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can’t tell a naval reservist by the c°mPany he keeps —reservists often fly °ngside regular aviators—but you can J by the aircraft he flies—the active
p guys are zooming along in today’s toP two, while the reservists are c llgging along in yesterday’s F-4s.
fmmm
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To an observer on board the USS Saratoga (CV-60) earlier this year, Naval Reserve Air Wing 20 (CVWR-20) performed like an active Navy air wing. Its fighter, light attack, photo reconnaissance, early warning, and electronic countermeasure aircraft pilots came in overhead in perfect formations, peeling off, and making flawless approaches—“on the ball”—to get the necessary ten traps (arrested landings) required for carrier qualification. During this once-a-year training exercise, the members of CVWR-20 responded like the experienced professionals they are. Even at 0400, when a nondrill man overboard alarm sounded, Reserve Helicopter AntiSubmarine Squadron 74 (HS-74) responded within minutes and rescued the sailor in heavy seas.
The same observer might have concluded confidently that if these individuals and aircraft were called upon in a national emergency, they could deploy immediately and become an effective part of America’s front-line carrier- based air force. Sadly, that is not the case.
To understand what is wrong with the Naval Air Reserve today, it is important to understand this organization and its mission. The Naval Reserve tactical air wings were established in 1970 to provide a mobilization-ready source of highly skilled personnel and combat capable aircraft. Today, that force numbers more than 1,000 officers and enlisted personnel who fly and maintain 152 aircraft divided between two air wings: CVWR-20, with squadrons located primarily in the eastern half of the United States; and CVWR-30, with squadrons in the western parts of the country. Their primary mission is to maintain personnel and aircraft in a state of readiness to deploy on board carriers during war. However, because of years of neglect by the Navy and the Congress, their ability to successfully perform that mission is substantially below that of active Navy squadrons they might be expected to augment or replace.
The problem is that in almost every mission category* the Naval Reserve carrier air wings are flying yesterday aircraft. Since World War II, the allocation of aircraft to the Naval Reserve has been from older inventories, whic were of no further use to the active force. In 1960, when the reserve fighter squadrons (VFs) were flying the su sonic F3 Demon, the active VF squadrons were flying111 supersonic F8 Crusader. Ten years later, when the reserve finally got the Crusader, the active squadrons had move to the multimission F-4 Phantom. And by 1980, when t ^ reserve had been given surplus early model F-4s, mo active fighter squadrons had transitioned to the F- Tomcat, the only aircraft employing the AWG-9/Ph°enlX air superiority missile system. Only immediately f°”0 ^ ing World War II when there was a tremendous surplus o aircraft and equipment did the two forces fly the same aircraft. ,
In other mission categories, the gap between today reserve and active aircraft is even wider. Some reser' types, which have been out of production for nearly - years, have become increasingly difficult to support- addition, they often lack the weapon systems and senso of their more modern fleet counterparts. In terms of Per formance, speed, maneuverability, and endurance, t reserve’s aircraft are less capable than the aircraft bet S flown by active Navy squadrons. As such, Naval Reser aviation lacks the tactical capability to fully meet today fleet mission requirements should it be tasked to do so m * mobilization. ,
Table 1 provides a comparison of the tactical aircra
Table 1 A Comparison of Active and Reserve Tactical Aircraft
Active Reserve Tactically Parts On Board Launch Bridle
Type (Year Introduced) (Year Introduced) Equal1 Most Carriers Required
Fighter | F-14A 1972 | F-4N/S 19742 | No | No | Yes |
Light Attack | A-7E 1970 | A-7B 1968 | No | No | No |
Photo Recon | F-14A TARPS 1979 | RF-8G 1964 | Yes | No | Yes |
Early Warning | E-2C 1973 | E-2B 1960 | No | Yes | No |
Tanker | KA-6D 1967 | KA-3B 19673 | Yes | No | Yes |
Electronic Warfare | EA-6B 1971 | EA-6A 1965 | No | No | No |
Antisubmarine Warfare | S-3A 1974 | — | — | — | — |
Medium Attack | A-6E 1972 | — | — | — | — |
‘Relates to aircraft's speed, maneuverability, endurance, sensors, and weapon systems. “First F-4 introduced to the fleet in 1961. ’First A-3 introduced to the fleet in 19^' Source: Office of Deputy Commander, Naval Air Reserve, New Orleans, LA, March 1983.
examines the Naval Reserve’s aircraft.
