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Contents:
Britain’s Choice of Threats Lessons of the Falklands' Crisis Eyewitness
A Basis for Tactical Thought
Attack Submarine: The Hidden Persuader
The Dwindling Muster
Thank God for the Sitting Ducks
CVNs Forever! Forever?
“Britain’s Choice of Threats”
(See J. Cable, pp. 26-32, August I982 Proceedings)
Admiral Sir James Eberle, Royal Navy, The Commander-in-Chief, Naval Home Command—Sir James Cable points out with compelling logic the difficulties and risks that the Soviet Union would face if it sought to initiate an armed attack on the Central Front in Europe. If such an attack is unlikely, then, he argues that high priority does not need to be given to the maritime defense of trans-Atlantic reinforcement and resupply of shipping. He does, however, point to the danger of inadequate trans-Atlantic maritime defense leading to the “decoupling” of the United States from Europe. This suggests that maritime defense in the Atlantic should be seen more as a deterrent task than as a defense task—although there is clear danger in separating these two tasks too widely. Effective deterrence must depend upon a perceived political resolve to uphold an interest and the availability of credible military force to defend that interest.
But the main thrust of Sir James’s article highlights the role of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of political coercion and the role of the surface ship and the special responsibilities of European navies in providing an appropriate means of Alliance response. The scenario that he chooses, the threat of Soviet action in northern Norway, can be criticized on the grounds that the linkage to the Central Front is so close that this situation is almost as improbable as is direct action on the Central Front itself. But then this scenario is only one of many that could have been chosen to illustrate the important principle that the Soviet Navy’s political role in peace is a more likely threat for us to have to counter than is its military role in war.
What Sir James does not point to in this article is the parallel problem of the growing global nature of Soviet military power. The overall picture of international relations in the world today is one of increasing regional instability; a weakening hold by the Soviet Union over its “empire;” a continuing poor economic performance by the Soviet Union, particularly in the field of agriculture; and a buildup of Soviet global military capability, the pace of which shows no sign of slackening. Taken separately, these factors would be a cause of worry. Taken together, they represent a challenge which the West can ignore at its peril.
“Lessons of the Falklands’ Crisis”
(See D. A. Dyer. p. 90. July I982: B. Baker and S. Costa, pp. 81-86. August 1982 Proceedings)
Brigadier General James B. Soper, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—As experts and amateurs alike dissect the nasty little Falklands "war,” it is the infantry, the “gravel cruncher.” who is overlooked. That’s the way it has always been. The key issue in the Falklands operation that seems to have eluded the press, some congressmen, and many writers is that an old-fashioned amphibious assault operation won the war! The Argentine position was doomed once the landing force was firmly ashore, and the enemy was confined to a port with his back to the sea.
From the beginning of that strange South Atlantic conflict, interest focused on Exocet missiles, aluminum superstructures, computerized fire control centers, and jump-jet fighters. The biggest arguments swirled around Britain’s lack of sealift and airlift capacity. Analysts reexamined the British budget cuts that mothballed big carriers, along with the radar planes capable of detecting low-flying jets carrying ship-killing, computerized rockets. But all that is secondary to the infantry, the footslogger, the 19- year-old private led by the 25-year-old sergeant commanded by the 42-year- old colonel.
All of those fine ships and planes flying the Union Jack had a single mission: they existed solely to land the infantry. And all the derring-do of the Argentine pilots had but one purpose: stop the British fleet from landing the infantry.
The British won because their soldiers, the lowest rung on the military ladder, were simply damned good. They conducted most of their operations at night, the toughest time of all to conduct tactical maneuvers over unfamiliar terrain. They were supremely self-confident and knew that being attacked at night is an unsettling experience even for seasoned soldiers. For raw recruits like the Argentines, it proved to be terrifying.
Despite the technological advances in warfare so noticeable in the South Atlantic and the Middle East, the lot of the foot soldier hasn’t changed all that much from the days when Greek hoplites camped around the walls of Troy. He sleeps on the ground, shivering when it’s cold and sweating when it’s hot. His load is always too heavy. And people are always shooting at him—not his ship or his plane, him.
Nor has his mission changed one bit from that distant beginning: Take and hold enemy-occupied territory. You can't do that with a B-l bomber or a Nimitz carrier or a Trident sub. “Take and hold” is the exclusive mission of the lowly infantry.
