Thailand: Distant Ally

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Five years after this photograph was taken of the bustling deep­water port of Sattahip, which supported U. S. operations in Viet­nam, the United States pulled out of Southeast Asia and left the Vietnamese to settle a score with Thailand for having been America’s staunchest ally during the Vietnamese War.

As fate would have it, Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond’s first meeting with President Ronald Reagan in October 1981 coincided with the assas­sination of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat. What was to have been a relaxed discussion of problems of mutual in­terest was interrupted frequently by White House aides delivering the latest reports on the situation in Cairo and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Prem made the best of a difficult situation. Speaking with obvious sincerity and with the terse directness of a combat soldier, he reminded the President that Thailand is America’s friend. But he also emphasized that America’s continued military and political support is vitally impor­tant if Thailand is to remain independent and secure.

Brutal uncertainties confront Thailand on all sides as it looks ahead into the mid- and late-1980s. The withdrawal of the U. S. military presence from Southeast Asia has presented Thailand with a new set of strategic variables.

Thailand’s national security problems are more com­plex today than they have ever been in Thai history. A small country, three-fourths the size of Texas, Thailand finds itself caught between the conflicting interests of three great powers: the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The first is an enemy; the second is a dubi­ous ally of the moment; only the United States has stood with the Thais since the time of President Lincoln and King Mongkut.

The Reagan Administration has reaffirmed its mutual security commitments to Thailand as spelled out in the 1954 Manila Pact and the subsequent Thanat-Rusk Agree­ment of 1962. The latter provides that if Thailand’s secu­rity is threatened, the United States would not necessarily wait for an agreement to take collective action by all mem­bers of the Pact before going to Bangkok’s assistance, but would act bilaterally with the Thais to deal with the danger at hand.

The question troubling the Thais is, “How soon and how effective will this assistance be?” They hope that as a result of the President’s $1.5 trillion five-year defense pro­gram, the United States will be able to play a more active role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) theater.

But Prime Minister Prem and his astute Foreign M*^nlS ter, Siddhi Savetsila, must have sensed that the crisis a mosphere permeating Washington at the time of Sadat^s assassination was caused not so much by the situation >ⁿ Egypt as by its possible impact throughout the volati Middle East. The two Thais could see that the Unite States, as powerful as it is, cannot be everywhere at once- If they learned anything from their visit, it was that U- ; security interests place NATO, the Middle East, Northea^s Asia, and even Central America ahead of Southeast Asm- As for Thailand, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger made it plain, during his November 1982 visit to t ^e ASEAN countries, that the United States considers its de fense commitments under the Manila Pact and 1 Thanat-Rusk Agreement adequate to deal with the curre situation, including the increased threat from the Sovi Union and Vietnam.

In June 1981, before Prem’s meeting with Preside¹¹ Reagan, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig made ³ diplomatic reconnaissance of the Far East. In his discus sions in Peking and during his meetings with the ASEA and Australian-New Zealand-U. S. (ANZUS) foreigⁿ ministers, he sought an Asian consensus that would id^en tify the Soviet Union as the major threat to world p^ea(f and isolate Vietnam, creating political pressures, wnic would force it to end its occupation of Cambodia.

In private bilateral talks, the U. S. delegation found t ^e Asian leaders probing for a clear expression of our pohw toward Thailand. Several of these leaders seemed c°n cemed that the United States might not fully apprccia’^e that country’s importance to the defense of Southed Asia. It is all well and good, they said, for the Unite States to treat Thailand’s security problems within 1 context of a broader ASEAN strategy. But they wanted ¹¹¹ to know that, throughout the region, Thailand is looked °³ as the vital “cork-in-the-bottle” blocking any furm^e southward expansion of communist power. Our Asia³ friends emphasized that Thailand’s strategic importance was increasing in direct proportion to the growth of Soviv military strength and influence in Southeast Asia.

