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It is still painful, almost three years afterward, to view this incinerated helicopter, its rotors resembling a broken “V” for the victory that was not to be.
An imperishable principle—the protection of U. S. citizens abroad dictated the decision to undertake the Tehran rescue mission. But, thereafter, the planning and execution should have reflected other principles the Principles of War.
When the U. S. diplomats in Tehran were seized and held hostage on 4 November 1979 by Islamic militants, an illegal act was committed against U. S. citizens. The government of Iran was obligated under international law to protect foreign diplomats in its country. Instead, the new Islamic Republic not only acquiesced in the taking of the hostages, but also became the chief demander of ransom for the return of the hostages.
More than five months after the hostages had been seized, former President Carter acknowledged that there was little hope for a negotiated settlement of the hostage crisis in the foreseeable future and approved a military rescue mission. However, the National Command Authorities (NCA) did not go far enough in requisitioning, developing, and approving the type of rescue mission that was needed. Rather than approving a bold, one-time-only rescue plan, they approved a conservative, safe, “minimalist” rescue plan with built-in forces reducing the likelihood of success. Some of the constraints built into this minimalist plan were the following:
► A requirement to safely rescue all (or at least 90%) of the hostages
► Numerous complicated go/no-go abort decisions at each stage of a long, complex mission ► A requirement to avoid harming any Iranians until (and including, if possible) final hostage seizure/re- covery, since retribution against the hostages was considered likely
► A requirement for a self-extract capability for the rescue force at every stage of the operation This minimalist approach to the mission affected not only the type of plan that was developed, but also its manner of execution. For example, commanders at Desert One were already considering an abort decision as soon as an abort criterion developed; instead, they should have been considering how the mission could have been adjusted and salvaged. Was the mission assigned to the rescue mission force, the Joint Task Force (JTF), by the NCA the proper one?
The mission assigned was: rescue the hostages. Implied in the mission was the proviso: avoid harm to any of the hostages at all costs, or the mission plan will not be approved. Such a mission was consistent with the administration’s emphasis on release of the hostages rather than the act of seizure itself. The maximalist mission that should have been assigned to the JTF is twofold. First, resolve (that is, end) the hostage situation; and second, rescue as many of the hostages as possible.
The total suffering (of both individuals and the country) resulting from the attempted execution of the minimalist mission—especially since the hostage situation was still unresolved more than a year after it began—was worse than that which would have been created by attempted execution of the maximalist mission. Had the maximalist mission been
assigned, the rescue plan developed by the JTF would probably have been significantly different. It would have shown less evidence of abort mentality. Even if the plan had been the same, the JTF executing a maximalist mission would (and should) have continued the mission with the five operational helicopters.
Ulysses S. Grant wrote in his memoirs that “It men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail.” It is equally true that men who violate or ignore the Principles of War will also fail. I do not know whether any members of the JTF planning staff used the Principles of War as a checklist to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the rescue plan, but they should have. A brief written analysis of each Principle of War as it related to the plan might have helped identify implicit assumptions, trade-offs between competing demands, and other weaknesses or problem areas. Hence, let us now analyze both the planning and execution phases of the Tehran rescue mission on the basis of the ten generally accepted Principles of War.
Mission/Objective: The assignment of a minimalist or limited mission was a mistake, which contributed to the JTF’s failure at Desert One. There were, of course, domestic political constraints under which the NCA and the JTF were operating. A maximalist mission was probably considered politically unacceptable except in extremis. Such a judgment is understandable, however, provided that a minimalist mission is believed to have a good chance of accomplishment. For example, when military planners are informing the President that the minimalist mission has a 90% chance of success, why should he request the maximalist mission?
In seemingly straightforward military missions, there are often critical differences in mission statements that must be analyzed carefully, not only at the beginning of the planning phase, but throughout that phase and during the execution phase. JTF planners should have been carefully evaluating the impact of a restatement of the mission (from min1' malist to maximalist) throughout the planning phase, particularly in early February when they had confidence in accomplishing the minimalist mission.
The President and the nation are ill-served through lack of adequate distinction between these two mission statements, military planners unintentionally inflate success probabilities of a minimalist plan (confusing them, perhaps, with the success probabilities of a nonexplicit maximalist plan), ?r' worse, intentionally inflate the success probabilit>eS of a minimalist plan because they believe a max'" malist plan would never be approved, and they fee that some military plan is required (that is, a less- than-optimum military rescue plan is better than no military rescue attempt at all). The distinction here
between honest mistake and deception is not clear, since the opportunity for self-deception in such a highly subjective and emotional matter is large.
