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Contents:
October 1983 Issue Harriers for the Task Force
The Pinafore Syndrome and Other Reserve Problems
Remember Pearl Harbor
Training Junior Officers Keeping Faith With Our People Education and Professionalism
Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom
The Roebling Alligator
Political Awareness Training in the U. S. Navy
FFG-7s: Square Pegs?
Beyond the War Game Mystique Junior Officers and Strategic Thought About-Face in Soviet Tactics
Selection Board Dynamics How Silent the Silent Service?
The Continental Strategy of Imperial Japan The Talent for Judgment Diesel Boats Forever?
Guerrilla Warfare at Sea
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
October 1983 Issue
Commander Arthur L. Conrad, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), President, The Heritage Foundation, Inc.—This issue is probably the most important issue ever published.
“Experience Is Not Enough” “Education and Professionalism” “The Talent for Judgment”
“Political Awareness Training in the U. S. Navy”
These articles are all vital to our educational system, both in and out of service.
I shall do everything I possibly can to make this issue and these articles known throughout the United States.
tainly, engineers working on the Harnet speedbrake never had design criter|a which included providing space so tna bundles of chaff could be stuffed inchaff dispenser belongs properly inte grated into the aircraft prior to its ern ployment in combat.
Is Britain on such rocky shores
and
Lieutenant Kevin W. Brock, U. S. Navy—A hearty “well done” to the contributors to the October issue highlighting naval education and training. The various authors submitted many thoughtful and imaginative ideas designed to improve the way we prepare to go to war and win.
However, I can visualize the emergence of a new wave of training programs, accompanied by inspections, assist visits, reams of implementing directives, and periodic status reports.
No wonder ship and squadron commanding officers can’t train their units to win the next war. They’re too busy struggling to survive the current peace!
funding for a proper chaff dispenser other important devices such as Si winders for the Royal Air Force Harrier5’ may have been shifted to provide fen 6 stampings for the export-oriented 1
umph TR-7? After viewing the fleet lack of systems development, integra tion, and deployment, it looks as if Pr° ponents of the short-run gain have c°n siderable influence on military spending This necessitated not only chaff *n
the
radar
airbrakes, but the use of frigates as. pickets. As in World War II, this pr°vlf very costly to ships with names such 3 Coventry and Sheffield. j
Fortunately for the British, the spe®^ brakes proved far more versatile a adaptable than original designers ha
“Harriers for the Task Force”
(See G. Swanborough, pp. 114-116, November
1983 Proceedings)
David J. D. Haberger, Senior Subcontract Administrator, Singer, Inc.— Gordon Swanborough’s discussion is interesting and serves to remind us of a timeless military truism: modification, innovation, and experimentation will always be practiced in combat to enhance chances for victory.
Perhaps Swanborough’s article should be viewed as a microcosm of the British military over the recent quarter century: continually pared down to a point where innovation, modification, and experimentation are the only ways it can approximate fielding a credible military force except in the narrowly focused NATO/war-in-Europe scenario. Cer
hich
they were attached. Even the advanced thinkers at Hawker Aircraft, Ltd., who i 1957 began considering a vertical take°^ and landing fighter, probably would ha scoffed at thoughts of such an aiNr operating off aircraft carriers with s jump” decks or rotating the jet n°zZ while in flight to achieve spectacu motion in the three dimensions. The H rier has proved more flexible, adapt3 ' and versatile than all but a few visional’ had imagined. , ,g
In the hands of flexible and adapt3 g the Harrier contributed
considered, as did the aircraft to w
personnel, decisive margin of military power ing more conventional elements and retake the Falkland Islands.
allow
to law
id
“The Pinafore Syndrome and Other Reserve Problems”
(See G. V. Brown, pp. 167-172, October Proceedings)
Commander John Allen Williams,
Naval Reserve—There is much to adnn^_ in Captain Brown’s article, but I strong exception to the notion that a , face warfare officer is “unprofession' if he has not completed all of his sun3
1983
u.
1983
Remember Pearl Harbor’
to impose economic sanctions issue to the brink of
JaDan * lmP°se dPan forced the i
ar- Aim — 10 me orinK o
vance ough never consulted in ad- blnited St.C ^utch fell in line with the Plan, s; 3tes> hoping that it had a grand n°unced CC tbe East Judies were the an- ure(j tar8et of a Japan desperate for
dutvaThqUaliflCations W*1‘*e on active of h'; 06 author does n°te the difficulty aDDmnn- S0 as a drilling reservist. More an off'31' t£StS °f Professionalism are sioneH , rJSi..performance in dut'es as- assism dn MS feadiness to perform his , l memS in the event of mobilization. Was a«S,an * surface line officer who Warfarp'8116^ 3S a fully qualified antiair cruiser 6Va uator on a guided missile rather than u lleUtenant junior grade) It eaiic °eing assigned to the bridge, then an i*16-t0 my performance
that [ ,k Sl,nce sh°uld be discounted and signment>U r bu dtsadvantaged in the as- commn i c)lallenging Naval Reserve tty to n S W^'c.ri do not call for the abil- be fn||,0nn .a sri'P and for which I might wav t'ypquallfied- Such a policy is not the Resen ensure 'he development of a Naval eServe professional.
J. K. T:!,' CostclI». PP- 52-62, September 1983; Pr°ceeding'sf’ P' ‘50, November 1983 Robert l) 11 ,
taken u "asR‘ch—John Costello has
toward S Partway around the compass Pearl ,,a rearignment of our view on
Harbor T. nP 3nd the Pacif,c War- Pearl
Such a S * looms up from history as °Ur visi rnonurnental event that it blocks We w'°n' We ought to go the full 90° if pened k ft0 understand fully what hap- the Pac r- °[e and after Pearl Harbor. For a Norn! '^ar Was not an East-West, but Prio °Uth’ C°nflict.
Sc°pe r t0 fU*y '<;,d I. the war’s potential Manehin,11 rom Soviet territory north of ever of M°’ Soutri to Australia. How- the Unit3! thC bclligercnts of 1941, only and the CM qtatCS’ tbe United Kingdom, right a t etberiands were compelled to °f the p Wo'lront war. That is a measure 'ey: the 'k S Japanese and Soviet pol- tries W|k y'dted that burden to the coun- Ihe I) b°tb w’shed to see fall, as l934Utch atchives show that, as early ripsaw ' ^ Netherlands East Indies Indeed ^0r|ri'ct with expansionist Japan. I934 ’ aPan made two major efforts, in ^egerti(,n I ri40-194], to gain de facto tefials n,'y °Ver tbe East Indies’ raw ma- UiatCh h i,lbc bargaining table, but the edly -p,C d off the Japanese single-hand- July _• S- unilateral decision, on 26 on War.
assUred a Japan uesperaie 10
^d olS;UPPries of oih rice, tin, rubber, 4 mne. By November 1941, Dutch
intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and naval radio traffic left no doubt in Batavia that war was about to break out. Only one detail was uncertain—where Japan would make its by-now traditional lightning surprise attack.
Costello properly deals with the true axis of the war; Japan, the Philippines, Indo-China, British Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and Australia. From the Dutch point of view, and given that obvious axis, Pearl Harbor became a Japanese target of opportunity upon the relocation of the U. S. Pacific Fleet there from California, since it represented a serious threat to Japan’s left flank, which had to be eliminated for the march to the south. There are documents which show that the Dutch believed it politically unwise to bring this obvious danger to the U. S. Government’s attention for fear of upsetting the neutrality of both countries. Dutch diplomatic, military, and intelligence records are replete with reminders of Japan’s ability to strike targets considered untouchable and by means not used in combat before.
