The Offensive Surface Ship

Eclipsed by the striking power of the submarine and carrier air wing, the offensive use of large surface ships in this century has been almost insignificant. Neither the dreadnoughts’ guns nor the destroyers’ torpedoes could bring decisiveness to Jutland in 1916; the Bismarck fell to a combined task force without so much as sighting an Allied merchant ship; and the battlewagons of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in World War II were relegated to use as mobile artillery batteries and antiaircraft battery platforms. The inability of surface forces to conduct effective offensive strikes at sea has been reluctantly but unequivocally acknowledged by naval planners for the past four decades.

The U. S. Navy, however, has again begun to develop offensive roles for its surface combatants. The Navy’s tactical thinking for the 1980s has been expanded to encompass such concepts as surface combatant task groups and surface strike warfare. The rebirth of offensive tactical thinking has been precipitated by the development of several new weapons and systems, primarily the long-range antiship missile. The accuracy and reliability of the Harpoon has led us to enlarge the traditionally defensive role of our major surface combatants to include an offensive purpose as well. The Tomahawk cruise missile will, when deployed, give a surface combatant a several-hundred- mile reach to strike enemy targets both at sea and ashore. The most visible manifestation of our new offensive technology is the resurrection of four Iowa-class battleships under current budget plans. The refitted battleships, bristling with Harpoon and Tomahawk cannisters, are perceived as the nuclei of our surface task forces for the remainder of this century.

In the surface warfare community’s eagerness to embrace this new offensive mission, however, it has failed to solve several problems the mission carries with it. But before examining the shortcomings of our surface force in an offensive role, that role must be defined. For the purposes of this discussion, the offensive tasks assigned to any naval force (air, surface, or subsurface) can be categorized into three general missions.

►Power projection ashore—the use of seaborne forces to attack land-based targets

►Destruction of seagoing commerce—the use of naval forces to attack an enemy’s merchant shipping

►Antinaval strikes—the active engagement of opposing naval forces through seizing the tactical initiative as opposed to a strictly defensive engagement

In determining our surface combatants’ abilities to accomplish each of these missions, the worst-case full-scale conflict scenario must be emphasized. Each mission, however, has a very real cold war counterpart that also must be within the capability of our naval forces.

The modem surface combatant has failed as an offensive weapon for four reasons.

►She has been too slow. With few exceptions, the warship of this century has been a 20- to 30-knot platform. This limited speed has prevented rapid deployment of surface forces over the extended areas in which past conflicts have been fought. In addition, the low speed has offered no defensive posture against the weapons developed for use against the surface warship; no capital ship has been able to outrun an airplane, a torpedo, or a cruise missile.

►The surface combatant has not been able to see far enough. The tactical picture available to the commander of the warship has remained fairly limited regardless of the technological advances of this century. Despite the progress from optics to radar, the surface ship’s inability to independently survey the ocean around her has limited her ability to take the initiative in battle.

►The major offensive weapons of the modem surface combatant have had too short a range. Although the cruise missile seems to solve this problem, several caveats apply, as will be discussed later.

►The major surface combatant has been unable to defend herself against less sophisticated, small systems. The airplane has been the traditional nemesis of the large surface warship, but, in fact, each generation of capital ships has not been able to operate against small, inexpensive offensive systems. The patrol torpedo boat, the submarine, and the airplane are the most traditional of these low-cost threats, and today’s technology is providing its own generation of systems that are cheap to build but expensive to counter.

These four limitations translate into several practical shortcomings that limit our ability to use our surface forces in the outlined offensive missions.

Who’s Who or the Liberian Freighter Syndrome: Although it has the obvious advantage of range, the long- range, self-guided cruise missile has difficulty in tracking targets at sea over extended distances. Over-the-horizon targeting is a crucial problem for our Harpoon platforms, regardless of the tactical air support available. We cannot take full advantage of Harpoon’s range in almost any scenario because of our inability to both discern and validate a target for the autonomous weapon.

