data never before in the public domain, through the Freedom of Information Act. The wealth of material opened to him was so massive, it is small wonder that the volume was five years in composition.

Goulden also admits that “dumb luf played its part. He stumbled onto m mation relating to the CIA’s operations Korea and later discovered that ^a Toft, who had run the agency s operations there, lived a few blocks r

was led to a memorandum of a P^r‘-' aide of General Douglas MacArt which provided new insight into that

The main body of the book covers ^ period from the North Korean onse the final inking of the truce at P^anin , jom in July 1953. However, the g^rea detail is devoted to the 17 months be ^ the war degenerated into stagnation late 1951, which is as it should be^ humiliating days of 1950 when our was pushed back into the Pusan P^en!j!j_ant are thoroughly covered, as is the bn ^ Inchon landing. One comment, thuOr ^ presages trouble, “A more subtle ^r of the Inchon triumph was the d^eV® ^ ment of an almost superstitious rega^r General MacArthur’s infallibility- The invasion of the north, the ad^va ^ toward the Yalu, the entrance of the ^ nese, the trap at the Chosin R^cscrv' . and the subsequent “attack in the opF. site direction” by the First Marine ^ son are reported with complete and a j rate detail. There may be those who

In flesh-killing cold, U. S. Marines valiantly fought their way out of the ChoS^lt> Reservoir trap in North Korea in late 1950 under Marine General Oliver Sm$ ^S leadership in the “attack in the opposite direction.”

GouId^en

his home. By a chain of events.

troversial man’s character.

the

say that the author is over-generous m

80

Proceedings / June

|9«-’

the re °^^{le k}'^rst Marine Division, but rin_{e r}^{COrd s}P^eaks for itself. Indeed, Ma- ^<“^>'*^ver P- Smith and Army true he ^^att*^lew Ridgway emerge as °fcom^r°^eS *'’^enera* Ridgway’s takeover when ^dur'ⁿ§ the last days of 1950, Wer_e at ^C, ^^ortunes °f the Eighth Army feadersh' *^{r nad}'^r’ ^was fortuitous. His dav f„ 'P ^and combat ability saved the

& ■"« ^{in K}°“- Well i Mac Arthur does not fare as flashba⁰^ ⁶ 'ⁿtroduction, a fascinating Jeffg ^C hy his former aide, Thomas sadistⁿ. ^^aV'^s’ ^sh°ws a suicidal and ^Vealed^{C S1}^^C °* ’^'^{s man nev}er before re- he shorn ^^U^'^c’         ’’S^t °f ’^ater events,

uncon. ^never have been allowed such tion ₀f^r°_M^ed command. Goulden’s rela- ^rea_Sons Mac Arthur’s dismissal and the that epi_S(|”j ^{nd d} 8'^vc a new viewpoint to

com_e^e ^ frovernment also fails to its mj' ^<d.^tdc events in question with in pristine order. The bun-

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lions /A ’heal infighting, the vacilla- out_{j a}^{aa l}hc hesitations, are all brought fr_0rtl ^no one who was responsible, Gulden’ ^^rcs'^dent °n down, is spared pen. ^s cold, appraising eye and sharp

easjiy^^ere *^{S a} ^^aldI *^{n l}h'^s valuable but detai] ₍^reaC* ^^ook’ *’ is in the paucity of ici_Srtl ^{n s}°me of the maps—a slight crit- ^vast s_c^{WhCn one} considers this work’s Petted °^^{C and} impact. So much has hap- Wa_{r e} '? ’^dc 29 years since the Korean ’hat thej⁶^- '^nc’^uc”ⁿg the Vietnam War,

event_s "^rp *^{S a ten}dency to forget those be f_nr ⁰ ’he early 1950s. But it cannot

Of the ^ __________________________

fercd ^rp?^dcn ’hat the United States suf- ‘ ^d ’42,091

casualties in Korea.

^Versity.                  ^was graduated from Princeton Uni-

^GLIcq _^-53, he served in Korea with the 1st

^!^e Nav_a|^Up^*^r^^aval Gunfire Liaison Company) in Signal r ^UnFlre Platoon, which was a part of 1st

^J‘gnal ^

^°^rced) pi^JP^y. First Marine Division (Rein

^F,eet Marine

Force.

The Battle for the Brj_fa. ⁿ,^{ds a}nd the Future of * ^Ua|n’s Navy

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is iqPPP ®^a’h> England: Ashgrove -’       ^S2- 194 pp. Ulus. Ind. £7.95

J_v^Pr°^X' ^$13^^PI

^C^y(Ret£)^JOhn °- ^C°°^te’

care_e/ P”hlic figure who sacrifices his the _Sc °^{n a} Point of principle affecting rtiaricj vPP'¹^ °’ his country should

d>sn,_ls"T^led'^at^{c an<}J lasting respect. The foot o^{Sa a} j^un'^or minister with his de$e_rv,^{n dlc} Political ladder is even more he ]_a !ⁿ8 °f sympathy, especially when tdu_S(^C,^S on’side sources of income. It ^e galling when events prove

him right within a matter of months.