* l8hter: Besides the Phantom’s age and inability to fire
*1
js ^aval Reserve tactical air wings. In no single category a reserve aircraft as capable and deployable as its fleet as ,nterPart- The problem takes on additional dimensions 2(B ^oen'x missile, two reserve fighter squadrons (VF- and VF-202) fly the F-4N model powered by the J- 79GE-8 turbojet. These aircraft, known as “smokers,” emit telltale black exhausts that can be seen for 20 miles. In addition, their tired airframes are a maintenance headache. During one period in 1982, nine of VF-201’s 12 F-4Ns were grounded because of fuel leaks and wing cracks. Although the F-4Ss flown by the other two reserve fighter squadrons (VF-301 and VF-302) have been modernized with clean-burning engines and pulse Dopier look-down radar, they do not have the rate of climb or maneuverability of the F-14. After next month, only one carrier, the forward deployed Midway (CV-41), will retain F-4 squadrons.
Attack: The six reserve light attack squadrons continue to face serious and immediate problems. Unlike their more modem A-7E counterparts in the active squadrons, the reserve’s A-7B is not equipped with an automated weapons computational system, inertial navigation system, or radar update capability. The absence of these systems greatly inhibits a pilot’s ability to find the target and accurately deliver ordnance. But this is not the aircraft’s most serious problem. As of 17 June, only 22 of the reserve’s 77 A-7Bs were flyable because of replacement engine shortages. The engines have been plagued for some years by a shortage of out-of-production critical components
39
0c<*dings / September 1983
for which there are no appropriate replacements or easy fixes available. In addition, the inventory of functioning A-7B engines has been further reduced by foreign sales to Portugal.
Other: The remaining 20% of reserve air wing assets are composed of an unusual collection of aircraft that would be a welcome addition to many aviation museums. Until June, when VAW-78 received the first of four E- 2Cs, the Naval Reserve’s two early warning squadrons operated the E-2B, an aircraft that, except for its exterior appearance, bears little similarity to the newer “C” model, which incorporates a significantly improved passive detection system as well as overland radar detection capability. Another reserve aircraft that superficially resembles its fleet counterpart is the EA-6A flown by the reserve’s two electronic warfare squadrons. However, unlike the fleet’s more modern EA-6B, this aircraft’s jamming equipment lacks the power and sophistication to handle a wide variety of threats. Two interesting aircraft types round out the reserve carrier air wings. The Navy’s last operational F-8 derivative, the 25-year-old RF-8G, is flown by two light photographic squadrons. As a dedicated high-speed camera platform, the aircraft has performed its mission well, but with only ten F-8s remaining in the inventory, the Crusader is becoming increasingly difficult to support. Last, the two reserve tanker squadrons fly the KA-3B “Whale,” a much modified aircraft that originally entered fleet service in 1956 as the Navy’s first nuclear strike bomber. Although its fuel capacity makes it an ideal tanker, like the F-8, the A-3 is becoming diffica [ to support and is reaching the end of its service lde- Conspicuous by their absence in the reserve are the S- antisubmarine warfare aircraft and A-6 medium attac bomber. Although there are no current plans to procure either aircraft for the reserve, an S-3 squadron augmen unit was established this year at North Island to train reserve ground crews alongside active squadron personne • In addition to these problems, the Naval Reserve faceS serious fleet capability problems. The reserve air wing51 are now at a state of readiness to mobilize within a mont . if called, but the level of fleet readiness to accommodate reserve squadrons on board the carriers is low. Spare part* and components for almost every category of aircra flown by the reserve are currently unavailable on board t fleet’s aircraft carriers. To stock them along with the ac tive squadron inventory—even on a few carriers—-wou be expensive and require increased storage areas. In rece congressional testimony, the Naval Reserve Association (a promotional organization for the reserve) estimated tn “. . . it would take up to six months to make necessary modifications to the ship in order to provide maintenance and supply support for the Reserve Air Wing.”1 The train ing of aircraft-handling personnel on board ship is anotne problem. Three classes of reserve aircraft require indivi ual launch bridle and holdback gear. Past experience strongly suggests that it could take several weeks for aI1 inexperienced deck force to become proficient enough to launch these aircraft quickly and safely in a variety 0
No, the aircraft pictured here are not museum pieces; they are Naval Reserve aircraft—KA-38 preparing to refuel an EA-6A, above; an E-2B making a carrier landing, opposite page (top); and an RF-8G preparing to take off, opposite page (bottom).