Table 1 lists the primary sensors our surface combatants would have available for long-range targeting, assuming they were operating as a surface action group (SAG) without support from a carrier air wing or shore-based long- range maritime patrol aircraft. The primary disadvantage of each sensor is its limited range and inability to positively identify a potential target. Only the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopter can identify a target with certainty within the Harpoon missile’s range. Its use, however, has several tactical disadvantages. First, it cannot pass targeting data to its home platform without abandoning an effective emission control posture. Second, its ability to pass targeting data is hampered by the lack of an automated data link. Information on a potential Harpoon target must be passed from the LAMPS via voice radio, a procedure that takes time and frequently leads to inaccurate or late input to the firing platform’s fire control system.

Using the other long-range sensor available to surface forces, electronic support measures (ESM), for targeting a distant enemy is dangerous. At long range, ESM bearings will yield a highly inaccurate fix on a target’s location. Actual identification of a specific hostile emission has become increasingly difficult as both potential friends and opponents develop new sources of electromagnetic radiation. Moreover, a nonhostile or even friendly ship can be positioned between the intended target and the Harpoon platform. This problem would be most critical in crowded waters during a limited conflict, the type of .conflict in which our forces are most likely to become engaged. The need to positively identify a target as hostile restricts the Harpoon-equipped warship to hold fire until someone spots the whites of a foe’s eyes.

The current vision of an offensive surface-launched strike is based on a pooling of targeting data from several of the sources listed in Table 1. But there is inadequate information exchange among units of the SAG. Although we have made advances in command, control, communications, and intelligence during the past several years, they have yet to be realized by a substantial number of platforms available to the SAG commander. The Navy tactical data system, our primary fleet data exchange system, is not installed on a majority of the ships that will likely be assigned to the surface strike mission. Currently, U. S. frigates, guided missile frigates, and a majority of guided missile destroyers are not equipped with an automated link capability. The timely sharing of targeting information with these units requires a high volume of voice radio traffic, which is not only susceptible to enemy interception and jamming but difficult to plot manually and evaluate as well. Thus, many of our surface combatants have an incomplete and inaccurate tactical picture beyond the range of their own sensors. Although their Harpoon may travel as far as any other platform’s, their ability to conduct a long-range attack is limited to operation under the direct guidance of another unit that has an accurate tactical picture.

A final area of the over-the-horizon targeting problem that must be examined is the role of national-level sensors and advanced intelligence input to our tactical forces at sea. Although the classification of such systems is beyond the scope of this article, we should note that such developments as Outboard and Outlaw Shark are needed on a greater number of SAG units.

Without the advantages of a tactical data system supported by real-time intelligence support, the SAG commander is not only blind but unable to plan future beneficial movements. In addition, the lack of conclusive data may lead the Harpoon shooter to engage a friendly or neutral ship either because it was mistakenly identified or simply because it was, unbeknown to the shooter, in the area. Our current shortfalls in command and control almost ensure that the hapless Liberian merchant ship that wanders into our Harpoon envelope will be the first casualty of the next war.

The Lone Ranger vs. the Tag-a-Long: Historically, the most successful offensive surface warships were those capable of operating alone with little support in their mission. Current surface combatants do not meet this requirement either tactically or logistically.

For the most part, our surface combatants have been designed to be dependent on outside support; therefore, they are unsuited for a variety of offensive missions. As described earlier, the actual targeting of our long-range surface-launched weapons will require a significant amount of mutual support among units assigned an offensive mission. This command and control requires our SAGs to operate close together, making stealth and surprise difficult. Logistically, the SAG will be hard-pressed to operate independently because of the high fuel usage of the smaller units included in the task group. Since our destroyers must be refueled in a matter of days, the SAG is unable to hide for long anyway; tracking our oilers will give an enemy, actual or potential, a reasonable idea of our surface combatants’ positions.

The concept of the “surface raider” has had almost mystical overtones for personnel in cruisers and destroyers ever since these ships assumed the less-than-glamorous escort role. But a unit capable of carrying out an offensive mission without outside support does not exist in our current inventory. Conversely, it is not tactically feasible to operate together a large number of surface ships for an offensive mission. They can be easily located and just as easily avoided or targeted first because of the speed disadvantages cited earlier. In addition, the units of the surface task force will be forced to “flock” both to exchange information and to refuel and resupply.