They pointed out that it was no mere coincidence m just prior to Secretary Haig’s arrival in Peking the l^a week of May 1981, the Kremlin went out of its way ^,0 remind the world that Communist Indochina was now ^3fl “irreversible fact of life.” Using the fourth Party U°n gress of the Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kampuch^ea (PRPK) as their forum, spokesmen for Cambodia, Laos- and Vietnam dutifully pledged that their three countfl¹-¹’ were henceforth united in a “monolithic bloc” of Iⁿ% Chinese states, “solidly aligned with the Soviet Union-

This consolidation of the Soviet position on the “^s° underbelly” of mainland Asia was the inevitable consc quence of the withdrawal of U. S. military presence ft⁰¹’¹ the area after the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Today. u¹® long-term implications of this U. S. redeployment are jus beginning to be felt. As the Soviet Union proceeds wi

as th^Ul d ^UP °^f *^{tS militar}y ^stren8^th in South Vietnam, and Yy e United States intensifies its efforts to mobilize Free °rd resistance to further Soviet expansion, the United T,^a es becomes more deeply committed to the support of ^ai and than ever before.

01 ® growth of Soviet power throughout the region not Co f ^{as a ne}gative impact on U. S. long-term interests, it j_mⁿ ronts the People’s Republic of China with a far more ₍j_r ^rrietliate threat. Consequently, a new boundary has been k^etween Soviet and Chinese spheres of influence in JtoattAsia. Unfortunately for the Thais, this geopolit- tw ^dlv^'ⁿg line coincides with the ill-defined border be- _Cg^een Cambodia and Thailand. As far as Bangkok is con- sin ^6d’ ‘^{s most} important strategic development _£^e the end of the Vietnam War. _su ^odaY’ this new front line between the two communist Perpowers is manned by proxy forces. On the east is the WOtf^{1 c}'‘^ent"^state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, is st „^S°^me         °f it^s troops deployed in Cambodia, it

try ' *^{n l}^^e P^rocess °f absorbing that unfortunate coun- covv’^{3 taS}^ ^w^'^cb ^whcn completed will consolidate Mos­^s control over the entire former French colonial em- ^PlrJof Indochina.

the ^{0 West}‘^s Thailand, forced by circumstances into ^r°*^e °h ^a reluctant ally of China. In the early 1960s, _tU)^r'ⁿf Ute Vietnam War, the Thais abandoned their tradi- Sta)³ ^°*'^CY neutrality and cast their lot with the United Wq ??' ^They assumed that the most powerful nation in the sta l ^Wou^’ *ⁿ relatively short order, overcome the ob- rest ^CS ^^at ^^at^ f^mstrated the French and would succeed in _no ^0ring peace and stability to the area. They certainly did _na ^exPect the United States to withdraw from South Viet- _wi™^{1, mu}ch less from all of Southeast Asia. Yet, this is ^a‘.^happened after 1975.

I llfi the Americans now some 7,000 miles away, Thai- ch • ^Pound itself faced with the unpleasant Hobson’s eith*^Ce °^{P Wor}^'ⁿg °ut some form of accommodation with _Vlet^er Moscow or Peking. When Vietnam joined the So- (_Cjw Union’s Council of Mutual Economic Assistance _a 2~ in July 1978, and only a few months later signed the t^^{ear mutua}i assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, two ^{6 Was cast}' Uhina clearly became the lesser of the first ^C^^s‘ Moreover, China had two points in its favor: _n ’ *t had substantial forces stationed along Vietnam’s S_e hern border that could react quickly and in strength. ^c°nd, the Chinese would not go away like the French or the Americans. Its presence, firmly rooted in geography, is, as the Chinese like to say, “eternal.”

So far, Thailand’s new patron has turned out to be a mixed blessing. On the positive side, China has shown that it is not afraid of the Vietnamese or the Soviets, either singly or in combination. In February 1979, only three months after the Vietnamese and the Soviets signed their mutual defense treaty, Peking decided to teach this upstart Asian ally of the Soviet Union a sound “lesson.” Ignoring possible Soviet retaliation (which never materialized), China mobilized a half million troops along Vietnam’s northern border. Announcing they were launching an in­cursion of “limited scope and duration,” they crossed into North Vietnam with a force of 100,000 men.

