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ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom and Naval Warfare
The March Special Issue
Are Two Heads Better Than Three in a P-3?
Green Buoys! What Next?
Dyad: Less is More
Military Retirement Pay: A Time of Crisis
The Unobvious Lessons of the Falklands War
My Dear Canada Reeding, Righting, and Rithmatic Keeping Faith With Our People Ride with the Seas Wake’s POWs
Mediterranean: Qaddafi’s Choke Point? Diesel Boats Forever?
The Submarine and the Falklands War New Role for Mine Warfare Naval War College: The Right Stuff? Whose Law of Whose Sea?
Send Her Victorious . . .
Space Race
Requiem for the Sixth Fleet?
adequate numbers of advanced point fense systems, up-to-date electronic a countermeasures equipment, and,
plans do not consider the carrier as principal counter to the Soviet A . threat. This task is the principal
and the
“Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom and Naval Warfare”
(See T. W. Parker, pp. 29-35, April 1983
Proceedings)
Captain John Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Parker’s essay is excellent and thought-provoking. He discusses some challenging ideas that our naval leaders should consider as they contemplate future weapons systems.
In this era of fast developing technological breakthroughs it is difficult and expensive for military planners and forces to keep up with the latest technological developments. This is especially true of a democracy in peacetime; many political constraints are placed on the development of new weapon systems, spending for large military forces, and maintenance of a large industrial complex to support military weapons production.
In the not-too-distant future, the large aircraft carrier may well become vulnerable to concentrated missile attacks or to some new weapon now under development. Much will depend on how seriously the Navy takes its task of defending the carriers by providing them and their accompanying ships and aircraft with the weapons and electronic equipment to defeat concentrated missile attacks. If the Spruance-class destroyer is any indication of how serious the Navy is, the outlook is pessimistic indeed.
Until now, the carriers have more than proved their worth in acting as deterrent and stabilizing forces to help keep the peace on many occasions since World War II. Today, in the Indian Ocean and the Near East, the carriers are the only available U. S. on-scene military forces to counter any sudden outbreak of hostilities affecting our country’s vital interests. If we had to use our newly created rapid deployment forces, the carriers would supply the initial air support until these forces could establish a beachhead and set up or take over their own airfields.
Commander Parker is probably right when, after giving credit to the formidable defenses of carrier battle groups, he says; “The current ability of the Soviet Navy ... to attack with a seemingly overwhelming number of air- , surface- , and subsurface-launched missiles is causing an increasingly serious feeling of in security in the U. S. Navy.” Hef * ® makes the statement that: “Unfo nately, even if we could incorporate a ^ vanced point defense systems, such a^ close-in weapon systems, on board ships, and even if we developed fun tional point defense systems, using 'utu^ technologies such as charged VaTtiC,^ beams or lasers or whatever, we wou still be unable to preclude saturation an therefore leakage.”
His second statement is just not tru for the foreseeable future. It is hig unlikely that the Soviets could assent and coordinate an attacking force capa of saturating the defenses of a three-c rier naval task force—at least three riers would be required in the tough gion—if the Navy equips its ships w'
. qC'
larger ships, beam weapons.
We need more large carriers to fur* dilute Soviet attacking forces and to able to control the sea-lanes in 010 j areas. However, in the current polit'cn economic environment we will be to nate to end up with the 15 large carrie^ we consider the minimum number nec sary to meet our mission requiremen Now is the time to consider converti some of the excess large high-speed m ^ chant hulls to sea control carriers wit ^ complement of small numbers of fight (eight-12 F-14s), antisubmarine war a (ASW) aircraft (six-eight S-3s), a'rb°rr early warning (AEW) aircraft (three- 0 E-2Cs), and a few ASW helos.
Commander Parker specifically me tions the fast-growing Soviet submari threat and points out correctly that ^ small number of large carriers cannot e tirely counter this threat. Actually- many of our destroyers, frigates, — new T-AGOS ships (designed to carry the surveillance towed array sensor sy-^ tern—SURTASS) plus 24 land-based V- aircraft ASW squadrons, 18 helicop ASW squadrons (many ship based), an 11 carrier-based S-3 aircraft ASW S4U‘* f rons. For some reason, Comman
an update to the appropriate training mand activities. Increased joint ope tions with U. S. units in the min0*1 could be pursued. The surface war community should have at least one r ^ in each class at the maritime tactlC course (at the bare minimum, the co manding officers and PCOs of ships to assigned to Standing Naval Force, At a tic, should attend). Finally, foreign la^ guage proficiency training should be ^ couraged and subsidized in
Parker omits mentioning the fast-growing “Backfire” air threat to our naval forces which can only be handled by carrier- based fighters augmented in some instances by land-based fighters.
The very conservative Soviet political leadership will not risk the war escalation involved in the use of tactical nuclear weapons even at sea, unless their land forces are in danger of defeat. Even then, they might wish to negotiate rather than escalate. Once the Pandora’s box of nuclear weapons is opened, the world’s future will be in doubt. Although Commander Parker gives many good reasons for the Soviets to use tactical nuclear weapons at sea against the U. S. carriers, they cannot be sure that the United States might not reply with a preemptive nuclear strike against one of their target complexes.
Commander Parker gives three principal courses of action to reduce dependence on the large-deck carrier:
► Increase the development of Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles on board our ships and submarines—more important, accelerate improvement for these and future unmanned missiles. The need for improvement is imperative since even now the Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles cannot penetrate Soviet missile defenses on their new ships such as the Kirov and Sovremennyy unless saturation numbers are fired. And they cannot reach many important Soviet land targets unless delivered by carrier attack aircraft.
► He calls for increasing our reliance on the land-based resources of our sister services and allies. Steps are being taken to include these forces in naval exercises whenever possible, but history shows their use in a major war is another matter. 1 can’t envision our limited number of B-52 bombers carrying out mining or sea patrol missions in a war with the Soviets.
► I strongly support his call for more sea-based aviation platforms, provided they are capable and can operate F-14, S-3, and E-2C aircraft—the aircraft most needed to maintain control of the seas.
I support Commander Parker’s concern for the survival of the large carrier in the current missile environment of a Soviet conflict and support his call for diversification when it makes sense. Top priority should be given to improving the carrier forces’ defensive capabilities, including installation of beam weapons. The large carrier, given proper state-of-the-art defenses, is survivable in most scenarios and still provides the United States with the weapon system that can carry out the most military tasks free from foreign political constraints across the entire spectrum of warfare.
March 1983 Issue
Commander M. R. Goodwin, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Mahlon S. Tisdale (FFG-27)—The March 1983 “International Navies” issue of the Proceedings is a superb compendium of worldwide naval capabilities which should be required reading in our wardrooms and tactical schools. Because of a lack of knowledge, we tend to downplay the capabilities of our allies and enhance that of our potential adversaries. One essay missing from the March issue which could help tie in the interrelationships of our allies, principally those in Europe, is a discussion of joint training and staffing. While NATO is obviously the alliance in Europe, there is a subtle, tradition-based naval cooperation which escapes casual observation. I served a tour of duty as a student at the French Naval War College and Joint Service Staff Course followed by an 18-month tour as an instructor at the Royal Navy School of Maritime Operations. Our European allies welcome joint operations exercises with the U. S. Navy. On a ship-for-ship basis their capabilities closely parallel ours and are well matched for integrated operations. However, in a major fleet exercise or carrier battle group (CVBG) operations we sometimes tend to swamp individual allied units because of the sheer numbers of U. S. units. Further, while “NATO procedures” are used, warfighting is done in the U. S. mode.
