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T'h
le only similarity between Trafalgar (1805) the Falklands (1982) is that, in both, ngfond expected every man to do his duty, Ve^ when such duty included the unlikely ;Ssig,ltnent of a midshipman to man a ^c'[1]ine gun to cope with the courageous 8entine aviators.
We were therefore greatly relieved when we were ordered to stop the exercise, disembark the staff, return to our base port, and prepare to sail for the Falkland Islands with a small group of ships.
During the next four days, which included a weekend, we stored for war—a war of unknown duration at the end of a long logistic pipeline. We embarked a large quantity of ammunition and stowed provisions in all sorts of unofficial places. We also acquired, fitted, and set to work three new weapon systems, two new sensors, and four communications equipments, one of them extremely large. Those familiar with the penny-pinching the Royal Navy has suffered recently and the elephantine process by which our ships normally acquire new equipment will appreciate that the support services were moving fast.
On the passage south, we studied the enemy order of battle and did a good deal of planning. The Argonaut's men were a bit short of current weapon training practice; of course, targets are few on passage, but we improvised by firing Sea Cat missiles at flares. We also recalled Vietnam experience that small arms fire can sometimes bring down aircraft and trained a large team of machine gunners. Progress was good and morale high.
We arrived at Ascension Island to find it crowded with
fixed-wing aircraft; the sky was black with helicopters. Before the Falklands emergency, Wideawake Airfield had handled an average of about two aircraft movements a week. While we were there, the air traffic controllers informed us they had overtaken Chicago’s O’Hare as the busiest airport in the world.
My group was organized into a larger task group under the command of Commodore, Amphibious Warfare. The commodore was embarked in an amphibious transport dock, HMS Fearless, as was the landing force commander, a brigadier general. Large numbers of ships under red, white, and blue ensigns, including the liner-turned- troop-carrier, Canberra, were in the group. But the number of escorts seemed, as always, not enough; there were between two and four for most of the passage, and on D-Day, there were only seven, of which two were quickly sunk. Like Lord Nelson before him, the commodore was short of frigates.
We continued south. Amphibious officers concentrated on an art that seems to be seldom practiced in our preplanned peacetime exercises—choosing a landing site. We eventually settled on the natural harbor of San Carlos, which offered shelter, suitable beaches, and some physical protection from air attack. To me, it was within reasonable range of Stanley, but no doubt some footsore Royal Marines would disagree. The amphibious objective area (AOA) did give us some antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and mining problems, but the AOA that has no problems has yet to be discovered. Much depended on taking the
enemy by surprise. Our Special Forces ashore had been reconnoitering the area and had reported it lightly ne fended. Even so, I remember thinking that if the Arge° tines were going through the same amphibious thoug process, they could hardly fail to settle on San Carlos a the landing site, too. (Memo for next time: things ne'e look the same on the other side of the fence.)
We assessed the threat in the best tactical school man ner, and, on paper, it was formidable: a large air f°rc®’ submarines, mines, swimmers, shore defenses, and t Argentine surface fleet with its Exocet missiles and stn carrier. Much depended on the Sea Harrier, of which w had 22 initially, and its performance without airborn early warning (AEW) against an efficient air force consis ing of more than 200 frontline aircraft, chiefly A-4 Sky hawks, Mirages, Pucaras, and Super Etendards. We kne the Sea Harrier was a fine aircraft, and aviators are alwaT declaring what great guys they are, but were they really as good as that? .