On 18 November 1941, the Dutch minister in Tokyo, Major General Jean Charles Pabst, was realistic and humble enough to cable his foreign minister that “it is very much possible that Japan will begin a movement hostile to us without my knowledge. I have cabled [Netherlands East] Indies that special watch must be mounted in the Outer Islands and oil harbors during the present tensions.” That cable was marked urgent in the Dutch Foreign Ministry and sent to the Dutch military command.
This advice, and other indications developed in Dutch East Indies intelligence circles, was more enlightening than information from the British Foreign Office received a month before. On 17 October 1941, the Dutch were informed that the British believed Japan would probably strike north of Manchuria, into the Soviet Union, and in November. The Dutch did not believe in that scenario by that date. But it was well in keeping with the attitude underlying the message received from the British Foreign Office on 1 November 1941: that the British saw no way possible for them to support a Netherlands East Indies’ request for accelerated delivery of 162 U. S. bombers, and this at a time when the bomber deterrent was allegedly the key to East Asian defense. The British even tried to divert to the Atlantic 18 of the 48 Catalina PBYs which the East Indies had succeeded in purchasing from the United States.
By then, the Dutch were more than suspicious of Britain’s attempts to take
control of all non-U. S. Allied funds, forces, materiel, and policy, and to insert themselves between the United States and the Dutch East Indies. As early as November 1940, it was clear that the British didn’t have anything near the materiel, plans, or will that were needed in Asia for common defense against the coming Japanese attack. Allied unity, let alone a common front against Japan, was hardly evident.
What Costello misses, in his determination to find a missing message to account for U. S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s about-face from 25 to 26 November 1941, are the available cables among the Dutch in Washington, London, and Batavia. Using 2 October as a starting point, these cables plead for any information about the secret talks between Hull and Japanese envoy Kurusu. The Dutch had to wait until 22 November 1941, when Hull summoned the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Britain, Australia, and, after two and one-half hours, China, to hear his plans for a modus vivendi with Japan. The afternoon of 24 November 1941 brought the same men to Hull’s office for a second reading of the plan. The Dutch thought Hull’s plan unrealizable, as well as caving in to Japan’s old tactics of bluster and threat, not to mention a weakening of the still fragile American- British-Chinese-Dutch-front. During that second meeting, Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih whispered to Dutch Ambassador Dr. Alexander Loudon that Hull was feeling the effects of recent German pressure on Vichy France, and was going along with the advice of the U. S. Army and Navy leadership to give in to Kurusu’s alleged “urgency” because of possible negative effects of Japanese politics and the chance of an explosion. Even before Hull’s famous “washing his hands” of 26 November, it seems that he was already reaching for the soap.
On 25 November 1941, the Dutch ambassador returned to Hull’s office to pass on the Dutch foreign minister’s detailed objections to the modus vivendi, noting inter alia that the United States and Britain had the goal of retaining or restoring their roles as great powers in Asia, while the Dutch East Indies sought only relief from Japanese aggression and the restoration of friendly ties with all neighbors. The much more sarcastic remarks from Batavia about the modus vivendi were apparently not shared with Cordell Hull.
The change, which Costello properly signals, was made known to the Dutch ambassador on the evening of 26 November 1941, for, at 2243 hours, he cabled the foreign minister a terse message:
0ff U 1,^ust informed me modus vivendi is r’ arusu handed a different note.” cm.M u3t eveninS- when the code room saHn .handle a longer message, Ambas- thn r. °Udon cabled his appreciation of Wel|S* Uatlon- In his view, the Sumner
di Jes factl0n had won the day- Hull’s
m Was regarded as too strong for the Dnn^nt\ esPecial|y because General to «iv 3S ^acy,irihur wanted another four Phiif Wee^s t0 build up the defense of the rem^P1aeS' That was where the matter Peari^u ,Untd *he Japanese struck at
wher arbor’ the Philippines, and else- re on “X-day.”
noccivi[1]-Was behind Hull’s change? One ale n * "y. *S tbat be l°st an internal strug- the fa M'Cy' Another might be found in ParteH^u ■ 31 tbe carrier task force deland k assembly point at Etorofu Is- 1941 °nJhe rooming of 26 November inetn u 1Cb was 25 November in Wash- CosteIJi ,etause the time difference, eonce ° S suS"est'on that a Soviet signal been rnin® 'he fleet movement may have the . Ir|tercepted, by either the British or ets wnt;;edkStates, or shared by the Sovi- Gove* dlCH oontact within the British not ab°ut that time is certainly
ut of the question.
Siber°r°,U’ tbe Kuriles, Manchuria, and jap 13 Were closely watched by both ese and Soviet intelligence services,
both often using Korean and Manchurian surrogates. Each one of the intelligence services had deeply interpenetrated the other. The Soviet freighter Uritzky may be the long-sought “merchant ship of a third nation” sighted by the Japanese carrier task force on 6 December 1941 (Japanese time), en route to Pearl Harbor, and it is also possible that the Uritzky, like the Pavlov Vinogradov on the Vladivostok route, was under orders from home to proceed as usual should she happen to meet with Japanese naval units in the North Pacific. The Soviet role, while so pertinent given history and geography, has been neglected in most considerations of the Pacific War. As far as the question of a war between the United States and Japan was concerned, Soviet and British policy goals were a perfect match.
Finally, Costello makes an excellent point on the mystery which still surrounds MacArthur’s bomber deterrent and fighters being caught on the ground hours after even commercial radio had broadcast the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. A week earlier, Dutch Vice Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich had ordered his entire East Indies fleet out of the harbor by 30 November 1941. The East Indies air corps was airborne a day later, and the East Indies army fully mobilized by 5 December.
Without access to Magic, Netherlands East Indies’ decision-makers had reached a correct decision in a timely manner for self-defense against Japan’s known strategy of surprise. Yet, neither Costello nor others have been able to demystify retired Dutch Navy and Army officers as to why the United States wasn’t as sharp as its little brother, the Dutch East Indies.
I support Costello and others, such as Admiral E. T. Layton, who spoke up at the U. S. Naval Academy’s Sixth Naval History Symposium in September, in their quest to make available a number of archives, including those of the British, in order to start toward tht final edition of the history of the Pacific War.
“Training Junior Officers”
(See D. M. Alexander, S. A. Sprayberry, pp. 95-106, October 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James P. Adams, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant John R. Hennigan, U. S. Navy—How many officers on a destroyer, submarine, or operational aviation squadron could afford to spend 60% of their time dealing with personal and legal problems and only 5% supervising division production?
The authors fail to mention time spent on watch, pursuing personnel qualifica-
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schlrf^nt^ai"^’ or rev*ev^ing maintenance effort,0r division training. To be an bec.n 1Ve cader' a young officer has to 0 ™.e te<-hnically proficient within his
Perahonal specialty. This proficiency is COmrr though counseling by the sdoik umg °^lcer or by the help of a divic' °r’ ^ut through spending time in the •sion work spaces.
PropriUn'°r ofd"lcer “welcome aboard” Whir-h 1S needed *n a*l ships. Two areas enahl 6 audlors fail to mention that can standi JUn'or °ff>cer to better under- the folk;S d‘v's'onal responsibilities are
concernh*S leading Petty officer
trativp ^ als rcde 'n division adminis- ► A r and counseling matters each *St °f retlu*red reading material for (Thp ine.W, reporting officer to study ited to" uh0Uld 'ncluc*e, but not be lim- lation ’ t lC sh'P’s organization and regu- ment nianua'> the ship manning docu- reeulat°r mann'n8 bill, the ship’s lation 10nS 3nd instructions, Navy Regu- hona/ reP°rts of the ship’s last opera- rnainte'0 adlran*strat*ve inspections, and and pe^nce and rnaterial management ttanuals1)1™31106 measurements systems
Peopk”Fai,h Wi,h °ur
(See D r u
M- Thomas iT'^’ PP' 58'63, February 1983: Quinn n «K;Curtls' P- 80' Ju|y 1983; J. C.
