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dted to nn, , 01 surrender we d
Placed territ °r*d ^ar II opponer tive|y rtiaim ,’^ ? °Ur disP°sal that effe l'°n °f interi med tllC advantageous siti array 0f h ,or strategic lines through
^U|Tent IT c ,
military wk strategy, tactics, an m ‘his cem qUCS have cvoived largel Britain proving ThrouSh ‘945, Gre; hnes 0f „ Cl 118 with interior strategi
0f 0Ur Po\verrnUniCation. for employmer ‘nterests Th potential in support of Ol ta‘ed t0' ^rms of surrender we die
naval aviation and submarine forces to support our Air Force’s nuclear capabilities by being prepared to launch offensive strike operations from the sea. But we did not maintain secure, direct access to strategic theaters for the deployment of large land forces.
In effect, from 1945 to the present, we have conducted our strategic affairs as a continental rather than a maritime power. Thus, few strategic factors stimulated change in our theater tactics and techniques of war, including the amphibious assault—i.e., taking the war to the enemy.
In background summary, the main elements of power in our past amphibious operations generally were:
► An accumulation of overwhelming superiority in ground assault elements directly engaged
► An overwhelming and one-sided advantage in heavy artillery, viz., naval gunfire
► An abundance of new, government-
Our national strategy ought to be as clearly delineated as the airborne Sea Knights, but it is as fuzzy as those on the deck of the USS Saipan (LHA-2) as we waver between being a continental and a maritime power.
U. S. MARINE CORPS <K. NICKS)
------- -------------------- j-orces
forcible entries staged by U. •
Therefore, modern forces (with - ^
cated equipment) will be even tno pendent on combat and service sup ^ Several techniques would make tn 3 ments more responsive and effec ^ {C.
modern combat atmosphere, eT'^jps maining on board predesignate . |)i and using state-of-the-art transp0 But such initiatives will not, by ( selves, fulfill the support require^1^aVy The broad future objective of forceS
and Marine Corps is to pro
vironn11
ient
forcement operations. However, of their unique capabilities, the P contribution of strategic unc|er j jS' must continue to be their undiU L sault potential.
,rirh;
j Ph^>>
the University of Maryland, an M. A. in aI1J
subsidized Maritime Administration Program shipping
► A focus of these elements of strength on operating areas of limited extent in the initial phases (Guadalcanal is a notable exception)
Given our strategic nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, the continental strategic approach has lost its viability with the coincident rise of a Soviet Navy that is able to contest our use of the sea. By default, we are on the way to a period in which we must operate along exterior maritime strategic lines of communication. We lack the capability to maintain interior lines, and no other congenial, provident power is available to maintain them for us. To return to a maritime- based national security posture, we must first redefine its vital points. We may no longer need to control the Azores and Iceland, Suez and Capetown, Panama and Port Stanley, or South Malacca and Australia, if we are able to operate along distant exterior maritime lines. We may also find that none of our civil or military institutions is well disposed to implement the only strategy currently open to us: a classically maritime one.
In applying our amphibious assault concepts, doctrine, and techniques to the maritime needs of the present and future, we find that:
► Our potential adversaries can assemble numerically superior and qualitatively comparable strength against any landing force that our ready forces can mount. The areas of operation are large compared with areas we can occupy, organize, control, and influence with our ready forces.
► Our naval gunfire support capabilities, current and programmed, are nearly nonexistent except for the reactivated /own- class battleships; in future operations, they will be the decisive support element.
► Programming of air superiority and air support for amphibious operations is, unfortunately, virtually unjustifiable under a continental strategy; dramatic increases are needed for an effective maritime strategy.
While plans exist for the provision of rapid deployment forces, collecting ships and aircraft for relief elements may create stay times of 45 to 60 days, assuming there is immediate availability for embarkation. The question of the amphibious force’s prolonged survival must come to mind when we look to opposition by armored formations of division and greater strength, operating in areas with significant road nets into the hinterlands. This leads to the prospect of operating against enemy defensive elements that are not pinned to specific terrain within easy range of our supporting fire. Furthermore, a serious threat to our supporting air operations has developed from the proliferation of effective low-, mid-, and high-altitude gun and missile air defenses. Again, the “new” battleships, with their array of offensive and defensive power, may be the key to viable operations. Thus, a landing force must count on its own combat support and service elements for continuous combat capability against an enemy that avoids quick, decisive engagements.
Military publications, papers, and documents have recently used the term “maneuver” as if it were new or different from that term used for many centuries, i.e., maneuver warfare.
Discussions with the authors and proponents of maneuver warfare have revealed that what they intended to convey was rapid deployment, or limited operations in scope and intensity, whereby lightly equipped forces with vastly superior and sophisticated weapons and communications could be introduced deep into enemy areas. They could disrupt key installations, accomplish limited objectives, avoid major action with large enemy forces, and be withdrawn. This is an ideal objective if the intent is to delay or postpone decisive and conclusive action. Accomplishing such an objective also depends a great deal upon the enemy’s “cooperation.”
Another key term is one that government objective papers now try to avoid: “assault.” This is in direct conflict with the years of effort in the 1960s to e that this term be applied to the alllJ’t|ieir ous assault forces in order to accen capabilities, versus those of adm1 j0(nj- tive or reinforcement forces. The ^1 nating thought in the planning Pr ^ was that assault forces could alway ^ used for lesser objectives, ''nllteraj(|s. gagements, reinforcement entry. ^ etc. But the reverse of that is n° ^ The enemy is more sophisticate ^ than in the 1960s and possesses
means to combat either light or
5.
comp1 mote <
vide
that can penetrate a hostile envir ^ from the sea in an effective fightn'Y^. ture, with minimum regard to the u, line, terrain, weather, and land c°^ofC&
nications. Such amphibious assau ^
must be expected to remain the P^ means by which the United State ^ achieve forcible entry into foreig0 -olls tory. It is understood that afflp' ef gc- assault forces may contribute to o ^ ^ tivities, such as crisis control 0 ^
be rV
m
Colonel Soper holds a B.S. degree in affairs from George Washington University* j^Cy attended both the National and Naval He concluded a 30-year military career as ^ £oif Director, Joint Planning Group, at Maria [ye'-’1 Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Current y^jop- free-lance consultant for naval research an ment programs.
Harriers for the Task Force
the time of the invasion betwe61’
By Gordon Swanborough
The operational success of the British Aerospace Harrier and Sea Harrier during “Operation Corporate,” the British action to repossess the Falkland Islands, has been well reported. Somewhat less well known is the effort that was expended to bring the relatively small number of aircraft—embracing Harriers of the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy—up to operational pitch in minimum time.
On 2 April 1982, the date of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the Royal Navy had received 32 of the 34 single-seat Sea Harrier FRS Mk-ls that had been ordered; one of these had been lost in 1980, leaving 31 available, but
d B'
one of the last two was comply 0f British Aerospace a month abe‘| $ schedule and reached Royal NaV‘ ri Station, Yeovilton (HMS Heron) 1
April- • -Kilted1,1
The Sea Harriers were distr*D nVo
fjav'
front-line squadrons, 800 and 801
M‘iai estakr ' 3 science experi-
:,t Bedford allSj,ments <such ^ the ones st()rano xy.‘*n Boscombe Down), and
on board HMS Her-
41 “ortc»v, , ^aiu mvia ner-
hms nTT'and No-801 movcd
fkys- WheTtT1^ during the next
h,,.. "vn the i- ...
two
,knited Cl fCa Harriers retained in the
Kin„. arriers retained in the 'ainin,,0"1 /°r .tra'n’n8 and trials,
* a nOU; ^ WCIC USCU IU
cOmmilSqUadron’ 809 NAS, which
AlrcraftflewSf10ned °n 17 APri1-' These Asm-.. iew from ihn iS-
- Mien i ------ vu cun
yy'0r- Onc ?arked on ‘he Atlantic Con *Ve alert du 63 bIarrier remained on ac ring the voyage to the Falk
l'aininr* ^ iicauuudriers
V||ton) thp8.S,quadron (899 NAS at Yeo- estahfctry of ^fence experi-
"age vvi.v, D°scombe Down), and r°ns> receivin'"..13 hoUrs of the squad- Was (ally in 8t,hecal) ‘o action, No. 800
meS - y stalled nn I------------- ,,wo ,,
,, • - »vhnn .u ---------- 6 "CAl lwl
hcse 'Wo ,nhe,task force sailed south, Strengths of r°ns were at respective S°me aircraft- 2 ^nd eight Sea Harriers,
^by 899 NAS °nnd haVi"8 ^
rernainin 7' *”* naming ana trials, e9uip a new8. e'ght aircraft were used to :?Cension"j f0111 dlc United Kingdom to jetor K nd (refueling from RAF Cfe then n u 2 tanl<ers en route), and
" crnharlrori ___ ai a i . „
lands, to be scrambled in the event of an approach by Argentine aircraft. On 18 May, a week'before the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, 809 NAS transferred its aircraft in two four-aircraft elements to the Hermes and Invincible, where their identity tended to be submerged in 800 and 801 respectively, aircraft and personnel being pooled on each carrier.
With the Royal Navy’s slender Sea Harrier resources almost totally committed to the task force from the outset, it was clear that attrition could be made good only by drawing upon RAF Harriers. Although the RAF’s Harrier GR Mk-3s had, in past years, made various demonstration flights on and off ships of varying size, such flights had been made by company or service test pilots, and before the advent of the ski-jumps on the navy’s aircraft carriers. Moreover, there were significant differences between the GR Mk-3, a dedicated ground-attack aircraft, and the Sea Harrier with its air defense capability. Consequently, the decision to despatch the Harriers of No. 1
Royal Air Force Harriers (camouflaged) teamed up with Royal Navy Sea Harriers on crowded flight decks to fight the Argentines in the Falklands. But the feat was not easy—a master plan of training and modification was the key to success.
Squadron, RAF, to the Falklands called for considerable training, as well as preparation and modification of the aircraft. This effort involved the manufacturers, squadron personnel, and service test establishments—particularly the one at Boscombe Down, which had to clear new equipment and weapons fits.