JTF mission planners almost certainly deceived themselves into believing that the mission plan developed had a significantly higher success probability than it did in reality. The JTF believed the Plan had a 70-90% chance of success. I believe an objective analyst would have estimated the plan had a 50% chance of success. The inflated success probability may have been, in part, caused by inadequate distinction between mission statements. In other words, there is a question whether Commander, Joint Task Force (ComJTF) performed an adequate mis- s*on analysis, including assessment of alternative mission statements. Proper mission analysis can help reduce the chances for inflation or misassessment °f mission success probability.
Offensive!Initiative: A military plan to rescue the hostages by force of arms was clearly an offensive action, which, if successful, would have seized the mitiative from the Iranians. Even in failure, the rescue mission put the Iranians on the defensive, forc- lng them to take hostage dispersal actions and make Public claims of such actions (not always synonymous) in order to attempt to prevent the United states from initiating a second rescue attempt. That the rescue force penetrated the territory of Iran as *ar as it did and was never detected by the Iranian armed forces was a lesson of no small consequence to fhe Iranian Government and the militants.
Wass/Concentration: The proximate cause for the ubort decision was the failure to mass the requisite number of operational helicopters at the desert refueling site. Mission planners relied too much on the J:xPectation that events would go according to plan. They prided themselves on their careful assessment °f every conceivable contingency and the resultant necessary actions. Although anticipation of every contingency is admirable and, indeed, necessary in military planning, it is never attainable. Military ac- h°ns involve an unquantifiable element of risk, and a wise planner can but allow for this, rather than cut his margin for success too thin.
Helicopters are complex and delicate items of equipment requiring vast maintenance efforts. In this ^ssion, the RH-53 helicopters and their pilots were Pushed to the extremes of their operating envelope m many categories (gross weight, range, altitude, L^.bient air temperature, flight time, reduced visi- mty, etc.). The planners should have anticipated a •gher-than-normal failure rate for both aircraft and Crews.
Pilot fatigue must be seen as a contributory cause ?*he fatal accident involving the RH-53 and the C- 9- The helicopter crews had just completed a arrowing, low-level flight of more than five hours mght, through unanticipated dust clouds where educed visibility caused many of the pilots to suffer
spatial disorientation.* The crews had not had sufficient rest the night before the mission, which had been preceded by a tiring and disorienting around- the-world movement to the objective area. Finally, the adrenaline high that probably was sustaining many of the pilots at that point in the mission may have been suddenly deflated by the abort decision—they realized that all the risks endured to that point had been for naught.
Economy of Force: This principle was adhered to by JTF mission planners but probably too much so, as discussed in the previous section. Yet, economy of force was not practiced in this case for its tra- ♦The existence of suspended dust clouds along the helicopter route to Desert One was not forecast for the night of 24-25 April 1980. JTF weather forecasters had knowledge, however, of the phenomenon itself and its possible occurrence in this area of the world. Unfortunately, the RH-53 pilots were taken by surprise by its occurrence.
Planning and Training Phase
4 1VaV 1070 Sixty*thrcc u s-
1 ±.Zr I Zr hostages seized and
held at the U. S. Embassy in Tehran by Islamic militants. Three Americans also held by the government of Iran at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran.
12 Nov.
Major General James D. Vaught, USA, directed by JCS Chairman General David C. Jones, USAF, to organize a joint task force with the mission of rescuing the hostages.
19 Nov.
RH-53 selected as the best available helicopter for the
mission.
20 Nov.
Six RH-53s deployed to Indian Ocean (eventually on board the USS Kitty Hawk [CV-63]).
First joint training ex
really JLY0C, ercise conducted western U. S. desert. Night navigation by helicopter pilots and refueling plan went poorly. Nine pilots replaced, and refueling concept changed.
T of riar' Seconcl J°int training exercise conducted with representative forces, using new refueling scheme.
% -rv Two additional RH-53s em-
J*Zd barked on board the USS Nim-
itz (CVN-68) for transit to the Indian Ocean.
^ A 1'V__ Christmas break began for units and individuals in training, primarily for operational security (OpSec) reasons rather than for personnel rest.
in
ing, eventually using three RH-53s and seven CH-53s. A forecast for visual meteorological conditions on the mission track was determined to be required before takeoff for mission execution.