^ 1 . August 1983 Proceedings)
^cZve'or HurtlCy' U' S~ NaV}'
5uppon r'fficer> Helicopter Combat
Coi»ntander ^ ^ (HC'9)~
C°mma \ F ^omas and Lieutenant
spite in'n6r Port's suggested that “deneed f0 C^dl research and well-argued tt'ssionH ^tendon °f the [combat rescue] in the Y ° ^^at s mei limits the reader nient ”C-r.?ICe alternatives for equip- gestthe u e commanders go on to sug- to mv u§hes 500MD as an alternative ^Proposed H-60 variant.
joint od'11- * coauthored the draft
Zander Nja*'0n:d requirements for Com- Atlantic UVa* ^‘r Forces, Pacific and P°n k|’, whh Lieutenant Commander thored an als° of HC-9. In 1982> 1 aa- hec0rne Pa|f document which has since Objectj,3 d,def °f Naval Reserve Project °f the Hn , cmorandum for replacement Reserve and HH-1K in the Naval Provide .,Wltb an HH-60E. This would Navy • s ale"°f'the-art capabilities to the Warfare °tb comFat rescue and special Ne p]a( ,Urcas and would provide a suita- anH ^ m°bile air-to-air point fense st, a, antisurface combatants of- °u d the Navy ever become less
An H-60 variant will meet four basic criteria that the 500MD does not.
parochial in its use of the helicopter in modem warfare at sea.
In analyzing needs and requirements when working on these two proposals, we used four basic criteria: Is the aircraft and associated systems state-of-the-art, and does it meet a preponderance of my needs as a mission operator? Does the aircraft and associated systems meet the Navy requirements of multiple mission capability? Is the aircraft and associated systems off-the-shelf and affordable, with little or no requirement for additional research and development? And is the aircraft supportable within the Navy supply system?
The answer to all four questions turned out to be a derivative of the Army UH- 60, with Navy engines and main transmission, the external stores support system, and suitable off-the-shelf avionics. This airframe is highly mission capable. Furthermore, it can serve both combat rescue and special warfare roles, with superior role growth potential. Most important, however, is its affordability. Twenty-four HH-60E aircraft can be purchased for 7% of the proposed research and development budget of the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Development Program (JVX). Also, these aircraft can be maintained at substantially less cost than the aircraft they would replace.
The Hughes 500MD was not proposed because it fails all four criteria. It does not meet mission needs because it falls short of combat radius requirements and cannot carry sufficient crew. You cannot fly the mission with a pilot and observer for a myriad of reasons. Further, it is too small to carry all mission essential equipment. The 500MD does not have multiple mission capability in that it cannot accommodate a Seal team squad and associated equipment. Substantial research and development funds would be required to bring the 500MD into naval service. And the 500MD is not supportable within the Navy supply system.
I applaud Commanders Thomas and Curtis on questioning the H-60 and on their support for the mission. There is far too little questioning going on today.
“Education and Professionalism”
(See W. P. Mack, pp. 40-47, October 1983
Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. R. Large, U. S. Navy— Doctors, lawyers, engineers, and many other professional groups sponsor tax- exempt or company-funded conferences, lectures, and seminars to leam about new techniques or state-of-the-art equipment. Although each naval officer has academically prepared himself for a profession more challenging than most careers in the civilian sector, he does not have the opportunity to attend short professional development seminars or stimulating lectures. The Surface Warfare Officers School, follow-on Department Head School, and the various war colleges provide each student with intellectual stimuli as well as prepare him for future assignments. Unfortunately, the naval officer spends a small portion of his career in one of these academic environments.
Recently, a San Diego-based type commander opened his doors to an expert on the Soviet Union to speak to all Southern California-based naval officers. The response was overwhelming. An open- to-all-officers invitation quickly overbooked the lecture hall, and the invitation was regretfully limited to lieutenant commanders and above. This underscores the Navy-wide need for periodic professional lectures and seminars. To rectify this inadequacy, type commanders or base commanders should sponsor such lectures.
Prominent military, political, and civilian leaders are continually visiting naval installations and would welcome the opportunity to speak before the officers. Such lectures should be booked at lecture halls capable of seating all officers who desire to attend. Should these programs be limited in attendance, and since they are designed for professional development, they should be a reward for professional performance. The officer with demonstrated professional performance can be recognized by glowing fitness reports, medals, and citations; but, even more,, he is the individual in whom the Navy wants to invest more training. To ensure that quality performers attend these lectures, the quota system could be instituted with a representative number of quotas allotted to each squadron and ultimately each ship. Each commanding officer could then monitor the quality of personnel attending the lecture, plus use this as a reward for demonstrated professional performance.
Continuing education lectures would provide naval officers with an insight into naval affairs and a renewed motivation for dealing with the challenges ahead.
munications (SLOCs) open from
flanks
the land battles on the European
Central
impact on the outcome of the
Front where the war will be won or
SSNs, which could be effective ag. Soviet surface units and submarines
ainst
but
:raft-
forces-
the primary threat to our carrier
Proceedings / I)ecenrt>er
“Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom”
(See A. C. A. Jampoler, pp. 22-28, July 1983 Proceedings)
Captain J. E. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I think naval planners have already discarded the swing theory of switching forces from one ocean to another to fight the Soviet Navy. Fighting Soviet naval forces simultaneously on a worldwide basis is one of the prime arguments now being used to justify a minimum of 15 carrier battle groups and 100 attack submarines.
The only exceptions to a worldwide confrontation with the Soviets could be an attempt by them to seize Iran and/or the Persian Gulf oilfields. The fighting then would likely be confined to the Persian Gulf area since neither NATO nor Japan has the forces or the will to open another front against the Soviets although their vital interests are involved.
Captain Jampoler brushes off the situation in the Pacific by saying the Seventh Fleet is in position to fight its Soviet counterpart. This when many of what were formerly Seventh Fleet forces are deployed in the northwest Indian Ocean and the remaining forces are no match for the Soviets’ large naval-air force buildup in northeast Asia.
The Japanese recognize that the So-
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26 viet-American confrontation in the Western Pacific centers on naval power and that control of the sea by friendly forces is essential to their existence. The Japanese worry about the perceived growth of Soviet naval power in the Western Pacific at the same time U. S. naval power there is being reduced to meet commitments in Southwest Asia.
There are three ways of remedying this growing imbalance of forces. First, persuade the Japanese to increase the size of their naval and air forces so that they can assume responsibility for defense of their homeland and adjacent sea-lanes, preferably out to 1,000 miles from the Japanese coast. This course of action has been tried as recently as this year by Prime Minister Nakasone and caused a tremendous storm of protest and may prove politically unacceptable for the foreseeable future.
A second course of action would be to augment the Pacific Fleet by building more carriers. This obviously would make the greatest impact on Asian perception of American power and determination. At this point, however, the Navy will be fortunate to attain its 15 carrier groups. Even now, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer is advocating cutting the Navy’s carrier battle groups to 13 in order to pay for more Army divisions.
The third choice is to go to land-based air located in northern Japan to defend against Soviet “Backfire” aircraft and Soviet surface ships and submarines. Currently, our Air Force is tasked with collateral missions against Soviet naval forces on a not-to-interfere basis with their primary missions. For them to take this on as a primary mission would require additional assets.