mission environments. In addition, the Nimitz-class carriers (CVNs 68-70) as well as older carriers after complex ing their service life extension programs (SLEPs) have only a limited number of catapults that can accommodate the older, bridle-equipped aircraft.
This state of affairs leads to the conclusion that it lS doubtful—except under the most extreme circumstance’ and assuming there was plenty of time—that the Navy would ever call up and deploy a reserve air wing on board ship.
The question becomes, given the reserve’s inability to
° ars to maintain the air wings?” The answer is “peo- e- The pace of modem war under many scenarios is an^ured *n weeks. Since it takes two years to fully train aviator, it is essential that a qualified pool of available tators and support personnel be maintained to fill Sickly the fleet’s needs.
spite of the aircraft they fly in their reserve duty, the
air squadron (including first and second deploy-
adequately support the fleet, “Why spend scarce budget
In
st ° ^?s'ona* caliber of reserve aviation personnel is outset 'n^—a ^act ^at drives in large measure from the nec*'vity the Naval Reserve can employ to fill the limited fj ^er °f available squadron billets. A 1983 survey of 1^ ter and attack squadrons conducted by Chief of Naval o erve (CNavRes) provides a clear indication of their 30^ experience. Nearly 50% of all fighter pilots and 0 of all radar intercept officers had actual combat expe- henc'c. Average flying time for these pilots was 2,563 ‘‘ours with 296 carrier-arrested landings. On the attack C’ the survey revealed that the pilots averaged 2,481 262^ ^°UrS (®^9 °i which were in the newer A-7E) and Co tra?s’ and that 40% were former instructor pilots. By tacI^Par*son> it is estimated that fleet pilots in a deployed trap1 {?ersonnel) average about 1,000 flying hours and 200 parts in the active squadrons. During the 1981 Commander, Fighter Airborne Early Warning Wing Pacific fighter derby, reserve VF-302 placed second in a field of 12 squadrons (eight of which flew the faster, more maneuverable F-14) by achieving the highest number of kills of any squadron present.3 At the 1982 Felix Invitational Fighter Meet, reserve VF-201, during three days of dogfights against U. S. Air Force and Navy adversaries flying modem F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-5E fighters, achieved a 15:2 kill ratio to win first place honors.4 Considering that VF-201 flys the old F-4N “smoker,” this is further testimony to the high skill levels of the reserve crewmen.
Other reserve squadrons have performed equally well in comparison with active fleet squadrons and during annual operational readiness evaluations (OREs). During the latter, they have been consistently graded “excellent” to “high outstanding” by fleet Navy evaluators. At the beginning of an ORE conducted earlier this year, the U. S. Pacific Fleet ORE observer referred to the personnel of CVWR-30 as “. . . . some of the most talented and professional aviators in the Navy.”5 Regrettably, soon after this statement was released, the ORE was canceled because of a lack of A-7B engines.
Another indication of the reserve’s skill and professionalism is their safety record. Historically, the Naval Air Reserve has flown more safely than any other major operational command in the Navy. During the past ten years, the reserve averaged four Class A mishaps (equipment damage exceeding $500,000) per 100,000 flight hours. For the same period, the active Navy rate was 7.6.6 Considering the age of the aircraft the reserve flies and the part-time nature of reserve training, this is a remarkable performance.