Tom Third j°int traininS exer'
IVYlli Jdilt cise held at a new site in western U. S. desert. Problems identified: helicopter reliability (four of seven were aborted for mechanical reasons), weather, refueling procedures, OpSec, airfield security and control. More precise intelligence also identified as a prerequisite for mission accomplishment.
J Yon Desert One site in Iran
1V1K1 jail, identified as a possible iso
lated refueling locale for the C-130s and helicopters.
II^ TToTfc Fourth joint training exer-
’■— / -TtD* cise conducted. Despite bad
weather, task force elements showed general improvement, but more work needed in helicopter navigation, airfield and aircraft control, and refueling plan.
8 171 i For the first time, planners had 1^00* confidence that a capability existed for the rescue. The eight helicopters on board the Nimitz determined to be sufficient.
^ S "fTi Fifth joint training ex— £ / F 0D* ercise conducted-
ComJTF concluded that six mission-capable helicopters must reach Desert One to ensure mission continuation.
Sixth and last major joint exercise conducted and considered a success.
25-27 Mar.
5 Jan. 1980
Helicopter detachment resumed train
7 Apr.
ComJTF approved Desert One as helicopter refueling site. Specially
ditional reason—to allow the economized forces to mass elsewhere and overwhelm the enemy—but to ensure attainment of security and surprise.
Maneuver: Tactically, the rescue plan made extensive use of maneuver to bring several types of forces to bear in the objective area from several different points of origin. Strategically, the militants at the U. S. embassy in Iran had been “maneuvered” into a feeling of complacency regarding the likelihood of a U. S. rescue mission in April 1980.
Surprise: In this rescue attempt, surprise was the sine qua non for success. This principle was rigidly
adhered to by mission planners.
Security: To ensure surprise, JTF planners required maximum operational security (OpSec). This requirement for security became such an obsession* however, that it affected everything about the mis* sion—the manner in which the plan was developed* the review of the plan, the details of the plan itself* the rehearsals of the plan, and finally, the execution of the plan.
More specifically, this emphasis on OpSec meant that compartmentation of information about raid plan* was ruthlessly enforced—a strict “need-to-knoW
Rescue mission forces deployed to staging
areas.
24 Apr.
H + 2
H + 8
configured C-130s replaced original C-I30s as refueling aircraft for the helicopters.
10 1 iC A rkn CJCS instructed
A-^”“XO x\pr« ComJTF to finalize Planning. ComJTF recommended 24 April as target date for mission. One specially configured C-130 and tour helicopters conducted refueling training. JCS approved plan. President Carter approved plan and authorized execution.
16-23 Apr.
Execution Phase
H-Hour was approximately dusk on board the Nimitz.
HTT Eight RH-53Ds launched from
"XlOVll the Nimitz in Arabian Sea for 600-mile flight to Desert One refueling site. C-130s launched from forward base and proceeded independently over slightly different track to Desert One.
Helo #6 received cockpit indi-
- cations of impending rotor blade
failure, landed, and verified the malfunction. Helo abandoned, and crew picked up by helo #8, which Proceeded independently to Desert One.
HI ^5 Helicopter formation (#1, 2, 3, "T" ^ 4, 5, and 7) unexpectedly entered
a cloud of suspended dust, which reduced visibility below the required visual meteorological condi- hons. Helicopter formation separated by poor vis- rbility. Helos #1 and #2 landed and reported dust Phenomenon to ComJTF, relaunched, and contin- lle<f mission. Helos #3, 4, 5, and 7 remained toother, unaware of flight leader’s actions.
HI ^ £ Helicopters broke out of first l“ ^ dust cloud, but very quickly
entered a second larger and denser area of suspended dust. Helo #5 experienced a failure of several critical navigation and flight instruments. The pilot determined that he could not safely negotiate the mountains ahead in this condition. Helo #5 aborted the mission, reversed course, and was recovered on board Nimitz virtually out of fuel at H + 8. Helo #7 lost sight of #3 and #4 but proceeded independently to Desert One. Helo #2 experienced failure of secondary hydraulic system but continued the mission.
Hi ^ Helos #3 and #4 arrived at De- “1“ 3 sert One approximately 50 min
utes behind schedule. Helo #7 arrived shortly thereafter, followed by helo #8.