I felt reasonably confident we could put the marin ashore. Some losses seemed inevitable, but the over chances of success looked fair. ,
On 20 May, we moved toward San Carlos, taking a vantage of an overcast sky and poor visibility and keepin= strict radio silence. The amphibious warfare ships an auxiliaries were in traditional convoy lines, and the esC°r(j formed an ASW/antiair warfare (AAW) screen arou ^ them. Meanwhile, Special Forces ashore were mounting series of diversionary raids at various points around Fa- Falkland, assisted by naval gunfire. The whole 'v°r knew the landing was imminent, but we could at lea keep the enemy guessing as to where and exactly wheI^ At this point, we were amused to receive a messar from the Ministry of Defence stating that the regulation for reporting burials were to be followed, and that 11 necessary forms should be forwarded to the appropr,a authorities. Fortified with this useful reminder in the ear - hours of a cold, starlit night on 21 May, we entered 1 ^ AOA unopposed. The amphibs anchored in the norther ^ part of San Carlos Harbor, and the off-load of troop- started immediately. ,
While ships with medium-range guns bombat**6 enemy positions ashore, the Argonaut's first duty was carry out an ASW sweep of the approaches to the and the AOA itself. The area is shallow, rocky, uneven- and has strong tidal streams at the narrows. In these condj tions, detecting and prosecuting submarines is difficU ’ but operating a submarine would not be easy either. O policy was to exclude submarines from the AOA by usin? the natural features and employing an aggressive active sonar policy, with Sea King helicopters in the approach^ to the AOA and ASW ships in Falkland Sound.
Our ASW sweep proved negative. When dawn brok calm and clear and no ship had hit a mine, we becat°e certain that air defense would be our major concern- The air attacks soon started and lasted all day. The frjj? ates and destroyers tried to hold the ring while the amphw ious ships continued off-loading, a process that always seems to take a long time. In general, we had little war0' ing of attack because of our lack of AEW, and, being ,n
ari(jar ^ *n the day, aircraft came very low over the hills "the fttac^ecl■ They released their weapons early and low.
: °mbs skipped along the water, some of them bounc-
(jiff- a land-locked environment, radar detections were ne„!CU l' we heavily depended on that potent but often bee CCte^ sensor’ [hc Mk-1 eyeball. Men with sharp eyes systarne famous throughout the ship. Similarly, our missile aiod1115 W6re uscc^ largely in their emergency visual pett6’ an^ our missile/gun director (visual) (MGD[V]), y Officer Jones, became one of the most important mea on board.
MOrJ\r ^ S^’P’ an<^ one l^em S0*n8 Just over the ( U(V)’S position.
“M°W c*ose was that one, Petty Officer Jones?” q 0 Problem, sir. It just parted me flippin’ ’air.”
,r °attery of 17 machine guns blazed away, using suff . tracer ammunition but tending at first not to put \Viti1IClent lea(l into their aim. We splashed one aircraft C)aj a ^ea Cat missile, but HMS Plymouth close by also t ed the hit. Later, we agreed to share the kill, ow are you doing up there, Petty Officer Jones?” ac •, S ^em Orgies, sir. They’re going to cause a flippin’ o'aent one day.”
att Vr f'rst accident came from an Aeromacchi, which radio ^ W'^ gunf>re and rockets. It slightly damaged our °Ur T3ntennae and upper deck fittings and blew a hole in to w radar antenna. Thereafter, the radar seemed
C]U(j. better. Three men were seriously wounded, in- chin'n^ master-at-arms who had been manning a ma- J=an- They were evacuated by helicopter to the Can
berra for emergency surgery.
During a brief afternoon lull, we realized that although three escorts had been damaged and one sunk, the amphibious shipping was so far unscathed. The feeling that we were not doing too badly crossed my mind. But at 1730, a wave of six A-4 Skyhawks came over the hills, flying very low. We soon fathomed that we were going to receive the undivided attention of all six. Although we splashed one and perhaps discouraged some others, two of their bombs arrived on board. They did not explode, but they did cause quite a lot of damage.
One entered the Argonaut just above the waterline at the bulkhead between the boiler room and engine room, smashing steam pipes in both compartments. Since we were at flank speed, a lot of steam was released, and the machinery spaces had to be evacuated. Unfortunately, the bomb also disabled a main air blower, causing one of our two boilers to explode. Several small fires and flooding contributed to extensive machinery damage.
The other bomb hit us on the port side, five feet below the waterline. It passed through two fuel tanks and into the magazine, which it devastated, and holed the starboard side too. Two Sea Cat missiles and probably some other ammunition exploded. The blast vented up through the hoist and blew off the door on the upper deck. It also lifted the deck of the forward seamen’s mess about four feet, compressing the contents, causing fires, and destroying cable runs.
