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l973 ;d
traae-ori wnen uic piwnj ^ 1 1 airlm11
there is enough fuel at the other end to ge t() <Jel|V
In many cases, however, sealift will be nee linL
the aviation fuel to the far end of the avia 1 -
'South'
, l#
Sealift
By Admiral James L. Holloway III,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
There is a military role for the U. S.
Merchant Marine that cannot be performed by any other form of lift—air or surface, foreign or domestic, government or private—now or in the years to come. Today, the U. S. Merchant Marine is capable of accomplishing this function of sealift—but just barely. What lies ahead?
What must be done to ensure that our strategic plans can depend upon adequate sealift in the future?
The military strategy of the United States is a forward strategy, one which employs the oceans as barriers in our defense and as avenues for extending our influence abroad. This forward strategy depends upon overseas allies, forward-deployed military forces, and the mobility to respond militarily to crises around the world. Forty of our 42 allies are overseas. The United States maintains four Army divisions in Germany, one in Hawaii, another in Korea, and a Marine division in Japan. We have the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific and Indian oceans, and the Second Fleet available to react to crises in the Caribbean.
In time of war, our allies and overseas forces must be reinforced and resupplied. Eleven active U. S. Army and Marine divisions are currently located in the United States. If they are ever to join the fight, they must be transported overseas.
The mobility and firepower of modem ground forces demand enormous quantities of war materiel. For example, more than 100,000 tons of cargo are required to deploy a single mechanized division. When overseas, that division will need more than 1,000 tons per day delivered to sustain it in operation.
The entire strategic airlift of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the mobilization of all the available commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet would be needed to deliver 2,500 tons of military equipment to Southwest Asia per day. In addition, much of the organic equipment of modem armies, such as bulldozers, bridges, and tank retrievers, will not fit in most aircraft. Finally, airlift is a
■ the
notorious consumer of fuel. Experience during ^oVV6 Arab-Israeli War with our airlift support tor t toD <■>> that six tons of aviation fuel were required o eptab military cargo delivered in Tel Aviv. That is ^igh un trade-off when the priority of the shipmen . jjptho^e' ic. fi„>i at the other end to get tne a ..qivei
e aviation iuei m me ^------ -p
i permit the cargo aircraft to make a rou
73
ed
of
ile
fld
|6-
■ef
oe
h
"'est
world
f ~“u s petr l examPle> although producing most of th< Dr ? eum> does not have on hand large stocks o ! 'Pped out fCt|! Generally, the crude petroleum i: ecessariiv ° u area ^or refinement. Thus, there is no est Asian th a“un^ance °f aviation jet fuel in the South iK tending frCUt.c7r’ l^at region of the Indian Ocean littora e Arab.isr0ITI. 'enya t0 Pakistan and inland to embraci andable Wffe ' con^rontation states. Thus, it is under y the DoD relies upon sealift for more that
90% of the movement of war materiel overseas.
Subsequent to the Vietnam War, however, the American people demanded massive reductions in defense spending. Former President Jimmy Carter rode into office on a cut-the-military-budget platform. For most of the 1970s, fiscal austerity governed the military. With the cut in defense funds came a reduction in U. S. overseas presence and military capabilities. The U. S. Navy no longer had the numbers of ships in the fleet to sustain the previ-
Liberia
Greece
Japan
United Kingdom Norway Panama U.S.S.R.
United States3 France Italy Spain
West Germany
Singapore
P.R.C.
India
All Others4
2,271
2,928
1,762
1,056
616
2,437
2,530
578
345
622
509
473
622
695
370
7,053
4 1
5
5 10
3
2
11
18
8
12
13
9
7
17
153,342,000
69.559.000
62.001.000
42.302.000
38.575.000
38.011.000
21.757.000
21.103.000
19.539.000
17.269.000
12.235.000
11.863.000
11.754.000
10.129.0 9,221,000
116,249,000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
3 11 12
13
14
15
ous levels of force deployments to the Western Pacific. Stores of combat consumables—fuel and ammunition— were reduced to stockpile levels that would support only weeks or less of full-scale fighting.
