Changeable Tactics, Changeless Sea

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AnJ^laf^e ^ ^{our seas} f^{or a} thousand years,

W?,-' ^{StiU Unfed}’

But f ^l,lere s never a wave of all her waves ^{Ut n}'<‘rks our English dead.

—Rudyard Kiplii

T ^e history of naval warfare is replete with both ₍^^set vi^ctories and with battles between evenly ^tories o a^^ec* f°^rces that resulted in overwhelming vic- ^vvhich ^r £^^eats' Why? Partly because the strategies by slowly ^VlCt°^r^ ^anc* ^^ef^eat are measured change little and ^ficklv °^Ven ^^un^^rec^^s °f years, while tactics can change self is clr™ nCW techⁿ°l°gical developments. The sea it- ^Can be aa8.^{e ess:} the great leveler of men and machines the unc^X^ °'^tec^ the skilled and ready but can devastate leaders ^£rt^^ln' Common qualities are prominent in the ^v'^ctori_e^{an su}h°fdinates participating in past unexpected ^Unexpe ^{Ut Sea}' These same qualities can also produce matched f₀ V'^ctors *ⁿ f^uturc battles between unevenly

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°f three ' ^°^r handreds of years, naval strategy consisted ^weathe_r-?^{lain maneuvers;} crossing the “T,” gaining the *^eashino paving the wind abaft the beam), and un- ⁿ° other^{Sai 0rs an(}* ^marines to “board and storm.” Since tical pi_a ^meth°ds of gaining victory were considered, tac- Ihcse pi'¹¹¹¹¹¹^ ^Was directed either toward advancing one of sudde_n °^F ^^e.^^enchⁿg against them. Consequently, the results a ^ro^^uct*^on °f innovative tactics had cataclysmic Aug_Usj 17Qo^he ®^atfl^e °f the Nile, on the first night of tianeuy \^^ear Admiral Horatio Nelson deliberately ^^r°adsid^rCa ^'^S ^^{ect so} that it was exposed to the French ^ln order to bring the anchored enemy vessels between two fires. French Admiral Francois Brueys’s ships, caught off guard, were devastated. Of the 13 French ships of the line, only three remained by dawn. One was run aground and burned by her crew, and the other two escaped. The British did not lose a single ship.

Seven years later, Nelson defied tradition again at Tra­falgar, confounding conventional tactics by splitting his forces into two smaller lines and a reserve and allowing the enemy to cross the “T” of his own outnumbered forces. Instead of fighting as a combined force, the ships engaged individually selected opponents and in less than two hours swept Napoleon’s ships from the sea. Once again, Nelson proved that using innovative tactics against an enemy trained to expect only one kind of battle pro­vides the innovator with a decisive advantage.

There are a number of other examples of uses of innova­tive tactics in history. For instance, a handful of German submarines had a paralyzing effect on Britain in both world wars. And the stunning sinking of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales by Japanese planes in the Java Sea on 10 December 1941 proved the efficacy of naval air power. Victory favors the smart over the strong.

Novelty: Concurrent with the ability to devise and exe­cute unexpected tactics is the ability to employ new weap­ons and devices to confound the enemy. A fleet trains to fight an anticipated threat; anything unexpected can tip the balance and alter the predicted outcome. On 7 October 1571, the outnumbered Christian forces of the Holy Alli­ance fought the Islamic forces commanded by Ali Pasha in the climactic sea battle of Lepanto. The Moslems de­pended upon the cutlass to board and capture, but, for the first time, the Christians had taken gunpowder to sea. For most of the battle, Ali Pasha’s ships had the upper hand, but when his ship clashed with Don Juan’s, the unantici­pated muskets had a decisive effect. The Pasha was killed, his standard taken, and his forces retired in disarray.

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Just as the introduction of gunpowder at Lepanto indi­rectly influenced the future of Europe, the introduction of iron at sea changed the course of U. S. history. On 8 March 1862, the ironclad CSS Virginia sailed out of Nor­folk to attack a Union blockading squadron of six wooden vessels. By afternoon’s end, the Virginia had sunk two of the Union’s ships and damaged one. The other three ran aground trying to escape the ironclad’s attack. Only the timely arrival of the Union ironclad Monitor the next morning (the Union’s only ship that could battle the Vir­ginia on equal terms) prevented the Confederates from sweeping the Union naval forces from Hampton Roads. The introduction of this new type of weapons platform was valuable for strategic and morale purposes as well as tactical purposes. Only the foolish and the dead need not be concerned with the obsolescence of their tools.