In the magazine, two seamen, who were putting a missile into the hoist, were killed instantly. The fires and
explosions there seem to have been extinguished by the inrush of diesel oil from the fuel tanks.
We had lost steering and were heading at speed towards Fanning Head. Fortunately, the forecastle officer, being a quick-witted fellow, let go an anchor, which held in the kelp and solved the most immediate of a number of problems. I went below to the combat information center (CIC) to continue the damage control exercise that had been interrupted a few weeks before at Portland.
The damage and casualties might have been much worse. I took comfort from the fact that since only two bombs had hit us, ten must have missed. We still had some electrical power and kept most weapons and sensors operational. Thus, we were able to continue to contribute to the AAW battle. But we were vulnerable, immobilized off Fanning Head with three hours of daylight left. My friend, Captain David Pentreath, of the Plymouth, sailed over and supported us. Together, we fired at a few more raids, but the opposition was flagging. All told, by day’s end, we had been attacked by more than 70 aircraft.
That night, the Plymouth towed us into the safety of San Carlos with a good deal of difficulty and a great deal of skill. We had suffered a total power failure because of contaminated fuel and were groping around with flashlights in an eerie silence. People lowered their voices when speaking, as in a cathedral. By daybreak, we had
restored some electrical power and managed, while un air attack, to get another tow from three plucky lan 1 c craft, manned by the Royal Marines. ^
We spent the next eight days in what became known “Bomb Alley,” while the off-load continued. For mnL of the time, our “improved” Type-965 radar was the on long-range radar present and was in demand for f>8 . direction. Our two overworked fighter controllers did t best to put the Sea Harriers into intercept positions- with no AEW, this was not an easy task, as the inconn1 ? strikes invariably came in low over land, and we them. Many of the successful intercepts were on hofl^ bound aircraft after they had attacked, but provided achieved a kill, we were satisfied. The senior comman of the task group (CTG), Rear Admiral Sandy Woodw^ had said “attrition is the name of the game,” and as score mounted day by day, we realized that the resour of the Argentine Air Force and Navy, although lar$ ’ would not last forever.
The Argonaut remained at action stations from daW11 dusk, firing at anything that resembled an enemy aircr We added two Mirages and another A-4 Skyhawk to , personal score and gave a number of seagulls and Up1*1 Geese the fright of their lives. After dark, we tried ^ repair damage, make ourselves seaworthy, and get rid ^ the bombs. During this time, the Antelope sank aftef bomb exploded while being defused.
Our after bomb had something rude written in Spa11 on the casing, but a team of army explosive ordnance . posal experts defused it with no problem. The f°rvVn. bomb was much more difficult. My diving officer, an trepid 21-year-old, dived into the shattered magaz'n j which was flooded with fuel, to have a look. He report® that the bomb was buried under a heap of broken Sea missiles and other ammunition. Some had already e ploded. The rest looked very unfriendly. The small P1®. of bomb that was actually visible had “Handle W1 Care” neatly stenciled on the casing.
38
Proceedings / August
l9«-
A team of naval clearance divers was with the f°rC ’
de ',?e as^ed ^or ^eir help. The officer in charge quickly had ^ ^at C0ldd not attempt to defuse this bomb. It att'/n ^°'stcd outboard, armed as it was, in its present - Ut*e, which was about ten degrees to the horizontal.
•pilt
u ,ln® 11 would be dangerous. Our plan was to repair the Cj ^ater holes, pump out, clear the magazine suffi- shi ’ ^’.cut *ar§e access holes through two decks and the U,;,P s s'de, and finally hoist the bomb up and outboard Wlth°ut tilting.