With limited resources at their disposal, military planners concentrated on being prepared for the most critical scenario of a general war with the Soviet Union—a Warsaw Pact assault against Western Europe. With the severe limitations on our capacity for sustained conflict, a NATO war was envisioned as a short war, a conflict of only several weeks duration. So, for the last decade, we have concentrated on Europe and how to increase combat power there within the first 30 days of a war—i.e., how to introduce U. S. troops over there rapidly. Airlift, not sealift, received primary attention. With large amounts of war materiels prepositioned in Europe, supplying our troops was a lesser concern.
Further, in a NATO conflict, the commercial cargo ships of our allies would be available for the reinforcement of NATO. These two facts and the underlying assumption that a NATO conflict would be a relatively short war masked the need for adequate sealift resources for contingencies elsewhere.
But assumptions change. According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in his fiscal year 1983 annual report to Congress, a short-term war (that is less than 30 days) is no longer considered in the formulation of military requirements.
“Another fallacy in defense policy regarding conventional warfare has been the short war assumption—the
design'11® 11
notion that in planning our strategy a c0nven'
forces we could rely on the assumption Qn sense tional war would be of short duration. theref°fL
and past experience tell us otherwise. correct th's instituted changes in our defense P° icy , r policyt0 fallacy. It goes without saying that s o conflict be deter aggression fail, and a conven i ben(j eveO' forced upon us, the United States w0 •, je The t'*'0 effort to win the war as quickly as P° . { sjnCe th® wars in which the United States has both 0
beginning of the nuclear era, howeve , enemy stl long duration. Unless we are so strong we can"0 weak that we could quickly achieve v‘ hs . . . count on a war ending within a lew
short
“The efforts I have initiated to overcome the^s ^ s
fallacy—improved sustained ability , defen3
forces, a strengthened capability o ^strategy an production, and appropriate ,ihood of
tactics—are essential to reduce the able reg'0'1. They are essential in particular for forces not b> protected neither by the presence o • •
an explicit nuclear guarantee. ^
A principal difference between our c^”J,2^of f1 icy and that of the previous decade is a rc ^ the Un'te
position in world affairs. It will be t e p jonai seci^1
States to react to grave threats to our vi p>apid P
interests at the time and place they oc • art of ployment Force (RDF) will bear the major P ^
Breeding* 1 }a"e '
^fense
Stated
Policy TKUy f°r imPlernenting this aspect of our foreign west A ' . abili(y tbe RDF t0 committed to South- egy Sla bas become a centerpiece of our military strat- men’t tVlrtua|Iy all of the planning for the RDF deploy- Sec° ^outbwest Asia depends upon sealift. nUai rl6tary of Defer>se Weinberger also stated in his an- _ report to Congress:
etanh f-SCa* year 1983-87 programs place increased Asia jS1S °n °Ur ab'bty to project forces into Southwest count • 1S °Ur Pol'cy to support the independence of the vemr'fS 'n tbis Politically unstable region, and to pre- a further spread of Soviet domination. . . .
‘‘Tl
Taskep^0rnrnan<^er RDJTF [Rapid Deployment Joint of a , orceJ wiH become Commander in Chief (CINC) si0n t ni^'ec* Command for Southwest Asia. Our deci- impo ° create a new command structure reflects the °Ur ab-ance We have placed upon Southwest Asia and region' t0 deter or °PPose Soviet aggression in that “Str .
Ovemh8'0 m°bility is critical to our RDJTF planning, itiary 6 course °f a conflict, sealift would be the pri- hveredr°V'der strateg'c lift *n terms of tonnages de-
rnandcTr ^S'ral Kent J- Carroll, U. S. Navy, Com’ ^ruitary Sealift Command, has said that:
If • •
OceanSlniilarcontingency occurred today in the Indian Vietn- rec,uiring 3 sealift comparable to Korea or the and th m conR*ct’ about 350 ships would be needed— s°Urcest’’V°ldd rePresent "75% of today’s available re-
sealift is a military function and thus will be With combat operations. Allowances must be made for casualties and losses from hostile action. The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) represent our main means to resupply and reinforce our NATO allies and our own military components deployed overseas. The Soviet Union recognizes this, and its naval strategy is designed to exploit our dependence upon our SLOCs. In the case of a war with the Soviet Union, allied logistics planners anticipate that our shipping losses will be heavy. Therefore, planning for this type of general war includes a substantial margin of replacement shipping. We would expect considerably less attrition of our sealift components in a contingency operation not involving the Soviet Union, because few other nations have the long-range air and naval capability to interdict U. S. maritime forces in open-ocean areas.