The fact that some of the Navy’s most talented personnel have had to make do with second-rate aircraft for so long is no secret. In March, the newly selected CNavRes, Rear Admiral Robert F. Dunn, reviewed the tactical air wing situation before the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee and warned that the A-7B engine problem . . .will virtually put us out of the attack business by fall.”7 Other witnesses have been even more blunt. Last year, Naval Reserve Association President Curtin Coleman told members of the House Armed Services Committee, ‘‘It is criminal to expect some of the present units to go into combat with the obsolete equipment on hand.”8
Despite these statements and the support of a vocal contingent of congressmen who favor modernizing these forces, the Naval Reserve has received relatively little attention from Congress. Part of the difficulty of convincing a majority of the members of the appropriate congressional committees of the need to fund a modernization of the reserve tactical air wings has been the general image of the Naval Reserve and National Guard forces being a repository for cast-off people and cast-off equipment. In addition, some congressmen view reserve aviators as being overpaid airline pilots who fly just for the fun of it. Another factor, which was particularly apparent during the 1970s, was the complete lack of readiness displayed by six Naval Reserve tactical squadrons activated during the 1968 Vietnam recall. Because of major aircraft maintenance problems and a low level of proficiency on the part of their aircrews, these three fighter and three attac squadrons were released after one year, having never been deployed on board a carrier. Vice Admiral Allen *'/1' Shinn, Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet- commented on the recall that the reserve squadrons-
“. . . . were not combat deployable and in the case of tn
F-8, not even carrier suitable.”9 This gave the Naval Re serve a black eye. But it also brought about an immediate change in the reserve organization and training that has le to substantial improvement in readiness to a point where today, in some cases, it exceeds that for fleet air wings ashore.
But the biggest impediment to modernization of the Naval Reserve’s air wings has been the large dollar cost o^ new replacement aircraft. An estimate prepared durin-r 1982 by the Office of Chief, Naval Reserve, placed the cost for 192 replacement aircraft (including 20 A-6Es an 20 S-3As) at $5.7 billion.10 Together with a long-standing Department of Defense (DoD) policy giving budget pre " erence to active squadrons, which even under the larger Reagan defense budgets are receiving fewer new aircrat than are falling out through attrition and retirement, the Naval Reserve’s modernization faces a formidable obstacle." Dr. Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant SeC' retary for Reserve Affairs at DoD, summed up the admit1' istration’s attitude toward reserve requirements when he told members of the House Armed Services Committee last year, “. . . . there are simply not enough dollars >n the defense budget for immediate procurement of modern weapons systems for the total force. . . . The Defense Department’s policy in this regard dictates that equipment
1 Fe ^lstriFuted on 3 ‘First to Fight’ basis.”12 his policy, however, at least as far as the Naval Ree is concerned, may be changing as a result of the siavy s Pi33 to procure 1,366 F/A-18 Hornets-—the largest F/A 6 nava* 3ircraft buy proposed during this decade. The v bas been under development since 1970 as an advanced light attack and fleet air defense fighter for both and'f' Carr'cr'based and Marine Corps shore-based attack tighter squadrons. Its versatility also may allow it to e used in the “recce” role. Thus, from the standpoint of the lity, tFe F/A-18 could be used to fill nearly 85% of reserve’s current aircraft requirements.