1 agree with Captain Jampoler that more emphasis should be given to keeping a permanent major fleet presence in the North Atlantic, British Isles, North Sea, and Norwegian Sea areas. At least one carrier, however, should remain deployed in the Mediterranean. Italy, Greece, and Turkey have come to regard our Mediterranean carrier deployments as the principal deterrent to Soviet aggressive moves against them. Submarines, destroyers, and patrol aircraft do not create the same perceptions of power.
I also agree with Captain Jampoler that in wartime our Navy’s main fighting against Soviet naval forces will be against the Soviet Navy’s Northern Fleet. We should, therefore, have a permanent major fleet presence in North Atlantic waters and familiarize our forces with the geography, weather, and enemy forces that would be encountered in war. Still, it is hard for me to visualize our present force levels keeping the sea lines of com
North
America to Western Europe and fr°m Mideast oil to ourselves and Western Europe and at the same time support1”® and the Central Front. Actually, the poh| ically important flanks will have W1
lost.
Keeping open the SLOCs will be imp01^ tant only as long as port facilities a available. Supporting our ASW f°rceS * their fight against Soviet SSBNs and Pr(^ viding crucial air support at a critical ti to the Central Front could well be most important tasks of our Atlantic ca rier forces. . gt
Captain Jampoler maintains threats to our carrier forces must be e t ^ inated or substantially degraded by vance elements, among which he lists
have no capability against enemy atrc
And to think of using nonnuclear Tom hawks to destroy bomber aircraft on viet airfields is nonsense. So, too, is erating our surface ships and Pa aircraft in enemy-controlled air sPaC^„jn In his weapons wish list, Cap Jampoler wants our major surface c batants to be armed like the Soviet *ir°^ and Sovremennyys—a good recount1 dation. Not so good is his call for T*- Navy patrol/bomber aircraft similar to Soviets’ naval “Backfire.” The • should push for a Stealth patrol-bom Also, arming the recommissioned ba
ships with large numbers of vertic launched high-performance surface-1® _r missiles would be worthwhile for own survival and as a valuable adjun the carrier task force. j c.
I concur with Captain Jampoler s t ommendation that support for l°rvv. ,e sites on Iceland and Japan should re^vfi greater priority. Iceland should Navy-augmented F-14 and A-6 SC1 rons, as well as its current P-3 squadron. The A-6s and P-3s shoul a be provided with large stocks of m1^ The one topic not mentioned by tain Jampoler which should be recei^- top-priority development funding cems the military importance of SP . and directed-energy weapons. Dire energy weapons installed on our ca and large surface combatants will Pr j cally ensure their survival from alf missile attack in a high-threat enV'wjH ment. Installed on space craft, they ^ enable us both to set up a ballistic nllS ^ defense and also contest the S°v*”tSttie- military control of space—the ground of the future.
. - 1983
The R°ebling Alligator
problemJ' Plagued by health
Donal^D warm climate attracted nancianR°ebllng t0 Florida ln 1929. Fitime tr. ^ lndependent, he devoted his vestio . COmmunity affairs, scientific in-
hurricanem ^ technol°gy- The
ida in devastated southern Flor-
ident 3caused Donald’s father, pres- Panv t J°hn A' Roebling Sons, Com- vehini„° su88est the need for a rescue water Y3pab,e °* °Perating on land and neerinp °Ung Roebbng applied his engi- type 0f mUS and constructed the proto- had r tSUCh an amphibious vehicle. It ntovem*1 erpi,lar-tyPe tractor treads for attachp h ^ °n land and paddle-like cleats
the watPr° ohe trCads for ProPulsion in usino r i, “u°yancy was achieved by
Roeblin tWe'8ht aluminum- This first lone 8 amphibious tractor was 24 feet
Powerede'khed 14,350 Pounds, and was
92 enEine “
new*!!,3?’ Roehhng had a completely
had been 6 Teady for testinS- The ,en'gth 8,7oo rcduced to 20 feet and weight to
achieve*01*111^’ but tlle most significant hack (iniCnt was improvement of the that ro [IVe Ro,ler bearings on a chain luted f 6 |!,n a steel channel were substi- usuali\?r tbe h0g*e and idler wheel design that dav C-!-/!<)yed by track vehicles of ''’as ret ' bc cleats diagonal placement ^quatic1"1^’ but they were now curved, hour C Speed improved to nine miles per
cle that appeared in the 4 October 1937 issue of Life Magazine. Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus read the article and mentioned the vehicle to Major General Louis McCarty Little, Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force. General Little forwarded information on Roebling’s invention to Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb, with the recommendation it be brought to the attention of the Marine equipment board. As a result, Major John W. Kaluf was asked to determine if the Roebling vehicle had any military value.
Major Kaluf went to Clearwater in September 1938. The Alligator was undergoing further modification and was not available for field testing. Roebling made it clear that he was not interested in any military use of his vehicle. In January of the following year, Kaluf returned to Florida. This time, he was able to convince a reluctant Roebling to demonstrate the Alligator. Major Kaluf was impressed with the vehicle’s performance and recommended, “Steps be taken to procure a pilot model of this type of amphibious boat for further tests.” The Navy refused to endorse the recommendation on the grounds funds for such a project were not available.
In September 1939, the new equipment board head, General E. P. Moses, witnessed a demonstration of the most current Alligator. Impressed by the vehicle, General Moses convinced Roebling to make his invention available to the military in recognition of the lives it would save should war be declared. The Marine
Corps still had no funds for the project, but General Moses persisted, and in March 1940, his request was approved. Financial arrangements agreed upon with Roebling for constructing a vehicle meeting military specifications were based on an estimated cost of $20,000. No consideration was given to the nearly $100,000 Roebling had already invested to bring his Alligator to this advanced stage of capability. The military prototype was completed near the end of 1940. Roebling determined his construction costs had been some $4,000 less than the allotted $20,000, but had considerable difficulty in getting the Navy Department to accept his check for a refund.
The military version retained its predecessor’s basic design, but weight was reduced an additional 1,000 pounds, and power was increased to 120 horsepower. Speed was now ten miles per hour in the water and 20 miles per hour on land. It was much more seaworthy than previous models; it would not capsize in a dive into deep water from a six foot height, or sink even when filled with water. After testing, the Navy decided that the aluminum construction was not of adequate strength and suggested an all-steel design. Roebling had used the Food Machinery Corporation (FMC) to make components for all earlier models. He recommended that organization for conversion of the original riveted aluminum construction to welded steel.
FMC built two all-steel prototypes and was awarded a government contract to build an additional 200. Now officially called the LVT (landing vehicle, tracked), the first production LVT rolled out of the FMC plant in July 1941.
The modem descendant of the Roebling Alligator is the LVTP7. It is completely enclosed, measures 26 feet in length, and weighs 50,350 pounds. Powered by a single diesel engine of 400 horsepower, it travels 40 miles per hour on land and just under nine miles per hour in the water. The paddle-like cleats have been replaced with an aqua-jet system that achieves aquatic propulsion by expelling water through steering deflectors. The LVTP7 carries a crew of three and provides a protected environment for delivery of up to 25 combat-equipped troops.