In order to ensure that there are adequate sealift forces for any contingency operations, military planners tend to look at the most difficult case. For the United States, this is also one of the more probable scenarios, the deployment of the RDF to Southwest Asia.
U. S. Sealift Assets: Can the United States provide the 350 dry cargo ships required for the most probable, most demanding major contingency operation in our current military plans? There are four sources of sealift shipping within our own U. S. assets: the Military Sealift Com-
War II types and their potential for mobilization as
reliable asset in time of emergency. Our planning
come from the pool of active merchant seamen, g exists only because of the demand for civilian mar ollt generated by the U. S. Merchant Marine. There are a ^ 38,000 civilian mariners, licensed and unlicensed, m
mand (MSC), the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), which is a part of the NDRF, and the liner (general cargo ships) sector of the U. S. Merchant Marine.
Military Sealift Command: The sealift resources in the MSC are U. S. Naval Ships (USNS), consisting of six specialized cargo ships and eight tankers. The specialized cargo ships are four roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro) and two breakbulk cargo ships with hulls strengthened for Antarctic resupply. Eight fast sealift support ships will be added to this force in the next three or four years. These are high-speed (33 knot) steam turbine containerships purchased from Sea-Land, Inc. All will undergo conversion from containership to Ro/Ro configuration before becoming operational MSC sealift assets.
In addition, there are 30 dry cargo ships and 35 tankers in the MSC-controlled inventory, which are privately owned U. S.-flag Merchant Marine ships on charter to the government and being operated on berth by the MSC with military cargoes.
National Defense Reserve Fleet: As of 1 January 1983, 180 dry cargo ships (liners) were laid up in mothballs in the NDRF, which is administered by the Maritime Administration (MarAd). They consisted of 162 breakbulks, 14 containerships, one Ro/Ro, and one small coastal.
One hundred and forty ships in the NDRF are World
sealift
assets is questionable. For example, many were ex sively used before being laid up and are therefore Pron® at failure because of old age and deterioration. ^ Ships have had less hard use are equipped with machinery s as engines, winches, controls, etc.) that was manufac many years ago, and for which no replacement sPare^arj_ or support equipment exist. Admiral H. L. Shear, time Administrator, has said in a 3 March 1983 me ! “MARAD has extreme reservations as to the contm viability of many ships in the NDRF, particularly ^ with construction dates prior to 1950. . . • Howeve ^ ship 40 years of age or older can be considered ^
so indicate.” Of the 180 ships in the NDRF, ^ a construction dates of 1945 or prior, making the N progressively less useful reservoir of sealift assets. ^ In the near future, the privately owned U. S.-ftaS chant Marine will continue to be the sole source o • into the reserve sealift fleet. . ,jn„
One answer to the non-self-sustaining containership is the development of auxiliary crane ships (T-ACSs). Putting movable cranes on these ships will allow them to off-load their own cargo as well as other ships’ cargo.
L’hip
manpower pool to man about 21,500 merchant-type . _ billets in the MSC fleet and the U. S.-flag Merchan ^ rine. The 180 ships currently in the NDRF (includmS ^ RRF) have 8,100 billets, which would need to be ft e ( mobilize the entire NDRF. The number of civilian niar,(|jft billets generated by full mobilization of all reserve se- ^ assets and the existing operational units of the commercial liner fleets amounts to 29,600 billets. O y mobilization of the NDRF during a national emerge
Manning is another concern with the NDRF (me ^ the RRF). The crews for these merchant-type ^P^jch
.,0r military
•han—tbat ........ ______
a South^ °^tbe S.-flag liner fleet would be required for hons-^iT681 As*an contingency. Under the worst condi- t° shr- ^coming more probable as the NDRF continues liner f] a11 the Privately owned ships in the U. S.-flag WoiiiH uCt’ and Possibly even more than that available, Uld be required.