H. s' Helos #1 and #2 landed at De-
“l O sert One approximately 85 min
utes behind schedule. Hydraulic failure (of backup hydraulic system) in helo #2 determined to be irreparable with available assets. Mission was aborted for lack of the required six operational helicopters. Abort decision recommended by on-scene commander and approved by ComJTF and NCA.
During repositioning of the five operational helicopters for refueling for the flight back to the Nimitz, helo #3 collided with one of the specially configured C-130s. Eight crew members died, and five other members of the rescue mission were injured. With the confusion and danger generated by two aircraft burning, ammunition exploding, C-130 fuel running out, and darkness, the on-scene commander decided to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130s and depart without destroying or sanitizing (for classified material) the remaining five helicopters.
f'nciple was applied. The minimum number of per- s°nnel necessary to plan the mission was used. Per- s°nnel granted access to mission details tended to w°rk overtime to fulfill new or expanding requirements rather than seek expansion of the planning 0pce. Review of the plan was likewise constrained 0 a minimum number of personnel. Normal review Procedures for a less sensitive plan would have en- ai|ed participation by a greater number of personnel ^nd staffs. The degree to which internal bureaucratic Q^SUres contributed to this excessive emphasis on PSec is indeterminate.
The plan itself, as discussed under the principle of economy of force, was developed to make use of the minimum number of forces necessary to accomplish the mission. As training and rehearsals revealed that the small numbers of forces initially planned were in some cases inadequate to perform required tasks, additional personnel and equipment were added. As additional mission personnel were assigned, however, commensurate increases in the number of helicopters were not always made. Compensating decreases in fuel, other equipment loads, or other planning and safety margins were sometimes made to offset the increase in mission personnel lift requirements.
OpSec constraints likewise dictated a reduction in the size, scope, and numbers of rehearsals. JTF planners believed that massing the entire raid force at any of its western U. S. desert training sites for full-blown dress rehearsals would be too difficult to conceal from the media or from U. S. military personnel not cleared to know of the rescue mission. Thus, smaller, less frequent joint training exercises were conducted to rehearse various segments of the plan, often with representative forces. Because of OpSec, only six major joint rehearsals were conducted during the five months of planning and preparation for the rescue attempt. None of these was a complete rehearsal of the mission, from start to finish, using all the actual forces and equipment that would actually take part.
During the execution phase, too, OpSec constraints led mission planners to stipulate strict control over radio and other electronic emissions from rescue force electronic equipment. Radio silence between helicopters and from individual helicopters to ground force personnel at Desert One or outside Iran was to be maintained unless an emergency developed. This meant that mission commanders (at Desert One and outside Iran) were not informed of difficulties and delays in the plan as they developed. Without such vital information, mission commanders were unable to make knowledgeable judgments and act decisively when the plan began to come apart. Thus, I believe excessive emphasis on OpSec prevented adequate command and control of the rescue mission force and was one of the most important causes of mission failure.
Simplicity: The rescue plan was certainly not simple. It may well have been the most complex amphibious raid in military history. Eight of the most complex helicopters in U. S. inventory launched from an aircraft carrier at sea were to fly 600 miles at night at low altitude, rendezvous with six of the most complex C-130 aircraft in the inventory (which had flown a different route from a different point of origin), refuel in an austere environment in total darkness, move on to a hide site, wait undetected through the next day, and finally participate in a complicated raid on the second evening. The principle of simplicity was obviously violated. This judgment presumes, however, that a simpler plan was feasible.
The principle of simplicity is relative, not absolute. It may well be true that no simple plan, per se, was capable of rescuing the hostages. Yet, no matter how complex the requirement, the simplest solutions are almost always preferable.
Unity of Command: The wiring diagram of the JTF command relationships shows that unity of command was preserved in a traditional command relationship for joint operations between the National Command Authorities (the President and the Secretary of Defense) and the Joint Task Force Commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are not in this command chain, but serve as the senior military advisory staff for the NCA and as the communications link between the NCA and the senior military commander (usually one of the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands).
Although some critics of the Tehran rescue attempt have suggested that the mission should have been assigned to one of these unified or specified commanders, there is nothing doctrinally wrong with assigning the mission to a separate joint task force that reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. JCS Publication Two authorizes the NCA to create a joint task force. However, the JCS and the chairman of the JCS, who acts for the JCS in crisis situations when time does not permit convening all five members of the JCS, are not permitted to form ajoint task force. They are not military commanders according to U. S. doctrine. The distinction between commander and staff here, however, is often a very difficult one to make. Two factors may have reduced the normal constraints on the chairman in straying too far in the command direction: rank and compartmentation/sensitivity of the mission.