Endurance: Naval history also abounds with victories in which the decisive factor was nothing more than the un­flinching decision to carry on, to keep fighting in the face of improbable odds. U. S. naval tradition finds a strong ican Bon Homme Richard was battered by her larger an more heavily armed adversary, and her crew was demora - ized when someone called out,

“For the love of God, Cap’n, strike!”                .

And the reply was, “No, I’ll sink first! Strike, never. have not yet begun to fight!”¹

Though historians quibble over the exactness of t words, the intent rather than the content has formed tn tradition. In any case, the outgunned, outdated converte merchantman took on and defeated the first-class 44-g^ua British frigate by continuing the fight at all costs and w¹ tremendous losses. There is a natural tendency to emph^a size one’s own damage and underestimate the enemy ^s’ but for every ship abandoned when she could still fl°^{at an} fight, there are those that fought to the bitter end aga>^nS all odds. Some lost—the Bismarck, the Repulse, and t Prince of Wales. And some won—the USS Frank ij* (CV-13) after being crippled by air attack on 19 Marc ^ 1945. Perhaps more than any other visible attribute, g^rea naval commanders are marked by the ability to dig i^{n a} keep fighting when the odds are against them.

basis in this quality, for in its early history, the U. S. Navy fought battle after battle against a better-armed and bet­ter-supplied opponent. Everyone is familiar with Captain James Lawrence’s command, “Don’t give up the ship!” But not everyone knows that eventually they did, and the American Chesapeake surrendered to the British Shannon. Even better known is Captain John Paul Jones’s challenge to Captain Richard Pearson in HMS Serapis at the Battle off Flamborough Head on 23 September 1779. The Amer-

Training: History does not bear out a very promise- record of training readiness. That the British had blo^c aded Napoleon’s fleet at Trafalgar for so long did not see to concern the land general. He simply believed his ^{sal 0} would be all the more rested and ready. His admirals kne better; Admiral Pierre Villeneuve understood the risks took in clashing with the British, even though in ships ^a° men he outnumbered the British fleet. The results '■^v'^e decisive and contributed to the British victory at Trafalg^ar

78

Proceedings / December

198-¹

value't ^S f^Hty ^{t0 tra}in while at sea was of incalculable Sim p ^l”^{e outnurn}bered British fleet, learned ^ar[1]^’    ^avy will ^not forget the lesson it

had trained ⁶ ^^att'^e ^^avo Island in 1942. The Japanese

ship. Knowing how to train and toward what goal is a tangible indicator of a fleet’s readiness for battle. Training is imperative, but only training for how the force intends to fight; anything else is useless.

Flexibility: One of the U. S. Navy’s traditional strong points has been the degree of authority that has been dele­gated to subordinate commanders, providing flexibility to exploit sudden opportunities that do not allow enough time to verify changes in plans. On a tactical level, delegation of authority also provides a force with the option of never having to fight on the enemy’s terms. If there is a single theme common to the upset victories of naval history, it is that the victorious commander seized every advantage possible and never looked back. In the British victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Spanish intended to close the British ships and fight man-to-man. The British never obliged them; they drew the battle up the coast to ultimate victory. At Salamis in 480 B.C., Themistocles forced the Persians to fight in a narrow bay where their numbers could not be decisive. In the Pacific during World War II, the Allies, instead of retaking the islands one by one, iso-

!n night fighting for years, had accepted its and were ready when the time

^associ_atP,i , ^ms^{,u n}g^nt" camp J ^ns^^{s ar,}d losses,

Came.

bered

The U

S. fleet was not. As a result, the outnum

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the Allie'^⁸ °* T°ky° Express inflicted severe losses on matter of ^Sln^*ⁿ^ ^^{our cru}>sers and damaging another in a Pared t° _f^minutes- The Japanese had trained and were pre- Eistc? the right battle at the right time. ^sl°°p P^rovides other examples as well. The Union Alabam ^earsarS^e saak the Confederate commerce raider ^SuPerioi-^a °ⁿ ^ ^^une her success resulted from her ^tra'nina 2m?^r^^smansl¹*P’ which was achieved by previous d’scipij ^ Tsushima in 1905, the rigorous training and ^teadv^R⁰^ ^^aP^anese Navy allowed it to crush the With u _t ^Uss'^an fleet, which sailed to the battle scene Gained*^{1 rainec}! ^crews. It was assumed they would be ^orouah^{11 r}°^Ut.^e' ^sa*lor should be sent to sea without ^name of ^tra'ⁿ‘ⁿ8> nor should training be halted, in the operational expediency, once he is assigned to a

bat-

two

matched forces to be overwhelmingly victorious in a tie. The margin of victory can be summed up in words: readiness and intelligence.

lated and nullified them, allowing the campaigns to move ahead more rapidly than the Japanese had anticipated. Winners never allow themselves to be forced into playing their opponent’s game.