billet001 3ppear t0 a problem. True, as the number of to dec]'*1 °Perating U. S. Merchant Marine continues ancj lne’ civilian mariners will migrate to other trades sh0u|.| P 0yment This reduction in manpower, however, as shjbe offset by the steady decline in size of the NDRF Ref ii 3d scraPPed because of old age and deterioration, a]) of . erve Force: The RRF consists of 29 vessels, within p'Ch are cor,sidered capable of being put to sea ships •1V? t0.ten daVs- Plans are t0 expand the RRF to 77 °pe ’ l?C*uding 16 tankers. These are all ships initially tiveiy ° °y the U' S' Merchant Marine. They are relathe rn*1^ and in §ood material condition, but they lack engine° eni car8°"handlmg equipment, automation, or ^erseas'tf ^lantS t0 be cornrnercially competitive on
ships iV'FlaS Merchant Marine: About 250 dry cargo vateiv lners) make up the inventory of the U. S.-flag pri- f yi°?/ned ^6et‘ Ad’ according to the MSC, are useful
1 ,to"' sealift functions. Under the ideal condi-
F -
Vessels^ ^ources °f Sealift: Other possible sources of dePiovmust be considered in planning for a contingency U. s yment °f the RDF to Southwest Asia. They are the fleers °}vned ships of foreign registry and the dry cargo of our allies.
the des' ^Wne<^ ^b'Ps Foreign Registry: These are, as c’tizen at*on implies, commercial ships owned by U. S.
try.____ L/hbUt registered under the laws of another coun-
CaPita! ■ e['a’ Fanama’ or Honduras—because of lower f^tory an i 0Perat'ng costs and substantial financing, regu- ships i ailk taX advantages- Table 2 outlines the number of these shthe effective U- S- controlled (EUSC) fleet. Will ernen> 'FS be available to the United States during an Fiberj.enCy ,5'rd'cs P°‘nt out that in 1973, the President of tion itf maffirmed his country’s support of the Arab posi- e Arab-Israeli War by forbidding all vessels of
To quicken sealift operations, the Military Sealift Command is converting eight 33-knot SL-7 containerships to Ro/Ros, enabling each of them to carry as much cargo as 150 C-5 aircraft.
Liberian registry from delivering war supplies to the Middle East for the duration of the conflict.
The value of EUSC shipping, however, does not rest upon the responsiveness of these vessels to the U. S. Government. Requisitioning is not the major issue here, even though the availability of these foreign-flag, alien-crewed vessels is questionable. The real issue is that all but a handful of these ships are extra large bulk carriers and cannot fulfill the stated requirements outlined by Admiral Carroll for dry cargo ships. In addition, the supertankers of the flags of convenience are not suitable for the military application required for contingency operations. Tankers of about 35,000 to 40,000 gross tons, which can be used for fresh water and for refined petroleum products such as jet fuel, diesel, and ship propulsion distillate, are needed. The fleet of U. S.-owned foreign-registered ships are therefore of very limited value for military contingency planning, not because of their sovereignty, but because of the small number (25) of militarily useful dry cargo ships and tankers.
Allied Merchant Ships: For unilateral U. S. military operations such as the movement of the RDF to the Persian Gulf area, our allies cannot be relied upon for sealift support, both for political reasons and their understandable reluctance to risk entry in a conflict in which they are not militarily involved. Recent history has demonstrated that our allies, both European and Japanese, will not participate in or support a U. S. effort.
For example, none of our NATO allies assisted the United States during the Vietnam War. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, neither overflight rights nor basing rights were readily available from our NATO allies for the U. S. airlift to Israel. The best-considered judgment of military planners indicates we could expect no help from our allies in sealift support of a solely U. S. contingency operation in the Middle East or Southwest Asia.