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WE'RE FIGHTING FOR YOUR LIFE
“Political Awareness Training in the U. S. Navy”
(See K. P. Weinberg, pp. 162-166, October
1983 Proceedings)
Aviation Electronics Technician Second Class Carl H. Schmidt, U. S. Naval Reserve—I remember when I was in boot camp in Memphis in 1971, marching down Attu Street to the chow hall and wondering how many of the guys in my company knew where Attu is and what happened there. I knew because my father was there in 1943, but I am sure nobody else knew, nor were we ever told. All during recruit training, “P” school, and “A” school, nobody told us anything about Attu, Guadalcanal, Midway, or Okinawa. Our Navy and our nation have such a glorious history; why are we embarrassed to talk about it? I received the best electronics training available anywhere from the Navy, from instructors better than most I had in high school or college. However, I can’t remember ever hearing a word about U.S. policy or history. Granted, I was in boot camp during the Vietnam era when it was fashionable to condemn anything American. Why the Navy didn’t counter this negative approach with its own political training I’ll never know. Instead of building on tradition, the Navy went out of its way to discourage it.
Today’s typical high school graduate or even college graduate knows little about geography, history, or political science and knows nothing about military history. The Navy must assume that the raw material that it receives is ignorant of these topics and take steps to correct it or else be confronted again with the chant of “ . . . one, two, three, four, what the hell are we fighting for?” “FFG-7s: Square Pegs?”
(,See B. R. Linder, pp. 38-43, June 1983; T. S. Sher, pp. 14-18, September 1983; J. M. Purtell, pp. 119-122, October 1983; B. A. Becken, p.
97, November 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert Hillery, U. S. Navy, Engineer Officer, USS George Philip (FFG-I2)—Commander Linder’s article has spawned much discussion. I suspect that the title was intentionally deceptive, designed to produce just such a result. He presents a positive treatment of emerging tactical employment of a new platform and weapon system. Bravo Zulu, Sir!
Throughout the construction and early development of the class, I have watched their operations with much professional interest. My enthusiasm grew during my training pipeline for my current assignment. These ships are capable of performing the principal design task 0 open-ocean escort of merchant convoys^ They are square pegs—and they fitin square hole.
Unfortunately, the hole for which t ®; were originally planned in the late 19 and early 1970s has been altered i changes in Soviet platforms, weapon^ and tactics. Lieutenant Commander S presents analogies between naval 311 corporate procurement procedures, hi he appears to understand the corpora^ process, he is surely aware of the e tremely long period from the concept1^ of an idea to congressional approval an funding to fleet introduction and *nte§ tion. This complex train of events 1 ^ volves many more planning and or?a^a zational interfaces than the marketing 0 new caffeine-free cola. .
The Oliver Hazard Terry-class s >P are the workhorses of tomorrow. 1 are proving themselves invaluable 10 support of many previously unforese duties. The FFG-7s have demonstra the flexibility of response and poten ^ for growth, both as a platform and in ta^ tical employment, necessary for the ope ations of today’s fleet commanders.
No ship can be reliably judged fr011^ desk. Frigates have always been kno^ as eager and able performers. George Philip's slogan is a fitting nl° “Let George do it!”
“Beyond the War Game Mystique”
(See F. D. Thompson, pp. 82-87, October Proceedings)
£
Commander Barry V. Tiernan, U■ Navy (Retired)—War gaming is a too the analyses required by the various nl> tary commanders. War gaming will se^ some uses well and some not at allfault for misuse of war gaming l‘es ve with the tool but with the user. We 3 to remember, too, that war games d ^ “say” anything; people do. We sh ^ stop excusing our poor decisions blaming them on other people and tl,,ne If stress will help achieve the PurP°j of the war game, stress can be 'nc*u^e Stress could be increased in a war g by increasing clock speed. In many games, it is considered advantageous remove the players from their norma tivities so that they can devote their e gies to the war game. s.
As a war gamer, I worry about the P sibility of war game procedures w will be prejudicial to new ideas.
(Continued on pa8e ^
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 28)
“The Critical Link: Junior
Officers and Strategic Thought”
(See T. C. Pierce, pp. 132-133, September 1983
Proceedings)
Commander James F. Giblin, Jr., U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Pierce’s essay is an enigma to me. It strikes me as short on substance but pithy. His continual references to something that he has labeled as “strategic thought” suggest that he has a somewhat less than precise idea of his argument. His excessive use of quotes on “strategic thought” seems out of place in an essay. Yet he does make sense.
His plea for a solid background in military history as one of the first prerequisites to the development of strategy, although certainly not original, is on target. I would, however, recommend that Lieutenant Pierce expand his diet to include heavy doses of diplomatic, cultural, and economic history, rigorously washed down with work in operational political thought, economics, international relations, and international law.
This is the crux of my criticism of Lieutenant Pierce’s work. What does he mean by “‘exposure’ to strategic thought”? Does he want to create a “do it yourself” enterprise in strategy for junior officers? I doubt it, since he seems to recognize that “exposure” requires time, an already scarce resource in the life of a junior officer working on his warfare qualification. Perhaps he would push for the inclusion of a “strategic thought” package in the theory portion of surface warfare officer’s personnel qualifications standards. Let’s hope not; it’s hard to imagine a one-hour oral on, say, the strategic implications of the developing law of the sea as a part of a junior officer’s wartime qualification path.
Shall we add one more fact book to a ship’s already burgeoning over-allowance of publications in lieu of giving our junior officers the luxury of the time they would require to dig out the relevant literature on matters of strategy and policy? This is a reasonable option provided that such a book was carefully authored to reflect a broad perspective on selected topics in “strategic thought” and that it be recognized for what it is: a strategic
thinker’s kind of McGuffy’s Reader.
All strategy is, in the end, a compromise in some form of allocating resources to achieve some policy goal. I challenge him and other junior officers like him to consider their own personal and professional resource constraints as measured against their personal and professional goals and then make known some specifics on what they think they need to have at their disposal to gain an exposure to “strategic thought.”
book, Soviet Style in War [New Y°r Crane and Russak, 1982], for an eXte^_ lent analysis of how deeply those c cepts are rooted in Soviet cultural as as military imperatives.)
In fact, while Mr. Peterson s
asses5'
ment of the Soviet naval literature probably accurate enough in the to (i.e., massed attacks and combined a ^ are once again a part of Soviet na'
ival as
de
well as military doctrine), it fails to pict adequately both important sbms >e the U. S.-Soviet naval balance over
past decade and what has been going
“About-Face in Soviet Tactics”
(See C. C. Peterson, pp. 57-63, August 1983
Proceedings)
Commander Kenneth R. McGruther, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Knox (FF-1052)—Mr. Peterson asked some important questions, such as why the “Oscar” nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) carries more than twice as many missiles as her predecessors, and why the Kirov is the first Soviet cruiser in two decades to carry surface-to-surface missiles at all. Clearly, something has changed in the way the Soviets envision war on the oceans, and it is high time we spent some time trying to define what that something is and what it might portend for us. However, I am not convinced of the adequacy of the answers to these questions reached in the article.
That Soviet military theory embraced (or at least that its spokesmen were made to embrace) the efficiency of nuclear weaponry under Khrushchev is neither new nor startling. Whether that phenomenon meant that the new doctrine achieved “total victory,” as Mr. Peterson argues, or whether the more traditional Soviet military concepts merely “went sinker” for a while is arguable. “Combined arms” and “mass” as basic principles of warfare are thoroughly embedded in Russian military tradition, and it is unlikely that Soviet officers schooled in that doctrine did much more than keep a low profile for a few years. Still, that argument seems insufficient to explain the shifts in Soviet building philosophy that the “Oscar” and the Kirov represent. (See, for example, Nathan Leites’s recent
in the broader aspects of Soviet mi
litary
policy of late. (When dealing with S military doctrine, one must also resist temptation to try to isolate services-
Soviet
the
The
very use of the term “combined artn gf by the Soviets has to do with their view ^ war as a “seamless web” of weap° ’ force types, and missions.) ^
Since the mid-1960s, many signif,c
events have taken place in the ju .