The operation ran into unexpectedly stiff resistance. According to State Department estimates, it cost China several billion dollars and set its military modernization program back at least a year. At the same time, however, the Chinese units overran several important underground supply depots, capturing large quantities of military sup­plies stored there by the Vietnamese during U. S. bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area at the height of the Vietnam War. Casualties were heavy on both sides, particularly among the Vietnamese regional forces who bore the brunt of the attack.

On the negative side, Peking’s efforts to keep the fires of armed rebellion burning inside Cambodia by resupply­ing through Thailand some 35,000 Khmer Rouge guerril­las has created a major refugee problem for the Thais. Repeated dry season offensives by the Vietnamese occu­pation forces have sought to wipe out these Khmer Rouge forces as well as a smaller, independent 5,000-man Khmer Seri resistance group. As a result of these surges of brisk fighting in western Cambodia, more than 200,000 Cambo­dians who have fled the combat areas are now confined in nearby Thai camps, adding to the instability of an already tense situation. The recent Vietnamese cross-border at­tacks in April 1983 were considered serious enough for the United States to airlift extended-range 155-mm. Howit­zers and infantry shoulder-held, heat-seeking antiaircraft rockets to the Thai troops. Meanwhile, the Chinese, not to be outdone, began an artillery bombardment of Vietnam­ese fortifications across the border in North Vietnam.

The refugees have become the excuse for an escalation of border violence whenever the Vietnamese or the Thais see an advantage to be gained. Prospects for some solution either through emigration to Western nations or through return to Cambodia seem remote. Diplomats in Bangkok are already referring to the complex of refugee camps on the Thai side of the border as Thailand’s “Gaza Strip.”

■Pr,

^ln£s / July 1983

57

Politically, the Thais find themselves in an awkward position as it is generally acknowledged that China’s sup­plies for the Khmer Rouge guerrillas transit Thailand with

the tacit approval of the authorities. This has made Viet­nam increasingly suspicious of the Thais’ efforts to en­courage the Cambodians to return voluntarily to their homes. As Hanoi sees it, those who are being sent back are not really refugees, but trained volunteers whose mis­sion is to fight against the Vietnamese occupation forces.

In June 1980, shortly after the Thais had pushed some 36,000 Khmers back into Cambodia, the Vietnamese de­cided drastic action was required. Three Vietnamese regi­ments launched a coordinated attack on a small refugee village several kilometers inside the Thai border, claiming it was a supply depot and recruitment center for the Khmer Rouge. Bangkok, fearing that this might be the first phase of a full-scale invasion, appealed to the United States for help. President Jimmy Carter considered the matter so se­rious he sent his Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, Thailand for direct consultations with our ally. Short¹; after Secretary Muskie’s arrival, an emergency at¹"*¹ began delivering limited quantities of U. S. artillery, ^ar mored equipment, and ammunition to the Thai Army-

This prompt response from the United States, whit logisticaJly impressive, does not seem to have had a la^st' ing deterrent effect on Hanoi. In June 1981, Vietnames^e Deputy Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang warned Thai or ficials that if they go ahead with their plans to send som^e 90,000 refugees back to their homes without obtaininj- Phnom Penh’s approval, Vietnam may have to atta^c again.

The refugee situation is only one of a number of ^un' pleasant, continuing security problems forced on Thailai¹¹

aat ^ *^on§"^term concerns must, of course, be subordi- _So to present dangers. Thailand recognizes that for “ ^e y^ears to come, it will be this threat of a Chinese to ^C<!^nd '^esson” that will serve as the principal deterrent H_0r.i 'etaamese attack. (The Chinese bombardment of t|₁j_s Vietnamese fortifications in April 1983 emphasized has u ^Ver~.P^rescnt capability.) And until the United States fast tf ^l'^{me t0 re}h^>uil^<d its own defense establishment, it be the first to agree with this assessment. _ej ^Ver the millennia, China has consistently opposed for- thiP^{resence on} the Asian mainland. As if to prove that i„ f ^stiH their policy, the Chinese released figures show- bj]|. at, from 1949 to 1978, they spent more than $20 •on j_n economic and military aid and committed more

ccTfr^ became ^a “front-line state” in the Sino-Soviet _tj ^{n lct}; Even with assurances of Chinese support, reali- _f ^6s ^^me and space force Thailand to take these threats °rn Hanoi seriously.