Normally, commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands are four-star general officers. This rank, equal with that of the members of the JCS, helps them to assert their positions as the senior military commanders and to fend off, if necessary, any usurpation of command authority by the JCS. ComJTF was, however, two grades junior to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).
Secondly, as discussed under the principle of security, OpSec considerations led to compartmen- tation of information on a strict “need-to-know' basis. The chairman of the JCS clearly had a need to know all the details of the plan, but such was not the case for all 400 members of the joint staff. 1°' deed, the four service chiefs were probably not as intimately involved in the day-to-day details of the plan and its development as was the chairman. Thus, it is easy to see that pressures existed for ComJTF to perceive CJCS, the one senior individual he dealt with most often and on all matters, as his boss.
Below ComJTF in the chain of command, *de principle of unity of command was violated, and this violation contributed to mission failure. ComJTF exercised personal command of the Joint Task Force during five months of planning and rehearsals and virtually until execution of the mission was approved in early April. Not until that time did ComJTF officially designate a deputy commander who, although informally the deputy commander for many months previously, was one grade senior to ComJ TF- Also, ComJTF decided that he and his deputy commander would not accompany the rescue mission
force into Iran, but would set up command posts outside the country. Accordingly, about a week before the mission, he designated an on-scene commander at Desert One. After completion of the refueling operation at Desert One, command of the rescue force was to be passed from the on-scene commander to the ground force commander.
A single mission commander should have been designated for the entire operation. During most of 'he joint training exercises, ComJTF had filled the r°le as commander of the four force elements assembling at Desert One. By not designating the onScene commander until so late in the game, ComJTF ^enied him the five months of planning, training, and rehearsal in the role of mission commander at esert One. No matter how qualified and capable . e individual, a commander needs practice in his Th-aS muci1 as any other member of the task force.
1 nis was particularly true for such a complex plan as the rendezvous of forces and the refueling of equipment at Desert One.
the on-scene commander, previously involved with °ne of the four force components assembling at DeSert One, had little time to develop a broader perfective of the mission force as a whole. With the amount of time given him to prepare to exercise command of all four components, he could do little e se but familiarize himself with the details of the P an and hope that events followed accordingly. He had little opportunity to develop the expertise and confidence a true commander should have had in order to influence the action and alter the plan on- the-spot according to circumstances encountered. In effect, then, there was no true mission commander on the ground at Desert One to instill a sense of unity of command, purpose, and effort in the disparate force elements participating. This unity was essential for success.
This violation of unity of command was the most serious departure from the Principles of War. A well- trained, cohesive, and spirited military unit, instilled with a sense of mission importance and led by an aggressive, positive, and capable commander, can overcome enormous obstacles and unforeseen difficulties in accomplishing its mission.
Finally, the command relationships’ wiring diagram shows the interposition of an informal staff adviser on helicopter operations between ComJTF and his subordinate helicopter element commander. I believe the confusion generated by this unofficial relationship—compounded by the fact that the adviser was a member of CJCS’s personal staff—contributed to a sloppy command relationship that can only be viewed as an additional violation of the principle of unity of command.
Flexibility: JTF planners attempted to build flexibility into the mission plan by anticipating and making allowances for every conceivable contingency. For example, if one of the helicopters were to develop mechanical difficulties en route to Desert One, the plan called for the trail operational helicopter to land with the downed helo, pick up its crew, and continue the mission. Two hours into the flight, helo #6 developed indications of impending rotor blade failure. The crew of helo #6 landed, shut down the engines, verified the malfunction indicators, and then sanitized the aircraft of all classified material and equipment. The crew of helo #8 followed #6 to the ground, picked up the crew of #6, and flew on to Desert One—all without radio communications to the other helos, to Desert One, or to any of the other commanders outside Iran. This, then, was an example of flexibility built into the plan.
I question the plan that specifies intentionally keeping commanders uninformed about such a significant development as the loss of more than 12% of the mission's helicopter lift capability. The mission commander at Desert One should have known that information immediately so that he could have considered altering the plan in order to accomplish the mission. Keeping the commander informed of such significant developments was worth a marginal, or at least debatable, risk to OpSec by breaking radio silence.