Table 2 Effective U. S. Controlled Fleet (1982)
| Freighters | Tankers | Bulkers | Total |
Liberia | 44 | 230 | 89 | 363 |
Panama | 23 | 56 | 17 | 96 |
Honduras | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
33 |
Suitability of Merchant Ships for Military Sealift: The privately owned U. S.-flag liner fleet includes 104 break- bulk, 97 container, 18 Ro/Ro, and 21 LASH/SeaBee (barge carrier) ships. All can be employed for sealift, according to the MSC. The automated containerships are most useful when they can employ the mechanized container port facilities available in certain modern port areas, such as the major North Sea and English Channel ports
supporting our NATO allies in Western Europe and the principal ports of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Military cargo packaged in containers and shipped through these highly automated handling facilities is by far the most expeditious way of moving war materiel. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the military use of containerization. For example, forces may be deployed to an area, such as Southwest Asia, where a containerized port facility is not readily available close to the theater of operations. The Navy is undertaking several programs to improve the capability of containerships and to provide mobile port facilities. The auxiliary crane ship (T-ACS), for instance, has been developed. This program will put movable cranes on non-self-sustaining containerships, which will not only enable them to load and off-load their own cargo, but also off-load other ships’ cargo as well. The Navy is also procuring mobile piers, called elevated causeways, that can be installed within 72 hours. In addition to these programs, funding has been provided to replace obsolete water craft in the Army’s inventory and to procure facilities to off-load tanker ships and store petroleum, oil, lubricants, and water ashore. A second limitation to the military use of containerships is that much combat equipment, such as tanks, artillery, and missile batteries, is not suitable for containerization. However, the DoD is attempting to adapt more ground forces component equipment to containerization, or to provide adaptors that enable these components to be carried and handled on board a container-type vessel. Containerships are, however, very useful for quick supply because of the rapidity with which a large number of containers can be handled and because of the fast speeds of many containerships. The inability of commercial vessels to carry outsized military equipment is not a real constraint on the use of the liner fleet for sealift purposes. The MSC considers all breakbulk, Ro/Ro, and barge ships capable of handling outsized cargo. Sixty percent of the ships in the operating commercial liner fleet are one of these types. Considering that more than 90% of the 180 dry cargo ships in the NDRF are breakbulk, the ability of the commercial fleet to | and even helicopters and light aircraft, which can e towed on and off these ships. All that is needed is a ramp laid to a pier on which the vehicles can be driven to objective area under their own power. Finally, the breakbulk freighter discharges cargo ron capacious holds through ship-installed cargo booms piers or lighters for further movement. This is the slowes^ system of cargo delivery, but the breakbulk freighter ca deliver its cargo under the most primitive conditions. Future Sealift Plans: The principal drawback of seaH^ as an element of strategic mobility when compared w* airlift is the greater response time it requires. Ships much longer to get to the theater of operations than aircr^ do. However, several things are being done to make sea ^ more responsive. The first of these is the acquisition eight 33-knot Sea-Land SL-7 containerships and their co^ version into Ro/Ro configuration for the fast depl«yn^.jj of U. S.-based forces. After conversion, each SL-7 carry as much cargo as 150 C-5 aircraft. The eight together will be able to load or off-load in one day , majority of the unit equipment—tanks, artillery, w ee . vehicles, helicopters—needed for two Army heavy anized or armored divisions. They can deliver these ^ goes to Europe from the East Coast of the United States ^ four days and to the Indian Ocean from the West Coas 11 days. se The second innovation introduced to decrease resP^s^ time is the concept of prepositioned ships (T-A ^ which are dedicated commercial-type ships loaded ^ ground and Air Force support materiel and combat sumables and prepositioned at sea near potential tro ^ sites. As many as 15 merchant ships will eventua J built or converted to Ro/Ro configuration, manned civilian seamen, and chartered by the Navy. When P.^ positioned around the world, they can be loade . enough cargo for three brigade-sized Marine air-gr task forces (MAGTFs) consisting of 46,000 ITiarlpre. Even today, in a program known as the Near Term positioning Force, the Navy has 17 chartered mete c°u"tesv oF . |
handle outsized military cargo should not be a problem. Barge carriers discharge their cargo in handy-sized barges, which can be handled by virtually any kind of port facility or further distributed through waterways to more remote inland sites for unloading closer to military positions. Barge carriers can carry floating derricks available | -a*- IBSfcUl .■ . 4\ |
in every major U. S. port, transporting such equipment to overseas locations where they would provide excellent |
|
floating discharge equipment for non-self-sustaining containerships as well as heavy lift discharge from inadequately equipped ships. These carriers can also transport and self-unload special barges, tugs, and other uniquely configured floating installations, such as desalinization plants, in addition to having generic lighter systems. Ro/Ro ships are ideally suited for the movement and delivery of the organic equipment of modem ground forces such as tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, tmcks, trailers, bulldozers, earth movers, tank retrievers, | -i' 4}yjj |
| .. ........... / nme 1^ |
•PS manned by civilian crews positioned in the Indian cean near Diego Garcia (Admiral Carroll, Congressional aternent, 15 March 1983). These ships contain enough ll^ment and suPPlies for a brigade-sized MAGTF of ’ 00 marines and some sustaining support for selected y r orce and Army units of the RDJTF. The proposing11 shiPs- although with less speed than the SL-7s, can n ezvous with the deploying forces as they arrive in the eater of operations.