rp ?Ur Pr°blems had just begun. The weather worsened, >ng underwater repairs difficult. Pumping out was bl0 |, tlme'consuming; the pumps continually became ed with clothing from the damaged messdecks. ajr£n We Were cutting the magazine deckhead during an thro^’ sudden|y uaught fire. The fire rapidly spread and • ^ od'soa^ed compartments in the vicinity, j. within seconds, we had a major fire on our hands. inn"8 the next hour, the forward half of the ship, includ- aall .Was evacuated because of smoke. When we fi- lot ^ ext*nguished the fire, we realized we had suffered a effe'l0re dama8e- But most weapon systems still worked pCtively, and the air battle continued. wmally, we lifted the forward bomb outboard and gently tyerered if still armed, into the water on a wire. But we sbjj.not to be rid of the bomb so easily. In the process of fin ,ln^ t»erth, the wire attached to the bomb became en- thin ^ *n screws’ and we started winding the damned cleU? a8a'n- Our diving officer quickly and coolly ed it. The entire bomb disposal operation, brilliantly
ed by the clearance diving experts, lasted a week. rqaeanwhile, great things had been happening in the life ,nery sPaces. One of the boilers had been restored to pip ’ and the crafty engine room team had repaired enough h0le .odc to allow the ship to steam at slow speed. The Hot !" boiler room had been patched, though this did Ifivi CaSe 0ne very young stoker, who said he had enjoyed a view for a change.
er more repairs, we put to sea and patched up ourselves further with the aid of the Stena Seaspread, an oilrig support ship that had been requisitioned for just this purpose. We then joined the carrier battle group for a few days before Admiral Woodward decided he could manage without the battered Argonaut. He detached us for home, and we returned to the sort of welcome normally reserved for Her Majesty the Queen—a moving and memorable homecoming.
Since the Falklands Conflict, both British and Argentine tactics have been widely analyzed. A bit of my own analysis follows.
AAW Tactics: The British policy was attrition, and we employed several layers of AAW defense. The Sea Harriers on combat air patrol provided the outer layer of defense. A pair of ships known as the “missile trap,” often positioned off the northern entrance to Falkland Sound, provided the second layer. These were usually a “Type-42” destroyer with Sea Dart and a “Type-22” frigate with Sea Wolf. The next layer of defense, known as the “gunline,” was a group of three or four ships in Falkland Sound, using every gun and missile system they possessed to fight off the incoming aircraft. Finally, positioned within Bomb Alley itself were small caliber guns and the Sea Cat systems of the amphibious transport docks, together with Blowpipe missiles, machine guns, and Rapier fire units, which were set up ashore.
For the Argentines to keep flying at all when they were taking such losses (51 aircraft in the first five days) was
courageous and deserves our profound respect. However, some aspects of their antiship tactics deserve scrutiny.
Since iron bombs must be safe for the aircraft that carry them, both on the aircraft and when they explode, there is a proper height and dive angle for delivering them. Below that height and at less than that dive angle, the fuses are designed to safeguard the aircraft by not arming the bombs.
Flying low, below the ships’ missile envelopes, gives the aircraft more protection. This is not difficult to do, and most pilots are cowboys at heart and enjoy low flying. But while they achieve self-protection, the bombs will not arm. If they fly higher, they will take and inflict more losses. It is a tactical dilemma, not a matter of luck or faulty fusing. The facts speak for themselves. Seven ships were hit by bombs that failed to explode. Only two ships with a self-defense capability were hit by bombs properly delivered.
The other significant effect of flying low is the difficulty in selecting the high-value target. In Bomb Alley, I think the Argentines hardly selected targets at all but simply took the first ship they saw—a frigate or destroyer in the screen. Thus, the troops and amphibious ships were unmolested until after the main landings had been completed. By the time of the final assault on Port Stanley, the Argentine Air Force had been effectively neutralized as a fighting force.
The Sea Harrier was never beaten in air combat and proved reliable and versatile. For example, on 1 May, the Hermes tasked 12 Sea Harriers in ground attacks on Port Stanley and Goose Green. One hour after their return home, the same aircraft were airborne for air defense duty. With organic AEW, now being provided to all our carriers by Sea Kings, they could have done even better.
The Sea Harriers and the men who fly them were the heroes of this war. (Memo to myself: try to be nicer to aviators in the future.)