Why? Because, at the working level we don’t know our allies’ equipment and capabilities. As a test, without consulting any reference source, name the following for the German, Dutch, British, French, and Italian navies:
► Major combatant classes and main battery and primary self-defense system for each
► Tactical data systems and their degree of compatibility with the Navy tactical data systems
I can almost guarantee that your allied counterpart knows these data about U. S. ships. They study their allies, and they train together. Dutch combat systems teams routinely undergo shore-based combat systems operational team training in company with Royal Navy ships. The Royal Navy version of our relatively new tactical procedures group courses, the maritime tactical course, is routinely attended by prospective commanding officers (PCOs) from several allied nations (except the United States). The Royal Navy conducts a NATO course which is, again, heavily subscribed by allied offi
cers. Joint operations in the Baltic are fairly common. .
Why? Because operating with foreign units is often too hard: “They don t un derstand what we want them to do an 1 is hard to understand them on the radio telephone (R/T).” I flew surface/suo- surface surveillance and coordinatio^ support as an observer with a Frenc Navy crew during a Mediterranean NATO exercise. The U. S. control s ip lost interest after the first half hour an simply directed the French aircrew cover a relatively small area and rep° every 15 minutes. From the respond over the R/T I could determine that re ports were not being copied. A recorn^ mendation by the aircraft commander more effective use of his aircraft w greeted with a confused “Roger, Ou • On another occasion, I witnessed a fhg of two P-3 aircraft staged into a FrenC airfield for a ten-day deployment in sup port of another NATO exercise. No 0 on either aircraft spoke French, so ev fueling the aircraft was a major et° (you can imagine the problems of nj1 out the U. S. supply documents in gal 0 as opposed to liters). I’ll guarantee y° allies know you. Foreign language stu is actively pursued by nearly all of*lC.^_ in non-English speaking navies. As ^ centive, some European navies Pa^ small bonus for demonstrated languaS^ proficiency, and foreign exchange to are viewed as “promotion” billets. u cers returning from exchange to debrief their respective warfare com® nities and PCO courses.
We could do much to heighten awareness of allied navy capabih1 Scenarios used during shore-based tra^ ing could include foreign units, should stop considering foreign exchang duty as “vacations” or “out of the m3 ^ stream” and recognize that through n gleet, a great deal of valuable training and information is being lost. Personn returning from Personnel Exchange ” gram tours should debrief appropr,a^ staff offices in the warfare sponsor
their respective communities and Prc,v
• com- unrestricted line community. Perhaps pursuing these tacks we will make
onger personal and professional comment to increasing readiness through ngthened ties with our allies.
‘Are Two Heads Better Than lllree in a P-3?”
f, j g DeThomas, p. 108, January 1983;
' ' Peretto, p. 24, May 1983 Proceedings)
New^7°n Fea^er R- J- Carran, Royal mn '<land Air Force- RNZAF Com- DeTh Qnd, Staff College—Commander t>le h °mas's recommendation is admira- ^ ut Some b's reasoning and argu- tj n s are> at best, controversial and, at is CS’ Unashamedly biased. I suspect he iflg3. We^l_qualified pilot, but his com- w. concern the operator’s viewpoint, 'c has a very different emphasis. a j- 0rTlmander DeThomas does not give thre^ atlC* ba'anced view of the two- vs. hi e'man cockpit controversy, selecting jnlaiater‘al to suit his case. If he is look- start ° SaVC rnoney> then a good place to m ''jould be with the third pilot that exn • Navy crews carry. He is more ofjfnsive to train and doesn’t aid in any asn 6 °Peratu)nab maintenance, or safety tor e<"tS re^errec* to. Few other P-3 opera- cre\yS6e 3 need *°r more tban two'Pilot
Commander DeThomas ignores what the flight engineers do on the ground in the way of pre- and post-flight checking, refuelling, and rectification. I can’t see any of the two-pilot crews getting involved with these sorts of things after a 12-13 hour flight.
He quotes an extensive list of aircraft using two- or single-pilot operation but fails to point out that these were designed that way from the outset. Furthermore, the P-3 will undoubtedly need many modifications, most of them major, to get the important cockpit controls within reach of either pilot. These are not to be dismissed lightly and are certainly not cheap.
Crew coordination is probably the single most important aspect of flight safety. If Commander DeThomas has two other people “watching and waiting” while he carries out his drills, he has a lot to learn about “interpersonal communication.”
“Green Buoys! What Next?”
(See R. C. Williams, pp. 112-114, April 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant P. W. Stromann, U. S. Navy, Division of Professional Development, U. S. Naval Academy—Captain Williams’s article, while thoroughly informative, contained an error. On page 114, Captain Williams states that junction/ obstruction buoys placed where the preferred channel is to starboard will be painted green over red as opposed to the current red over black buoys. These buoys are currently black over red.
“Dyad: Less is More”
(See A. C. A. Jampoler, pp. 65-70, April 1983,
J. C. Toomay, p. 16, June 1983 Proceedings)
Captain Ralph E. Williams, U. S. Navy, (Retired)—Captain Jampoler said it better than anybody: “For any land-based mode that is not mobile, there is some combination of accuracy and warhead size that can put an ICBM at unacceptable risk.” He succinctly describes the futility of the continuing search for ways to reduce the vulnerability of fixed-base intercontinental missiles. The stillborn “dense pack” concept, for all the learned-sounding hoopla that accompanied its unveiling, still suffered the fatal disability it was designed to cure, and it deserved the fate it received.
The MX basing solution proposed by the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces—putting 100 of the new missiles in existing Minuteman silos—is even
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worse and will suffer the same treatment given to “dense pack.” No real improvement in survivability will result from putting new wine into old skins; this will only make them more valuable as targets because of the larger number of warheads that can be destroyed by each hit.
Even worse, however, is the prospect of obtaining the 100 MX missiles by transferring an equal number of missiles from the triad’s secure sea-based leg. Although the SALT II agreement remains unratified by the United States, we have found substantial reasons to adhere to its ceiling of 1,200 multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and official attitudes support the assumption that we shall continue to do so. Under such a ceiling, the replacement of 100 unMIRVed Min- uteman IIs with the multiple-warhead MX could only come at the expense of the Navy’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force.
The Carter Administration’s proposed solution wasn’t much better. The notion of shuttling 200 missiles among 4,600 sites in Utah and Nevada was a simple case of reinventing the wheel—and a
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square one at that. At an estimated cost of $70 billion at last count, the proposed “Racetrack” mode would have fielded, in ten to 15 years, a system vastly inferior in mobility, dispersal, and concealment to that already operational in the Navy’s SSBN fleet. The vaunted accuracy of the land-based ICBMs would not be much greater than that obtainable from the D-5 SLBM within the same time frame.
But Captain Jampoler’s suggestion that pierside SSBNs “offer a uniquely flexible [ICBM] basing mode” is simply another approach to basing ICBMs ashore, with all the shortcomings of the other land-based modes, plus a few more besides. Compared with existing ICBM installations, submarines tied up at a pier are soft targets of great value close by large aggregations of industrial facilities and population. Each one struck would produce a loss equivalent to the destruction of 16 or 24 ICBMs even before taking into account any differences in numbers of warheads carried by each missile. Collateral damage and noncombatant casualties would be horrendous. While SSBNs, like all other vessels, must spend time in port for maintenance, to contend that they have value as weapon systems during such intervals is to make a virtue out of necessity.
However, Captain lampoler’s main thesis remains undiminished by such minor lapses. The land-based ICBM is a concept whose time has gone. It is time we recognized the truth of his assertion that “there probably will emerge no workable, doable ICBM basing scheme ...” and instead “put our reliance on a deterrent that is essentially sea-based, supported by an ancillary air-launched cruise missile component.” Less is more. Two is better than three.
tively match that capability at a 0 cost. In fact, it is because of the high r ability of the ICBM force that we accept—and afford—lower alert ra e the triad’s other two force elements.
The following is from the Report of President’s Commission on Strae Forces, a document which reflecte unanimous views of the comrruss ^ members, including R. James Woo former Undersecretary of the Navy, retired Vice Admiral Levering Smith.