t[)The high speed of reaction provided by the SL-7s and r£e PrePositioned slower ships essentially eliminate the ^uirement for high speed in the sustaining lift—that q 8‘stic pipeline needed to provide the required 1,000 tons f0Car?° Per day per deployed division of an expeditionary PlFh m theater- This sustaining lift can then be accom- beS ^ seahf^’ which has the advantage over airlift cause of its ability to deliver vast quantities of outsized be placed upon (actors such as total numbers of ships, total capacity, time required to mobilize or to sail with the military cargo, and the reliability of ships’ propulsion plants and equipment. Concern for the distribution of liner configurations—breakbulk, barge carrier, Ro/Ro, and container among the sealift fleet should be secondary, since neither the actual theaters of operation nor the available port facilities can be specified in broad sealift planning.
r"ctcd
lnRs / June 1983
the i\jS ^reat ^stances. The U. S.-flag liner component o ff0 ^rc*tant Marine, the RRF, and the available ship: of - tae NDRF can make up the sustaining lift. The speee of ese ships will be adequate to sustain the steady flov ar materiel into the overseas theater, the t.lle vari°us types of general cargo freighters ir Whe ' hner fleet has its own military use. Therefore flag1?. aPPraising the capabilities of the operating U. S. gene 'ndustry and the reserve cargo fleet to fulfill the ra re9uirements for strategic sealift, emphasis should
A Sealift Scenario for the RDF in Southwest Asia: How would sealift play in a limited engagement in the Indian Ocean? As soon as the President decided to commit elements of the RDF, heavy equipment would be loaded on board the SL-7 fast deployment ships, which would then be gotten underway at high speed for Southwest Asia. If there were no threat of hostile reaction to the introduction of the RDF into the objective area, the troops with side
Sealift means getting the “beans, bullets, and black oil” to where the troops are, but it also means getting the troops there. A deployment of major elements of the RDF can only be done by a U. S.-flag Merchant Marine of current size and capacity.
arms and air transportable equipment would be airlifted from U. S. bases to airfields located near available seaports in theater, timed to arrive with the SL-7s. After landing, the troops would pick up their heavy equipment from the SL-7s.
In situations where the security of the in-country airport or seaport could not be assured, marines would be landed to establish secure perimeters around the airhead and seaport. Both the Sixth and Seventh fleets maintain at least one Marine Amphibious Unit in assault configured shipping in their deployed forces.
When the troops are ashore and married up with their heavy equipment, they will immediately commence to draw on combat support stocks unloaded from the prepositioned ships that have been waiting in the area. Because these prepositioned ships carry only enough supplies for 30 days, a sustaining sealift must be established to support the RDF forces after this initial 30-day period.
Here, the requirement for the U. S.-flag liner fleet becomes critical. As previously pointed out, Admiral Carroll stated that about 350 dry cargo ships would be necessary to sustain an RDF force in a contingency operation in Southwest Asia. There are six dry cargo ships in the MSC and 29 ships in the RRF. Not more than 100 ships in the NDRF would probably be suitable to be put into an operating status, and the overhauling, refurbishing, and manning of these old vessels would take up to six months and more. This amounts to a maximum of about 150 ships from U. S. Government assets. For a unilateral U. S. military contingency operation, we cannot plan upon the availability of the commercial ships of our allies, and only a small number of the U. S.-owned foreign registry ships are suitable for this dry cargo lift.
Hence, 200 or more dry cargo ships will have to be provided by the operating liner fleet of the U. S.-flag Merchant Marine. This requirement can only be met by requisitioning almost the entire privately owned operating liner fleet.