^{e m}'llion-man Vietnamese Army, equipped with an ba'k¹³^ ^ billion of captured U. S. equipment and the ^Cl^ ³ *^{:wo m}’bion-man militia, is stronger than So ?°^mk'^ned forces of all the noncommunist states in utheast Asia. More than one-fourth of Hanoi’s 75 active ^visions are already deployed in Cambodia, seven of _w^ert|^ln close proximity to the Thai border. From there it °^u take less than a day for a North Vietnamese ar- °^^ea task force to reach Bangkok, letnam has an old score to settle with Thailand for its _stiJ^ersary ^r°lc during the Vietnam War. North Vietnam j_a ^ears the scars of the U. S. air offensive that was . ached from Thai bases, and it has not forgotten that the to ?^S,^{Sent one} °f their best divisions (some 11,000 men) alongside the U. S. forces in the “Iron Triangle” qic ^north °f Saigon. And Thai artillery units in Laos in­^{c e} heavy casualties on the communist Pathet Lao units.

ortunately, Peking has reminded both Moscow and rg]⁰⁰¹ ^at if Vietnam tries to take advantage of Thailand’s ad³¹ vply ^weak military position, China may be forced to Wa _H^{lniSter a} ' ^scconct lesson,” sending its troops south- terr' ^a^^a*ⁿ’ ^on^ b^{me muc}h deeper into Vietnamese Po]-¹ *^)ry- The prospect of such an invasion keeps Hanoi’s taclf^{t Ur}° ^aPP^reb^ensive. When China launched its first at- aio. |^ln T^orth Vietnam had some 100,000 soldiers, i_n ^{St y re}serves, in position to protect its northern prov- denT ^T°^day’                      bas more than 250,000 of its best troops

P °yed between Hanoi and the Chinese border. ^ern ^Stron§’ hostile Vietnamese forces along their east- far ^ank ^an<^ ^whh the United States overcommitted and _po ^away, the Thais are indeed grateful for China’s sup- t_er ' .      ^{1 l}hey cannot help but feel uneasy about the long-

Peri^{1 lntent}'^ons °f their northern neighbor. From their ex- the*^enCe  middle Kingdom over the past centuries,

tj_vJ^{e Is} always the question: are China’s ultimate objec- the ^{S and} Thailand’s security interests compatible? While Th- ^{6 C}°^{ncerns are never} mentioned in public, many senior allv* °^'^C'^a'^s ^^ear that- ^over the years, China may gradu- eve ^etlcroach on their country’s independence, seeking _Con"^tUally to bring it directly or indirectly under Peking’s than 300,000 troops in engineer and antiaircraft units to help expel France and the United States. Today, China’s problem is how to get rid of the Soviets.

Being in no position to directly confront the Soviet Union, Peking has adopted an underdog strategy—that of “bleeding” the Soviet Union through its.proxy, Vietnam, by supporting the Khmer Rouge guerrillas in their armed struggle against the Vietnamese occupation forces and Heng Samrin’s puppet Cambodian Government.

There is a weakness in this strategy, however. The Khmer Rouge, while experienced guerrilla fighters, lack the local population’s support. As a result, their operations have been confined to the vicinity of their base area in the remote Cardoman Mountains. According to United Na­tions officials administering relief operations throughout the country, the Cambodians would much prefer to live under Heng Samrin and the Vietnamese occupation army that keeps him in power than under Pol Pot, the dreaded Khmer Rouge leader. They remember only too well the days of terror during his Democratic Kampuchean rule when an estimated two to three million of their people were brutally slaughtered.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are pursuing what they call a “resource war” strategy, directed not so much against China as against their archenemy, the United States, and its allies in Europe and North Asia, especially Japan. As they see it, consolidation of Soviet control over Indochina is the first phase in their conquest of the entire Southeast Asian peninsula. Their ultimate goal is to take possession of the rich natural resources of the entire region and to dominate the strategic Strait of Malacca. Moscow plans to do this by making full use of the U. S.-built military infra­structure in South Vietnam, particularly the huge port and airfield complexes at Danang and Cam Rahn Bay. From these forward bases, they will be able to extend the range of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s Far Eastern Fleet and its supporting land-based “Backfire” bombers into the South China Sea and on into the Indian Ocean.