“. . . the Commission recommends
strongly against adopting a stra^ force posture relying solely on su rines and bombers to the exclusion ICBM modernization; it recognize > however, the increasing importanc
“. . . deployment of the MX is esse
tial in order to remove the Sovie vantage in ICBM capability an. ,
help deter the threat of conven i or limited nuclear attacks on t e ance. Such deployment is also ne sary to encourage the Soviets to m ^ toward the more stable regime ^ deployments and arms control. • •
“It is illusory to believe that we cou^ obtain a satisfactory agreement the Soviets limiting ICBM dep ments if we unilaterally terminate only new U. S. ICBM program could lead to deployment in this ade. Such a termination would ei tively communicate to the Sovie s ^ we were unable to neutralize advantage in multiple-war ICBMs. Abandoning the MX at time in search of a substitute w
jeopardize, not enhance,
Colonel Joseph D. Bester, U. S. Air Force, Director for Plans, Headquarters Strategic Air Command—Captain lampoler’s article is an amalgam of fact and fiction. On one hand, he concedes that peace has been sustained for three decades because of the deterrent strength of the triad. On the other hand, he opines that retiring land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would produce a dyad of more stability and capability— and at lower costs.
There is no clear logic leading to the recommendation to retire a force which provides more than 50% of the strategic alert weapons (at an alert rate approaching 100%) for slightly more than 10% of the operating and support costs of the entire triad. Captain Jampoler neglects to explain how he would propose to effec
equitable agreement.”
If Captain Jampoler followed the!\°S he used for ICBMs, surely he would ommend retirement of a system in hundreds of U. S. weapons were P ( tially vulnerable to a single weapon, ignoring, as he did with 1 the other significant advantages o SLBM force. j£St
While it is human nature to be pro of one’s own organization, the true y fessional is well versed in the history ^
contributions of other organizations^
other services as well. No one sys e ^ invulnerable, and no one system |S£ capable. History has shown that al strategic systems work together to attack and promote stability. The Pr triad concept deserves more thoug^ treatment than it has received from tain Jampoler. (Continued on poge
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 20.)
the
business community is spread across
and interested in political and econc
conditions traveling overseas on than for any other purpose.
“Military Retirement Pay: A
Time of Crisis”
(See T. M. Hale, pp. 108-III, April 1983
Proceedings)
Michael J. Clowes, Editor, Pensions and Investment Age—Captain Hale makes an excellent case that the retirement pay for military personnel compares unfavorably with that of civilian uniformed employees such as police and firefighters. Unfortunately, he also attempts to make the case that the retirement pay for all three groups is out of line with civilian retirement standards.
Captain Hale’s tables show that the 20-year annuity for military personnel at the $25,000 level is almost as great as the median 30-year annuity for private sector workers. The 30-year annuity for military personnel at the same level is well above the 30-year annuity for private sector employees. This does not take into account that virtually all private sector retirement plans set normal retirement age at 65, while a 30-year military man could retire as early as 50. If a civilian employee retired at age 50 with 30 years of service he or she would receive no pension until age 62 at the earliest, and that pension would be significantly reduced from the normal age-65 pension; the military pension can be collected immediately upon retirement.
A couple of other factors improve the military situation. First, about half of private sector employees have no retirement protection other than social security—for which most military personnel can qualify with post-service employment. Second, government figures show that the average civilian employee stays at any one job only about six years. Thus, the ten-year vesting to which Captain Hale refers is not as good as it seems. The job tenure figures are distorted by the frequent changes young employees make, but nevertheless, relatively few of those civilian employees covered by private pension plans stay long enough to collect 30-year pensions.
Captain Hale argues that the ERISA law—the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974—made private pensions safe for the civilian employee. Not quite. A number of companies have terminated their pension plans, either because they went out of business, e.g., Braniff Airlines, or because they needed the money for other purposes, e.g., A&P. In either case, the civilian employees of these firms received annuities for the pension benefits they had accumulated, but they can’t touch the annuities until they turn 65. And the benefits these annuities would provide would be a fraction of the benefits they would have received had the plan continued in force until they reached 65.
Captain Hale also argues that the military personnel deserve special treatment because they can be forced out after 20 years and must start new careers. But civilian employees can be forced out at any time. While some may find jobs in their chosen fields, many others will have to change careers. For example, how many auto workers will be recalled? How many clerical workers displaced by computers and word processors will have even the $600 to $800 per month of the retired E-8 to keep living on while finding a new position?
Even more important, the military man’s pension gives him a significant price advantage in the job market. If he has an $800 per month index pension he can agree to work for $300 or $400 a month less than his civilian counterpart and still come out ahead.
Captain Hale’s reference to the Banker’s Trust study—that 70% of the corporate plans give post-retirement increases—is misleading. The study showed that 62% of the plans referred to had given only one increase in the previous five years, 28% had given two increases, and 3% had given three increases. Only 5% of corporate plans had automatic increases annually tied to the consumer price index, and most of those placed a cap of 3% on the increase.
Captain Hale suggests that a complete review of the military compensation system is urgently needed. Tinkering with the retirement benefits will not do. The compensation review should start from ground zero, asking what level of compensation will attract the number and quality of citizens to the military life with all its dangers, hardships, and discomforts. It should then ask how that compensation can most efficiently be pr°" vided. A competitive retirement system would no doubt be part of the package, but one wonders whether pensions beginning at age 40 are required.
Frances Lee Brady—There is a discrepancy in Captain Hale’s article. Civil service retirement is computed on base pay—not including overtime as stated m the article.
“The Unobvious Lessons of the
Falklands War”
(See S. Turner, pp. 50-57, April 1983;
A. D. Baker, p. 19, June 1983 Proceedings)
Commander W. 1. Milwee, Jr., V- S- Navy (Retired)—Admiral Turner’s a111 cle is undoubtedly one of the m‘>st thoughtful and far reaching on the lessons of the Falklands War that I have read- However, I have two observations.
Admiral Turner comments on the m ability of countries to feel the pulse 0 another nation. He says, “The American
world and should be an excellent source for feeling the pulse of the nation.’’ T^lS is entirely true. Though business does have a narrow focus, senior executiv have a rather wide view of nations an political and economic situations. Tney could provide valuable input whic ^ when combined with other fragments form a whole, could help complete P' of the intelligence picture. It has been nj^ experience that few agencies charged ^ collect information from open sources interested in using the resources availa in the U. S. business community, h lS(£) serious mistake to ignore this source of decide that it is too narrowly f°cUij£. re provide significant information. * are more Americans trained in obser
iom'c
businesS
use
My second comment concerns of British merchant ships to supp(,rt military effort in the Falklands. The ish were very successful in using re9u '
?
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tioned merchant ships diverted from their normal trade and even used them in some fleet support functions for which the United States maintains naval forces. The remark that U.S. merchant shippers have not been responsive in past wars to providing shipping for support of the war effort at the expense of their normal trade is well taken but deserves to be put into perspective. The ship operator is simply not in the business of supporting the government at all times. When he removes a ship from a certain trade or makes it unavailable for a length of time, he runs the risk of losing long-term trade to foreign bottoms or other shippers who are not required to support government operations. The shippers should be offered compensation, as the British shippers were in the Falklands Conflict. But I question if the compensation offered can ever be adequate to make up for the loss of trade. Patriotism in support of an allout mobilization is to be expected; however, in a democratic nation, is it realistic to expect any portion of the business community to risk its long-term investment and business in support of a shortterm, government-sponsored operation that represents a hazard to it?
We should take a hard look at our merchant mariners’ ability to support even a relatively short-term and limited operation such as the Falklands Conflict. A hard-nosed, realistic view of our merchant marine’s ability and willingness to support any sort of wartime operation is warranted in the same manner as is a tough appraisal of our military capability.
Admiral Turner has given us much food for thought which should become the basis for action.
Jere D. Cox, Chief Engineer, SS Button Gwinnett—I take exception to Admiral Turner’s statement, “Our merchant marine has never been very responsive.” If the U. S. Flag Merchant Marine did not supply the war effort in Vietnam, then who did?