A plan to ajjocate p/A-18s to the Naval Reserve sur- sd early last year when Secretary of the Navy John e man told members of the House Armed Services Com- th‘ttee lb3t “. . .the Naval Air Reserve will begin a shift s year from a vertical integration of our aircraft—the wctlce of putting older aircraft models in the Reserve as • t Phase newer ones into the fleet—toward horizontal p egration of the Naval Air Reserve into the Total asrce- ' Secretary Lehman, a reserve aviator qualified tjlean A-6E bombardier-navigator, probably understands reserve aircraft problem as well as anyone, ecretary Lehman also understands the economics of t1 ltary aircraft procurement and congressional sensitivity 3 substantial unit price increase on big-ticket programs. °t coincidentally, the horizontal integration idea arose e- °.n|y after the Marine Corps abandoned plans to procure r'Sht squadrons of attack-configured Hornets, and John ehman himself had approved a Navy recommendation s0t to procure the fighter variant for two carrier fighter ^quadrons. The result was a reduction by an estimated 336 'fcraft in the originally stated requirement. However, in ^stimony early last year before the House Armed Services °mmittee, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air
Warfare, Vice Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, testified that the 336 aircraft should not be deleted from the buy, reasoning that: “There are probably 150 of those that will go to the increased carrier requirements. The other 150- plus would then go to the Reserve. . . ,”14 Although some view this proposal as modernization of the reserve by default rather than design, it would go a long way toward preserving the F/A-18 unit price of $22.5 million (1982 dollars) Lehman has promised Congress.
Approval, however, is far from assured. Some congressmen view the integration plan as a slowdown in the active air wing modernization program. In addition, the F/A-18 procurement plan has run into considerable opposition from other members of Congress because of the persistent criticism that the aircraft may surpass carrier weight specifications and lack the range to meet requirements for the attack role. One of the plane’s most vocal critics is presidential hopeful Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), another naval reservist, who charged recently that the F/A-18 “. . . . has proven at least second-rate and sometimes an outright failure in every role for which it was designed.”15
Table 2 Naval Reserve Tactical Aircraft Five-Year Modernization Plan (FY 84-FY 89)
^uadron 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
—-------------------------------- i _______________ _i_________ i---------------------------------- 1_________________ i_________________ i_________________ i___
^AW—78 | ______________ i— E-2B | 1_____________ 1---------------------- 1_____________ I______________ I______________ 1_ E-2C | ||
VAW—88 | E-2B |
|
| E-2C |
v^"203 | A-7B | A-7E | ||
Va 204 | A-7B | A-7E | ||
S"205 | A-7B | A-7E | ||
v^"303 | A-7B |
| 1F/A-18 |
|
v^~~304 | A-7B | |||
Va—305 | A-7B |
| 1 F/A-18 |
|
Z"201 | F-4N |
| F-4S |
|
Vr 202 | F-4N |
| ~ 1F-4S |
|
vr""301 | F-4S | |||
Vf—302 | F-4S | |||
v2r~206 | RF-8G | |||
VFp—306 | RF-8G | |||
Va£"208 | KA-3B | |||
VaK^308 | KA-3B | |||
VAQ--209 | EA6-A | |||
309 | EA6-A | |||
Office of Deputy Commander, Naval Air Reserve, New Orleans, LA, 1983. |
While the Navy steadfastly insists that the aircraft is meeting performance requirements, administration confidence in the F/A-18 is beginning to waiver. During March, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Thayer, after giving the go-ahead for production of 176 more F/A-18s, ordered a year-and-a-half study of the required mix of F-18, F-14, A-7, and A-6 aircraft, commenting, “I do expect that this study is going to result in some changes in numbers across the board.”16 If it does, and current procurement plans are revised downward, it could mean that the major part of the Navy’s plan to horizontally integrate F/A-18s into the Naval Reserve will die. In the meantime,
funds have been requested in the Navy’s fiscal year 1984 budget to transition one reserve attack squadron to F/A- 18s, and organizational steps have already been taken to accomplish this.
Even with the planned transition of F/A-18s to one or two attack squadrons, the overall picture for reserve modernization during the next five years is not bright—see Table 2. The only “sure” thing (i.e., funded) is the transition of one VAW squadron to E-2Cs and one VA squadron to A-7Es, both of which took place in fiscal year 1983. The remaining squadron modernization programs, excepting the transition of two VF squadrons to more modem F-4s, is expected in the out years (i.e., least certain) of the plan. There are no replacement aircraft scheduled during this time period for VAK, VAQ, and VFP squadrons, and no plans to introduce medium attack (A-6E) or antisubmarine warfare (S-3A) squadrons. The current plan guarantees that the reserve carrier air wings, in terms of capability and compatibility, will continue to lag behind the fleet to the year 1990—and possibly much longer.