Alternatives to the Merchant Marine: Four principal options for providing sustaining military sealift exist:
► A U. S. Government fleet of operating sealift vessels
► A U. S. Government reserve fleet of sealift vessels in mothballs that can be activated in time of a crisis
► Privately owned U. S.-flag commercial shipping that can be chartered or requisitioned
► A combination of the foregoing
The first alternative would be expensive, considering the costs of procurement of modem sealift ships in the numbers required, maintenance of the ships in an operating status, and full-time crewing of these vessels. For ex
ample, the government is spending almost $3 billt°n acquire 12 ships for prepositioning combat materiel in Indian Ocean and to acquire and convert the eight 5 to fast deployment ships. In comparison, between and 1979, 83 commercial ships with military sealift caP^ bilities were built in U. S. shipyards for U. S. Merc ^jl- Marine operators with a government subsidy of $1 ° lion. This subsidy not only ensures that U. S.-flag chant Marine ships are available for military duty, u also maintains the U. S. shipbuilding industrial baseTh6 mobilization needs in time of a national emergency- annual operating costs of the 20 MSC sealift vesse s be about $286 million; the government spent $333 mi in subsidies to support the operation of 159 Pr,va ^ owned merchant ships. These 159 commercial baersa all available on short notice for military service duri national emergency. . tj,-
Maintaining a reserve fleet of sealift vessels in ^ balls entails some inherent limitations. First, the m balled ships must be maintained in such good ma■ ^
condition that they can, after mobilization, depen ^ move cargo without frequent breakdowns. $econ > ships must be of fairly recent construction so that sp^ ^ parts and support equipment are still available. 1 1 ’ e pool of trained mariners upon which to draw to man vessels must be available. The NDRF provides a g illustration of these limitations. ^ ^er.
The third alternative, relying on the U. S.-flag te chant Marine, is not practical because there are ina eq ^ numbers of ships to satisfy the military requiremen ^ addition, many dry cargo ships may no longer be com ^ dally competitive on the free trade routes of the wor ^ may still have a large sealift potential. Without a TC ^ sealift fleet, these ships would be sent to the breakers g sold abroad. Thus, a national reserve fleet of carg° uld that have outlived their commercial usefulness bu be activated for military duty is necessary. a this
The only real solution is the fourth alternative, an jj^y is, in fact, the current approach to the strategic nu sealift program.
The Future of the U. S.-Flag Merchant Marin. ate Merchant Marine must not be reduced in size, or a sealift will not be available for current war plan req ^ ments. The interests of the DoD would be best serV^oUt expanding the liner fleet from its present level to
trade* tbrouSb normal growth stimulated by increased conf n l^S Wa^’ 3 maj°r commitment for sealift in a itv !fng,ency °Peration would not destroy the future viabil- j° tbe ^ ^ Merchant Marine, thew i ’ tbe S‘ Merchant Marine was the largest in rank °r ^ 3°d carr*ed 42% of our foreign trade. Today, it liner ln s'ze and carries less than 4%. Although the are ^ ^ henlthiest and most competitive sector, they cre^3^*11^ 0n^ ^7.5% of our foreign liner trade, a de- of more than 30% from 1977. titjo e 01051 ser*ous impediments to more effective compe- fla„ f|Wltb foreign carriers are the high costs of the U. S.- cohe 6et’ the restrictive u- s- laws, and the lack of a 39 rent ff- S. cargo policy. The annual labor cost for a wjfjj ? S. crew is about $8,200 a day; compare this similar °Ut f°r a 33-man crew on a foreign ship of
size. A 40,000-ton containership built in a U. S
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to f0ra8 shipping under certain circumstances relating °n„rplgn trade- These exemptions were reaffirmed by *1oweveSS ln a^ter extensive review. In recent years, of the6r’ court decisions have tended to erode the primacy acts •pant0rust immunity provisions established by these Penan;0 a^’ tbe threat of criminal prosecution and triple many a . ltr u- 6.-flag operators from considering bile’s Ctlons.that would strengthen our Merchant Ma- MerchC0ITIfetdlve Posibou- Primacy of the Shipping and Paced1 ^arine acts needs to be reaffirmed. ships h Wl,lh tbese Problems. U. S.-flag merchant 'vorld\aVC °Cen disappearing from the trade lanes of the chant M°CeanS 10 increasing numbers. The U. S. Mer- re8ain anne.must reverse the decline of its industry and ity adea P°s,tion of economic strength and strategic capac- rtientv; ^r?6 to the industrial and military require-
If th rthe United States-
f°reifir,e , -lner ‘udustry alone could increase its share of the ■ner trade of the United States to not less than
the FC°pS a^out $^0 million; a similar ship constructed in have? ^aSt C°StS ^ million. In the past, these high costs hetw Cen °^set by subsidies, which pay the difference HoWgen f°reign and U. S. labor and construction costs. ferent'T’ S10Ce ^81> there have been no construction dif- <^o tal subsidy funds in the President’s budget.