There is much that can be done to support the man who goes the last 100 yards to victory, and it often appears that such support is lost in a blizzard of sophistication and research more devoted to affect than effect. The one support item that did work for Britain was also old fashioned—naval gunfire. The small 4.5-inch naval guns— the largest available—did a yeoman’s job, and they paved the way for the amphibious landing that won the war for Britain. However, against another, more skillful, determined, and logistically supported enemy, the technique might remain the same but the naval gunfire would have to be greatly increased in volume and weight of metal, i.e., the 16-inch naval rifles would be essential and decisive. This is especially true in the early stages of the operation. Studies and experience have clearly shown that the Iowa-class battleship can put more weight of metal on target within minutes than the largest aircraft carrier flying air sorties for hours on end. This is not to deride aviation, naval or otherwise, but aviation is not a complete substitute for naval gunfire. All of the supporting systems will help the infantry, but when the chips are down, it will be naval gunfire, especially the 16-inch rifies, that will permit the troops to achieve success in an amphibious assault against a well-disciplined enemy.
In this era of maneuver warfare, sterilized computer determinations,
and sophisticated techniques, the awful truth that an amphibious assault, naval gunfire, and plain old fire and maneuver by well-trained infantry won a war must grate terribly on certain experts who have been predicting the demise of every aspect of military operations except some form of sterile exchange in which no one gets their hands dirty. There are still a lot of hard targets down the road, and this nation must be prepared for them- History does repeat. Whatever can be done to support the man who goes the last 100 yards to victory should be the first priority—not the last!
“Eyewitness”
(See R. Mason, pp. 40-45, June 1982; Y.
Kawamura, pp. 80-83, July 1982; G. D.
Bond, p. 86, August 1982 Proceedings)
EGeneral Prize
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4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author's name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name and address of the essayist, the title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Editorial Board has made its selections.
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Henry Milanski—Thank you for publishing this story. Speaking as a military historian, it is excellent “I was there” articles such as this that help to clear up a great deal of mysteries concerning incidents in both war and peace. I hope that this article will serve as a spur to others to finally part with
their ‘now it can be told” stories, be- ■°re it is too late.
^^ Proceedings is providing both he military historian and the casual reader with a valuable forum. 1 hope you will continue to do so. History is o° important to have to rely on spec- Uation and reasonable deduction. Eyewitness” has proven once again hat even the official declassified rec- a‘d F. Hughey, ex-chief aviation °rdnanceman—As a former crewman ln *he USS Lexington (CV-2), I often P°ndered what disaster had befallen ommander Seligman, our XO. He was a hne, competent, well-liked officer. I ^ew he must have transgressed hhehtily to have disappeared from
sight.
A Basis for Tactical Thought”
(See T. C. Taylor, pp. 27-33, June 1982 Proceedings)
C°tnmander K. A. Lee, U. S. Navy, bommanding Officer, USS Gato (SSN- aJ—I was surprised and dismayed
upon reading Mr. Taylor's article to note that it was an award-winning essay. Mr. Taylor’s opening quote— “Gunnery, gunnery, gunnery, all else is twaddle. Hit the target.” (Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher, 1914)— certainly caught my attention and showed promise of a substantive article. Alas, the remaining 99% of the presentation proved to be twaddle.
Mr. Taylor’s few-thousand-words construction of his perception-decision approach to tactical thought could have been, and should have been, reduced to: “List all the things you know about you and the enemy; then list all the things you suspect to be true about you and the enemy; then list all the things you know you don’t know about you and the enemy; then react accordingly.” This is not a bad approach to organizing one’s tactical plans; the listing process can be a quick mental review or a paper process depending upon how imminent is the enemy encounter. But it is just an approach or basis for tactical thought and, 1 maintain, is an incredibly obvious process when reduced to plain English. Mr. Taylor presented a basis for tactical thought as promised in his essay title;
but he also took his profoundly simple basis and thoroughly submerged it in grandiose, postgraduate jargon.
Having engaged in tactical thought for hours on end in real and exercise situations, 1 look forward to some substantive ideas on the topic and know I’ll find some in future editions of the Proceedings.
High on my list of personal lessons learned in tactical thought while commanding a nuclear attack submarine is the need to engage . . . press the attack! . . . seize the initiative! . . . (initiative is not handed out—it is taken)
. . . stop analyzing and shoot the S.O.B.! We are endowed by our environment with a nature to observe and react, and 1 find the most fruitful area to discuss in tactical thought is how to make the other guy react. It is done by taking charge of the situation, and the means of how to do this is the basis for a winner’s tactical thought. I would enjoy opposing a group of combatants who include “perception- decision” in their vocabulary.