1 • orta111
U. S. naval balance. The most imp0
of these have to do with the heavy
focus
of the Soviet Navy toward maint;1|^ ing—even in wartime—a secure st gic strike capability (i.e., keeping SSBN fleet as a force in being), and ^ introduction into the U. S. Navy 0 fensive systems such as Aegis and F-14 Phoenix system, on the one ha^ and offensive systems such as Tornan „y and Harpoon, on the other. What we be seeing is a Soviet effort to impr°''e e ability to accomplish with confi°e ^ missions set for its naval forces m early 1970s and a general effort by Soviets to catch up, in terms of hardW with the major movements the u ' Navy has made toward widespread 0 ( range surface-to-surface missiles- j there is another important elemen what might be behind the Soviets in^s duction of new capabilities, and that^ to do with the Soviet effort to deal ^ the potential problem of a long, con tional war that Mr. Peterson notes.
That effort has produced within the ^ decade or so a major reorganization o Soviet military command structure ward a system which assigns both 1° ^ and missions to commanders and j mands that they then be able to c°n
that
able one’s own forces to compete in
itild
to the
with a missile comparable in range
critical places within assigned times in order to be able to dictate the scope and pace of the war. In wartime, Soviet air forces, along with the appropriate mix of ground, naval, and transport forces, would be assigned by Moscow to commanders operating in theaters of military operations (TVDs), something akin to our unified command system (Yosek Bodarsky, Business Week, 12 September 1983, p. 65). The key point in this new system is that, owing to the heavy predominance of officers of the Army and Strategic Rocket Forces in the Soviet military high command, these theater commanders will almost never be naval officers. The consequence of this for the Soviet Navy is that it may not be able to count on long-range strike aircraft to provide the vital part of the “massive coordinated strike” upon which Soviet defense of its seaward flanks has focused.
It is within the context of these three developments that recent Soviet platforms and weapons developments can be best understood. For one thing, it ought not to be unexpected that a service facing the loss of direct control (and consequently, the loss of assurance of success upon which Soviet “correlation of force” calculations are based) over its air strike arm would seek to introduce as quickly as possible a system which it would control to replace that loss. To validate such a hypothesis, analysts might want to compare the ordnance delivery potential of a Soviet naval aviation strike regiment (i.e., the number of missiles per plane times the number of planes per strike against a single carrier) to the ordnance delivery potential of the “Oscar” SSGN. In a military planning system as rigorously analytical and as obsessed with “control” and assured outcomes as is the one the Soviets use, it might be too much to attribute an exact identity between these two figures—in view of the increased capacity of the “Oscar” which Mr. Peterson notes—to coincidence.
From the point of view of one planning how best to attack U. S. naval defenses, the introductions of the F-14/Phoenix and, later, Aegis must have provided the Soviets with an operational imperative to consider the increasingly likely eventuality that even the best planned first strike might be unlikely to be completely successful. Faced with that prospect, the Soviets have had to reckon with the certainty of a substantial counterstrike by remaining forces, which, by virtue of widespread deployment of surface-to- surface missiles within the U. S. Navy, was now likely to come from many plat
forms. This strike-and-counterstrike se
quence is, I would suggest, what has caused Soviet theoreticians to return t° consideration of the “engagement’ see nario which Mr. Peterson notes. Facing such a prospect, the inevitable response would be to recommence widespre deployment of surface-to-surface tnissu in one’s own combatants in order to en engagement. And, if possible, one woU ^ want to deploy missiles which outran? the U. S. missiles. Thus, enter the K‘r°v in the late 1970s, with missiles compai'3 ble in range to Tomahawk, and the S°v remennyy-class guided missile destroy
Harpoon. Another coincidence/ likely. .
The Soviet system is usually Prec^lC, able if we pause to think things throng from the Soviet vantage point. To do t we need to consider what they want to able to do, what we are developing wW offers to deny them those objective (which must be dated from the time start talking seriously about it—whicn when the Soviets believe they need ^ become concerned—rather than when deploy new capabilities), and what state of technology is which is avails to them to counteract our initiatives.
The widest horizons of technology. 9
aerospatiaK?
Selection Board Dynamics”
PP' 123"‘25’ September
Ene!Hander S' A' Mohsberg III, Civil Svlv/7 (~orPs- U. S. Navy—Captain nami S Cr USeful|y summarizes the dy- boardSfanC* proccc*urcs of the selection (UR i \ °r olEcers °f the unrestricted line „enfr'!,andrestricted line (RL). While the scrihp Principles and process he de- varin S 3 so aPP*y to selection boards for corPs> *e details vary, ered h ^ and RE officers are consid- staff „y 3 sln8le selection board, each staff p0r^S '13S ’ts own. The details each those °f,S selection board uses vary from board ° 6acfl otber sta0 corps selection and rjS T" as from those for the URL
Corps (PFr^'11 USe the Civil En§ineer Whl ° aS an example. naval «-•there are more than 62,000 more *Cers on active duty, only a little CEC 'rif11 1,500 are members of the board wiiw^6’ 3 CEC caPtain selection record ... ’ or example, review far fewer lection k 311 tlle EEE and RE captain se- each off °ard bacl1 hoard member reads to a sel *Cer S record in its entirety. Prior ers Usil“tl0n board meeting, the record- ord (Off ^ read tbe selection board rec- fiche 1CSr 5llrTllT|ary Record and micro- 6 record) of each officer being considered and attempt to correct any errors or omissions. Both can generally be corrected using the resources of the Naval Military Personnel Command; if not, the officer is contacted. After the board convenes, the members spend many hours over several days reading each record.
The recorders prepare a ballot listing the name of each officer to be considered. Included are those above, in, and below the promotion zone. Members then secretly vote for a number of officers. This number is usually equal to the quota assigned by the Secretary of the Navy. Within this limit, any number may come from above or in the promotion zone; the number that may come from below the promotion zone is limited by law.
In a process parallel to that Captain Sylvester describes, the board may decide that any officer unanimously voted for would be selected, producing several selectees. A new ballot excluding these selectees would then be prepared, and another vote taken. Again, those receiving unanimous votes are usually selected. Conceivably, this process could continue until the board’s quota was reached. Usually, however, after several ballots, none of the remaining officers would unanimously be voted for, and the unanimous constraint is relaxed, producing several more selectees. Eventually, the board would reach what Captain Sylvester calls the “crunch zone,” the number of officers remaining who have received significant support on each ballot would exceed the number remaining to be selected. At this point, a discussion of the record of each of the remaining officers would ensue. Members might reread and discuss some or all of the officer’s records. Additional ballots would then be taken, bringing forth the remaining selectees.
Captain Sylvester describes the emphasis on fairness and the appearance of fairness on selection boards. CEC boards include members currently serving in each of the major professional specialties, currently or recently assigned to each of our major geographical areas, and representing each of our commissioning sources and designators. Each board includes a minority member. Women officers, a relatively recent and rapidly growing addition to the CEC, have achieved enough seniority to serve as recorders. Recorders are usually present during the deliberations of CEC selection boards.
aerospatiale
07 66 de Montmorency
Paris Cedex 16 - France
As Captain Sylvester clearly states, “The Navy Selection Board is the most democratic process available to fairly and accurately select naval officers for promotion.”
JJ“W Si,ent the Silent Service?”
Ro«iRnPl^Se^U' pp- 40"45’ Ju|y 1983; T. J.