The outcome of the last precedent for such drastic action cannot have encour­aged then-Navy Minister Keith Speed in his agonizing moment. In 1966, both Christopher Mayhew, the First Lord of the Admiralty—a title carrying much more historic clout than “Navy Minis­ter”—and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Luce, resigned when Defence Minister Denis Healey cancelled the CVA-01 aircraft carrier program, thus signing the death warrant for the Fleet Air Arm’s strike capability. The military consequences of the political expediency which declared that Britain would never need major naval forces East of Suez did not become fully apparent for another two decades, thanks to a slow run-down of existing carrier forces and some nim­ble operational planning. The Royal Navy’s methods of coping with all the recurring and largely unforeseen crises in distant waters, from Korea to the Falk- lands, is neatly summarized in this book’s last chapter dealing with Britain’s naval needs for the rest of this century.

Sea Change starts by relating the events leading up to these top-level resig­nations and ends with a quote from Soviet author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: “The threat [to the West] lies not so much in the capabilities of its enemies as in its own indifference.”

Mayhew and Luce disappeared with­out a ripple on Britain’s national con­sciousness, let alone its conscience. To be fair, at the time, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov had only just initiated his long-term plans for the rapid buildup of Soviet sea power, and even the Royal Navy could deploy superior forces in most oceans. In those days, the delinea­tion of NATO boundaries was justified by the fact that the Soviets posed no sea­borne threat outside that area, except for their remote East Asiatic Fleet based on Petropavlovsk.

The events leading up to Keith Speed’s dismissal as Navy Minister—he refused to resign, so was summoned from dinner with the Chinese defense attache to get the chop delivered personally by Mrs. Thatcher in her room at the House of Commons—are told more in sorrow than in anger, since he clearly retains his ad­miration for his prime minister. But he knew the political ground rules well enough to realize that if he did not resign her only other alternative in response to his speaking his mind about Defence Minister John Nott’s policies was to fire Mr. Speed.

The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, did not follow Speed into retire­ment, rightly deciding that he could bet­

ter use his last year of active service to expose the fallacies and half-truths un­derlying his minister’s inflexible credo, stated as recently as 27 July 1982 in The Times to the effect that his 1981 long­term defense plans still hold good after the lessons of the Falklands campaign, a victory in which fortune favored the brave professionals to a gratifying extent.

Speed’s book was published before the appearance of the next “Defence White Paper” outlining government policy. So his views are on the table and, it is to be hoped, might play their part in an objec­tive debate on future British defense re­quirements. For the Royal Navy, he is not asking for much more than the force levels which the Conservatives inherited when they came to power in 1979: a min­imum of 50 operational frigates, two an­tisubmarine warfare (ASW) carriers in commission, and the submarine-launched nuclear deterrent. On the latter, he is somewhat ambivalent, leaning toward an advanced medium-range Tomahawk cruise missile—as yet unproven—fired from conventional submarines to replace the Chevaline-fitted Polaris SSBNs. But he suggests a change of mind if the cost of Trident is borne by the defense budget as a whole and does not “distort the pat­tern of our defences at the expense of a single Service.”

How it is all to be paid for will call for an entirely new look at Britain’s defense expenditure, in quantum and allocation. But, significantly, this book appears when there is a mounting debate whether Britain’s primary contribution to the At­lantic Alliance should continue to be on the Central Front, leaving the rest of the world, including a number of its overseas dependencies and interests, to the benev­olent protection of the U. S. fleet.

This is an important and timely book by Britain’s last Navy Minister—the post was abolished overnight by a sad and quixotic decision which was, if the meta­phor can be pardoned, rubbing salt into an open wound. The book’s dignity and lack of rancor or “I-told-you-so” manner do the author credit. At least he speaks with the experience and background of a professional naval officer, a unique qual­ification among the politicians and civil servants who have been involved at the center of Nott’s savage run-down of Brit­ain’s maritime capability.

Captain Coote was a Royal Navy submariner who saw war service off Norway and in the Mediterranean and later held four sea commands, 1948-54. At age 38, he resigned to go into newspaper publishing at Fleet Street, ending as Deputy Chairman of Beaver- brook Newspapers. His article on the Falklands, “Send Her Victorious . . .” was published in the January 1983 Proceedings.

^llnS^s / June 1983

81

Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor