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Leadership: A New Answer to an Old Problem
By Captain Henry H. Beam, U. S. Naval Reserve
As a young division officer in the flee in the early 1960s, I wondered why 1 e professionals in some divisions consis tently performed their duties more effcc tively and received more satisfaction from their work than others. Often these top performers were members of divl sions headed by junior officers whose own superiors were not receptive to their approach to management because they did not adhere closely enough to t <highly structured “Navy way” of doWr things. In contrast, many enthusiastic- career-oriented officers who placed prl mary reliance on the Navy’s formal aU thority structure became counter-produc tive in their zeal to have the hes performing division on board ship.
In 1974, I had an opportunity to inves tigate this question when I was grants access to the data gathered in a survey 0 2,500 Navy personnel conducted >n 1972-73 by the University of Michigan s Institute for Social Research. The survey was conducted just prior to the implc mentation of the all volunteer force an contained a representative group of CI1 listed respondents from each major wat' fare category.
When I had completed my own analy sis of the survey data, I had empiric3 support for an effective approach to nava leadership at the first-line supervisor level. This approach placed the primary emphasis on people rather than structure to accomplish the tasks of the wor group. This approach has long been use by the Navy’s highest producing supervi' sors, although most of them are not aware of the theory behind their actions. Navy professionals whose supervisors use these principles of leadership consistently show higher work group effectiveness; higher individual satisfaction with their job >n
avy; and higher re-enlistment. ra tonally, leadership styles have whn,c?ns'^ere^ to range on a spectrum 'C 'S autocrat‘c at one end and demoNav °r partic'Pative at the other. The
try ^ ^ WCl1 aS mUch °f civilian indus- call 3S historical|y operated autocrati- wh.^~rthe superior tells his subordinates ens*1 3S t0 ^onc ar|d then checks to an.|Ure *!lal they do their tasks properly 0r 0n time. Orders flow down the chain COr^0.mrnanci’ and reports on work ac- H0wP lshment or problems encountered pr- ack UP- Fear of punishment is the te !° source of motivation to perform at the lower levels.
sh()^°WeVer’ t*lere's growing evidence to W|')W ^at supervisors are more effective ^ en they move from autocratic leader- tiyP t0Ward the democratic or participa- lead 6n^ c°ntinuum. Here, the
as er and his subordinates work together Pr h/earn l° establish work goals, solve of° erns> and accomplish the work. Fear tru^Un'S*lrnent's rePlaced by a sense of doh'^d confidence that each person will
abili|S °r ^Cr t0 ^CSt ° ^'S °r ^Cr
se ^eor‘st whose works are very repre- v , allVe °f the newer approaches to de- oping effective leadership was Rensis So 6rt’ *^e founder of the Institute for C|al Research. In his book The Hu- ]Organization (McGraw-Hill, Inc., )> Likert defines four systems of wh03^61116111—Systems I through IV— te j can ex'st in an organization. Sys- r ,T1 is closely related to the autocratic C|0,1 °f management while System IV is osely related to the democratic or par- O'pative style. Systems II and III are in ta Ween' Many studies of civilian, mili- cn a 3nc^ governmental organizations I aducted by Likert and members of the th(;tltUte ^oo'al Research indicate that iurther an organization moves toward ystem IV the more effective the organi- Zat'on will be.
Conventional wisdom has held that
military organizations should operate somewhere between System I and II to be effective, and that any movement toward System IV would result in a loss of control and undermine the chain of command. I challenged this assumption by comparing the System 1 type of leader who emphasized structure to get results to the System IV type of leader who placed primary emphasis on people, a dimension I called “human factors awareness.”
The results showed that effectiveness and satisfaction increased as the degree of human factors awareness displayed by the supervisor increased. In contrast, there was a slight decrease in satisfaction and effectiveness as the degree of structure increased. This made sense in light of the answer to another set of questions which had asked how much structure and how much human factors awareness each person preferred in his work relationship with his supervisor. All respondents expressed a preference for a high degree of human factors awareness from their supervisors (a mean of 4.2 on a scale of one to five) but only a moderate preference for structure (a mean of 3.3 on a scale of one to five). This moderate preference for structure was interpreted to mean that some structure was necessary to communicate work assignments, but that too much emphasis on structure became abrasive, reducing effectiveness.
I concluded that the Navy’s most effective work groups are those which are managed with an emphasis on human factors awareness coupled with an adequate amount of structure—a System IV approach. Thus, if the Navy’s supervisors can increase the amount of human factors awareness they show toward their men while holding the amount of structure constant at a reasonable level, the Navy can expect improvements in both the individual satisfaction of its members and the effectiveness of its units.
So far so good. But what about the Navy’s ability to attract and retain able young men and women in an all volunteer force environment? To answer this, I divided the respondents into two categories: those who intended to re-enlist and those who intended to return to civilian life upon completing their enlistment.
Table 1 shows that for those who intend to re-enlist, human factors awareness, satisfaction, and perceived work group effectiveness are all significantly higher than for those who do not intend to re-enlist. Identical results were obtained when only first-term enlistees were considered. This is important since about 80% of those who re-enlist once will remain in the Navy for a career.