>50 nL L C,0ber l983; R p Hansen, P Dr ’ November 1983 Proceedings)
Parish ^oun8’ defense analyst—Dr.
ture 0fU S ^°lnts about the probable na- clear r, 3 strug8le against a Soviet nu-
for comm?61! aUaCk submarine (SSN> gent , ° ur,derwater space are co-
Th serve atten,K)n-
to U sPT exchange rates attributed nients with c S “ one-°n-°ne engage- rnuch tr ^0viet SSNs are probably failure?'' <?t'm*stic’ Partly because of a logic of° 0rough|y explore the tactical that Dr p1 engaSemcnt along the lines substant- ,anseau lays out. A torpedo’s ing aeon??traVel tlme to target- its alert- Probabilirf8na!ure> and its significant for a t, ^ 0t 3 m‘ss create opportunities destruc, 8Ct SSN t0 retaliate op fend off much m°n 3nt* eominuc the fight on the exrh°re fav<)rable terms. Therefore, great],, 3n®e rate on initial attack must multi-shn?e?State S- capabilities in a
v'et SSN d°8^gbt w‘th a tenacious So-
mutuai d,UC*ng even a small probability of during i'0n frorn enemy retaliation an othe 6 lrSt. attack drastically lowers rate- , rWlse favorable exchange
theticai etrlenlation reveals a hypo- Statcs i ()XC| ange rate favoring the United ti°n- jt r |, ’ assuming no mutual attri- ehance S to 5:1 when only a 10% the exch-' ** doub*e kill is allowed, and beld at in0®,6 rale ‘n one-sided attrition is tual attr.v ‘ ^ith a 20% chance of mu- ehanse ?‘?n °n first attack> the 10:1 ex- rnutuai ?)? ° *abs. to 3.4:1. The risk of anlikelv*1. r!'°n in submarine warfare is
Simila ? be negli8ihle.
r y, the possibility of a miss on
first attack, followed by a forced fight on equal terms, also dramatically reduces an otherwise favorable exchange rate. Suppose that a U. S. SSN, with a hypothetical 10:1 exchange rate in the initial engagement, cannot disengage following a miss on first attack, but must continue to fight on even terms at a 1:1 exchange rate—which might be optimistic, according to Dr. Pariseau. Then, in such multistage battles from which a U. S. SSN cannot disengage, the 10:1 exchange rate falls to 6.6:1, 3.7:1, or 2.4:1 if the chances of a miss on first attack are 10%, 30%, and 50%, respectively. (Dr. Pariseau indicates that 50% might be closest to the truth, assuming no counterattack from the target SSN.)
What is the consequence of allowing these two effects to work together? Suppose that, on first attack, there is a 10% chance of mutual attrition and a 50% chance of a miss. Then, a hypothetical exchange rate of 10:1 on initial engagement will drop sharply to 1.8:1, which is unacceptable given the relative number of submarines available on each side.
Thus, unless U. S. SSNs are able to disengage following a miss on first attack and restore the status quo ante, the exchange rate on initial engagement is a deceptive measure of U. S. capabilities, if even a small probability of mutual attrition and plausible probability of a miss must be allowed. Further, if Soviet SSNs have superior agility and plan to stick close with active sonar, then the prospects for disengagement cannot be bright. A Soviet attempt to intercept inbound torpedoes with a nuclear-armed torpedo also might favor the use of active sonar in the follow-on battle under acoustically noisy conditions. That U. S. SSNs are more
likely to find themselves in one-on-many engagements, with less-detectable diesel submarines occasionally among the many, darkens the picture.
These considerations suggest that unless the U. S. SSNs are able to overcome these extenuating circumstances, closing for torpedo attack is unlikely to preserve the great advantage for initial detection that U. S. SSNs are believed to enjoy.
This advantage could be exploited by an effective stand-off weapon, preferably conventionally armed, but nuclear if necessary. A capability for stand-off attack would minimize the risk of counter-battery retaliation, for which Soviet SSNs also are equipped, and, above all, give U. S. SSNs a much better chance to disengage and avoid close combat—perhaps the essential requirement for a high exchange rate.
However, even if equipped with a potent stand-off capability, U. S. SSNs still must be prepared for close combat. U. S. SSNs require: superior active and passive torpedo countermeasures (pro-friendly and anti-enemy); several independent fire-control channels for multiple-target engagements; the best possible rate of kill per channel using fast torpedoes, autonomous guidance, and high single-shot probability of a disabling hit; and agile, tough platforms.
It would be unfortunate if a critical facet of our defense—securing control of underwater space—were to be jeopardized by an inability to out-think and adjust to a resourceful opponent who is doing his homework, as Dr. Pariseau points out.
“The Continental Strategy of
Imperial Japan”
(See C. G. Reynolds, pp. 64-71, August 1983;
T. C. Hone, p. 187, October 1983 Proceedings)
Mr. E. Panagopulos—Dr. Reynolds writes: “In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Togo’s Combined Fleet bottled up the Russian Pacific Fleet inside Port Arthur and repulsed its sortie.”
The strong bonds of friendship between our country and Japan today should not be an excuse for misrepresenting history. The attack against Port Arthur by the Japanese fleet took place on the night of 8-9 February 1904, without warning or prior declaration of war. In a way, it was the rehearsal for Pearl Harbor. It will not sound right if some 40 years hence we read in some military-historical publication: “Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet bottled up the U. S. Pacific Fleet inside Pearl Harbor and repulsed its sortie.”
July
“The Talent for Judgment”
*£££**’ PP' 48-53’ °Ct0ber 1983
/\^'<na,nt C°l°nel A. P. Dobsevage, q i . °f United States (Retired)— of p am Beader gives a simplified model oberitrerneS’ t*le "’ovact system based on tmi ICnCe’ craftsmanlike skill, and cen-
can rr; and ttle "art °f war” grouP-1 Uati * ■ °* some more recent tactical sit- troo°nS m t*3e Middle East where a para- ionw c°i°nel in Israel moved his battal- t,„ 0 ant-i UP the Golan Heights before
Co eceivec* the go signal from the army ow maphing officer, both acting on his tank- Unt* cor|fusing the Syrians. Another com cornmanding officer, who became a cent]r°Versial minister of defense re- and n10Vec* his tanks across the Suez force much larger Egyptian
Were 1 ^ 6 men knew the art of war and
Diesel Boats Forever?”
(See J i p,
K. c, Q , Byron’ PP- 35-43, December 1982;
1983- M J1!1, G' Hart’ PP- 25-26, February
March 198T- v°n;M- E‘ Capron’ pp‘ 69~72’
PP- in 11 P' Weinberg, B. R. Longworth
36-44 ^pr^ ^®3; J. T. Hayward, pp.
1983 P^cLdinfs] S' L' Byr°n’ PP- ^
rnan'b/^fer Toyka, Federal Ger-
on a c lv it’s high time for a comment ttents CW 01 Commander Byron’s state- have .reSarding diesel submarines. 1 hiesel1110^ ^ears experience in modern \yatersSU marines in Northern European
snorknjm?nder Byron dwells on the fore hi h S h‘8her detectability and there- ered £f tkan that of nuclear-pow- he doe1* marines- We all know that. But 'n tranS n0t seem to know that of 24 hours Snortin''1 °n^ a ^ew hours are needed fot area -pL3^ even less time in a Patr°l served • Ut S dlc case 'n the boats I have is j^or !n' During those hours, the diesel a mod6 VUinerahle than a nuclear sub, but ing pj6rn diesel is not deaf while snort- sel js J|nng non-snorting hours, the die- tectabl UC5 ’ff'der and therefore less de- con^0 ,an the nuclear sub. Every fine adHln8 officer of a nuclear submales ®SN 6Xav 'n£lUdCS the USS LosAn&e-
modem 1• c ass> who has trained with tiling • diesels, knows that I am shouiH ! *ike d Is- Commander Byron
jjg la,k to them.