Major General H. R. Del Mar, U. S. Army (Retired), President, National Maritime Council—Admiral Turner’s comments regarding the U. S. Merchant Marine were completely erroneous and uncalled for. The specific statements, “For the United States though, it would be questionable if we received such support,” and “Our merchant marine has never been very responsive,” are biased and refute past history.
To rectify the inaccurate allegations, review U. S. Merchant Marine support of the U. S. military for the past 200 years. Merchant marine officers and men manned Navy ships originally, and more recently, the U. S. Merchant Marine carried more than 90% of the food, fueL ammunition, unit equipment, and general stores required to support the deployed troops in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The allegations that U. S. carriers did not want to give up lucrative, commercial trade routes is also distorted. The U. S. Government, by regulation (principally, the Maritime Administration), directs the U. S. carriers to serve specific geographic trade routes. These trade routes also encompass the sources ot some of the 91 critical strategic materials required to sustain our industrial base and maintain the U. S. national strategic stockpile programs. In this era, administrations stress the “guns and butter” aspects of our society, and Congress refuses to call critically required reserve and national guard units into federal service. It is a well-known fact that many professionals sought refuge within these very units.
The U. S. Merchant Marine in World War II (e.g., Murmansk Route to supp0ft the Soviet Union) lost, in ratio to their numbers, more personnel than any mil1' tary service except the U. S. Marines •
“My Dear Canada”
(See J. L. Byron, p. 124, March 1983; J. A- Keenliside, J. M. Sullivan, pp. 19-20, June 1983 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral J. A. Fulton, Canadioti Forces, Commander, Maritime C°'n, mand—I was surprised and concerne that a magazine of your stature woul publish a letter of the type written by Commander Byron. The criticism of an ally’s defense policy by a serving officer is unusual and implies, in my OP10'0/1: the general agreement of the criticism by his service. >s
Canada’s record in two World Wars well known. In both wars, we fought si by side with our allies from start to l,n ish. I have no doubt that the Canady people, when they perceive that a mu ^ greater defense effort is required'—' they did in 1948 when the first overtur for NATO was made through our Parha ment—will demand that effort. ^
Commander Byron’s uni n form2 ^
statements can only be attributed to goS sip since, to the best of my knowledge he has never served with us in Can® j The commander obviously considers t the Canadian Navy should be the source of exercise submarine targets • the U. S. Navy. It has apparently esCj* him that we as a sovereign nation n
other requirements.
The publication of a letter of this type oould lead to similar letters in other de- ense publications which would seriously arnage the good relationships which ave developed over the years between allied navies.
enry H. Hill, Halifax, Nova Scotia— o one asked me either, but as a Cana- 'an I take offense at Commander By- s article. Canada’s navy (Maritime omrnand) is in sad shape, but Commander Byron’s comments represent an arrogant approach to solve a Canadian Problem.
The cooperative spirit which Canada and the United States have shown over e years has been excellent, and the ex- ange of ideas, technology, and sugges- ‘°ns has been helpful. The problem for anada is that the U. S. big-brother approach to Canada has not always been in anada’s best interests. Commander yr°n proposes a submarine fleet for ^anada, but it seems better suited to the • S. defense plans. There are several asons why a submarine-equipped Marie Command does not serve Canada’s Dest interests.
Is a submarine-oriented force a viable P Jon for Canada or any other country yy hundreds of miles of coastal area? 2ftn Can t even P°l‘ce and enforce our ~rnile economic zone with submanes. Several years ago, Maritime Com- and s destroyers escorted two Cuban s lng vessels into Halifax Harbor be- 2()Use they violated Canada’s 200-mile fo116 ^ Wonder how a submarine-oriented yr.Ce would have handled this problem? Wj>'aS a torpedo is expensive compared fiv ■3 *ew rounds from a destroyer’s sim'|lnC^ ®un' This type of situation is q 1 ar to those faced by the U.S. Coast ard: it uses a surface fleet.
Why should Canada consider purchasing second-hand U. S. submarines when it could look at several modern European-designed submarines? These could be purchased, and then they could be constructed in Canadian shipyards. If submarines are the answer to Maritime Command’s commitments, why not purchase second-hand U. S. nuclear and diesel submarines? Both types would give Canada a well-balanced submarine force.
In the Falklands War, both Britain and Argentina had balanced fleets. The British fleet bore the brunt of the action, but it was the British nuclear, not diesel, submarines that played an important part in recapturing the Falklands.
After World War II, the Soviet Navy built large numbers of diesel-powered boats along with nuclear-powered submarines. The Soviet leadership saw the need for a balanced fleet. The United States also has a balanced fleet as do most of the modem industrialized powers.
If Commander Byron’s views of “Canada’s best interests” are to be taken seriously, he should have examined closer Canadian interests as they apply to our national policy, which differs from that of the United States.
Canada’s NATO commitments are also discussed. I agree that Canada, even in time of restraint, could increase its NATO commitments. Perhaps our contribution to NATO does not show well as a percentage of our gross national product, but the United States used Canadian air space for low-level B-52 flight tests and is now seeking our cooperation in testing the cruise missile in our air space. West Germany carried out armor exercises in Western Canada and, along with Great Britain, used Canadian Force airfields and air space for exercises.
Even a conventional war in Europe would require supplies from North America to support the NATO effort. The Soviet submarine force would no doubt repeat the German Navy’s U-boat offensive during World War II. Without strong surface escorts in the West, Canada included, would the West be facing the same disastrous situation it had to contend with during 1939-45?
“Reeding, Righting, and Rithmatic”
(See C. W. Taylor, pp. 106-108, December
1982 Proceedings)
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Commodore Don G. Primeau, Director, Total Force Planning/Training Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—Rear Admiral Taylor has correctly directed attention to the Navy’s need for personnel with the basic competencies to meet the challenges of an increasingly sophisticated force. However, I would like to add to his description of ongoing Navy efforts to improve basic skills. The Navy Campus Functional Skills program offers Navy personnel the opportunity to improve their reading, mathematical computation, and/or English composi- tion/grammar skills. This basic instruction is provided by civilian colleges under contract with the Navy. In fiscal year 1981, 25,377 Navy personnel (13,670 afloat and 11,707 ashore) took functional skills courses. In fiscal year 1982, this grew to 27,383 (11,751 afloat and 15,632 ashore). Classes are taught during duty hours, and, while personnel often volunteer, participation is at the commanding officer’s discretion. About 24% of the personnel attending functional skills courses ashore in fiscal year 1981 did so prior to attending their Navy technical school. Participation in the academic remedial training (ART) program and the job oriented basic skills (JOBS) is much smaller (fewer than 3,000 recruits per year in ART and 2,044 in JOBS in fiscal year 1982).
“Keeping Faith With Our
People”
(See D. G. Hartley, pp. 58-63, February 1983
Proceedings)
Commander Mack Thomas, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Ken Curtis, U. S. Navy—Commander Hartley has provided us with an excellent analysis of the Navy’s combat search and rescue capability. However, despite his in-depth research and well-argued need for retention of the mission, he limits the reader in the choice of alternatives for equipment.
As Commander Hartley accurately states, “Given tactics and training, the primary limiting factor to successful combat rescue prosecution is the scarcity of available airframes and their severe shortcomings in state-of-the-art helicopter design and equipment.” It follows, therefore, that no advancement in the mission can be realized until an appropriate vehicle can be found. We need not take the narrow view that we must wait for some exotic new airframe of the future or a costly variant of the SH-60B, nor must we stay with the current deficient HH-3H.
Sticking with the present airframes limits any growth and possibly the livelihood of the combat rescue mission. A common variant with the Air Force—the Blackhawk—shows some promise, but because of present funding it is a solution in the distant future. The joint-service’s advanced vertical lift aircraft (experimental) program proposals are unknown and too far in the future to be considered as a real alternative. An “acceptable”— instead of “optional” airframe—is needed now. It must be cost-effective, readily available, and survivable if the Navy’s role in combat rescue is not to atrophy.