Increased individual satisfaction will also make the ship or station a more enjoyable place to work. This intangible benefit will make Navy men and women more reluctant to leave the Navy for a civilian job which may not be as satisfying and will probably not offer the educational and travel opportunities the Navy does. System IV supervision would be advantageous because a high level of satisfaction would have a laudatory effect on retention and ease the burden on recruiting new members with the requisite skills.
If the System IV approach is so good, why has it not been applied more widely in the Navy? Part of the answer may be that many supervisors, particularly at the lower levels, have not had an opportunity to leam about System IV. Some have heard of approaches similar to System IV but have reacted to them with skepticism. Others believe that their traditional prerogatives of command and control are threatened. Still others assume that while System IV might work in civilian organizations, it is a “soft” leadership style which is incompatible with the unique demands for discipline and responsiveness in time of crisis inherent in a military work environment.
I will address the most common arguments against having naval supervisors
Table
1 Comparison of Navy Enlisted Survey Respondents by Re-enlistment Intention (comparison of means of respondents)
Managerial Variables End Result Variables
Jatention P°n Completing tnl'stment |
| Human Factors Awareness | Structure | Effectiveness | Satisfaction |
^e-enlist | 40% n=312 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 3.6 |
Pcturn to Clvilian Life | 60% n=459 | 2.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.0 |
01c 1: Scales range from 1.0 to 5.0.
H,)c 2: p < .01 for each comparison between groups.
0 e T Those retiring with 20 or more years service upon completion of current enlistment excluded from comparison.
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use a participative, System IV approach.
System IV Weakens the Chain of Command: Supposedly, asking people to have some say in planning their own work and engage in lateral consultation will result in a flagrant neglect of the chain of command and a breakdown in control. Not so. System IV is built around work groups overlaid on the traditional chain of command. There is no attempt to change authority relationships; each subordinate still has only one immediate superior. Rather, System IV improves the communication flow. Each supervisor is a member of two groups—one in which he is a superior and one in which he is a subordinate—and his ability to function effectively in this “linking pin” capacity is essential to facilitating the information flow laterally between work groups as well as from the bottom to the top of the organization. The chain of command will be supported more firmly than ever, because each person knows his opinions will find an audience higher up in the organization through his superior.
No Time for Meetings in the Midst of Battle: System IV recognizes that when time is of the essence, orders must be issued promptly using the chain of command. However, the Navy spends most of its time in non-crisis conditions which provide ample time for discussion prior to action. Participation of work group members in decisions which affect them can be a useful way not only to make a better decision, but also to gain acceptance of the decision that is made. And the acceptance of a decision by those it affects can be just as important as the quality of the decision. Without acceptance, even the best decision has little chance of success.
System IV Works Only for the Well Educated: The reasoning is that System IV is useful only as a way to make the Navy palatable to the well-educated young people required to man today’s complex ships and weapon systems. These young people allegedly have different values than the older Navy members and require special treatment if they are to be reenlisted in adequate numbers. On the other hand, personnel in the less technological ratings are assumed to prefer the old Navy way. Yet, there is no empirical support for this assumption. I could find no difference in preference for management style between any of the 42 representative enlisted ratings included in the survey. Thus, if System IV can work for the highly skilled technician with two years of college, it can also work for the deck hand who joined the Navy without completing high school.
System IV is Non-leadership Under a Different Name: The assumption is that
all the decision making as well as work is left to the subordinates, leaving the supervisor with nothing to do. Syste”1 IV actually requires more from a supervl sor. Now he must be alert and response to the needs and potential for contribution of each of his work group members. ?ot example, he now has more time to spen on coaching and developing his suborn nates so they will be qualified when the time comes for promotion. System 1 permits the supervisor to concentrate on developing and leading his or her subot dinates rather than checking up on them to ensure that they are carrying out the instructions given to them.
All of these criticisms fail to recognrte that System IV is a way to increase the effectiveness of any organization by 1,11 proving the management of the organic tion’s human resources. Those 'vtl would dismiss my results as inconse quential and argue instead for mom forceful implementation of the ‘ °. Navy” leadership practices with them heavy reliance on structure as the primary method of control miss an import31’1 point. Most articles on naval leadership have reflected the author’s subjective u1' terpretation of effective leadership- Sue discussions are often instructive, hut since they lack scientific rigor they cannot be accepted as generally applicable and are therefore of little practical value- The results of my analysis are genera - izable and hence useful, because they are based on a scientific analysis of a statist*' cally representative sample of the Navy s entire enlisted population.
Although the Navy has always placed a strong emphasis on leadership, it has only been since the early 1970s that systernat|C attempts have been made to transfer knowledge of leadership based on research findings into practice fleetwide- One way this has been done is through the establishment of a set of human resource management centers. There has also been an increased requirement f°r more rigorous leadership training on an ongoing basis, and leadership and management education training modules are now incorporated into many Navy courses.
We can incorporate the System IV approach into our Navy system without altering such time-proven concepts as the chain of command. If our junior officers and petty officers implement these practices, we can expect increased unit effectiveness, higher individual satisfaction with the Navy, and increased retention- We will then be tapping the full potential of our most valuable resource—the men and women who man our ships, air squadrons, and shore stations.