One thing seems certain. The Soviets and their surro­gate Vietnamese Army, which is acknowledged to be the third most powerful armed force in Asia, have no intention of stopping at the Thai border. The U.S. State Department estimates that the Soviet Union is pouring more than $3 million a day of military and economic aid into Vietnam. In January 1981, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs told a U. S. audience, “One must be ex­tremely simple-minded to believe the parsimonious Sovi­ets are financing a Vietnamese army of such size just to cope with the Khmer Rouge and its leader, Pol Pot.”

It is this collective Soviet-Vietnamese military threat that must receive the West’s priority attention. Of the five ASEAN states (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Phil­ippines, and Indonesia), Thailand is the only one whose borders are in contact with communist countries. More­over, it is the only friendly country with a military infra­structure capable of supporting large-scale combined oper­ations. Its seven jet-capable airfields, its nationwide highway system, and its deep-water port at Sattahip, all built to U. S. military specifications, would be invaluable in the defense of the region. Most important, its central

On 11 April 1983, in response to Vietnamese cross-border attacks, the United States airlifted, in C-5s, 155-mm. howit­zers and infantry antiaircraft rockets to Bangkok.

geographic position astride the northern approaches to the Kra Isthmus and Malaysia blocks further expansion of communist power, be it Soviet or Chinese, toward Singa­pore and the vital Strait of Malacca.

The objectives of Moscow’s resource war doctrine are to gain control of the sources of strategic minerals and other important raw materials so essential to the industrial­ized democracies, and to be able to close or blockade the geographic choke points of ocean-borne commerce through which the ships bearing these materials must pass. This is to be accomplished either by revolution or other forms of physical disruption, through market manipula­tion, or by establishing communist regimes in the target states. If necessary, the fast-growing Soviet Navy and Air Force, operating from advanced bases in South Vietnam, stand ready to assist.

The priority choke point in Southeast Asia is Japan’s jugular, the Strait of Malacca. Through this narrow, crowded waterway there passes every ten minutes or so a tanker loaded with Mideastem oil for Japan’s refineries.

The Soviets realize that Japan is the “cornerstone” of U. S. policy for Asia. Nor has the fact escaped them that this island nation is the most vulnerable of all the capitalist countries to resource denial through a resource war. Japan relies on distant and politically unstable Third World countries for most of its essential imports and on ocean shipping to bring to its • factories these raw materials it must have to stay alive. But lacking an ocean-going navy to protect the flow of these supplies, it looks to the United States to handle this task. It is a difficult, thankless re­sponsibility that is in our national self-interest to accept.

Since Thailand, the “cork-in-the-bottle” for ASEAN, also blocks the land approaches to the Malacca Strait, it must be considered as a part of the forward defenses of Japan. In this capacity, Thailand can no longer be thought of in the limited context of Southeast Asia. It plays a key role in helping maintain the security of Japan and the en­tire Far East.

Thailand’s national security problems are internal as well as external. They are complicated by the current worldwide oil and monetary crises and by fluctuations in the international commodity markets over which Thailand has no control. The resulting economic uncertainties have subjected the bulk of Thailand’s 47 million people to do­mestic hardships, rising prices, and increasing poverty.

The bulk of the country’s foreign exchange is generated by exports of agricultural and mineral products whose prices in the world commodity markets are currently badly depressed. Hardest hit is the agricultural sector, which accounts for more than 70% of all exports, employs three-fourths of the Thai labor force, and generates one- fourth of the gross national product.