(Continued on page 78)
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“Attack Submarine: The Hidden
Persuader”
(5pp A. Van Saun, pp. 100-103, June 1982;
W. J. Ruhe, p. 25, and P. F. Freeman, pp.
74-76, August 1982 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Van Saun’s contribution is a good one, and no doubt will arouse plenty of controversy. However, like many naval officers, he is looking for an absolute in naval forces. History has shown us there are really no absolutes in life or in naval forces. I did my best to convince Admiral Rickover that "weapons make a warship.” The incongruity of having a submarine that can go around the world without requiring refueling but with only 26 weapons is ridiculous. I wonder where Commander Van Saun was going to get his replenishment weapons!
It is hard for me to see how the attack submarine does away with surface ships. He makes a great point of our being dependent on foreign economic resources. How do we obtain them with submarines? The loose use of the words “sea control” is meaningless. Like control of the air, it is a transient situation and depends on many variables. Attack submarines cannot control the sea! The mission of the U. S. Navy is to defeat the Soviet Navy, wherever and whenever it threatens the national objectives of the United States. It calls for well-balanced naval and maritime assets. There are too many advocates of certain types of ships or aircraft who fail to see that the synergism of all types is required for our objective at sea.
His plea for having a Navy of just large numbers of attack submarines misses the point of the objective of the Navy. The carrier didn't take the place of the battleship; the airplane changed the face of warfare at sea. The carrier is an airfield in order to get the aircraft at sea. The advent of the jet engine and long-range, land-based aircraft has made it mandatory that the carrier be a long way at sea. What could an attack submarine accomplish against long-range, land-based aircraft equipped with air-to-surface missiles that could interdict all surface shipping for at least 1,000 miles at sea? 1 certainly can see many places in the world that this tactic could be employed to interdict our surface shipping, bringing us those important economic resources the commander speaks about. They would be more lethal against those ships than an attack submarine. They are able with their speed and firepower to pretty much sink any such surface ships they see that are not protected by modern sophisticated jet fighters armed with air-to-air missiles.
The commander's statement that submarine offensive systems have increased dramatically is not borne out by facts. The Mark-48 torpedo is still the basic weapon of our SSNs. It goes back to the late Fifties, when I was Deputy CNO for Development, and the weapon was called the EX-10. The Harpoon was started as an ASW weapon for the P-3 against surfaced submarines in the early Sixties. It is now in the fleet’s inventory, but it is only a 60-mile range missile. The Tomahawk will come into the inventory in 1983. As to fire control, we have had no real dramatic advances. Our submarines still have only four torpedo tubes. The problems posed by the present limitations make a very complex combat situation for an SSN skipper. As in the air battle, the submarine always has the friend-or-foe problem. This probably would not exist in an all-out war, which is the least probable, but since World War II, every war or incident we have been involved in has brought very specific rules of engagement that never permitted firing at any target unless it was positively identified. This is not a simple problem, and it has not been solved.
The commander’s argument on the use of the conventional submarine in our naval forces is a sound one. We would have had them a long time ago if it hadn't been for Admiral Rickov-
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SHIP (Hull # and year aboard) AIRCRAFT (Type and year) er’s opposition. There is no question on the superiority of the nuclear submarine, but it is quite apparent from the constraint of funds that we can never get an adequate submarine force just building Los Angeles (SSN-688)- class submarines. There are many tasks which conventional submarines and their ability to be the quietest of all submarines can exploit. We are the only nation with nuclear submarines that doesn’t also operate a viable force of nonnuclear-powered submarines.
The commander’s belief that the carrier concept is bankrupt shows he still doesn’t reckon with the use of aircraft at sea. His article does not address the problem of the interface of land and sea, such as is the case in amphibious warfare operations. His attack submarines certainly couldn’t land our Marines in any projection of power role.
The commander’s criticism of our submariners is a valid one. They haven't fought since World War II. As he so truly says, our submariners today are “all eyes aft” with no exposure to the Navy-wide problems. I was present at a meeting in the Secretary of the Navy’s office during Admiral Burke’s tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, when candidates to be program manager of what was to be the Polaris program were discussed. Also present were Secretary Gates, Admiral Burke, Admiral Grenfel, Admiral Rickover, and Secretary Wakelin. Admiral Rickover’s recommendation was not to give it to a submarine officer because they lacked imagination! The secretary evidently listened to his advice. Admiral Raborn. an aviator, was selected for the job.
This is a good article for the Institute to publish because it brings to light many divisions of thought on the makeup of our naval forces. We must realize there is no simple solution to the problems that our Navy faces if it is to be in a position to accomplish the objectives of the United States across the oceans of the world.
I join Admiral Leverton in his congratulatory remarks (June 1982, page 21) about the Naval Institute. A job well done!
Lieutenant Commander Bruce B. En- gelhardt, U. S. Navy—Commander Van Saun’s article is both articulate and provocative. However, his charge that today’s nuclear submariners “lack tactical perspective and a thorough
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knowledge of naval warfare” is absolutely false.