Fortunately, there are aircraft today that meet many of the criteria for an acceptable rescue vehicle. A possible alternative could be the Hughes 500MD. It offers high speed, maneuverability, small target/radar/infrared signature profiles, low noise levels, and limited night/instrument/close-to-the-earth capability. It can be easily transported with little preparation by . numerous aircraft (e.g., C-130, C-141, and C-5A) to areas close to trouble spots for fleet use. The arrival of several of these small helicopters would pose no difficulties for aircraft carriers or small air-capable ships. They would require minimal maintenance support or personnel investment. They can be flown single-piloted with a highly trained combat aircrew observer. Most important, they are inexpensive, available, and with some modifications, acceptable as an alternative.
If the Navy is to have a combat rescue capability, we must act now. If we are to develop the tactics and have the training liaison with tactical air—then we must do it in the air, not on paper. The KISS (keep it simple, stupid) principle does apply when we need a solution today. Give us enough to get the job done today, and by all means, let’s “keep faith with our people.”
“Ride with the Seas”
(See W. K. Earle, pp. 78-79, February 1983
Proceedings)
Captain John Cadwalader, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The command which sent a large naval force into the eye of a typhoon on 17 December 1944 was ignorant of the shiphandling lesson Captain Earle learned as a young ensign. I was then on board the USS Monterey (CVL- 26), and we learned that lesson the hard way. That day, our task group had been fueling from tankers, and as wind and seas got steadily worse, fueling was ordered stopped, and we separated from the tanker group, although still headed into the wind. Even though it was generally known that there was a tropical storm in the area, we were ordered to turn right 110° and steam at 15 knots, right for the eye of the typhoon. As the pounding grew worse, several ships requested permission to reduce speed, but they were told permission was not granted. Regardless, ships began dropping out of the formation, and with waves building toward 60 feet and visibility down to a few yards, all efforts at control by the staff ceased. One of the last transmissions over the voice radio was a report from the tanker group commander that he was heaving to. When asked by what authority, he replied, “By the authority of common sense. Out.” The tankers were the only ships to come through unscathed.
Meanwhile, the Monterey was taking 45° rolls, and aircraft on the hangar deck broke loose, charging from side to side. Gasoline from ruptured tanks was ignited by sparks from metal objects banging about on the steel deck, and the hangar became an inferno. On the flight deck, all aircraft had already gone overboard, fortunately not crushing any of the gun crews, and these crews broke out the fire hoses at their stations and trained them through openings into the hangar deck on the spreading fires. Then the water pressure went off.
The ship had been slowly slogging ahead in an effort to comply with the last orders, but as the hoses went limp we lost the little way we had and were also swinging off course. Careening aircraft had ruptured the uptakes through the hangar deck, and burning gasoline had fallen to the engine room. The fires which started there were promptly extinguished, but the smoke and fumes drove out the black gang. We were without power.
This saved the ship. Our experience was exactly as Captain Earle described when he stopped his engines, except that his ship hove to on orders from a good seaman; ours did because it was unable to carry out orders to the contrary any longer. We rolled heavily while passing through the trough, but kept on swinging’ settling quite comfortably with the wm° on the starboard quarter, and, to quote Captain Earle, “A sudden quiet settled over the ship.” There was a pitching motion as the great seas passed under us, but relatively little roll. The black gang managed to get up pressure again on the hoses, and the damage control crew, n° longer being thrown wildly about wh°e dodging careening aircraft and flyin§ missiles, put the fires out. Luckier than the three destroyers that went down |[1 that storm, after repairs at Bremerton, *e were able to get back to sea in time f°r the Okinawa operation.
“Wake’s POWs”
(See E. A. Junghans, pp. 43-50, February '^83
Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Charles Holmes, U. S. Marine Corps (Pe tired)—I am one of the Marine survivor of the defense of Wake Island (Decem°e 1941) and subsequent U. S. prisoners °. war that rode the Nitta Maru to Shangtd. and survived the remaining 44 months the war in China, Korea, and Hokkaiu0, Japan. j
Captain Junghans’s article is super0- really appreciated seeing it in the Pr0 ceedings. After 37 years, it finally e* plained to us Wake defenders what rea 7 happened to Admiral Sakaibara, one the “beasts of the Far East.”
will be common, and the submarine
•ke*
The nuclear submarine encounte
ring
as
“Mediterranean: Qaddafi’s Choke Point?”
(see R. Danziger, pp. 138-140, March 1983 Proceedings)
Richard A. Worth, consultant and former manager of Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle, Department of the Navy—Dr. Danziger’s excellent analysis of Qaddafi’s buildup of the Libyan Navy into a true offensive threat against the vital shipping lanes of the Mediterranean touches on the use of small submersibles for the covert or clandestine activities typical of terrorist organizations. However, he believes the most likely offensive move would be carried out by a surface missile attack using the long-range Otomat surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) rather than the small submarines or even the “Foxtrot” submarines at Qaddafi’s disposal because it would be “less risky.” Dr. Danziger discounts the value of the inherent covert nature of submarine operations.
The use of any surface means of attack would be hazardous as to detection mainly because of advances in satellite surveillance as well as over-the-horizon radar targeting systems. Sinking an unarmed ship such as a liner, merchantman, or tanker, which Dr. Danziger suggests as a likely target, would bring against an identified perpetrator, at the least, world condemnation and, more likely, would produce a retaliatory raid to destroy naval and other assets of the offender. Qaddafi could not risk discovery because his defenses are not adequate against any Western navy or air force. Even at his irrational worst, he would realize that retribution for a provable attack far outweighs the rewards of a surface or aerial attack against any merchant shipping. A more covert and therefore more likely threat is use of the SX-404 submarines acquired from the Italian shipbuilder Cosmos Leghorn. The SX- 404 class is specifically designed for covert delivery of divers and explosives. To accomplish its primary role, the SX-404 has rather impressive design and performance characteristics, including a displacement of 40 tons (dive trim), a speed of 11 knots surfaced, and a range of 1,200 miles surfaced.
These vehicles could be used against any nonmilitary anchored ship, harbor installations, drilling platforms, or pipelines in the Mediterranean with little chance of detection. Whether for blackmail or actual destruction, these devices would be more suitable for Qaddafi’s penchant for terrorism than his more sophisticated missile combatants.
The most difficult antisubmarine warfare detection and location task is the slow-moving diesel-electric submarine operating in less than 300 feet of water. This is further compounded in the relatively confined waters of the Mediterranean by variations in salinity, tidal flows, ambient noise, and thermal layers much larger than in the oceans’ open waters. These factors greatly enhance the value of Qaddafi’s submarine as a covert offensive threat, and, as Mr. Danziger points out, Qaddafi has provided the Palestinian Liberation Organization with at least two of the SX-404s, posing a potential terrorist threat not only in the Mediterranean but also in the oil shipping lanes of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Persian Gulf.
The Mediterranean Sea was the scene of numerous midget submarine/swimmer delivery vehicle forays during World War II by both the British and Italian navies including attacks—some successful,
some abortive—against ports at Gibraltar, Alexandria, Palermo, La Spezia, and even Libya’s capital, Tripoli. Advances in the technology of explosives and attack diver operations make these midget submarines at Qaddafi’s disposal a serious threat to the Mediterranean’s stability, and should be recognized as an extremely dangerous terrorist weapon.
“Diesel Boats Forever?”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 35-43, December 1982;
K. G. Schacht, G. Hart, pp. 25-26, February 1983; M. Wilson, M. E. Capron, pp. 69-72, March 1983; K. P. Weinberg, B. R. Long worth, pp. 10-11, April 1983; J. T. Hayward, pp. 3644, May 1983 Proceedings)
“The Submarine and the
Falklands War”
(See J. L. Byron, p. 43, December 1982; A. M.
Steele, pp. 11-12, April 1983 Proceedings)
Commander John L. Byron, U. S. Navy—My turn. The several letters discussing diesel submarines warrant reply.