One series of modifications gave the GR Mk-3 shipboard compatibility: this included protection against salt water contamination, providing deck lashing points, fitting a transponder, and making possible the alignment of the Ferranti FE 541 inertial navigational system (INS) on a rolling deck. Sea Harrier undercarriage lashings were made available, and Sea Harrier experience also indicated the areas that needed to be sealed to prevent spray ingestion. I-band transponders were fitted (as already in use by Sea Harriers) to permit the ships to identify their aircraft positively; this modification was visible as a small fairing and blade aerial under the nose. British Aerospace made 12 transponder kits between 22 April and 1 May, and 15 more later.
Ferranti and British Aerospace worked out a means of leveling the INS platform and providing true north alignment, known as FINRAE (Ferranti Inertial Navigation Rapid Alignment Equipment), and of using a trolley-mounted system based on the newer FIN 1064 inertial navigational system—now being produced as an update for the RAF's Jaguars. The GR Mk-3s required additional wiring and a new plug-in point on the external power supply panel (27 kits were produced), and the software for the FINRAE was transmitted by satellite link after the task force had sailed.
The RAF GR Mk-3s normally carried a pair of 30-mm. Aden cannons under the fuselage, two 100-gallon (Imperial) drop tanks on the inboard wing pylons and BL-755 cluster bombs, 1,000-pound high explosive free-fall bombs, or 68-mm. rocket pods. For South Atlantic operations, they were fitted to carry a pair of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for selfdefense, Pave Way laser-guided bombs, and Royal Navy two-inch rocket pods, as the 68-mm. version could not be used in the high electromagnetic environments on board ship. Kits for 12 aircraft to be fitted with Sidewinders were provided
AIM-9L Sidewinders was transI" , the task force a week after it ha .
To enhance the Sea Harrier s
.placing nic iwu-gaiiun ^ led Since hostilities in the Falklan s on 14 June 1982, the RAF has reta detachment of Harrier GR NL^As ^ Stanley, although the principal s of fense is now provided by Phan ,s gea No. 23 Squadron. The Royal Not Harriers remain at a high state o ness, in the hands of the front-line ■ .
;da
pod
de-
IICNN, ill lilt uaiiua ot -
rons deployed on board the ^er"1^ vincible, and Illustrious. The enhancements described in this
va
note’
magazine.
between 21 April and 1 May, with the facility at Boscombe Down conducting live firings and giving clearance for use; all new armament fits also had to be proven on the training ski-jump located at Yeovilton.
One other major modification, made later in the sequence of events, was to fit in the rear fuselage a chaff/flare dispenser, using equipment obtained from the United States and similar in design to that proposed for the forthcoming Harrier GR Mk-5 (AV-8B). This dispenser was introduced on 12 May; a dozen modification kits were supplied to the RAF by 20 May. Prior to the introduction of this modification, some of the Harriers operated with bundles of chaff tucked in the air brake and bomb release mechanisms.
No. 1 Squadron, based at RAF Wittering (the only U.K.-based Harrier squadron, two others being in Germany), was alerted to its South Atlantic role on 14 April; on the same day, pilots began training on the ski-jump at Yeovilton and additional training in bomb dropping and rocket firing was initiated. On 22-23 April, dissimilar air combat training took place over the United Kingdom with Mirages and Super Etendards from the French Air Force and Navy respectively. Five pilots fired Sidewinders from RAF Harriers for the first time on 29 April.
Deployment of the RAF Harriers to Ascension Island began on 3 May; the 4,600-mile nonstop flight lasted nine hours, with Victor tankers in attendance. Further waves flew out on 4 and 5 May, to bring the total to ten; of these, one later returned to the United Kingdom and three remained temporarily as a defense force for Ascension Island, the other six embarking on the Atlantic Conveyor. These six aircraft, led by the squadron’s commanding officer, flew off the Atlantic Conveyor on 18, 19, and 20 May to HMS Hermes, entering fleet operations on the 20th. They were further reinforced by two pairs of Harriers that made epic air- refueled flights from Ascension Island to HMS Hermes on 1 and 8 June, in flights lasting about eight hours. More aircraft had meanwhile reached Ascension Island from the United Kingdom and four Harriers transferred from Ascension to the Falklands on board the merchantman Contender Bezant early in June, but these did not enter combat. The RAF pilots found no particular difficulty in operating from the aircraft carriers. Several pilots from this service also supplemented the naval personnel in the Sea Harrier squadrons. The Germany-based squadrons contributed both pilots and aircraft to the total RAF Harrier effort.
Sea Harrier losses in the event were less than had been feared, totalling six of the 28 aircraft deployed (two in takeoff deck accidents and two in an unexplained accident in cloud cover, perhaps a collision, as well as one to a Roland surface- to-air missile and one to ground fire). Consequently, the RAF Harriers were used primarily in the ground attack role, strafing and bombing Argentine positions, while the Sea Harriers continued to fly mostly in the air defense role. The RAF Harriers did not carry or fire Sidewinders on operations. Up to the end of the conflict, the RAF lost four Harriers: one in a landing accident and the others to enemy fire (including one to a Blowpipe surface-to-air missile).
The Sea Harriers, from the start, had been ready to enter operations without modifications. But one important activity undertaken by British Aerospace was to provide computer software for loftbombing from an offset radar ins ^ tation package. In addition, the s°(0 fire necessary to allow the Sea Harricrs^ to
file-
• taUatio"
power, a double Sidewinder '^^yles was rapidly developed (i.e., two ^ on each outer wing pylon), base ^ Her studies made for the U. !>.
Corps. This installation had t ® /t0
winders set at slightly different ang ^ avoid a concentration of heat on ^ spot of the aircraft structure w ^ missiles were fired); this in turn ca for changes to be made in the softWajminS the heads-up display and weapon s
computer. Manufacture of twin V ^ began on 27 May, but they were a operationally in the conflict. Sea also have been fitted with the c ® (jg dispensers developed for the K Mk-3s and with 190-gallon drop replacing the 100-gallon vsiriety- '
Since hostilities in the Falklan on 14 June 1982, the RAF has reta r
.di
If
iri°uS
main either permanently erobo01^ ^g available for use if needed on a .^jl Mk-3s and Sea Harriers, and aa ^ed aircraft of both types have been 0 to make good the losses.
Mr. Swanborough is the editor of Air in,er
Logical Logistics
By Major Gary I. Wilson, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
to requests. However, the empha ^ logistic support is being active ^
. • m i » ___ W Ml
tactical application of logistics, w’e
Marines no longer can anticipate the luxury of basing large logistic support areas ashore or inland for combat operations. Large, semifixed logistic sites serve as lucrative targets for the enemy’s deep-threat capability. The logistic approach to supporting marines ashore and inland should minimize the buildup of large logistic areas.
Ideally, the preponderance of logistic support remains afloat, reflecting a sea- basing concept—provided that adequate shipping is available. Sea-basing allows logistic elements to remain mobile and increases their likelihood of surviving and performing their mission. Nevertheless, the combat commander ashore or inland will need logistic support. Those task-organized logistic elements providing that support must be integrated as much as possible with the combat forces.
Generally, logistic support can be adequately provided to maneuvering combat forces with the basic logistic organization which exists today. Ten logistic considerations are of significant interest to the combat commander with forces on the move.
Active Anticipation of Requirements: Logistic systems must be organized to anticipate the requirements of the ground combat elements, while being responsive active. To develop an approach anticipates a combat unit’s nee . |(i require training our logistic perso ^ ^ tactical doctrine. Logistic personn ^ technicians and specialists; as suej’0pef' are often insulated from tactics an ,flC i ational considerations. “Every ma . rifleman” can be applied to the cian who understands operation*^,, mands and can anticipate combat ^ rather than respond to requests. ^ ^ to move away from the “bean-conn4'^! mentality; combat effectiveness
ca* Ksfficlency) is the key to tacti'
^Snnel'nfj!'0 requirements’ logistic with the h i 1 maintain close liaison logistician n 7ed COmbat forces- The
element In tedS t0 be with the combat ating loeist' a?tlCa' comrnander, evalu- situation n!C “rnands and the tactical cian the' r, ‘ng forward gives the logisti- ba‘tIefieiH , ,Vantage Point to read the ant‘cipate ’ ,m'ne the situation, and ordination f^1 force needs- close co- Pers°nnel with .,COOperation by logistic gence 0ffiJ he operations and intelli- to support th S Wl11 enab,e the logistician mande^i 'mtcnt of the tactical com- demands adccluately anticipate logistic
httiire hauler °Perati°ns: The
systems be ^ . uY*" d'ctate that logistic tions 24 u aPable of sustaining opera- 'vill not K(,<t'U|rS a day; catch-up logistics logistic onenorated' ConSequcnlly’ ni8ht Although the u°ns Wil* be commonplace. c°ncealment h°Urs of darkness will aid in )ogistic n ' ’ “ presents difficulties to darknessP tr°nnel- To offset the effect of Under varvinarmn^ sbotdd be conducted include- 8 COmbat conditions at night
f PesuptivP temP°rary logistic facilities
► Tactiei operations
► De 'Cal refueling
► °f bulk Mquid,
► Expcdiema('nt,enanCe tasks
Salvage a‘5eld repairs
W Weapon « rec°very operations [ C°nstructiyS 6m rePlacement
► Judging tasks gap Crossing
^ ^s,ablkhm °f men and material
Wi ent °f mobile supply dumps
► Light and noise discipline The combat commander conducts continuous operations to disrupt the enemy’s time schedule in order to gain and maintain the initiative. This can be done only if logistic personnel are prepared and trained to provide support 24 hours a day.
Resourcefulness: The commander
must be persistent in keeping his logistic tail lean and unencumbered. Judicious use of logistic assets and resourcefulness will help to ensure that our forces are not overloaded, or that our logistic organization is not choked with unused supplies piling up in dumps.