For the most part, the nuclear submariners have developed, operationally tested, and perfected the modern submarine tactics and weapon sys-
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terns which Commander Van Saun so eloquently espouses.
Nuclear submariners developed modern submarine sonar search and localization tactics and strategies.
Nuclear submariners developed modern at-sea sound-quieting techniques and noise-reduction programs on nuclear submarines.
Nuclear submariners developed and implemented virtually all the complex and dangerous under-ice tactics.
Nuclear submariners are responsible for the majority of the Mk-48 torpedo’s tactical development and employment on nuclear submarines.
Nuclear submariners have developed all of the tactics for the Harpoon and Tomahawk cruise missiles for submarine operations.
During the past two decades, nuclear submarines have received numerous commendations for operations of extraordinary importance to the defense of the United States, up to and including the prized and rarely awarded Presidential Unit Citation. I can assure the commander that the officers and men of these submarines did not receive these commendations for being “superb nuclear engineers” who are “poorly schooled in general submarine capabilities and potential.”
Nuclear submariners, in addition to being superb nuclear engineers, are also superb tacticians. Nuclear submarine excellence in engineering is not at the expense of tactical and operational excellence, but in addition to it.
The U. S. Navy has learned the hard way that sound tactics and effective weapons are useless if its ships cannot propel themselves to within their weapons’ range of the target, and even more so if their crews cannot maintain ships’ systems fully mission capable. With the help of outstanding people, sufficient budgetary and material support, lots of hard work, and superior engineering management, the nuclear submarine force has set the Navy standard for ability to deploy, fully mission capable, to all parts of the world and remain on station, totally independent, and submerged for long periods of time. To imply that this standard has been set by officers “poorly schooled in general submarine capabilities and potential” is contradictory.
The poor material conditions and state of engineering readiness of our diesel submarines at the outbreak of
World War II is a matter of record. In Clay Blair, Jr.’s chronicle of the diesel submarine effort (Silent Victory), numerous submarine engineering failures are cited both before and after World War II. It is this heritage, and not just nuclear power, which has mandated the need for emphasis on solid engineering expertise in the submarine force today. Engineering plant performance is the foundation on which the tactics and weapon systems are built. Commander Van Saun seems to ignore the fact that the shift to technologically sophisticated diesel submarines manned by his brand of superb tacticians would also be accompanied by serious and complex technical problems. He would have us believe that our need for an emphasis on the less glamorous, mundane details associated with solid engineering management would disappear if we could take the nuclear away from the submarine.
Commander Van Saun would also have us believe that large numbers of nuclear submarine officers are resigning because they “do not like the limits placed on their creativity by the nuclear power community.” There is no evidence to support this. During the past five years, nuclear submarine officer retention (30-35%) has kept pace with or exceeded that of the other unrestricted line communities. The shortages of nuclear submariners can be attributed primarily to the almost exponential building rate of new submarines, and to the limited numbers of quality people available for accession into the program. In perpetuating the myth that we are locked into an “all-eyes-aft” philosophy. Commander Van Saun does a great disservice to those concerned with recruitment of quality nuclear submariners.
Diesel submarines became extinct because they were too slow, too vulnerable to detection, lacked endurance, and did not have a viable mission in the modern Navy. It is possible that, like the battleships, there may be a need to resurrect diesel submarines in a form similar to the commander’s SSDX concept. This decision should be based upon the sound tactical judgment and vast operational experience of nuclear submariners. The case to build diesel submarines again should not be made by impugning the professional reputation of the Navy’s nuclear submarine officers.
is on target in identifying the current propulsion system focus as the basis for the present malaise in submarine force structuring analysis. He is off the mark, however, in his assertions that the submarine, or any other single platform type, is the dominant seaborne weapon system around which
Commander H. D. Connell 11, U. S. Navy, Prospective Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron 271—Commander Van Saun makes some excellent points regarding the use, type, and number of submarines necessary to compete with the Soviet Navy for control of the seas. I also suspect he
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In the areas of submarine construction priorities and submarine operations in a sea control role, his analysis must be applauded for its clarity and common sense approach. His handling of submarine capabilities within the broader context of general naval warfare, however, and the extremely jaundiced appraisal of the aircraft carrier’s utility deserve wider treatment than that offered through the eyepiece of a periscope.