Fortunately, the F/A-18 horizontal integration idea is not the only plan being studied to modernize or improve the reserve’s capability. Starting in fiscal year 1984, selected reserve aircrews will begin flying F-14A, E-2C, and A-6E aircraft belonging to fleet replacement air groups as part of an expanded squadron augmentation program. This will provide training in first-line aircraft for those reservists earmarked to augment active squadrons in war. It is expected the program will be expanded in later years to include training in F/A-18, S-3, and A-7E aircraft. In addition, the Naval Reserve has been investigating a variety of other options that make do with existing assets or those that are expected to be funded during the next five years.
One plan, which has been examined periodically over the years to improve the capability of the reserve’s existing aircraft, is to replace the relatively small training carrier Lexington (CVT-16) with the larger Coral Sea (C ' 43) and simultaneously designate her as a reserve carrier. The Coral Sea is fully capable of launching all the reserve’s aircraft types, and since training carriers do no support training command aircraft, her normally empty intermediate maintenance and supply compartments com be outfitted to support the reserve’s older aircraft. This would enable a reserve air wing to fly on board and deploy within weeks of mobilization. The idea, however, lS flawed. While it would solve the compatibility problem, *j_ would do nothing to improve the tactical capability 0 many of the reserve’s obsolete aircraft. In addition, the Coral Sea has already been designated as the Navy’s firs F/A-18 carrier and is expected to be used in the fleet unti the end of the decade. .
Acquiring aircraft from the active wing inventory another possibility currently being explored to upgrade a
least a few reserve squadrons. A surplus of first-line tactical aircraft does exist in varying states of readiness as a result of the Navy’s policy of procuring roughly 1-2 times the number of aircraft needed at any one time to cover squadron requirements as well as attrition, maintenance, and training (approximately 110 aircraft per a’r wing).17 In one recent survey, nearly 40 stored F- 14s were identified as surplus, some of which could be used to upgrade one or more reserve fighter squadrons. Since the reserve rarely loses aircraft, if necessary the aircraft com
ransitioned back into the active wing inventory with of the Secretary of Defense. Even so, some y planners strongly oppose this plan because they tra 'ntain all first-line surplus aircraft are required for nsition to future air wings that will be formed. e most ambitious plan yet offered, and one which bv thIS6S 3 s'8n'f'cant improvement in reserve capability e end of the decade, is to integrate the Naval Reserve ,w*ngs into the active force. This could be accom- c^ls ed as part of the Navy’s current plan to build up to 15 tl)e battle groups by 1990, one that calls for expanding add' av^ s sea-air arm to 15 deployable carriers (with an jceltl0nal carrier in SLEP) and 14 active air wings. The ca^t0 ’ntegration proposal is that at least three of these dur *erS W’" always be in the yard for a year or longer, rln§ which at least one air wing will be ashore. The erve integration proposal envisions taking the 110 air- D| Presently earmarked in the five-year procurement tn *°r the 14th and last of the active air wings (scheduled theStanc* UP during fiscal year 1988) and allocating them to to> t0 ^aval Reserve tactical air wings. These aircraft Sch,i Cr W’t^1 ^e small number of modem aircraft already eduled for transition to the reserve would meet nearly ss9tiadron requirements (including ASW) for both re- CVW ^ w'n8s’ which would become CVWR-14 and woi 15' ^ lbe same time, the 13 active air wings 0JlU d be rotated on the 13 deploying carriers—i.e., as cae.Carr*er enters overhaul, her air wing transfers to a rerr/”r leaving overhaul. The modernized 14th and 15th tuerve air wings would maintain their present wing struc- eye and geographic location ashore and be ready, in the nt of mobilization, to deploy on the first two carriers lng out of overhaul or augment individual squadrons pother carriers.