Only those supplies which are moved to the point of need and are used contribute to the course of battle. Economy and resourcefulness will allow the commander to reduce the size of his logistic tail. An effort must be made not to equip the rifleman for every possible contingency. To achieve these conditions, the commander can:
► Strictly control the size of prescribed loads
► Reduce the size of supplies held in dumps
► Maximize the use of organic assets
► Move a larger amount of supplies with fewer vehicles
► Stipulate that marine riflemen carry only essentials
► See that all elements carry their share of the logistic load
► Arrange for direct through-put of bulk supplies (ammo, fuel, and water)
Current logistic thinking describes flexibility in terms of duplication of men and equipment. But duplication for the sake of redundancy is not the way to structure a lean and active logistic sys- tern. To reinforce the idea of resourcefulness and a lean logistic tail, the commander should conduct training which emphasizes: the use and repair of captured equipment; improvising and using field expedients; leam-to-do-without exercises; developing limited organic logistic capability, and cross-training in various military occupational specialties.
Resourcefulness and economy require a commander to conserve his assets and use his own organic capabilities to the fullest. To capitalize on his organic logistic resources, the commander should view these assets as a logistic reserve. This organic reserve will allow the commander maximum freedom of action. By having a logistic reserve of high priority supplies, the commander will be able to go that “extra mile” at the most critical moment. The commander’s organic logistic assets are preserved by the logistic element and replenished at every opportunity. The combat element does not deplete its own supplies before requesting resupply. The combat element is force-fed supplies, and only uses its own assets when absolutely necessary. The task of the logistic element is to preserve and maintain the combat force’s organic logistic resources. A commander may establish a small reserve of high-priority supplies by specifying prescribed loads, and directing that the use of these supplies and/or quantities will be with his expressed approval.
Camouflage and Deception: It is imperative that logistic sites, fuel/supply dumps, and logistic activities be camouflaged and concealed from enemy observation to reduce the possibility of having them destroyed. The enemy must be deceived as to the location of logistic facilities and the logistic point of main effort. In addition to night operations, further measures are necessary to improve logistic survivability:
► Constructing decoy logistic facilities and areas
► Setting up dummy supply points using discarded containers
► Assembling dummy fuel farms using unserviceable equipment
► Staging phony vehicle repair and refueling areas with destroyed vehicles
► Creating various diversionary logistical activities
Mobility: For the logistic element to provide effective support, it must possess
to the tac'
plenish combat units as far f°rvV .
possible. A fix-it point is the P^^t which a vehicle has stopped- ot teams repair vehicles at fix-it P° tj0n disabled vehicles are towed to co
areas.
Positioning mobile
colocated with maintenance ^ un
recoverable vehicles found forwa provide a ready source for useab Cfl[1, Hidden caches of liquids, arnn!-ynyaril and repair parts may be placed 0 , a[ Refueling should be accornp 0f every opportunity. Unit distribu ^ fuel is desired as far forward as pr ^ The necessity for tracked tactica
the same degree of mobility as the ground combat element. If the logistic element is unable to keep pace with the assault forces, then the combat element runs the risk of overextending its lines of communication. Being encumbered by a slow- moving logistic element restricts the commander’s freedom to maneuver, limits the rate of advance, and diminishes the ability to exploit tactical opportunities.
Having the same degree of mobility as the assault echelon also significantly improves the survivability of logistic elements. The weapon systems of the combat element, including antiair and antitank assets, can provide a protective envelope for logistic elements. Ensuring close proximity of logistic detachments to combat forces means that repair parts, supplies, and contact teams have shorter distances to travel to get to the supported unit. It must be stressed that mobility does not necessarily entail the use of mechanization.
Expeditious handling and movement of supplies and repair parts are vital to maintaining a constant flow of logistic support. High-priority classes of supplies (less bulk liquids) and critical, high- usage repair parts are prepackaged in packout blocks which are configured for relative ease of handling. Packouts are force-fed to forward units and positioned near or colocated with maintenance contact teams. Packouts may be loaded on mobile supply dumps and dispersed throughout a zone.
Direct “through-put” from the source
Rigging LVTs for refueling, as above, and ensuring that riflemen carry only essential gear are two ways to keep a combat force’s logistic tail from dragging.
of supply to the user is desired, especially in the case of ammunition and bulk liquids, which are difficult to handle. Direct through-put requires less handling and speeds resupply; unit distribution and centralized control of motor transport assets facilitate direct through-puts.
Flexibility: To achieve flexibility with logistics, the commander (with his logistician and operations officer) must develop and designate a logistic priority which coincides with and supports the main effort’s tactical point. It is paramount that the commander is confident that his logistician understands the concept of operations, and knows the commander’s tactical intent. The logistic point of main effort directs logistic support to crucial areas and establishes supply priorities. Once it has been designated, it becomes the focal point for combat support activities. The logistic point of main effort is characterized by the following:
► Designation of combat element to receive priority of logistic support
► Increased arrangements for high-priority classes of supply
► Prepositioning and prepackaging of supplies
► Planning for mobile dumps far forward
► Establishing hidden caches for fuel and ammunition
► Emphasis on unit distribution
► Requests for additional transport capabilities including helo and fixed wing
► Designating and improving multiple routes for resupply, medical evacuation,
and vehicle recovery/salvage ^t-
► Establishing priority of repair 0 tie-damaged vehicles and weapons
► Planning for additional logistic s
from outside the task force 0(t
► Centralized control of motor tra •
assets s of
► Forward-deployed contact tea
logistic detachments (s “
► Designation of logistic eleme
provide the priority of support tical point of main effort jj.fi*-
Fuel-It-Fix-It-Forward: “Fue.j fltf
it-forward” thinking must Preva|ir)(| reidea is to repair, refuel, replace^ aS
V at
dumpS ^‘trave1 reduces the distance supplies mu c(,n- and lessens response time. Packo ^ taining prepackaged supply td°c juiii lected high-demand repair Pa^ maintenance items configured W e cific geographic locations and ch ,.,-t intenance
teams. In addition, destroyed ay
am
Cal tracked* Cfan the r°le of a tact a slin-in if. Uf^er wi'b the developme lng unit can. ui der Package and dispen 'mnsferrin,^!- e refueling vehicles ar ers> and or UC, t0 other refuelers, tanl t 011 nd storage units. The tact
Th
f°r Forcible Entry
^ ^harlej~F~Tl
' b. Myers, Jr.
ent bulW,! f evident- The Corps’ pres-
the-road ca Kt,ankerS have limited off-
VehiH Pablhties and slow. needed and salvage are
lines of mm °8.main suPply routes and equipmemTn7mCuati0n- Ba‘de-damaged rePaired fn vehicles which cannot be tion and ^ are.evacaated. Collec- and moveri fVage P°lnts are redesigned
pr°gSsoffraKrd!okeep up wkh the
elements win*^ batt e’ Ground combat such as tan. evacuatc major end items,
and no further^ ‘° flX"it points 08>stic nprc , he commander and fuel, fjx ,°,nnfi must be prepared to lhc for ’. le d captured equipment in field exneH- 3rea' CaTlnihalization and e*cep2 T are the rule—not the
Hulk Linmu °perating forward. Water) nrp! dS' Bulk ,lcluids (fuel and eoniman(i(.rem.,S^eciai Problems for the earlier CIlrand tbc log>st'cian. As noted 'nventorv K.,Cnt,.rcPue'ers >n the Corps’ bility. a , Ve hmited off-the-road capa- 1'200-Eai| at ed tactical refueler with a improve a c Capaci'y would markedly CaPabilitv Tt,1' 3t Un't s organic logistic armored , u , Production of the light Marine F0r,Cle (LAV) into the Fleet qniretiiem Wdi pose a significant reas mainton.,0r refuefing forward, as well enhance th AlthouSh the LAV will and maneuv COmbat. element’s mobility ment Wjn er capability, the logistic ele- w'th tbe i f ard-pressed to keep pace demands > i S and meet their logistic kas the s'am? 6SS tke logistic detachment Vehicle n "!e mobility. An LAV logistic pr°blem a\ prov.ide a solution to this vehicle (LVT)§ W'tb tbe trackcd landing
The I Vt . ' „ .
No ■
°f forces*!0*1 Possesses the combination ar>d remai ec*.Ulred to invade from the sea by a bal;!* In 3 *and wh>ch is defended P°sed of | nCCd’ modem military com- 'bc abiiitv°ya1, Well‘trained troops. Yet, ?Ssertce of ° perP°rni this mission is the lncnt fac( P°Wer projection, and a prom- 'be Unite,? c m Protecting the interests of pdy on th1 tatCS and 'hose nations which The Con*S Coun,ry f°r military support, "’at, wit) PrefS has clearly established 'here Wili'h DePartment of the Navy, e maintained a capability to cal LVT refueler could transport either fuel or water.
Recently on the West Coast, Air Logistics Corporation demonstrated for the Marine Corps a slip-in bladder conversion package, which reconfigures the LVT internally into a tracked tactical refueler. The slip-in package and dispensing unit appear extremely promising and is an excellent means of transporting bulk liquids forward and inland. This exciting development could provide the Corps with a flexible forward logistic capability to move bulk fuel in the forward area.
Security/Protection: The commander should consider giving his logistic element some defensive “teeth:” infantry units, antiarmor weapons, surface-to-air missiles, etc.
Commanders can expect rear areas to be highly vulnerable. The primary objective of rear-area security is to prevent serious interference with logistic function. Logistic personnel must be prepared to work and fight. Logistic personnel should be trained in the following:
► Infantry weapons familiarization
► Individual protection measures
► Antimechanized and antiarmor tactics and weapons
► Camouflage and concealment
► Patrolling
► Barriers, obstacles, and mine fields
► Hardening vehicles
► Convoy procedures and immediate action drills
The commander’s rear-area security planning is developed concurrently with operational planning. Intelligence is critically important to rear-area security as it attempts to assess the enemy’s capability to interfere with logistic functions. The tactical environment may be such that rear-area security may drive operational planning.
Forming Tactical Logistic Elements: An option available to the commander is
seize and hold foreign territory; restoration of that capability is overdue.