Covering Our Own Six: Regardless of the offensive punch built into the modem surface combatant, her ability to defend herself against an equally sophisticated platform is questionable. U. S. cruisers and destroyers are vulnerable to the cruise missile technology they now sport, and virtually every major or Third World navy has this technology available to it in a readily usable form. Since World War II, the defense of our forces at sea has been dependent on the carrier air wing, thus deploying our surface forces alone leaves gaps in their defense. Most noticeably missing in the SAG is viable long-range air cover, necessary for countering an opposing tactical air threat or air-to-surface cruise missile. Theoretically, the cruiser or guided missile cruiser can provide adequate antiair warfare protection for the SAG, but the protection offered is limited on several counts. First, long-range air surveillance can only be achieved through active radar sensors, which virtually pinpoint the location of the SAG. Second, the cruiser’s Standard Missile-1 (extended range) [SM-1 (ER)] system offers only a limited protection area for dispersed SAG units. The advent of Aegis and the installation of the SM-2 (ER) will upgrade the quality of our surface-to-air capability. These systems, however, will not be available in significant numbers for years, and those planned will have to be shared by our surface combatant task groups and our carrier battle groups.

In antisubmarine warfare (ASW), the SAG fares better at protecting itself, primarily because most of the units assigned to SAGs were designed with ASW as a primary mission. The modem ASW threat, though, is of such sophistication that mutual support from outside the SAG is vital. With embarked LAMPS and hull-mounted sonars and towed arrays, the SAG can maintain a 30- to 50- nautical mile area of ASW protection around itself. Since the range of many submarine-launched cruise missiles has exceeded this distance, ASW support from either land- or carrier-based assets is a necessity. In addition, the diesel submarine threat projected by smaller navies cannot be taken lightly by the SAG commander. Active measures are the only practical counter to the silent diesel sub, and these measures advertise the SAG’s presence.

The defense of a surface task group conducting offensive operations is an expensive compromise. Assets from outside the SAG will be required when U. S. forces are pitted against all but the least sophisticated adversaries. These assets will most likely be drawn from a nearby carrier or, if friendly territory is nearby, from land-based airfields. The SAG will have to devote its own assets toward defense at the expense of its offensive mission. The SAG commander will have to choose between either employing his LAMPS for over-the-horizon targeting or ASW patrol and maintaining a restrictive emission control posture for surprise or using his long-range defensive sensors.

The Silver Bullet Limit: There is a shortage of weapons available to the SAG for its offensive mission. The Harpoon has become the basic weapon for our surface combatants, and these are available in limited quantities to the SAG commander. Our cruisers and Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyers carry a cannister loadout of eight Harpoons. Our frigates and guided missile destroyers are being equipped to launch Harpoons from existing antisubmarine rocket or Tartar launchers. Surveying the typical SAG, the total number of Harpoons available may reach only 20 to 30. The relatively small size of the Harpoon warhead means that hard kills of large naval targets will require multiple Harpoon strikes. In addition, not all Harpoons can be depended upon to reach their target, despite the weapon’s reputation for reliability.

Another shortfall of our surface forces in the offensive role has resulted from our reliance on Harpoon as the only primary weapon installed in surface warships. U. S. developments in gunnery have been restricted to refinement of 5-in./54 cal. gun mounts and fire control systems. There have been no plans to take advantage of modem advances in precision-guided weapons. Cancellation of the major caliber lightweight gun program is the most blatant example of this neglect. The automated 8-inch gun, originally scheduled for installation on the DD-963s and new cruisers, offered these ships an economical, long- range antisurface weapon potentially effective both at sea and for shore bombardment. With advances such as rocket-assisted projectiles and laser guidance, this weapon would have had an obvious place in our surface task groups.

Similarly, the Standard antiradiation missile, which has been in the fleet for about ten years, is facing gradual extinction. Fired from existing Tartar launchers, this weapon’s ability to passively launch and home in on an enemy vessel’s fire control radars would have made it a natural complement for Harpoon in a coordinated attack and for rapid defense against an opposing surface threat.

Strengthening the Surface Offensive Capability: We should establish some rules for employing surface combatant task groups and surface action groups offensively. First, the offensive role assigned our surface forces must be limited to action in a restricted area against specific targets. The SAG can demonstrate naval presence, especially in the Third World, and counter the threat posed by smaller countries without large coordinated naval forces. The SAG may also be employed in an area denial mission or for peacekeeping patrols in potential “hot spots.” Second, surface forces assigned an offensive mission must have both tactical and logistic support. An opponent who knows he can outwait, outrun, and outshoot a SAG can counter any offensive action the SAG may undertake.