Captain Schacht is correct, World War II diesel submarines did not go to station at 20 knots. However, they did not use this capability because the high transit speed would consume too much fuel. This points out again the diesel submarine’s difficulty with range and endurance.
Commander Steele is wrong in stating that World War II submarines operated 10,000 miles from their home ports. Throughout the war in the Pacific, submarine bases were moved westward to be ever closer to Empire waters. Patrol distances were nowhere near 10,000 miles—the pond is not that big! To give a benchmark, a Barbel-class diesel submarine, topped off with fuel at the start, can barely get from Yokosuka to San Diego, a distance of only 7,000 miles.
How fast can a diesel submarine transit on the snorkel? Captain Schacht says the modem diesel submarine has “twice the speed’ ’ given it in my article. I agree with a high-end snorkel speed of around 1* knots, but hold to five to six knots as a practical maximum for covert transit against opposition. The figure comes from courses taught by the Pacific Fleet Tactical Training Group.
Several writers talk to the matter o detectability. The fear of the captain of a transiting diesel submarine is that, while snorkeling and therefore deaf, he wi stumble into the range of a patrolling enemy submarine. He’ll reduce the ns by alternating quiet listening periods on the battery (thus the five to six knot max' mum), but the risk cannot be eliminated- Because of her slow speed, the diese submarine is at risk in transit more than four times longer than the nuclear boat, snorkeler is significantly noisier than modem U. S. nuclear submarine, whic further increases the diesel’s risk factor-
Commander Wilson says the periscope provides ample counterdetection capab1 ity against potential threats when snorke ing. Not always. Visual detection is n° much good at night against darkene ships and aircraft nor, in daylight, is certain to see a patrolling aircraft betor the latter spots the characteristic win stripe a snorkel mast tears in the oce surface. v
As to electronic detection, an enemy operating his radars intermittently m catch a snorkeler at close range. In ad tion, the periscope’s electronic sens are susceptible to radar flooding teC niques. In enemy waters, threat signJ commanding officer will have to snor in spite of their presence.
an enemy threat can hide, fight, or flee tactical considerations dictate, with the battery constraint suffered by the sel submarine. The diesel sub has same tactical opportunities, but with choice severely biased by the battery state of charge and by the knowledge t each choice will sooner or later dep the battery if not initially successful- Sooner or later, the diesel subrnari must snorkel or die. When snorke 1 ^ she is subject to acoustic, visual, electronic detection. The nuclear su fine, not needing to charge batter^^ avoids this regular exposure to enemy. j,t
1984
Admiral Hayward and Captain Sen
comment on manning, suggesting that considerations here favor the diesel sub- manne. But it would seem that operation and maintenance of state-of-the-art senses, weapons, and communication suites acquire the same trained sailor whether c equipment is installed in a nuclear submarine or a diesel. If the issue is ■ 6Wer men because of automation, this Evolves design philosophy, not type of Power plant.
The question is: Should the submarine ■esel or nuclear) be more automated? o, if you believe the lessons of the past resPect learning built into U. S. u marines. We sometimes lose sight of e ‘act that the modem submarine is very uch an American invention. Hull aPe, power plant, sensors, weapons, uvironniental control—the submarine’s ., Per*or components were developed in tio States. The same sophistica-
n ln submarine development shows in c'ability, maintenance philosophy— jn picking the point where automa- . ls brought in and a piece of hardware stituted for a trained sailor.
sh "reC corTesPondents take shots at my p comment on submarines in the ^at anc^s War. I stand on my conclusion U(a British nuclear submarines contrib- e m a major strategic way to the war’s outcome (through early blockade and in sinking the General Belgrano), whereas diesel submarines were insignificant in the conflict.
Judging from the letters, the principal disagreement between nuclear submarine proponents and supporters of diesel submarines involves two topics: missions and money. Regarding missions, 1 quickly agree that diesel submarines are effective in coastal defense, but I have difficulty seeing coastal defense as significant in the forward-defensive strategy of our global Navy. In the forward areas, the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, the Mediterranean, and the Norwegian Sea are already well covered by allied diesel submarines.
Diesel submarine superiority in shallow water is unsupportable. Whatever is imagined to the contrary, nuclear submarines are fully capable in shallow water operations.
Envisioning support for construction of diesel submarines, primarily for use as targets in ASW training, is difficult. Predicting we will not build diesel submarines for this purpose is not inconsistent with thinking the diesel threat a problem, as Admiral Hayward would have it. We will continue to find it necessary to work on this problem of countering the diesel submarine even after our last one is decommissioned. Where live targets are needed, we will have to rely on our allies for their diesel submarines and on ourselves to simulate the diesel target with properly augmented nuclear submarines. The latter is simple, Captain Schacht, just tell the nuclear boat’s CO to turn on the noisemaker and then slave tactics to the requirements of slow speed and regular exposures at periscope depth.
The real issue is money. Senator Hart and others are quick to make clear they don’t say diesel submarines should be built instead of nuclear submarines; it’s always supplement, complement, and in addition to. But submarine money is submarine money, and there is only so much. Money spent on diesel submarines will be at the expense of nuclear submarine construction.
The fundamental question is utility versus cost of the two submarine types. No serious disagreement exists that diesel submarines have far less utility than nuclear submarines, so the focus is on cost. More specifically, the focus is on the proposal of a German firm selling us, for very little money, the diesel submarine equivalent of a Saturday Night Special.
Leave aside the sad record of growth in contractors’ original cost figures. Leave
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aside the unacceptability of dependence on foreign sources for a major element of national defense. Leave aside any concern that Germany lost 850 diesel submarines in World War II. Consider the design. The proposed German off-the-shelf boat is unsuitable. She lacks reliability, maintainability, safety, design margin for future growth, and noise quieting. We need these things in any submarine we build, whatever her power plant. Providing them accounts for much of the price ofU. S. nuclear submarines. Backfitting the same crucial features into a diesel submarine of foreign design would prove quite costly, but more significant would be the unacceptability of transferring this amount of submarine technology to a private firm of another nation.
The cost to build a diesel submarine has been studied to death. The price of an acceptable design is too high to warrant the purchase. In presenting the latest study to Congress last fall, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman summed up the issue:
“In an era when the U. S. Navy will not have enough submarines to carry out all necessary wartime missions at one time, every submarine in the U. S. force must be capable of responding rapidly to changing conditions and performing a multitude of missions. The diesel-electric submarine provides, at best, a marginal and limited capability when attempting to operate in the open ocean against a modem Navy. Since well over 100 multi-mission SSNs are required to meet all projected submarine wartime missions, the mixed force would effectively reduce our overall submarine force capability. Our limited U. S. Navy shipbuilding funds should be invested in submarines that provide the required flexibility and open ocean capability, namely, in nuclear powered attack submarines.”
“New Role for Mine Warfare”
(See C. F. Home, pp. 34-40, November 1982; T. J. Smith, p. 21, February 1983; W. C. Oehrle, p. 28, March 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander J. M. Steussy, U. S. Navy—Admiral Home’s comprehensive review of mine warfare in the U. S. Navy included a photograph of the USS Meyerkord (FF-1058) which shows a U. S. surface combatant laying mines for the first time in more than 16 years. Using simple, inexpensive, and portable minerails, the frigate laid three Mk-55, 2,000-pound bottom mines in less than
ten minutes as it steamed off the coast of Southern California. The ship’s crew then dismantled the rail assembly and stowed it in the helo hangar, restoring the flight deck to full operation. While not as sophisticated as the installed minerails of the Sovremennyy and other classes of Soviet combatants, portable minerail assemblies such as these or of improved design would provide the U. S. Navy with a combat capability it has lacked for many years. Even one Mk-55 mine exploding under the keel of any submarine or surface warship would severely damage her or sink her outright. The ability to carry such weapons would give frigates, destroyers, amphibious warfare ships, and even auxiliaries the capability to destroy even the largest enemy ships at a small, perhaps negligible cost. Surface-laid mines should be used mainly in defensive and protective mining nlis sions, but, on board combatants, mines could even be used in tactical applied tions against enemy forces in much t same ways other weapons are used.