The case for relaxing controls on electronic emissions to keep the commander informed is even stronger in the case of contingencies not foreseen
by the plan. The unanticipated clouds of suspended dust and the mechanical problems with helos #5 and #2 are cases in point. In the former, the helo flight leader (pilot of helo #1) did land temporarily to report the dust phenomenon to mission commanders. However, in the latter case, no reports were made when the problems with the two helicopters developed. Only after the crew of helo #5 decided to abort the mission was a radio report sent to any commander. This was too late to allow the mission commander to instill any flexibility into the execution of the plan. Had the crew of #5 communicated with the on-scene commander at Desert One, he might have directed them to proceed to Desert One by flying well above the 6,000-foot mountains and risking Iranian radar detection. The problem was, however, each helicopter crew was operating independently according to the prearranged plan. Flexibility existed only to the degree that each of these crews modified the plan on their own initiative, creating a decentralized, piecemeal approach to flexibility. The mission commander should have been afforded or should have demanded the necessary information to command, thereby injecting a greater degree of flexibility into the plan. Thus, although the JTF planners attempted to build flexibility into the plan, strict adherence to the details of that plan in the execution phase was a fatal inflexibility. Conclusions: Analyzing the planning and execution of the Tehran rescue mission on the basis of the ten Principles of War has thus revealed the following weaknesses in the plan that more than likely contributed to its not realizing success: ►Command and control were inadequate and ineffective. Command relationships were unclear and confusing. The location of the ComJTF was too far from the scene. Command should be exercised on the scene, at the decisive point of action, unless communications from that point are inadequate to allow effective control. Desert One had more than adequate communications. Communication procedures did not allow the commander to remain fully aware of developments as they were occurring so that he could effectively command (that is, inject his influence on the action). ►Leadership lacked drive and determination in the execution phase. A strong, effective leader determined to accomplish the mission would not have accepted inappropriate command post location or passive communication of operating procedures that prevented him from exercising leadership and influencing the action. In addition, adherence to the plan, rather than accomplishment of the mission, seemed to be the overriding objective of some leaders. ► There was excessive emphasis on OpSec in both the planning and execution phases, which affected the development of the plan itself, reduced the size, scope, and numbers of rehearsals, and inhibited nor- | mal review procedures. It also caused electronic emissions control to be maintained during the execution phase even after the plan had begun to come apart and the commander needed information to make judgments and act decisively. Finally, OpSec prevented planning for healthy reserve forces and equipment to offset unforeseen problems. ►The emphasis on a short-term, emergency rescue prevented proper consideration of requirements for a long-term, deliberate rescue. Short-term and longterm mission requirements are antithetical in many ways. The adversary can force one’s hand and determine timing in the first case; whereas, initiative and choice of time can be retained in the latter. An ad hoc group of the most experienced personnel available, such as helicopter pilots, may be required for a short-term capability; whereas, existing combat units can be trained for the tasks required in the long-term case. One group of planners cannot possibly deal with the incompatibility of the two requirements. ►JTF planners underestimated the significant cohesive benefits that accrue to organized combat units that train together as a team on the same equipment and use the same doctrine and techniques over a sustained period. This underestimation tendency is endemic among our military and civilian leaderships personnel turbulence is chronic in our armed forces. Such turbulence would not be tolerated if the teamwork benefit were truly appreciated. Parallel to this is the tendency to overrate the ease with which ad hoc units of otherwise well-qualified units can be thrown together to accomplish a special mission. ► JTF development and NCA approval of a minimalist rescue plan rather than a bolder hostage situation-resolving rescue plan reduced the chances for a successful raid. Both the NCA and the JTF lacked appreciation of the full implications of the U. S. Government policy of nonnegotiation with terrorists and the fact that a rescue mission was a one-time-only card. Some planners deceived themselves into believing that an abort decision at one of the movement stages would not necessarily compromise the mission—that is, that an extracted rescue force could try again at another time. Commanders were considering an abort decision as soon as abort criteria developed at Desert One rather than considering how the mission could have been adjusted and salvaged. Finally, the minimalist approach had a detrimental spin-off effect on leadership drive, determination, and decisiveness. Major Earl graduated from the Naval Academy in 1967 and \yaS a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, where he studied politics and economics. He has served in the 5th, 2d, and 3d Marine Divisions, at the Development Center. Quantico, Virginia, and at the State Department and CIA. A 1981 graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, he is currently serving as operations officer of the 3d Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, MCAS' Kaneohe, Hawaii. |
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