The Navy has the authority and the opportunity to take the lead in developing composite forces which can provide a high-confidence capability to intervene when appropriate. The size of the forces is less important than the balance of the key elements, which include:
► Sealift
► En-route protective systems
► Objective area protective systems
► Ship-to-objective transportation to configure logistic support detachments with a mix of combat, combat support, and logistic personnel. The tactical logistic detachments are provided with weapon systems and personnel to afford limited protection from enemy air and armor. These detachments are highly mobile and would be expected to fight their way to the unit they are supporting if necessary. The primary purpose, however, of such a detachment is to perform logistic tasks as far forward as possible. Mobile logistic detachments using LVTs is a means of providing mobility to logistic personnel; the inherent logistic capability of the LVT crew should not be overlooked. A tactical logistic detachment with a mix of military occupation specialties, including combat arms personnel, will allow a commander to fight with his logistic units.
Through logistics, combat forces are provided with the means of war to accomplish their mission. At the same time, a commander must ensure that combat units are relieved of everything that hinder them. In meeting this challenge, a system of logistics must be developed that is consistent with operational concepts. Adequate—but austere—beach support areas must be maintained without creating large logistic tails to support combat operations ashore. Our logistic forces need to be flexible enough to accommodate changes in the tactical situation; they need to be integrated with the scheme of maneuver. Finally, we need to develop an organic logistic capability for ground combat elements, with flexible forward logistics for both short- and long-term operations.
Major Wilson is a graduate of the State University of New York. Having served as an infantry officer, he is currently assigned to the 4th Marine Division.
► Stalwart fire support bases
► Effective around-the-clock fire support systems
► Effective land combat forces
► High state of composite force readiness The quest for funding and the development of rationales to support military requirements sometimes lead to the selection of scenarios and enemy combinations which demand impossible feats and unattainable budgets. Obsession with inordinate and imponderable requirements can create despair and disenchant-
Tonkin. The artery of the attack -• have been quickly severed by U- and surface elements, but it was n ^
• ua letW did not, however, exhibit the *
and volume necessary to arrest the
advance.
The testimony of U. S. Army
irtrays
The New Jersey was so effective off Vietnam that she was mothballed after being branded a “destabilizing influence" on the Paris peace talks; recently, the Marines found her to be a stabilizing influence off Lebanon.
ment with a mission. A definition for “how much is enough” remains elusive. History, however, is helpful in characterizing the forces which would provide a high level of confidence for executing a forcible entry from the sea.
In September 1943, Allied forces invaded Italy at Salerno and fought against the remnants of four German divisions which had armor and air assets. The Allied order of battle included five aircraft carriers, 12 battleships, nine cruisers, 40 destroyers, 36 minesweepers, plus 500 ships/Ianding craft carrying a British/ American combat force of about 139,000 troops. In addition, they were supported by 3,700 tactical aircraft operating from Sicily. On the fifth day of the battle, a German counterattack led by 100 tanks jeopardized Allied success by creating a salient within a half mile of the beach. British Fleet Admiral John Cunningham assembled the Allied warships close to shore and “roto-tilled” the battlefield with naval gunfire (NGF) until the attacking German force had been destroyed. Similar action by Allied naval forces helped to turn the tide at Normandy. At Hungnam, Korea, heavy gunfire from naval guns (18,000 rounds in a week, plus 12,000 rockets) created a steel curtain behind which the U. S. commander was permitted to withdraw 195 shiploads of troops, civilians, and valuable equipment, thus averting what could have been a military disaster.
No U. S. military venture has failed when adequate naval gunfire was on hand. Perhaps the commander of invasion forces should demand a clear deed and title to about 30 square miles of enemy real estate on the beach and be assured of sufficient, constantly available fire support to protect against a serious breach of this area. Our invasion forces have always had an abundance of naval fire support, and they have often needed it. Naval gunfire has provided a respite when a resourceful enemy seized the initiative and threatened the success of our venture. It has been demonstrated that naval gunfire can determine the outcome of land combat in coastal regions. Successful forcible entry has required equipment, combined arms, inshore tactics, and readiness that are common to our current naval forces.
The North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive is a good example of an opportunity where Navy forces might have stabilized a land combat situation which got completely out of control. Preceded by a
Vietnam
heavy artillery barrage, North v ^ ese armored divisions attacke° ugh Route One and the beach areas t Dong Ha, Quang Tri City, and north main axis of the thrust was oriente ^ 0f and south within ten miles of the
air
tactical air assets were inhibi ^ weather and air defenses, and the ,e ble Navy combat ships lacked a e weapons to cope with the profile'11- , i The USS Buchanan (DDG-l^'^eII)y half-dozen companions harassed ^ forces with five-inch naval gunfire; a Marine Corps major made a va > y. fort to slow the enemy armor by u yjet ing a 600-foot bridge over the Cu River. Post-action reports state tha ^ tually, during the month of many as 25 destroyers and two c arrived on the gunline to ProVI(? 2L)n5- support, primarily with five-inch^ofa]j Weather, communications, and ce; were degraded with the enemy a by chaos and panic set in, as evidentg the collapse of the South Vietn ^ ^js, Army’s 3rd Division. In the midst^ j| destroyer-based NGF proved r°^fh3ijty
fine Corps officers clearly P01
Weather°LN^F When confusion and challenge th T W'th the fog of war t0 worthv8nr hC f°rCes under attack- 11 is
Period the USSwhat dUr'ng th‘S critical hack in L.uu ^Jersey (BB-62) was
fr°m the war he S’ haVmg bcen eJectcd be a de^tnK r ecause shc was deemed to
Peace talks'/2'"8 ,lnfluence on the Paris Warner a,, • 3S re ated by Senator John teactivatirin'Hf I?16 Senate debate over 198]) o ° tle New Jersey, 7 April c°ntributinn ^ °nly sPeculate on the effort invni ° 3 combined-arms naval
c°mposed nf1",! a,surface action group coveringa m battleships and cruisers, WestwarH . i anne 'ncursion force slicing laying a Hhk ng tbe *'ua ^'et R'ver and north to n„ °ntIof flre along Route One s°n to si.o ng , • h is not beyond rea-
cxisted, ffortL'v-’ had SUch a caPability Nguyen c' Vietnamese General Vo arttiored div^ Wou*d not have risked his Well havp k1S10i1s; the entire attack may
Sea ba V" Contained-
nent role^ 3'r power W*U play a promi- Warfare on- SU^ort °f anY amphibious far|y stages/f10"8’ howevcr’ during the he expert an operation, it should not Portion of th °rprovide more than a token tne firepower required for forcible entry. The essential contribution of carrier-based air power is its protection of ships and their valuable cargo from enemy air, submarine, and surface threats. Enemy homeland defense forces usually have displayed ingenuity and heroism; pilots of combat aircraft should be expected to press fierce attacks against the invaders. U. S. carrier-based aircraft must counter with missions such as striking airfields and maintaining barrier combat air patrols, while providing continuous air cover for the amphibious elements. Surface-to-air defenses may inflict heavy losses on enemy attackers, but should not be expected to prevent continued attacks. Navy aircraft must be present to break up concentrated attacks and to inflict attrition during enemy egress from the contested zone. Carrier air can expel enemy combat ships or patrol boats, and harass land forces which attempt to counterattack. Fighter and attack sorties for direct support of ground combat are likely to be meager and irregular from carrier-based aircraft.
Close air support from amphibious assault ship-based Marine Corps aircraft can be useful, but cannot be expected to provide the sporadic, heavy volume of fire which must be available to blunt enemy counterthrusts. In its current form, tactical air power has not proven to be effective in the face of high-density automatic gunfire associated with mechanized infantry and armor units. This fact, coupled with the demonstrated degradation of effectiveness in reduced visibility, provides little basis for heavy reliance on air assets to provide fire support. Optimistic projections for improvements to air support weapons are of no consequence since—in most scenarios— Marine fighter/attack units can be present during crucial periods only if the objective is near a country which will allow us to launch aircraft from its territory.
It is time to consider the near and long-term options which may be combined to restore the Navy’s capability to execute the forcible entry mission with
Along with the Iowas, the de-moth- balled cruisers Des Moines and Salem could help to fill the Navy’s gap in fire support with their 18 eight-inch and 24 five-inch guns.
rificed during peacetime, and that s mission capability might vanish
Author’s Note:
Force on Fire Support for Amphffi Warfare has performed an extend a view of the adequacy of fire suPP°f rC0t full range of situations, including) ^ entry, withdrawal, raids, and g f(. support of land combat in coaS..t, The findings tend to ampTa
gions. .... ^
message contained in this paper ■ > ^
tion, congressional concern ana tion, as expressed in the Senate ^ Services Committee Report on the t Year 1984 Budget, confirms the pr°^ and urges corrective action by the ^ ^ A cogent
»** Itvtvmuvi ISIS M M/tH-WH-fl-l ** Jj
Currently, he is a member of a Defense Board task force that is studying the appl,ca fire support for amphibious warfare.
high confidence for success. First, sufficient ships must be provided which are tough enough to continue fighting after being hit several times. In spite of the best efforts of protective air cover and shipboard defenses, leakage must be anticipated; ships will be damaged.
Naval fire support may take many forms in the future with the use of emerging technology, but through this decade only naval guns can yield the volume and lethality required under most weather conditions. Naval gunfire has paved the way for friendly forces, provided them a respite when under pressure, and immobilized enemy forces on the battlefield. Like artillery, NGF is an area weapon which—when dispensed in volume— yields the desired effect. The larger the caliber, the better.
Range increases with caliber, and larger projectile volume permits internal arrangements to be tailored for specific target types. In large-caliber ammunition, specific rounds can be used to attack armor, troops, ships, or bunkers. Major- caliber guns can serve as high-speed buses to distribute battlefield mines or ingenious submunitions which can be guided to radiating targets. Laser-guided projectiles (LGPs) which home on laser spots directed by controllers are in development and/or are being procured. LGPs are essentially guided missiles launched from guns and are less expensive than air-launched missiles designed to perform the same function. The goal of this sophisticated option is, of course, to overcome the inherent degradation of gun accuracy which accompanies increases in range.
Such means for improving gun accuracy can be very cost-effective in many situations: when there is a need to destroy small armored targets, when time is of the essence, and when logistic lines are slender. When engaged in combat against another ship, the time required to effect a kill can be critical. When “chaos reigns,” it may be more practical to rely on “dumb” ammunition and the effects of large-caliber area fire than “high technology.” In any event, experience has demonstrated that the commander in the field should be provided with a full range of options.