Perhaps the most important precept o surface mining is that it should be consi ered only as an augment to—not a substi tute for—aircraft and submarine mining- These platforms can execute vital offen sive and most defensive mining missions, while surface ships can accomplish t very important but now wholly a^a^- doned mission of protective mining our ports and waterways. Such mining would place enemy minelaying subm^ rines and disguised naval auxiliaries risk before and while they lay their oVj^ mines. It would protect and enforce use of Q-routes, which are currently^ least dangerous ways into and out ot ports. If there are no mines available protective fields, upgraded obso ^ mines, such as the Mk-25 and -39 solid state DST-type sensors, moy what are needed. Even rearmed M moored mines would give ships an m mediate water-depth mining caPaV,eNy with a simple, but effective weapon- ^ mines under development should be^ pable of surface launch without spec gear or unusual launch requirements-
“Naval War College: The Right Stuff?”
(See J. E. Jackson, pp. 71-77, April 1983,
B. Buell, E. V. Badolato, p. 20, June 1^ Proceedings)
Commander Richard N. Griffin.
Naval Reserve—Commander -I®1 sr article concentrates on the post- age developments at the Naval War Co ^ as they relate to resident students an ^ searchers. Yet, since he is the head o
Defense Economics and Decision Mak- JJ'g Division of the Center for Continuing ducation, it is curious that his essay ignores the involvement and contributions 0 a large and enthusiastic nonresident community.
By far the largest number of nonresi- ent students are enrolled in correspon- ence courses which are patterned after e three basic core areas of the resident curriculum—strategy and policy, de- ense economics and decision making, and employment of naval forces. Corre- spondenee students include active duty 0 icers from all of the services as well as •tjactive duty reserve officers. The zone e eligibility begins at the 0-3 level, al- 0ugh waivers are available for other- ^lse qualified applicants. In recent years, e student load has been hovering ar°und 1,100.
The college awards a nonresident di- P°rna to students who finish the correspondence program based upon the resi- ent curriculum, plus one of two j eec[ive” courses, international law or st ^national relations. Relatively few udents persevere through the estimated
975 . diploi
all.
study hours required to satisfy the 'ma requirements, but most, if not
k Would agree that the experience was 0[h broadening and useful in their naval
careers.
^ A significant aspect of the “Turner dic|V°^Ut*0n'' tbat Commander Jackson ^ not mention is the Washington, qu •’ 0ff-campus program office, where aa "led students have the opportunity to n P? ^or enrollment in faculty-led semitin S-' ^be Director of the Center for Con- ^ Uing Education is responsible for this.
19tL 'tS be§innings *n academic year Se . ^5, when 33 students enrolled in Calnars >n strategy and policy, the off- Copas Program gradually added the nav-i etC Core curriculum. Active duty (y^a officers of the grades 0-3 through ees ^>mPr‘se the largest group of enroll- S(u , A great incentive for this category of
gard 'S that official NMPC Policy re-
pro S completion of the off-campus as Being equivalent, for assign- tied' Un^ Pr°motion purposes, to inter- ^ate-level service college, an o 6 *'rst ^ enrolled students passed aWa°.Urse requirements in 1979 and were c0ltLeci nonresident diplomas in the 95th Sjnc, encement ceremonies in Newport. j>radu tbal dme, 98 students have been carnp31^' Moreover, the interest of off- theyPhUs Pr°gram graduates in the subjects Ufed h*lVe studicd remains high, as meas- y their contributions to professional
^umals
(e g., see K. Lynch, “Their
l98bdpAvia,i0n’” F Proceedings).
ber?o^Aviation,” PP- 46-52, Octo-
Naval Reserve officers not on active duty have been enrolling in Naval War College nonresident programs for many years. Most, of necessity, sign up for correspondence courses, but a few have been fortunate enough to have been accepted into the Washington off-campus program. During the first eight years of the seminars, three reserve officers have completed the prescribed course of study and have received nonresident diplomas along with their active duty and Department of Defense civilian counterparts.
In addition, a small number of reserve officers can study at the Naval War College. Most of the slots are two-week periods of active duty for training (AcDuTra) during the annual reserve officer courses that have been held every year since 1949. In recent years, the practice has been to offer, in rotation, a concentrated segment of each of the core courses. As a result of a recommendation by the Secretary of the Navy’s Reserve Policy Board, a few inactive duty reservists have been enrolled as full-time students at the college. In academic year 1982-83, two senior reserve officers were phased into the policy and strategy trimester followed by two in the naval operations trimester. At the end of this academic year the phased-entry approach was ended. When the next group of students arrives, one Marine reserve and one Navy reserve student will be enrolled in the junior- and senior-level courses for the entire year.
Nonresident War College programs have received considerable support from the Naval Reserve. Since the 1980-81 academic year, a qualified reserve officer has been the primary instructor for one of the Washington off-campus seminars, while others have filled in as substitute moderators and have occasionally graded student essay submissions for the correspondence courses.
The close relationship between the War College and the Naval Reserve has substantially increased the competence and mobilization readiness of the participating reservists, and the Navy has already begun to receive benefits in the absence of mobilization. For example, with the experience gained on the floor at the Center for War Gaming, the detachment of reserve umpires has taken its own manual game on the road, helping to sharpen the tactical skills of a wide variety of customers, including other reserve units and the members of the Naval Academy war gaming group. Also, Commander, Training Force, Atlantic, has asked a number of experienced reservists to act as at-sea instructors and observers during the Atlantic Fleet’s periodic major exercises in the Caribbean.
A saga of sea power.... and the Attack Carrier
• “Hook Down, Wheels Down” (parts I & II). Langley, Saratoga, Lexington. Enterprise, Wasp. Hornet, Ranger and their lighting aircraft like Wildcat, Dauntless, Avenger and Hellcdt. Here is the Maridnnas Turkey-Shoot and the "Thdch Weave" ot the battling Wildcats. Hell-bent-for-leather Naval Aces at their finest.
• Seapower-Plymouth Rock to Polaris.
American seapower from the creaking decks ol wooden sailing ships to Nuclear Subs and Carriers. An unforgettable visual record ot the making ol the American Navy
• The Rise of the Soviet Navy. Bold and powerful record ol the Russian Fleet from the days ol the Czar to today's modern and potential threat. This remarkable documentary includes footage the Kremlin attempted to destroy. Rare combat scenes.
All three programs,
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“Whose Law of Whose Sea?”
(See D. R. Neutze. pp. 43-48, January 1983
Proceedings)
Commander Dennis R. Neutze, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U. S. Navy—The original title of my article was “Naval Mobility and the Law of the Sea: What Now?” The title accurately reflected the contents of the article: how the United States, as a nonsignatory of the U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, should operate its naval and air forces in the posttreaty environment. I was not aware of the title change until I received my February issue.
1 also did not write the precis to the article. Although some of the words therein were taken from my original manuscript, as used in the precis, my words were taken out of context and took on an inflammatory meaning never intended.
The title and the precis, as published, suggest that the United States, in rejecting the LOS Convention, is acting in a lawless manner. It is the opposite impression that I sought to leave with the reader; that is, the treaty merely describes existing practices in new ways. The concepts of transit passage and archipelagic sea-lane passage are simply ways of expressing existing navigational freedoms in the treaty context. Thus, continuing to operate our forces as we have in the past—particularly through straits and archipelagoes—is entirely consistent with the state of the law as we find it today and as we will probably find it ten years from now.
weighs only a little more than a pound; that of a Roland weighs 14 times as much, yet Argentine Rolands failed to knock down Harriers, which were able to stay out of the missile’s “zone of lethality” (about 20 feet in radius). This should particularly concern the U. S. Army, which plans to buy many thousands of Rolands. By contrast. Rapiers brought down eight aircraft, and British paratroopers using Blowpipes and small arms knocked down four Pucaras out of six during the attack on Goose Green.