Conversely, those forced by precedent or by orders, or those too unimaginative to change when change is re­quired, face a difficult or impossible task. History bears out their losses. In 1905, the Russians sailed 18,000 miles, suffering disaster after disaster, to Tsushima and were destroyed at the battle. In 1916, neither the British nor the Germans were imaginative enough to exploit avail­able opportunities; in the end, Jutland became a bloody draw with almost 10,000 casualties. History is unforgiv­ing to those unwilling or unable to take advantage of op­portunities that suddenly present themselves.

Carpe Diem: “Seize Today.” No precept of military strategy and tactics has been emphasized as often or caused such devastation when ignored. The military insti­tutes emphasize, “In war, all sins are forgivable except hesitation.” The Naval Officers’ Handbook dictates, “De­cide. Knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must, but decide, and have no fear.” Victories are won by aggres­sive commanders who persevere and play every advantage to its maximum effort. Naval history is filled with decisive actions that carried the day. At the Battle of the Nile in 1798, Captain Thomas Foley in the Goliath took advan­tage of the independent action granted him by Admiral Nelson and swung his ship through the French line in shal­low water only a few feet from his enemy.³ His bold action opened the way for the following ships. Nelson’s flag hoist before Trafalgar is quite familiar, “England expects that every man will do his duty.” But of more tactical value is his advice to his captains before the battle, “Something must be left to chance, nothing is sure in a Sea Fight. ... No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”⁴ Seize today. From wooden ships to steel, the injunction remains imperative. Naval victories go to those willing to take risks and exploit opportunities. Just as the Japanese accepted a risk by at­tacking Pearl Harbor in 1941, Admiral Raymond Spru- ance accepted a risk by launching his planes at Midway in 1942. Both proved that big plans get big results.

When opportunities do not readily present themselves- they must be made. Two of history’s most unevenly matched forces came together in the Battle off Samar on 25 October 1944. Three U. S. destroyers and four de­stroyer escorts accompanying six escort carriers were suprised by Admiral Takeo Kurita’s attacking force of f°^u^ battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 1 destroyers. In the face of overwhelming odds, the U. ¹⁵• escorts attacked. Their ferocity fed Kurita’s fears of a trap- and he, believing he had found a much more heavi y armed threat than existed, retreated.⁵ Many qualities are required for victory at sea, but if anything is the sine q^ua non in naval warfare, it is the ability to take or make every possible advantage, to accept a dangerous risk, and ^t0 seize the day.

The strategic elements of naval planning are virtual y changeless, for the end results of mastery of the sea wef^e old even when Phoenicia ruled the Mediterranean, and t effects of wind and wave remain the same. Tactic thought, however, changes with each new development ¹ weapons or seamanship. Successful naval commande are those who can best combine the timeless requiremen^ of the sea with the most up-to-date tactical refinements- is possible for an inferior force to be victorious in an un even sea battle, just as it is possible for one of two even;

^!Len Oitzen, Guns at Sea (London: Cox & Wyman, Ltd., 1976), p- 43.

H)nzcn. p. 92.                                                    ^

³Fitzhugh Green and Holloway Frost, Some Famous Sea Fights (Toronto: Met⁶ Press, 1968), p. 176.

⁴David Howarth, Famous Sea Battles (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 198D- 69-70.

’Howarth, p. 176. ^•

_________________________________________________ Dear John_____________________________________

When my son was quartermaster on board a destroyer during World War II, he and four other shipmates decided to compile the perfect love letter. After weeks of adding flowery phrases here and deleting unpromising expressions there, the letter was complete. My son typed the final version and made four carbon copies for the men to copy in longhand and send to their respective wives or sweethearts. In due time, the men received answers thanking them for the lovely letters. All except one. He got a letter from his fiancee breaking their engagement. He had sent her his carbon copy.