Today, despite the return to active duty of two /owa-class battleships, the Navy is still unable to provide amphibious forces with adequate naval gunfire support. The Iowa and New Jersey are but two stalwart platforms with 16- and five-inch batteries. But if all four of the Iowas are brought back into service, their NGF capabilities can be enhanced by incorporating the use of 155-mm. guns, which can exploit the extensive family of Army- produced ammunition, which includes an improved conventional munitions round and the laser-guided projectile known as Copperhead. The feasibility of firing reduced-caliber rounds from a 16-inch gun was demonstrated by the Navy in 1968, using the Army’s 280-mm. (11-inch) round; the range achieved was 50 miles. Using such an option, the lowas could alleviate our fire support deficiency.
The case can be made that a need exists for a special inshore surface combatant to provide fire support for land combat. Her design might exhibit a low profile, appropriate armor, redundancy of critical systems, multithreat defenses, and a mix of surface-to-surface fire support weapons. Until such a ship can be procured, and in view of the undeniable need for an assured abundance of NGF, the solution components include an upgrade of guns on existing hulls, reactivation of the four /owa-class battleships and two Des Moines-class cruisers, and the development of ship and aircraft combined tactics to eliminate shore-based defenses as they appear.
Remember that sites selected for forcible entry will usually be far from heavy enemy coastal defenses. Once the operation is under way, the enemy has the problem of moving his combat forces to meet our advance. Aggressive interdiction of access routes by carrier-based aircraft and ships (armed with Tomahawks when the tactical situation permits) can reduce the threat of surface-launched
weapons to Navy fire support ships- Forcible entry from the sea is ttieJflne difficult of all military missions ^ that only the Navy/Marine Corps ^ has the potential to execute. It is[ e ^ combat mission for which forces cifically obligated by statute; it ^ the legitimate concern of Congre^ ^ amphibious warfare assets might^ ,
Leg‘s'
. nd f«r
lated support for this mission a aC|y naval forces that are configured an s to execute forcible entry will Pr° a\. sound basis for plans to restore a cap ^ ity that has proven most valuable nation over the past 40 years.
■ • „ 0 Since writing ^
paper the Defense Science Boar
....................... ................... .. .;*K
,> global, political-tnilha0 ^
sessment, coupled with the faet°rS ‘ ^ sented in this paper, could pro''1 p basis for the Department of the A ^ emerge as the combined arms J0T need to respond to Third World c^\t This need could provide a more ^ base for growth of naval forces tl .)tl current theme of direct confron with the Soviet Union. .
e
Mr. Myers is the president of Aerocounseh ^ ;! organization that assesses the mission re weapon systems for both the government a corporations. His professional note. ’ , .nOtP
Interdiction System for Power Projection. in the November 1979 Proceedings, PP- 5cjei
Some Will Have It Hot . . .
By Colonel John C. Scharfen, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
The temperature is only 90° Fahrenheit, yet the marines stationed inside the bunker are uncomfortably hot. Suddenly, a klaxon sounds: chemical attack! Well trained for such an event, the men don their chemical protective (CP) garments in seconds. It is then that their problems begin.
Immediately, the temperatures under the marines’ CP suits climb; their heart rates increase. Those performing tasks that require eye-hand coordination and precise judgment find their reactions to be quicker, but prone to error. The men sweat profusely, causing the visors on their masks to fog; they cannot clear the
it stib®
sweat from their faces, so the san ; -js and blinds their eyes. Drinking through the masks is clumsy . anz,. it difficult to replace lost fluids. T ev fines will soon become dehydrate • eral are already victims of muscle c and spasms. ^1;'
Without relief, these men will s
areal - i~
relieveh,ln8can
difference KtreSS sutticiently to mak '°rce an.t etWeen a combat-effei The proh?6 that 1S debilitated, recorded u- ern op heat stress is as o here limif atory- In the past, solul
►a, • ted to:
^VoiJintv
^ents wh .8 °Pera‘ions in hot envi
► Rotau?!never Possible
?als and o °r teheving exposed indi
► 0ressi n8r°Ups
knd reten,8 t0 minimize the absorr
► ShieE°n 0fheat
°r infram.i8 Individuals from direct 5
rea radiation
in many situatior
die. Th(.^ casuab‘es—they may even denly leaH anne Corps commander, sud- faces defeat8hafParaleZed COmbat force’ begun to attack °re " e"emy haS even
Th
hie, AmniVi0US scenario is all too plausi- and marin6 replorts indicate that sailors even moTr!twho wear CP garments in
heat casualties ‘^.peratures wil1 become threat of n e bls means that the mere cient to n ,mical attack may be suffi- action ^ a. combat force out of "Those t. 6tP ,ysiologist has written that Work for *Ca tasFs which involve hard come ne.,re than one hour would be-
Personnef ’mpossible to complete.”1 equipped ... ° !be nava* services are not ing Qp cj avoid heat stress while wearing strenn,,, m8 in warm climates or dur- Physical ,inS Worlc’ Without regard to the tUre envirnn11*6^ °* beat’ bigh tempera- the efficient.1116?tS may severely degrade Peace jn . -v 01 a naval force in war or in support nS Pcriorniance of combat or spaces on h^H0115'- There are °Perating stand con*; . , p wbere temperatures
MiddleS‘6ntly at 140° F-2 ^ U. S. a8c sumni(,ri; °rcc sh'Ps operate in aver- Marine fo rtlme temPeratures of 110° F.3 East wji. h1Ces committed to the Middle test regionin one of the hot- °n ^ieeo r • e Wor^. Warehousemen nearly intniarc'a and Okinawa operate in be cooled Erab e conditions that cannot Carrier cafWltb conventional systems. ‘ng hot " ThU * englne spaces are blister- shelters in w d'gbt deck fire fighter eVen when h IS proximity protective suit lc°pter 0nPr!.1S merely standing by. Hel- Put the hen |10nS at tree-top levels can r°nrnent wV',y <dad aircrew in an envi- 3S 'he Cocr tban tbat on the ground, greenhoiK„ Plt and cabin respond as a
A partia!W°?ld to solar radiation.4 Pr°blem of u S° u^on t0 devastating and has air? Stress is readily available in industrveu J proven its effectiveness Personal Cn r 'n mi*itary laboratories: Solution h° ln®' P is not yet a complete ■ Ut Personal (as opposed to
► Cooling operating spaces
► Taking primitive personal cooling measures, such as wetting down or fanning the body to encourage evaporative- convective cooling
Unfortunately, these solutions are often not feasible in contemporary operating environments. The requirement for protective clothing (flak jackets, helmets, boots, and CP gear) often is essential to survival. Cooling the entire operating space can be a solution, but there are limits to the practicality of cooling enclosed spaces; that leaves personal cooling.
Five systems have been identified for personal cooling.5 The first has been described as the ‘‘Red Adair approach” to fire fighting. The heat capacity of water is used to cool fire fighters by covering them with a steady stream from water hoses. The system obviously has restricted application.
The second approach is the ice jacket—blocks of solid carbon dioxide (dry) or water ice stored in insulated jackets. Such jackets have been developed in Japan and in the United States at Kansas State University. Reports on their effectiveness are mixed: U. S. Air Force- funded tests have found the jackets to be partially successful while some commercial tests have proven them to be unsatisfactory.6 Water ice jackets also have been tested at the University of Pennsylvania with mixed reviews.
The third system was evaluated by the National Air and Space Administration. It employs large bags of cooled water carried on the backs and chests of personnel.7 How much this system will cool and for how long are obviously a function of the volume and initial temperature of the water. The weight of the system probably precludes any general application for the Navy and Marine Corps.
The fourth system brings us close to an approach that the sea services could use—forced air cooling. A personal aircooling system can take several forms, including battery-powered packs, or packs tied by umbilical cords to an external pumping station.
Simply put, the effectiveness of air cooling is based on the evaporation of liquids that cover the body. Under most conditions, these liquids are sweat (although wetting the person before or during the cooling would be advantageous). Cooling depends upon air being blown over the skin, extracting moisture from the personal environment.
The air introduced into the system is cooled by the intriguing vortex tube. This simple mechanism converts an input of compressed air into two separate streams of hotter and cooler air. It is a fairly efficient instrument where there is an abundance of compressed air, and where the volume or area to be cooled is small. One manufacturer of industrial air-cooling systems reports that their small, lightweight, waist-mounted vortex tubes will supply cool air 6° to 60° below the temperature of the compressed air supply.
In a war fought with chemical and biological agents, our troops may collapse on the field—not from those agents, but from heat stress caused by the protective garments they wear.
Table 1 Benefits of Cooling*
Function
Unit of Measure
Head
Cooling
Torso
Cooling
Heart Rate | Beats per minute | -3.7 | -1.1 |
Rectal | Degrees Centigrade | -0.10 | -0.03 |
Temperature Body Sweat | Grams of sweat, divided by square meters of body surface, multiplied by number of hours | -18.7 | -9.3 |
Forehead Sweat | (same as above) | -49.8 | -24.0 |
Comfort | Subjective scale of 0-10 centimeters | +0.6 | +0.2 |
* Results shown are I | from the cooling of 1% of the body’s surface |
|
|
Source: Nunnelly & Maldonado, U. S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, 1982. |
|
tion through a closed loop. The ^ j
The results of their 1982 experm- 0 summarized in Table 1. Results are on conditions where the ambient te U,p ature was 96° with subjects wearirv,.
rate of one liter per minute.
find1 a
vest and headpiece is a flexible tu^.
oU
s li
0-- — r ■ enters at temperatures of 55 to
lo
Air-cooling systems have obvious applications in some naval environments, particularly on board ship where there is ample electrical power and water, and where the use of a tether to a source of compressed air is not a problem. However, these applications are limited. The principal drawback to air cooling is that, in the evaporative cooling process, the subject must provide a continuous flow of moisture through sweat.