Lieutenant Commander D. J. Ramsey, U. S. Coast Guard—Captain Coote’s article is interesting and entertaining. Especially informative is his sense of despair over the continu-
Royal Navy’s Fishery Protection Squadron as a “Mickey Mouse" outfit. This is hardly fair to the dedicated sailors operating the minesweepers, patrol boats, and lightly armed offshore protection vessels (OPVs) based in Rosyth. They carry out an essential purpose—providing protection of resources within the 200-mile limit and serving as a suitable measure of naval presence when and where necessary- In its Coast Guard-like role, the Fisheries Protection Squadron carries out an arduous and little-appreciated mission year round in some of the world s worst weather. And two of the squadron’s new “Castle”-class OPVs served in the Falklands campaign.
Must this part of a navy be called “Mickey Mouse” because it has fe'v big guns or missiles? Armed with sur-
Donald P. Hall—In the recent Falkland Islands War, the heavy losses of Argentine aircraft achieved by British surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) seem to vindicate the “hittile,” or direct- hitting projectile concept. Unlike older SAMs, which carry large warheads and proximity fuzes, weapons such as Rapier, Blowpipe, and Seawolf explode on impact with the target. Although this requires greater accuracy from the hittile, the need for a large warhead and a complex fuze is obviated, and the round is consequently light and compact.
The Rapier warhead, for example.
ing erosion of British naval forces. It appears that the erosion will not be checked by the fresh demonstration in the Falklands War of the importance of the Royal Navy to the interests of the United Kingdom. In fact, the shrinkage of this historic service will likely be accelerated to pay for the war, the repair of damaged ships not slated for retirement, and the maintenance of suitable forces in the Falklands. In truth, the Royal Navy will likely be penalized for its success.
I must take issue with Captain Coote’s disparaging reference to the
Pictured here returning from the Falklands campaign, the Dumbarton Castle, steaming with one of her sisters, Leeds Castle, proved that srnal offshore patrol vessels can be employed for other purposes.
face-to-surface missiles, minesweeP^ ing gear, or carrying antisubman warfare weaponry and helicopters, telligently used and supported, srrn ships can assuredly serve as usetu in wartime as they do in peacetime- “Space Race”
\See J- E. Lacouture, pp. 51-57, February *983 Proceedings)
Charles B. Stevens, Director of Fusion Research, Fusion Energy Foundation—Captain Lacouture’s call to arms fails to emphasize the essential strategic questions raised by the space race. These broader issues have been addressed by Dr. Edward Teller, America’s leading nuclear scientist, and Lyndon H. LaRouche, America’s fading economist, and involve deeating the nuclear freeze movement, ending the age of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and using advanced 'fft-ted energy weapons research as a science driver” to revive the U. S.
conomy. Economic revival is, above a n nat'ona* security issue.
Or. Teller has warned in recent speeches that if the nuclear freeze aiovement is not defeated, thermo-nu- ear war or U. S. capitulation to the °viets will result. Furthermore, Dr. eller has emphasized that the only ay the nuclear freeze movement can e defeated is by informing the Ameren public of what the Soviet lead- rship already knows—that ballistic elss'le defense based on directed en- r8y weapons can, within this decade, a the age of MAD and initiate the ]®e °f assured survival. And Dr. Teller of Vested that the existing policies security” classification must be ^odified in order to provide the em'fir'Can peoP*e w*th essential sci- me facts which the Soviet leaders aiready know.
aRouche, a member of the board p lrectors of the Fusion Energy
'ntU|r^at'°n anc* f°un(fer °f a private ^eiiigence service which publishes
endf U!tVe Intelligence Review, has °n ^r- Teller’s general views
ref t S su.f,ject and emphasized two the"1 ^ po‘nts- First, ending the age of rmonuclear terror will destroy the he| Ca°iogical environment which has OoIq2^ t0 ^oster antiscience, anti-tech- tj0 ^ movements among large sec- r0_s °f fhe U. S. and Western Eu- fronr? Populations. Second, the natuler scientific and technological me- Pe directed energy systems dev uS *^at a crasi1 program for their jn °Pment would produce spin-offs jnce ec°nomy as a whole and vastly n0m£ase general productivity. Eco- ^As'a stu^'es have shown that the spon ^Apollo effort was chiefly re- S|ble for productivity gains in the
1960s. For every dollar spent on NASA, at least ten dollars of economic activity were generated.
. Dr. John Rather, a leading laser specialist, in the December issue of Defense Science 2000+ , pointed out: “High energy lasers hold vital promise for replacing weapons of mass destruction with vastly more versatile and benign weapons having a highly surgical nature. While serving as major deterrents to total war, if intelligently parlayed, such lasers can also provide mankind with major nonfossil energy options, a quantum leap ahead in opening space for massive human endeavors, and enormous new defense and commercial opportunities in remote sensing, communications, photochemistry, etc.”
Besides the immediate strategic military imperative, Mr. LaRouche has stated that a crash program to develop directed energy weapons may be the only way for the Western economies to pull themselves out of the current world depression. It should be noted that since its inception four years ago, Mr. LaRouche’s “Riemannian” computer-based economic model, which he and his associates have used to make these assessments, has consistently produced highly accurate published economic forecasts, while all other major published forecasts have been wrong to the point of absurdity.
“Requiem for the Sixth Fleet?”
(See P. T. Deutermann, pp. 46-49,
September 1982; B. L. Brown, p. 14, November 1982; R. L. Cobb, pp. 17-20, January 1983; J. Cable, pp. 80-81, February 1983; J. G. Procopio, pp. 12-17, March 1983 Proceedings)
Jack A. Palmer—We should be grateful to Sir James Cable for his clarification of the status of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It is, indeed, a national force, deployed entirely for national purposes.
Those with short memories who find some of Sir James Cable’s supporting comments to be harsh can be assured that in one case—the harassing tactics of the Sixth Fleet during the Anglo- French intervention at Suez—they are in no way extravagant. The harassment was very real and exasperating to the British force commander. I was on the bridge of his carrier flagship when the maneuvering of the Sixth
Fleet, poised directly between the British force and Egypt, led him to show his irritation.
His first hint was both diplomatic and gentle. Addressing the nearest Sixth Fleet destroyer, he signalled “Do you require a screen station?” The reply was immediate and polite: “No thank you. I have one.” But the maneuvering continued. The next exchange of messages was more to the point. Calling the Sixth Fleet flagship by light, he asked in plain language and innocently enough: “Are you taking part in this operation?” On receipt of the response “Negative,” he minced no words and thundered “Then clear my line of fire.”
The alacrity of the Sixth Fleet compliance may have been coincidental; it may have been political. Or it may have been militarily politic, since the force was heavily outnumbered by the British four fixed-wing and two helicopter carriers, with a French carrier and the supporting battleship Jean Bart just over the horizon. Or it might even have had something to do with the reputation of the British admiral concerned, who as a captain nine years previously, had sunk the Japanese cruiser IJaguro in a surface action which will always remain a classic in the annals of destroyer warfare. Let us merely be glad, after all these years, that this little family squabble did not have an unhappy ending.
To return to the thesis that the Sixth Fleet should be withdrawn, the arguments for and against, however persuasive, have omitted the one which is most telling of all. The Mediterranean, in the 1980s, is no place for aircraft carriers in wartime, so long as at least half the littoral is more or less unfriendly. Any carriers actually in the sea before the outbreak of hostilities might just possibly be able to repay their investment before being overwhelmed, or having to apply all their resources to their own survival. The military risks of ordering them either to stand and fight, or to put Gibraltar on the starboard quarter as soon as possible, would have to be weighed at the time. But against a foe of even average worthiness, attempts to enter the Mediterranean after war has broken out, with the warning of intent inevitable from a passage starting either at the Virginia Capes, or in the Norwegian Sea, could be very expensive indeed.