Naval Gunfire Support: We lost one frigate, the Ardent, which had been knowingly exposed to carry out naval gunfire support, and toward the end of the war, we had a destroyer, the Glamorgan, damaged by a shore-based Exocet missile while on bombardment duty. There has been some discussion whether it is proper to risk ships in this way.
Admiral Woodward stated his purpose was to keep the enemy awake, guessing, and worried. Typical of the reasons given by Argentine soldiers for their surrender was one who said, “It was the guns. They never stopped.” Thus, the risk to ships carrying out gunfire support was one that had to be accepted.
The Mine Threat: Our intelligence had not predicted mines in San Carlos. And we were consoled to know that a massive mining effort by the Argentines would have been necessary to cover all possible landing sites.
One of our ships had transited Falkland Sound ten days before D-Day and not hit a mine, but, of course, she could have just run off a couple of ship counts. Mining from the air was always a possibility.
In fact, the Argentines confined their minefields to the areas near Port Stanley. There were no mines in Falkland
Sound, which was fortunate. We had no minesweepe^ available on D-Day, and if we had run into serl0^ mining, we might have had to withdraw and replan o operation.
Command, Control, and Communications: Comm
and,
control, and communications generally went very we’ ’ politicians supported the admiral with good, strong 111 of engagement and resisted the temptation to backs drive. Admiral Woodward was given operational con of most forces in the South Atlantic; other CTGs wer given a mission and tactical control of the necessary un • The CTGs had many conflicts of interest, with diffe^ missions competing for the limited resources, but very1 of these problems were not properly resolved, often wi good British compromise. For example, what time sho the landing be? Dawn said the navy (maximum conce ment on the approach); dusk said the marines (maxim time to consolidate in the dark). Decision? Split the di e ence and land at 0230. Since the Royal Navy is about ° seventh the size of the U. S. Navy, all the British eaptaa and admirals know each other rather well. This certai helps.
Transferring from one CTG to another was slightly u ^ settling for the CIC teams. CTGs tended to produce t own innovations to established procedures to meet si ^ tions as they arose, and the newcomer’s ignorance ° ^ innovation with which everyone else was familiar sometimes a problem. Some people say that a stan procedure should be followed, with no deviations- ^ innovation and initiative are the lifeblood of tactics a should not be discouraged in wartime. Scrupulousness passing the new information to the newcomer seems ^ only answer, but with ships frequently joining and deta ing, this is not always easy. t
Channels of communication were well loaded, but excessively so. The communications situation was be than most large exercises in which I have particip31 Morale: In San Carlos, morale on board was very g°° j even when things looked discouraging. Perhaps a sen*^,g history helped. We all knew the story of the previous H ^ Argonaut, which in 1942 had suffered far worse than we and carried on. At all events, the sailors’ tra tional virtues of endurance and humor in adversity abundant in the Argonaut. Our petty officers’ mess
i-ig\V
Fleece” hanging outside its door. After the damage, a
were had
had a hand-painted pub sign announcing “The Golde jutside its door. After the damage ‘The Hole in the Hull—Business
of the
sign appeared:
Usual.”
The Old Alliance: Finally, we were well aware support, both moral and material, that we received it our U. S. friends, at some cost to themselves in diplorn terms. Many thanks. The Royal Navy will not forget
Royal Navy Colley *
Captain Layman graduated from the Britannia Koyai 1958. He became a specialist in communications and electronic W ^ and has commanded four ships. During the Falklands Conflict, he
and *aS
awarded the Distinguished Service Order for the action in San His current appointment is Naval Director of the Joint Maritime up tional Training Staff, Edinburgh.
command of HMS Argonaut and the Seventh Frigate Squadron
40
Proceedings / Augus*
1983
IWas April 1982, and my ship, HMS Argonaut, was I ergoing operational sea training off Portland, En- Ofp^ anc^ Under the authority of the staff members of Flag clasCfrSea Gaining, who were everywhere, my Leander- in ‘ ngate was being subjected to simulated fires, flood- ^y'sh38113'1*65’ anc* machinery an^ equipment failures. As trick m Was Ueing reduced to a smoking ruin, the “dirty cj department of the staffers noted the officers’ and s reactions in their little brown notebooks.