Humans use sweat to regulate body temperature. The sweat (eccrine) gland is one of the most energy-efficient engines known. These glands (approximately three million) are capable of pumping 40 times their weight in moisture in a single day; the system can produce about ten quarts a day. Yet, this remarkable regulatory system must be fueled, for it takes energy to produce the sweat (which can contribute to fatigue) and water to replace its output (otherwise dehydration will result). High relative humidity, or impermeable garments which prevent evaporation, inhibit the cooling properties of sweat. In these circumstances, the buildup of moisture on the body becomes uncomfortable; 20% of sweat-wetted area of the body is considered to be the threshold for discomfort.
Under the air-cooled alternatives, the user must work to produce sweat, must be warm enough to generate it, and must replace the liquid lost by drinking large volumes of water—all of which could pose substantial problems in an operational environment. The air-cooled system is less efficient than the liquid cooled, requiring five to ten times the power to generate an equivalent level of cooling. As stated by the National Academy of Science Committee on Chemical Protective Clothing Systems, “Air ventilation systems are usually adequate for
Personal cooling systems are being developed that lower body temperatures through the circulation of air or water over the skin’s surface.
Such systems can be adapted for use by sailors and marines who must work or fight in environments that are likely to cause heat casualties. For example, fire fighters who must wear asbestos suits can be made more comfortable with personal cooling systems.
low work rates but liquid cooling is generally required for high work rates.”8
This brings us to the final alternative: the liquid-cooled garment (LCG). The LCG was developed by NASA for personal cooling of the astronaut within his or her space suit after it was determined that air cooling did not perform as hoped.
A cap is included with an LCG. Cooling the head makes sense because the blood vessels in this part of the body do not constrict in the presence of cold to the degree found in other parts of the body; also, about 40% of the blood supply courses through the head. The head is a very efficient cooling mechanism—three times more effective per square inch of
i , r the b0$’
exposure than other parts oi ^
according to physiologists at m “ Force School of Aerospace Memc
rimed’
atuiv. was wim auujw<vw • ■ -
gear. The subjects were seated, e*P jj ing very little energy. The cooling } passed through the garment at 6U
The logic of head cooling is con by Air Force tests. There has been a^f, cem, however, that the body’s deep c(j moregulatory system, which is con ^ by the brain’s hypothalamus, . fooled by head cooling. The ratlco0|, was that, since the head would be ^ the hypothalamus would signal 1 ..
mainder of the body’s heat rejection ^ tern to shut down; the result won ^ heat stress. Air Force tests seem t0 ^ prove this theory and establish ^ cf. only is head cooling three times m° y ficient than torso cooling, but that ^ ^ find “no evidence in our own worn the literature to support the specu that head cooling might directly a ef output from the thermoregulatory c in the hypothalamus.”10
While there are several LCG con rations that could be described, tj1® lowing assumes that the system, in ^ ing a headpiece, is portable. With10 ^ vest and headpiece is a flexible t ^ system which carries a water-glyco18 ,j<J
SifacmTu'2t about 75°' The liquid
Wood vessels th?. head first (sincc these the slight] v , W' not constrict) and then the torso Th armer liquid passes across
Cyc|ed overtWarmed (750) Uquid ‘S then
to the ss°a*o ’,Ce cartndge and recooled The ~W evel-
fay be^0" wearing a portable LCG pounds iinH^lng 3 load of about 14 be able tn < ,Cr some conditions, he may in a centra]6 °r hand the cooling system nients. in ,harCa and wear on|y the gar- ahout two „ *S Case’ tbe weight load is elects not tP°unds- When the individual
'nay tie into uT' COoling system- he cord, whieh hr°Ugh a ,2-foot umbilical diameter I 8^eS bim a 24-foot working his coolin<Yn lgbcr temperature ranges, fore h "fCa«ndge will last an hour W about twn n ° reP*aced- He will get chargeable h°“rS of service from his reChiller unit hUei^' Hooked UP to a fixed to chanve C Wdl bave no requirement The S/Ce cartridges or batteries, fent ran ,!>r °r tuarine wearing this gar- r°nments „X^eC,t t0 be Protected in envi- 4(1-60% 5°° *' He can expect that
eliminated ,1!? stored body heat will be temperam’ Uf, bis beart rate and core efficiency remain stable, that his stress, anri ,u n,0t be irnPaired by heat There a ^ be wdl he comfortable, within the «6 bundreds of applications Urations 0fCU serv‘ces f°r various config- Benefits r, 3 f>ersonal cooling system, critical f()t.ngC bo,n those that may be fhose wher-nUSS10n accomplishment to tles the Wl'C mcreased proficiency justi- ,eRis. fiacbaring °f Personal cooling sys- ered on jt<iaPPbcation should be consid- expenSe .|l,>'!Vn merit to determine if the l°gistic bn i ,ltl0na' weight, and added Warranted f.Cn °f Personal cooling are c°oling Wo ,. would seem that personal ,ion that r u o he a necessity in any situa- Thc LriUlres the use of CP clothing. ne tank crew, in a chemical environment with temperate to warm weather, is a prime candidate for personal cooling. In such an application, the crew would probably be best served by a dual system that permitted them to plug into a chiller run off the tank engine; this would provide an uninterrupted supply of cool liquid. Should it be necessary to dismount from the vehicle or shut down the engine in “silent watch,” the system could become portable by donning a belt system equipped with an ice cartridge that had been frozen by the chiller.
What advantages can one expect the crew to realize? A test of a system similar to the one described was made by the Army 9th Infantry Division in high-technology test bed evaluations. Two M-60 tank crew members were equipped with LCGs, while a third member had no such gear. They were subjected to temperatures up to 104° within a tank for four hours. The most striking results of the test were those concerned with water intake. The crew member who did not wear the LCG consumed 37 times more water than the others to replace the copious amount of fluid lost from sweating.
Other sea service personnel who have jobs which could be aided by wearing liquid-cooled garments include: crewmen in the catapult areas on board carriers, construction sites, warehouses, engine room spaces, boilers, personnel carriers, helicopters, fire fighting, welding in confined spaces, and a host of others.
How far away are the sea services from adopting personal cooling systems? Industry has been using the systems in steel mills, laboratories, nuclear power plants, and shipyards for some time; but military research and development are, painfully slow. If personal cooling is going to provide the relief that sailors and marines warrant in a reasonable time, it appears that the cognizant DoD staffs and service commanders must demand an uncharacteristic response from the research community. The simple fact of the matter is that the sea services are currently unprepared to combat heat stress in the operational environment; personal cooling can provide the solution for a wide range of applications.
'Dr. Ralph Goldman, quoted in the Advisory Board on Military Personnel Supplies Report No. 104, by the Committee on Chemical Protective Clothing Systems (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1981), p. 31.
"Temperatures cited here will be Fahrenheit (F) unless otherwise noted.
3As reported in Navy Times, 26 April 1982, p. 24. 4For a discussion of a helicopter CB training exercise see 1st Lt. B. C. Lapiska, USMC, "Dress Rehearsal for Doomsday,” Proceedings, April 1982, pp. 107110.
'Dr Matthew Radnofsky, “Approach to Solving Heat Stress Problems, ” an unpublished paper sponsored by Encon Manufacturing Company, Houston, 1982.
6For a favorable report, see S. Konz, etal, “Personal Cooling with Dry Ice,” American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal (March 1974). A less favorable report came from a 30 January 1982 heat stress garment test at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, California.
"Radnofsky, op. cit.
"Advisory Board on Military Personnel Supplies Report No. 104, op. cit.
9S. A. Nunnelly and R. J. Maldonado, “Head and Torso Cooling During Simulated Cockpit Heat Stress,” USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks AFB, Texas, 1982.
'“Nunnelly & Maldonado, op. cit. Also see G. A. Brown and G. M. Williams (test results), “The Effect of Head Cooling on Deep Body Temperature and Thermal Comfort in Man,” Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, June 1982, pp. 583-586.
Colonel Scharfen holds a B.A. in psychology from Stanford University, and an M.A. in international relations from Georgetown University. He retired from the U.S. Marine Corps as deputy director of the Joint Planning Group at Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Currently, he is the senior scientist at the Rosslyn, Virginia office of ATAC (Analytical Technology Applications Corporation).
J^dSome Will Have It Cold
y Captain r -------------------
eorge J. Hill, Medical Corps, U. Much re •
a8e-old DrS,l'|Urcb *s needed to solve the *°r the com 6mS Personal protection SuPPlies r bow to provide adequate vveather u Water and food in cold cold i °W t0 g've °Pdmurn treatment bosti|e cnJiU,nes and those injured in a c°nduc’t e°fr .env'ronment, and how to c°ld, S()lcient military operations in C°ndition "k- and 'cc' Superb physical and unit d' e b m°rale, self-discipline, lant f0(. 1SciPline are particularly impor- lhe CQldUccessful combat operations in envtronment. We must maintain
S. Naval Reserve
these qualities through effective training, and continually upgrade our methods of protection and treatment through research and development.
Much has yet to be learned about cold injury and adaptation to the cold. We do not yet know exactly what happens when cells and tissues freeze, and why thawing sometimes occurs without gangrene and loss of the part. We do not fully understand how some animals and natives survive in bitterly cold environments with little or no protection. Can drugs be developed that would enable troops to adapt quickly in a similar way? And what are the possibilities of new plastics for protection, and use of radar generators for the warming of spaces, fluids, and body tissues? What are some of the most pressing needs and possible solutions for stabilizing, treating, and transporting the sick and injured in the field? For starters, we can examine ten prime areas for cold weather medical research:
Footgear: Better boots are needed to keep feet dry and warm that have a firm
sole with good traction, ankle protection, flexibility and welt, and upper-portion durability. A modular boot of new synthetic material may be the best approach. However, the vapor barrier (VB) boot used by U. S. forces has essentially a zero incidence of permitting any freez- ing/cold injuries. But, in the 30 years of the boot’s existence, it has apparently never been field-tested for direct comparison against boots worn by other NATO forces. Of the 48 different kinds of boots used in the Falklands, none was the VB boot. Joint allied planning and testing of footgear are clearly needed. Effective protection of the feet (and hands) requires a knowledge of fabrics and plastics, and of the precise molecular and cellular changes that occur in the entire body during intense exercise, fearful stress, dehydration, and in a fierce winter wind.