°nes "f V'. S\ Hner companies, especially the smaller cause dlfflcu,t t0 survive even with subsidy, be-
hjg^i ey are unable to make the capital investment in the and fa I|!ecbanized, advanced cargo-handling equipment ping p °'es required to be competitive with foreign ship- s°lidat Urttlermore’ U. S. companies cannot merge, conduct'6’ °r P°°* tbe‘r assets or services to achieve the In • !,T 10 overhead and economies of scale, and o 'ti0n t0136108 b‘8b,y subsidized by its government PercenPterat'ng uoder national policies that reserve large foreig 3§eS °f tbat nation’s trade for its own ships, the c° ° c°mpetition can generally merge to form larger form -ni?S t0 f00' capital for investment. They can also ran„emC °Sed con^erences’” which are cooperative ar- ar>titru m tS Wldl S6t rates aod coordinated schedules. The ators f aWS tbe United States prevent U. S.-flag oper- doi°8 eitber °f these.
to fj ^ ‘PPing Act of 1916 provided antitrust immunity Jr ag shipping under certain circumstances relating Conore'gn. trade- These exemptions were reaffirmed by
40%, the size of the liner fleet could be expanded so that it would be fully capable of carrying out the military sealift requirements of our defense plans.
To achieve this economic turnaround would require, as a minimum, three things: regulatory reform, fleet modernization and replacement, and increased cargoes.
Regulatory reform would be accomplished through legislation that would remove the restrictive burdens currently imposed on U. S.-flag carriers by redefining conference activities and providing antitrust immunity.
Fleet modernization requires construction of new vessels or modification of existing ships to provide replacement vessels with significantly improved efficiencies in propulsion systems, manning levels, and cargo-handling equipment. In the absence of a construction differential subsidy, the solution lies in the authority to build or convert commercial ships overseas.
Although increases in cargo share can be expected from the improved competitive position resulting from regulatory reform and fleet modernization, the U. S.-flag fleet must still compete with foreign carriers that benefit from national policies affording various forms of cargo preference and subsidization. The answer appears to be a system of bilateral agreements such as those now in effect with Brazil and Argentina, which reserve 40% of the trade for each partner and the remaining 20% for cross-traders.
Our national security is based on a system of foreign alliances strengthened by overseas-deployed U. S. armed forces during a national emergency. A main thrust of current U. S. policy is to have our allies and potential adversaries alike believe that the United States intends to respond to crises that threaten our vital national security interests, using the necessary military force to resolve those crises in our favor before they can develop into shooting wars. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, the centerpiece of U. S. crisis response and intervention capability has been the RDF. The capability of the RDF to deploy to Southwest Asia has become the symbol of the Reagan Administration’s resolve to react with force to perceived threats to the long-term security interests of ourselves and our allies.
A deployment of major elements of the RDF can only be accomplished by employing the U. S.-flag Merchant Marine. The nation’s ability to execute the most likely of our conventional contingency plans depends upon a U. S.-flag Merchant Marine of current size and capacity. Any significant diminution in the Merchant Marine would hinder deployment of the RDF, resulting in a critical threat to the credibility of U. S. foreign policy.
Admiral Holloway retired in 1978 as the 20th Chief of Naval Operations after 39 years of active service in the U. S. Navy. His duty assignments include destroyers in the Pacific during World War II, a jet fighter pilot in the Korean War, commanding officer of the USS Enterprise (CVAN- 65), Commander of the U. S. Seventh Fleet during the Vietnam War, and duty as Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Holloway currently serves as President of the Council of American-Flag Ship Operators (CASO), a national association representing a majority of the owners and operators ot U. S.-flag liner vessels engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States.
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'8s I June 1983