Similar problems occur in the energy sector. Roughly 90% of Thailand’s energy comes from imported crude oil. In 1972, the price of crude was around $3 a barrel. Since then, the pricing policies of the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries, the fall of the Shah, the Iraq-Imn War, and the general unrest in the Middle East have raise the cost per barrel to its present uncertain level of $28- ^a 1980, Thailand’s bill for its crude was more than $2- billion, or the equivalent of 42% of its total exports. A though there has been some relief in this area because o recent oil price reductions, energy costs remain a maj°^r burden on the economy.

It is said that Thailand is thrice blessed by Buddha, has a monarch who knows and loves his people; a homog enous population loyal to both king and country; and unifying Buddhist religion. Although during the last two decades its real growth averaged more than 7% annually > it is still struggling with the difficult transition into the 20th century. Traditional Thai business practices have been subjected to the stresses of new technology and war-

Ever since the end of World War II, political power m Thailand has belonged to the army, while economic power has remained in the hands of a “Bangkok elite” made up primarily of wealthy Sino-Thais who control banking an trading. In the pragmatic Thai style, this elite has formed a marriage of convenience with the senior generals, and to gether they run the country. In return for the military ^s assistance in expediting business affairs through the p°ⁿ derous Thai bureaucracy, the generals are provided “cam paign” funds to support their own political maneuvering for key positions within the senate or the army itsel •

Periodically, Thailand’s economic and social pressures boil over, and there is a change in government. Usually’ these transitions have been nonviolent and bloodless. In “student revolt” of 1973 was an exception, resulting >ⁿ unfortunate casualties near Bangkok. A military coup ^waS attempted as recently as 1 April 1981 but fell apart withm 48 hours when the army withheld support.     ,

60

Proceedings / July

19*3

This situation, while a happy one from Prem’s point o view, serves to emphasize that despite the surface calm pervading the Bangkok scene, there are serious economic problems that make life increasingly difficult for both tn farmers and the urban workers. The Thai authorities rec­ognize these problems, but being difficult to solve, they are often tacitly ignored or “papered over.”

amounted to $381 million, most of which, $375 a . —> wet Assistance,

Ass'*^{00, Were} foreign Military sales. The grant, Military

lir.^SlStance’ came to $4.5 million, with another $1.5 mil- "On r

earmarked for military education and training.

Ihe-pP^ortunhics exist for the United States to work with rep' ^{aaiS t0} 'uducnce a favorable outcome of events in the With°ⁿ' ^^{or now}’ U.S. and Chinese objectives converge ^ diose of Thailand and the other ASEAN states. tj_nu-^{n ortUn}ately, however, negative factors present a con- Sov'⁰^ ^t*^lreat- Thailand is now a focal point for conflicting ^anc* Chinese interests; it is an obvious target in the

ⁿ 1978, World Bank reports warned that 25% of the 19Xn Population was living in “absolute poverty.” In

> the government conceded that the poverty rate had _m^{Sen to} 31%. Prime Minister Prem calls it “Thailand’s °st pressing problem.” The country’s current five-year _cj>n seeks to outline a long-range solution. But the rich ⁿ inue to get richer while the hard-working farmers, ⁰ earn 70% of Thailand’s foreign exchange, have yet to Th^ ^{3 return} f°^r their labors, bv ^a^^anc^'^s energy problem should become manageable nat ^{ae ent}^ ^,^^le decade thanks to two huge deposits of ^Ura*.8^as found offshore in the Gulf of Thailand. Large _trj ^ant*ties of this gas are already flowing to the main elec- ^CaI generating plant in Bangkok through a 600-kilome- underwater pipeline. By the end of 1983, gas is ex- b_e^^tec* ^to replace nearly 20% of the imported crude now ⁿg used as the primary source of electric power. This rcentage is expected to increase steadily in subsequent y_le^^rs; Hopefully, the saying that “where there’s gas, ^e s oil” win someday apply to Thailand. Seismic sur- nie ^Conc*^ucted by several of the major petroleum compa- o ^S ^how good promise that oil will eventually be found %)re i_n Thailand and off the coast, land ^{6re Seem to reasona}bly good prospects that Thai- l_e          ³^^{e t0 surmount} *^ts current economic prob­

oth ^{S 3n}^ ^conh^{nue to} prosper. However, like so many _Witf^r developing countries, it must face up to and deal We l ‘^tS P^r™ary social problem—the maldistribution of ^a lh. Only then will it be able to grow strong and re- ma;ⁿ Politically stable.