Clothing: Garment improvements
should include better face, eye, and hand protection capability. They must be quick-drying, protect against torrential rain and immersion in water, and be well ventilated for body heat and moisture, yet flame resistant. Fewer layers would be better, if high insulative capacity and ventilation could be retained. Garments should be suitable for body armor incorporation and quick-change capability. Eye protection should be enhanced against sunlight (especially ultraviolet rays), wind, particles, and should be suitable for wearing over prescription glasses. All items must be sturdy, inexpensive, and lightweight.
Water: The daily ration of potable and nonpotable water for field troops in a cold environment must be established and quantitatively validated for different exercise levels, diets, and for various ambient conditions. Techniques and doctrine need to be developed to prepare fresh hot water in the morning, which can be available and consumed during the day rather than at night, as is the current situation. The cold weather military canteen must be large, well insulated, and readily accessible on the march. Research is needed on flavoring methods and the value of flavoring as a stimulant to encourage consumption. Can the heat produced by internal combustion engines be used to produce water from snow? New technology is needed to produce intrave-
Marines are trained to fight in the cold, but what happens if they are wounded? What is a corpsman to do, for instance, when his medicine—or the wound itself—freezes?
nous solutions that can be administered in the field at subfreezing temperatures, and to improve field monitoring of urine specific gravity and concentration.
Rations: Continued study of field rations is essential, particularly regarding the emphasis that should be placed on caloric intake, compared with the value of energy expended in preparation and consumption of drinking water. The values and risks of various dietary levels of salt and the values of the high fat (low carbohydrate, minimum protein) diet commonly used by natives in cold climates need to be studied. Do the 4,5006,000 calories burned daily by a hardworking person in the cold need to be replaced on a day-by-day basis? Or should the lower amount of calories that
consumption be regarded as one aspe ^ the natural adaptation to hard work t cold environment? eI)t
Casualty Management: Manage ^ ^ of frostbite, hypothermia, and iNne* trauma in the cold needs much atIenc0j(| We have learned little in regard to injury since World War II, as this research is very limited. Appare . n. it is not a priority item for military P of Heal*-0 urgently needed. Could small h°ve.||(|0 be used for casualty transport? We s1 not know how to determine if a co ... ualty in the field is dead or hypoth6 .. a personal locator beacon for lost- J thermic individuals is needed. M u
ners, the National Institute the Veterans Administration.
A durable, lightweight sled/strei
,. i / I I /111.*"
Amphibious Fire Support
“y L
andbbwim practlcal situations (in cold
or at the hnt,STW’m U tent'in a lifeb°at, Prarn , ta'10n aid ^tion). ing howCa|n'|nStruCt'°n is needed regard- Pat1 the f W len t0 rewarm the cold son^„i Jr°Zen Pa", and the cold per- ^°ndi.ion,npVar,,OUS tact‘ca‘ and climactic erators, diath^'0 frequency (radar) gen-
methods need ml’ ^ °ther rewarming The a! !’0 be compared, charcoal s!'bUming Norwegian Army American ^ 6m sbould be tested by
‘n§ bags, casuahvl' ^ warming sleep-
nets. We n i jy ltters’ and drug cabi- not break TT drUg containers that will stable afterWfh /r°Zen’ drUgs that are methods t„ a ,freeze-thaw cycle, and ahles and U minister parenteral injected envinmmraVen0US infusi°ns in the s'ricted hi,, I0™ int0 Patients with conduce intr ‘ °d vesse|s- Methods to proper I mTS n“id froni snow or sea not have a n-i'CM°Ugllt' We currently do Venous fini i. • e method to give intra- hec/ino . s ln a low shelter and at sub- 7ya^. temperature.
Calists needf .Caure of cold weather spe- and intern,,", be maintained. Regular
training am Cydes of cold weather
e,mPhasizinprnqaired ,tor the sea services, shills, f0iig Personal and group survival
Plex Work°Wed by Progressively com- environmentr challenging
necessarv r ^hiing skills may be un- •hough the j^oonspecialized troops, al- Cramp0ns :a ' “y t0 use snowshoes and 'nto a cold essential for anyone going ‘ary skhnper°nment- Could not mil f- tra‘ned tnv, bC restncted to specially
Navy instnPS,-USlng rigid ski boots? A father ca^'i'0" 1S needed for cold Heat ca tles (comparable with the should be ^ r . instruction). Training exPected- Ca ISdc b,r the environment marines need amphibious,
Th<
■ Dean Simmons
rently jn ('|°Us,and naval systems eur- ’Nlt the Can mi°prnent may wel* mean °Perations ,,U ! Ity ‘° contluct preassault °"e ‘hat (..”ni‘hc Scale of World War II is ‘he assault e easi|y foregone. Tactics xharige force and the defense will Navys at1gn'flcan‘ly because of the craft trV°An °f tbe a‘r cushion land- 5°-knot ‘^AC)- When the LCAC’s 111051 anv,,Kd 3nd lts abili‘y to land al- nPced and!'?, are coupled with the fl*‘oftlm°blllty ot the Marine Corps’ Will be aui Sfort helicopters, U. S. forces °Ver a tarf °carry out surprise landings areally significant area. (Stratelow-altitude, and moderately high-altitude (up to 9,000 feet) experience with daytime temperatures to — 25°F. (plus wind, as in Norway).
Navy personnel need cold, very wet, and very windy exposure. Those who go to the Antarctic need special equipment and training. All training should include specific goals and objectives, with validation of skill levels needed; randomized tests should be initiated to evaluate different training methods and skills (snow shoes versus skis, for example).
Continuity: Long-term planning and support for a cold weather program are essential, with overlap provided for transferred personnel at all levels. Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve personnel can provide continuity if assigned to specific duties and responsibilities.
Allied Joint Planning: Exchange of research/field data, joint conferences, and joint operations with our allies should be encouraged. Currently, cold weather uniforms, equipment, and winter warfare schools are being shared informally. Specific detailed planning for the practice of casualty management in cold weather allied maneuvers is needed. A dual system of cold weather illness and casualty reports might be developed which is similar to naval aviation accident reports. One group of these reports should be used only for information (inadmissible in court), thereby eliciting candid comments that are particularly valuable in redesigning faulty systems.
Basic Research: Cryobiologic cellular research is needed, including the mechanism and sequence of freezing injury (including electron microscopy). We know little about the mechanism of subfreezing local tissue injury and about optimum methods for resuscitation of hypothermic victims, with or without dehydration and
gic surprise would seem unlikely, given the ability of satellite reconnaissance systems to locate and track a large amphibious task force.)
To exploit this capability for surprise, advance force or preassault strikes will have to be rapid. The Navy and Marine Corps will no longer be able to bombard the objective area for nearly three days, as was done before the 1945 landing on Iwo Jima. Preassault strikes will also have to be spread over a fairly wide area to deceive the enemy as to the location of the landing sites.
To defend against the threat posed by
hemorrhage. Studies are needed to search for local drugs to dilate the blood vessels which have maximum duration with minimum side effects. We also need suitable animal models that are inexpensive, relevant, and ethically satisfactory.
Field Studies: The well-trained, prepared mind of a professional scientist is a valuable resource for research and development. Experience should be provided for selected scientists in the field environment, as in cold weather training and at Arctic warfare maneuvers, so the problems of field commanders and strategic leaders can be translated into an orderly series of questions suitable for scientific study.
Military medical research and development are conducted in response to needs and tasks that are established by combat planners. The challenges to personal survival and effective military function posed by the cold environment must be recognized and assigned appropriate priority for research, development, and training. Whether it is to prepare for the snows of winter in the Mideast, Europe’s snowy winter lowlands and mountains, or the Arctic environment on land and sea, every level of research requires support.
Some responses to cold weather can be beneficially modified by training or medication, and lead to better performance and improved personnel selection; this knowledge can be developed only through medical research. Success in military operations in adverse weather can be assured, and casualties minimized, only if cold weather training and research continue.
Captain Hill is a professor of surgery and chief of the Division of Surgical Oncology at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey in Newark.
such mobile assault forces, the opposing commander will have to move the bulk of his forces farther inland so that he can respond over a much broader front. Such a defense is far different than what is used to defend only those beaches suitable for current conventional landing craft. The opposing commander will likely choose to adopt a mobile defense, comprising numerous small elements located near the coast, but with most forces held in reserve. This tactic can be used to counter the unpredictability inherent in use of LCAC- and helicopter-landed amphibious forces. Use of such tactics will also
This is not to say that naval &un?j0^ onger be useful—they will be.
, their role in the future will n®oSjves
no longer be useful ever,
hurl thousands of tons of
counterattack the forces on t
sio"
the inva:
was demonstrated so well at
nfi*
---------------- , —v, — voluine
can provide the responsive, hl^?"[j)[usts-
power until the Marines’ organic ai” ^] is able to take over. Like artillery’ guns can deliver responsive fire j.(jons.
will include ships in several c'aSS^(| to mission areas. Because of the n ^
Navy will want to place antiair
t_ : ------------- l .... A ~I,, /,„innnf'll ^ z1
mean that fewer targets will be within range of naval gunfire ships until the enemy responds to the landing and begins to maneuver forces to counter it.
While the recent conflict in the Falkland Islands demonstrated the efficacy of amphibious operations, it also revealed the peril posed by antiship missiles. Because proliferation of such weapons now seems more certain than ever, amphibious and naval forces must take measures to protect themselves from both air- and surface-launched antiship missiles. The missiles’ range is likely to prove quite large, given that the technology for over-the-horizon targeting is available. The principal fire support systems affected by this threat will be the surface combatants that provide naval gunfire. The ships in the supporting carrier task forces will be deployed much farther out to sea, and they will be able to take ad-
The LCACs’ speed and ability to land almost anywhere will add so much mobility to invading U. S. forces that amphibious commanders may well be reluctant to have their advantage of surprise ruined by lengthy naval
vantage of their own multi-tiered air defenses. To protect themselves from antiship missiles, naval gunfire ships will be forced to move farther offshore, thereby reducing their coverage of inland targets.