Within the framework of these ground rules, several steps can be taken to strengthen the offensive posture of our surface combatants.

►We could upgrade our smaller units’ ability to process tactical information. The technology and hardware to equip our surface combatants’ command, control, and communication suites are available. Most needed is a data link capability for the frigates and guided missile destroyers intended for surface strike assignment. Installing a full Navy tactical data system is not necessary to solve this problem; a modular automated data display system could be installed in these units. Each ship commander must have access to tactical information, and each sensor in the SAG must have an input in the tactical picture.

►We could develop weapons that will contribute to the surface combatant’s offensive capability. Continued development and procurement of the major caliber lightweight gun and the Standard antiradiation missile should be pursued. Also, installation of the Tomahawk would give the surface combatant a weapon with a reported range of several hundred nautical miles and one that could attack targets ashore. The future of the Tomahawk is murky because of the limitations that may be imposed on it because of its strategic implications. Nonetheless, its progress proves we have the capability to build a reliable, long- range cruise missile.

►We could expand our surface combatants’ integral helicopter capability to include an attack helicopter. The attack helicopter has been ignored largely by the Navy because of the preponderance of strike superiority offered by the carrier’s attack aircraft. The attack helicopter, however, offers the surface combatant a flexible, efficient weapon, and it has several advantages over the cruise missile. First, it is more intelligent than a cruise missile. The previously noted problems of target location and identification inherent to the cruise missile prior to engagement are solved by using a manned attack vehicle. Second, use of the attack helicopter is an extension of the

SAG’s deterrence role in peacetime or in a cold war. An armed attack helicopter provides naval presence without using an overt force and without revealing the location of the SAG units. While it is impossible to launch a cruise missile as a precautionary measure or recall one launched in error, the attack helicopter can do battle and fire a warning shot as well. Finally, the attack helicopter is more cost-effective than the Harpoon in several instances. Usable over a wide range of targets, it is particularly suited for engaging small patrol-type craft that may be lodged close to the shore. It also offers a limited power projection capability ashore that may be effective against antiship batteries or bases for patrol craft. The United States has already developed an attack helo, the AH-1 Cobra; now it must be accepted as a naval weapon. The Sea Cobra offers the SAG an off-the-shelf air capability for surveillance and attack years in advance of any other proposed vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft with similar capabilities.

►We could concentrate on building advanced surface units for the offensive mission. We could add a new dimension to our surface force striking capability by building platforms able to travel more than 40 knots. Currently, only the Pegasus-class hydrofoil (PHM) has this advantage of speed, and only six of them have been built. The hydrofoil can patrol the coastal waters most Third World countries border.

In the open-ocean scenario, the surface effect ship (SES) equipped with Harpoon presents a formidable opponent when contrasted with conventional hulls. Unfortunately, the SES has been put on the back burner of the shipbuilding program. Admittedly, the SES is an expensive platform; however, its offensive capability coupled with the projected ASW role for which it was planned justifies the budgeting sacrifice the program demands. Speed has been overlooked in our efforts to make our surface forces both more survivable and more threatening. The PHM and SES, each used in the proper environment, could cover a vast area with their offensive weapons, and they would be difficult targets to counterattack.

Despite these shortcomings of our surface combatants when employed offensively, we should not only retain this offensive mission for our surface forces but upgrade and refine our capabilities to perform it as well. The technology on which our present interest in offensive surface operations is based is valid. The reliability of antiship missiles has been satisfactorily demonstrated (insofar as peacetime measures allow), and many of their cited problems can be solved with systems already developed. In addition, the offensive role of the surface combatant fills a void in our at-sea strike capability that is left by the paucity of other offensive weapons. The most effective modem offensive naval weapons to date have been the low-mix variety. In short, although primarily conceived as a defensive escort, the surface combatant must assume an offensive role because other' assets are not available to perform the task. The enthusiasm our surface warfare planners have shown for this offensive mission must be extended to solving the problems the mission involves.