Thailand’s strategic equation today, the United States So .^{ecome 3} distant ally without the military presence in g ^east Asia it once had. The Security Assistance Pro­p 111 c°ntinues however. In fiscal year 1982, the total . §^ram amonnfpH tn     million moct of \x/hir»h

_aip,. . - ^s resource war as it geographically blocks Soviet Pen '^{10nS t0 ex}Paud its influence down the rich Malaysian into* j^SU*^a’ across the strategic Strait of Malacca, and on karri ^nc*^ones‘^a; locally, Thailand lacks any natural terrain ag i ^ers around which to organize defensive positions n_am^{nst an} invasion from the east; its relations with Viet- Vi_et ^are constantly in a state of tension caused by the gee ^natTlese occupation of Cambodia; and the large refu- a pr^hf ^U'^at'°ⁿ adjacent to the Cambodian border presents the ^{em w}i¹>ch, like refugee situations in other parts of Ifth is likely to remain a festering sore for years. ■nS ⁶ ^ⁿ'^ted States is not able to play a more active role P^eac°f ^{CaSt jAlS}'^a’ and if it continues to stand aside, this Spaj^{C u}*’ friendly country could one day become, like the ⁿ °f the 1930s, a “free fire zone” where the Soviet

Union, China, Vietnam, and the United States test their weapons and tactics in preparation for World War III.

In this uncertain world, it may turn out that U. S. and Thai mutual interests will prove to be longer lasting than those we are presently seeking to cultivate with the Chi­nese. If China’s Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping’s new poli­cies of modernization and liberalization enable the long- suffering masses of China to regain control of their own destiny, thereby shifting gradually away from the doctri­naire communism of Mao toward a free enterprise society that will release the natural entrepreneural skills of the Chinese people, all well and good.

But it is another matter entirely if the vast Chinese com­munist bureaucracy, seeing its vested interests threatened, should join forces with the old-school Maoists in the army and reverse the course that has been set by Deng, clamp­ing down on the people’s instinctive longing for greater personal freedom. Widespread resistance would probably occur. Should this happen, the communist bureaucrats may find it expedient to repair China’s relations with Mos­cow in order to stay in power. Such a rapprochement would confront the West with a perilous situation reminis­cent of the days of the Hitler-Stalin pact that set the stage for World War II.

The United States cannot afford to forget that, even under Deng, China remains a communist superpower whose whole society is based, not on the freedom of the individual, but on the undisputed authority of a minority elite, the Communist Party. Despite current ideological and political differences with the Soviet Union, China’s basic political philosophy is much closer to that of the Kremlin than it is to ours.

Until the situation in China becomes much clearer than it is today, the United States would be wise not to count on U. S. and Chinese interests being always mutually sup­portive. As we move to counter the expansion of Soviet influence around the world, we would be well advised to expect some surprises from the Chinese side. Lee Kuan Yew warns, “As long as China openly supports Commu­nist parties in armed rebellion against ASEAN govern­ments . . . she cannot expect ASEAN to believe that her longer-term objectives in Southeast Asia are benign.”

The United States would be prudent to pay more atten­tion to our ally, Thailand, a country whose strategic im­portance seems destined to increase with time.

Clare Booth Luce is a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a former ambassador to Italy (1953-57). member of Congress (1943-47), foreign correspondent, and a prominent American playwright. She was recently awarded the Medal of Freedom, the na­tion’s highest civilian award.

General Black graduated from the U. S. Military Academy with the Class of 1940 and served in the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) in the European theater during World War II. During his Army career, he com­manded a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division, served as military assistant to three deputy secretaries of defense, and attended the National War College. During his third tour in Vietnam, he was Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division. General Black is now an interna­tional consultant on alternate energy resources and on joint business ven­tures in Southeast Asia.