If the landing site is in an area that has been mined (need we mention that the Soviets have the world’s largest inventory of sea mines?), it will not be possible to use naval gunfire ships extensively unless the fire support area has been swept first. The initial minesweeping effort may have to be limited to approach lanes for landing ships and craft, and a small fire support area from which the naval gunfire ships can operate. More extensive mine clearance can be undertaken as the landing progresses. Until the mines are swept, the commander of the amphibious task force will have to rely on systems other than naval guns to neutralize enemy defenses.
It seems likely, therefore, that naval guns will play a smaller role in future amphibious operations than has been experienced in the past, because of: the assault force’s desire to retain the advantage of surprise that results from using LCACs and helicopters to land, the enemy’s adoption of a mobile defense to counter the enhanced capabilities of the
fire ships to stand off at greater distaa ^ because of the threats posed by an missiles and sea mines.
ashore to soften an entrenched de ^ In future amphibious operations, guns will undoubtedly make their gr(0 contribution when the enemy attemP the beach- * of Salerno, Italy, in 1943, naval gal
firepower needed to counter such ^ During the initial stage of the a naval guns can provide effective ^ _____ A ’ grannie flu* .1
,upPotl
day and night in all weather con ^ Future amphibious operations pro ^
need
defend against antiship niissileS ships such as Aegis-equipped class cruisers (and the proposed ^ 51-class destroyers) in the fire s^jjs
%3
carries !!;„E.a?,h destroyer in this class morethan , ^ ^-mch guns and The ASW ’ u- rounds of ammunition. ‘mP°rtant au nf arC like|y t0 Prove
Port shins n a u Realise the fire sup- Wil1 be onP ° the amPhibi°us task force °f coastal jarlnT 'n deeper water because Re • defenses.
*ips wilt3'10" °f the /owa‘class battle- Creased r;tnPr°Vlde naval 8uns with in- tke standofM-and letbality. Even from shore-has„ , lstances made necessary by 8Uns on 'lhdakntlshiP missiles, the 16-inch significant . deships can still cover a 3rea- Alth racl'on °f the beachhead kattleships°fincluding one or more desirable st°rf ''re suPPort *s certainly exist for th d * comPetition is likely to The fyav *T capabilities of these ships. SUrface acti 3nS <0 pIace its battleships in amPhibious10tn ?rouPs> which means that have t0 u - ask force commanders will *hern as fi ' Persuasive cases for using The o SUpP°rt ships.
’b-inch ordnance available for the
fithoupK n ls a high-explosive round, ^'n8 consifw'e,ty °f. new munitions are •icetile and Cred’ including a guided pro- s°nne] tbat dispense antiper-
^Ve'inch antlmaterial bomblets. The ?D-963 r!anS found on the CG-47 and °r the DDr^s 'P'US tbe ones planned fffective uJI' destroyers) can make !'°n r«und a" tlle new high-fragmenta- !Stic shane kcause °f its improved bali n the cn C round has a greater range aset^guj. CHcnt high-explosive round. A ''dopej fn Projectile has also been de- M °nds hav/ * lc *'ve-inch gun, although 'W CUrenient to be committed for pro-
• aser-guided rounds can be
Li I I
AT*- , I
4,
used to destroy “hard point” targets such as tanks and bunkers—targets that are virtually invulnerable to conventional ballistic ordnance.
Naval gun systems can be effectively complemented by use of tactical aircraft. Aircraft have the necessary range to reach targets throughout the objective area. They can strike targets near the beach, as well as those much farther inland; they can also deliver ordnance best suited for the target. Moreover, aircraft can be based on land or at sea. The capability to operate Marine Corps vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft from helicopter assault ships enhances the flexibility of at-sea basing.
Aircraft are also likely to provide the amphibious task force with one of the most useful target acquisition means available. Because modem armies are so mobile, the ability to obtain targeting information in near real-time is quite important. Without such a capability, attacking the enemy’s mobile troops, artillery, and air defense systems will be quite difficult. In addition to locating targets, reconnaissance aircraft can assess damage to ascertain which targets still need to be destroyed.-
The Navy aircraft carrier, with her array of defense, attack, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft, will play a major role in amphibious operations. Some amphibious landings probably will need to be supported by at least three carrier battle groups. Two would provide day and night air defense for the task force and its support elements. The aircraft from the third carrier would be used to strike targets ashore. The number of the
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U. S NAVY <P SOUTAR)
Marine V/STOL aircraft, like the AV-SAs based on board the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) above, provide much needed flexibility to amphibious landings. But the amphibious force is at its fighting peak when it can count on firepower from land-based aircraft.
strike aircraft on board the carrier assigned to the strike role could be increased by trading in non-strike aircraft. In addition to providing task force air defense, the F-14 fighters and F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft could escort the strike group.
If the amphibious force is to take full advantage of the aircraft at its disposal, a suitable land base must be established for that part of the Marine air wing that cannot be based at sea. More than 100 A-6Es, AV-8Bs, and F/A-18s are planned for the wing, and they can deliver far more firepower than a single carrier-based air wing.
The Marine air wing also includes a large complement of attack helicopters. Their principal mission will be to escort the troop-carrying transport helicopters. Once this task is completed, they can also be used for fire support. The dense, low- altitude air defense threat (e.g., “Strela” shoulder-fired missiles and self-propelled antiaircraft guns) likely to be found near the front lines will tend to restrict the attack helicopters to those targets that can be attacked from firing positions behind friendly lines. However, the helicopters are equipped with TOW and Hellfire antitank guided missiles, which will make it possible for them to defeat tanks
used during the initial stages of .. phibious operation when fire supP restricted to aircraft and sea-based S ^ and missiles. Once the landing h,r -r£ ashore, one of the more importan support assets available is artillery- Marine Corps’ decision to replug ^ 105-mm. howitzers wit ^
and armored vehicles operating near the forward edge of the battlefield.
In order for these aircraft to be effective, ground-based air defenses will have to be dealt with successfully. While artillery and naval guns can help by delivering suppressive fire, the aircraft probably will have to play the major role in defense suppression. Electronic countermeasures, chaff, flares, antiradiation missiles, and suitable attack profiles can be used to reduce the vulnerability of attack aircraft. In those cases where targets are beyond the range of naval gunfire, and aircraft attrition rates would be too high, other attack means will have to be found.
One means is the conventionally armed Tomahawk land attack missile suitable for attacking fixed targets at ranges of 600-1,000 nautical miles. Currently, the only conventional warhead for Tomahawk is a 1,000-pound unitary charge, but other possibilities are being investigated. These include warheads with antipersonnel and antimaterial bomblets, and airfield cratering munitions.
Because of the complexities of targeting cruise missiles, it is likely that they can best be used to attack fixed targets such as high-level command posts, bridges, permanent or semipermanent missile sites, and airfields. Missiles armed with antimaterial bomblets could attack unsheltered aircraft, while missiles armed with airfield cratering munitions could damage runways, thus preventing the enemy from launching interceptor and strike aircraft.
Current plans call for the placement of cruise missiles on board submarines, battleships, and destroyers. Because battleships and destroyers are preferred naval gunfire ships (probably the hulls that
would be assigned to amphibious operations), it follows that cruise missiles will be readily available for the amphibious mission.
The amphibious force may have access to other missile systems. Although no formal development programs are under way, a vertical-launched land attack missile has been proposed that could be used by the DDG-51- and DD-963-class destroyers. The missile would have a ballistic trajectory and would be guided to its target by an inertial navigation scheme. The missile would have a range of 50100 nautical miles and could be used to attack a variety of land-based targets. An important adjunct of this system is the synthetic aperture radar target acquisition system proposed for use with the Navy’s A-6Es. This radar could provide target updates even while the missile is in flight. Such a capability would allow the missile to be used against mobile targets.
The successful development of terminal-homing submunitions that rely on millimeter wave or infrared seekers to guide them to targets, such as tanks and armored fighting vehicles, would provide the missiles with an additional capability. A single missile could carry up to 20 submunitions, which could then be dispensed over a target, such as an assembly area or a column of vehicles. Other warheads proposed for this missile include antipersonnel and antimaterial submunitions, airfield cratering munitions, and scatter mines.
The principal drawback of missiles is cost. Because missiles are so expensive, they must be husbanded for those heavily defended targets that would inflict too high an attrition on attack aircraft.
The systems identified thus far can be
mm. laser-guided projectiles — effeC' Marine artillery the capability t0 m tively attack point targets such as ^vC and bunkers. Submunition rounds ^ increased the effectiveness of a against exposed personnel and f ^ armored vehicles. In addition,. ^ can deliver incendiary, smoke, ^0[£. tion rounds, and scatter mines. ^ over, artillery can be deployed ^ closer to the front lines than naval g ships, increasing the reach and re . siveness of an operation’s fire
Given its advantages, artillery * ej be landed as rapidly as possible. |j, artillery can be brought ashore by ^ copters, while the heavier, self-pr0?^ pieces will have to be carried on landing craft.
Figure 1 shows how these piectS to provide effective fire suP^ji
mm,
&
grate
c\ laUi>c
First, cruise missiles and vertical
land-attack missiles attack the enj ^flair bases, air defense systems. an ship missile sites. Radar-equipPe --
craft operating from standoff rangeS
vide targeting for these missions- ^ these attacks are completed, sea ^ land-based aircraft strike other imp }j targets ashore. These attacks are throughout the amphibious obj fncr> so as not to reveal the location ^
naval k
landing sites. Early on D-day,'
arc*
fire ships move into the fire supp0^ 0jj and deliver brief but intense prePa‘' Ml fire on the landing beaches and ,a ^ j
As the amphibious task (t
vades, air defense ships protect the ^
operation from antiship missiles.OnC
assault force has landed, naval ships provide fire support as n
as
Additional support is available f“"»
and land-based aircraft, and fro’j1 ^
helicopters. Finally, the role oi^6 ^
guns is eventually taken over by Corps artillery.
:nt«r
Dr. Simmons spent seven years at the e ^ i , Naval Analyses working on amphibious w , A sues. Currently, he is a member of the rese at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
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