migration would also largely alleviate the persistent of th6rn Vo'ceb by active Navy aviators that modernization c fe reserve air wings would delay delivery of new air- jj0to active squadrons. The prospect of integration, Wever, has raised other concerns from the active com- tiv n,t^’ ^ome believe the longer deployments for the ac- sch a'r Wln8s necessitated by the plan would impair andh*^ex'b>lity» reduce opportunities for training, a have an adverse impact on personnel retention. Under to^-iH-three deployment ratio typical for most carriers seaay’ the plan would require the active air wings to be at ’ °n the average, an additional nine days a year. Nevertheless, this would appear to be a manageable problem and, in as much as a reserve air wing costs roughly half as much to operate as an active air wing, the proposal offers a more cost-effective option for building up air wing assets while modernizing both reserve air wings.18
Given increasing congressional concern over large defense budgets, the Naval Reserve integration plan may be the affordable and timely means of achieving a 15-battle group force. In addition to cost savings, this proposal offers the opportunity to return some of the Navy’s most professional and experienced personnel to its first-line carrier-based air forces.
Written statement by Captain Curtin R. Coleman II, USNR (Ret.), before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 7 March 1983, p. 27.
2Office of Deputy Chief of Naval Reserve, New Orleans, LA, 1 June 1983. 3Ibid.
4Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron 201 to Commander, Carrier Air Wing Reserve 20, 1 December 1982.
Memorandum from Commander Light Attack Wing, U. S. Pacific Fleet ORE Observer to Commander, Carrier Air Wing 30, 7 March 1983.
6Tommie F. Rinard, “The New Naval Air Reserve—‘Stretching Its Wings’,” Wings of Gold, Winter 1982, p. 53.
7Written statement by Rear Admiral Robert F. Dunn, USN, before the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Naval Reserve Authorizations, Washington, D.C., 15 March 1982, p. 12.
8Written statement by Captain Curtin R. Coleman, USNR (Ret.), contained in the House Armed Services Committee Hearings Report, Washington, D.C., 25 March
1982, p. 1,102.
9Command brief given by Deputy Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force, New Orleans, LA, 22 March 1983.
10Testimony of Rear Admiral Frederick F. Palmer, USNR, contained in the House Armed Services Committee Hearings Report, Washington, D.C., 25 March 1982, p. 1,185.
1 George C. Wilson, “Navy Cites Shortfall of Combat Aircraft,” The Washington Post, 5 June 1983, p. A-5. Norman Polmar, “Naval Aviation Update,” Proceedings, February 1983, p. 120.
12House Armed Services Committee Hearings Report, 25 March 1982, p. 1,144. l3Rinard, p. 48.
,4Testimony of Vice Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN, contained in the House Armed Services Committee Hearings Report, Washington, D.C., 10 March 1982, p. 432.
l5Rick Maze, “Hart Proposes Navy Hardware Cuts,” Navy Times, 4 April 1983,
p. 10.
16Alan Jarvis, “F/A-18 Bomber OKayed For Full-Scale Production,” Navy Times, 4 April 1983, p. 23.
,7Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., May
1983.
18Coleman, 25 March 1982, p. 1,102.
Mr. Serig earned his BS and MBA degrees from New York University in 1965 and 1967. He is an economist for the Department of Transportation and specializes in ocean transportation projects. His article, ‘‘The Iowa Class: Needed Once Again,” appeared in the May 1982 Naval Review Issue of the Proceedings, and his most recent Proceedings contribution, ‘‘Where Are the Battleships?” was published in July 1983.
__________________________________________ A Chance in a Lifetime-------------------------------------------------
My shipmate and I were walking across the destroyer base in San Diego, and he wasn’t wearing his hat. Unfortunately, the captain spotted him. “You’re out of uniform!’’ he bellowed. “Go to the exec’s office and put yourself on report!’’
The next week, the captain scanned the names of sailors on report, and my shipmate’s was not among them. Immediately, the captain sought him out and raged at him nose-to-nose. “I thought I told you to put yourself on report!’’
My shipmate looked the captain in the eye and replied, “I thought I’d give myself another chance.’’
Linda Lee Olechno