Very ..i’’1' 8’ The modern submarine is the suhCB an ^merican invention. . . . '''ere , mar‘ne s superior components This is b>Vei°Ped in the United States.” ConUlv fU,e 4or nuclear submarines, but il d^initf11 ^ Byron includes diesels in his °n of modem submarines, the
German-designed submarine family built in several countries from the 1960s until now, with more than 60 units, was based on the German Type XXIII of 1944. Neither that type nor her predecessors were of U. S. invention.
Commander Byron points out that the diesel submarine is effective in coastal defense. True, but I can’t follow the conclusions. Has coastal defense no significance in the U. S. naval concept of operations? Has he forgotten the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942? Also, the diesel submarine is well-suited for choke-point operations against surface units and transiting nuclear submarines.
Commander Byron is wrong when he says, “Diesel submarine superiority in shallow water is unsupportable ... nuclear submarines are fully capable in shallow water operations.” Modem diesel submarines, because of their outstanding maneuverability and limited size, can operate in waters 100 feet in depth. Nuclear submarine commanding officers get gray hairs proceeding on the surface in such shallow waters, because they can’t operate submerged there.
As far as our future mission of presenting live targets for an allied navy is concerned, that’s a flattering proposal, but I can assure Commander Byron that the U. S. surface community’s experience of never having enough training opportunities with live submarines is matched by the allied nations. Does he expect allied navies to offer their limited submarine training hours to a navy which does not consider the expense of having its own training submarines worthwhile, at least as long as their own escorts lack enough submarine training hours?
By the way, a 1,500-ton diesel cannot simulate effectively a 7,000-ton nuc. It has something to do with maneuverability, sound reflection, and noise. For realistic training, you have a submarine doing ten to 20 knots on battery only, without turbine, if necessary for hours. Forget your noisemaker; only 10-20% of diesel submarine time is snorting time.
Now we come to that part of Commander Byron's story that doesn t make any sense—German submarines. Commander Byron objects to a German firm s offer to supply a submarine to the U. S. Navy for evaluation based on the “unacceptability of dependence on foreign sources for a major element of national defense.” I hope that none of the Europeans intending to buy those major elements of national defense like the F-16, F/A-18, Patriot, etc. is going to agree with this argument. I would assume that a country that has developed all superior components of submarines should be able to copy and develop a design once it has been acquired and evaluated.
I don’t understand at all his “concern that Germany lost 850 diesel submarines in World War II.” Does this imply that they were lost because of faulty designs and poor workmanship? I always thought that those brave men and boats were lost mainly to the fighting men, ships, and aircraft of the Royal Navy in concert with the U. S. Navy. Is Commander Byron offering us a new historical explanation? Finally, I must challenge his flat statement that the German design “lacks reliability, maintainability, safety, design margin for future growth, and noise quieting.” Having served and operated in German submarines against many allied antisubmarine warfare forces, I know that these diesels are extremely quiet, reliable, maintainable, and safe. You can even have them nonmagnetic if you want. And the “German 209” class with its different modifications is a classic example of a design capable of accommodating several hundred tons in a 1,200-ton design without designing a new boat.
Diesel boats forever? Well, of course.
“Guerrilla Warfare at Sea”
(See F. J. Glaeser, pp. 41-47, August 1983; N.
Friedman, p. 183, October 1983 Proceedings)
Commander Marc T. Apter, U. S. Naval Reserve, GM-14 General Engineer (Combat Systems), Naval Material Command Headquarters—Commander F. J. Glaeser has identified the solution to making his proposed operational concepts or even our current concepts feasible in wartime. Our battle groups must be self-supporting, including the capability of repairing electronics somewhere other than at a Navy contractor depot. But manning and training changes by themselves won’t allow us to change our electronic maintenance philosophy.
The needed change in electronic maintenance philosophy is happening through programs like the miniature-microminiature electronic component repair program (now being installed in the fleet), the deployment of digital automatic test equipment on the Spruance (DD-963)- class ships and larger, the development of an allowance for a kit of piece parts for electronic module repair, and the efforts of the Chief of Naval Material to have documentation developed to use these programs.
A change in electronic maintenance philosophy can only be implemented if we deal with the whole ship and/or battle group and not develop a different philosophy for the maintenance of each individual equipment or system.
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niy | Wbo doubt this eventuality with both Germany and Japan poised to attack. Our work for peace should be deliberate and cautious.
In the arguments concerning nuclear war, is there a fine distinction or fundamental truth from which we can find hope? I have looked and found none. I do not mean that a nuclear weapon is just another weapon. Nuclear weapons are different, and they will change some aspects of war. But the moral difficulties involved in nuclear war are not logically or fundamentally different from conventional war. History shows that we have never been good at controlling or predicting the consequences of war, limiting collateral damage, protecting noncombatants, ensuring just use of deterrence, or applying proportionality. And we have feared the demise of the world since before John wrote “The Revelation.” War is war, and history has shown us repeatedly that the future will be more like the past than any startling “1984.”
In the search for peace, then, nuclear war has become the red herring which has distracted us from the fundamental issue of war. That distraction is the evil of nuclear war. Millions of people died in war long before the first nuclear weapon was detonated. Capricious killings and flagrant offenses against justice predate the discovery of the atom. To blame all of society’s ills on nuclear weapons is a delusion which misdirects the search for real causes, confuses cause with effect, and interferes with the two fundamental teachings of our tradition—first, the sovereignty of God as the author of all legitimate power and, second, the dignity of the human person.
Judging by the number of people who drive after drinking, smoke, and don’t wear seat belts, one could conclude we don’t care about our own lives. (Deaths from these causes on an annual basis eclipse our total losses in Vietnam by an order of magnitude.) How can we expect our neighbor, let alone a Russian, to care about them? Our callous attitude toward both involuntary and institutionalized destruction of life has blunted our capacity for dealing with the true causes of war.
Bishop John O’Connor, former Navy Chief of Chaplains, observes “that both war and the absence of peace are the direct results of the failure to recognize and honor concretely the dignity of life, the worth and value of the human person—a worldwide failure that ranges from indifference and neglect to total contempt.” Pope Paul VI exhorts, “If you want peace, defend life.” Pope John Paul II has it in the right order when he says, “If you want peace, work for justice,” not the other way around. Respecting the sovereignty of God and the dignity of life leads to justice from which peace flows. Our failure to follow that hierarchy leads to frustration and distraction.
Absence of peace follows from injustice and failure to respect the sovereignty of God and the dignity of human life. The biggest threats to peace are the threats to life and justice. Our intellectual resources should be devoted to furthering the fundamental truths concerning God and human life.
With regard to maintaining our defense posture, when we can leave our doors unlocked and dismantle our police departments, we will know we have made progress toward respecting the sovereignty of God and human life. When the Soviets dismantle the KGB, I will beat my ceremonial sword into a plowshare. This may sound flippant, but it is possible. Today, we have a mutual strategy where we hold each other’s demise in our hands. It is a small step in logic to see that we also hold each other’s lives. There is hope.
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We military officers owe it to ourselves and the nation to resolve these issues in our minds, so that when called to fight we can do so with understanding and without reservation. Military ethics have long been part of our tradition and profession. Lately, we have been too busy to teach it. It’s time we did so.