Two basic.flaws are apparent in the undersea perspective. The first is a failure to appreciate the need for flexibility in naval forces. Our surface ships, submarines, and aircraft must be able to deal with a'host of operational scenarios, not just the worst cases of being prepared “to prevent the Soviet Navy from carrying out its missions.” The author seems preoccupied with the Soviet threat to our sea lines of communication (SLOC)- Although geography and the present size of the U. S. fleet merit obvious concern, defense of the SLOCs is not the only factor upon which to structure our naval forces. To be really cost- effective, naval platforms must be capable of responding to multiple mission tasking. How many times since World War II has the U. S. Navy been confronted directly by a challenge to our SLOCs by the Soviet fleet?
How many times has the U. S. Navy been tasked to provide close air support, air reconnaissance, interdiction, or presence? One wonders just how Commander Van Saun’s fleet of “cost- effective sea control units that can operate independently and be widely dispersed” would go about recapturing the Falkland Islands or evacuating personnel from Beirut.
How many times would an invisible and unconfirmed presence beneath the waves stabilize a crisis as effectively as the visible steaming of a large combatant just offshore? Submarines, despite the excellence of their attributes for conducting sea control, lack the mission flexibility to be effective in all operational scenarios.
The article’s second shortcoming is its myopic view that the submarine’s demonstrated suitability for sea control somehow equates to superior potential for other areas of naval operations. In a conventional power projection role, in particular, submarines seem less suitable than Commander Van Saun implies. Despite the
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vaunted Mk-48 torpedoes. Harpoon missile, or even the new Tomahawk missile, the strike-minded submarine skipper must either close the target— “and it may be dangerous to do so”— or else employ support forces to provide positive identification and over- the-horizon targeting. Such a coordinated effort seems out of line from Commander Van Saun's concept of no-frills independent operations, and rather like the coordinated, interdependent battle group concept he disparages.
Tomahawk land attack missiles notwithstanding, does Commander Van Saun really mean to compare the flexibility, staying power, range, and payload capabilities of the aircraft carrier and her manned and recallable aircraft to fired and forgotten missiles from diesel-electric submarines? How well might his high-low mix of submarines defend a convoy from “Backfire” attack in the North Atlantic? Could his fleet, safe in dispersal and concealed by the depths, attempt a hostage rescue at Son Tay or Tehran? Could it meet the air support requirements of a Marine brigade engaged in a forced insertion amphibious operation?
No single platform type is versatile enough to dominate naval warfare across the spectrum of peacetime and combat scenarios; not carriers, not submarines. Force structuring must provide combat balance. While Commander Van Saun’s article provides compelling arguments for providing a better balance for the submarine force, his perspective seems too narrow for putting the Navy’s total force structuring house in order.
“The Dwindling Muster”
(See D. L. Pilling, pp. 35-39, June 1982
Proceedings)
Commander Marc T. Apter, IJ. S. Naval Reserve—Commander Pilling says that the decline in quantity and quality of personnel will more seriously affect the readiness of the fleet in the future. He suggests reducing shipboard manning of high-skill personnel because of the highly reliable equipment being installed.
His solution does nothing to improve the wartime readiness of the fleet
now. Instead of people trained and equipped with the tools and spare parts to fix damaged or broken equipment right on the ship, we replace failed components with on-board spares that hopefully are available. Because the equipment Commander Pilling is proposing we buy to be able to do this will be highly reliable, there is no requirement to carry a wide range and depth of on-board spares. Instead, we send the faulty component back to a depot to be repaired. And the faulty components are sent to the repair depot by U. S. Mail/Federal Express for eventual turn-around and return by the same means to the supply system.
*
21st Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest Deadline31 December'
Ten prize-winning photos will be chosen and awarded $100 each in the U. S. Nav Institute s 21st Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest. The winning photos will be published in a 1983 issue of the Naval Institute's monthly publication, Proceedings
Entry Rules
1. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person.
3. Entries must be either black and white prints, color prints or color transparencies.
4. Minimum print size is 5" x 7”.
5. Minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass-mounted transparencies, please.)
6. Full captions and the photographer's name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount.
(No staples, please)
7. Entries must arrive at the U. S. Naval Institute no later than 31 December 1982.
Photographs not awarded prizes may be purchased by the U. S. Naval Institute. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owner if accompanied by a stamped, self addressed envelope.
Mall entries to:
Naval and Maritime Photo Contest U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE Annapolis, Maryland (301)268-6110
In peacetime, this gives us a ship that should be ready. But what happens in wartime when a ship is far from a now-disrupted mail system, can’t wait for a replacement component not available on board, and doesn’t have the trained people or documentation and parts to make repairs to these components? The simplistic approach of reducing high-skill manning may solve the manning part of the readiness equation, but it could just worsen another part of it.
YOKOSUKA:
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Tom Tompkins
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Carrier Aviation
Peter Garrison
| Photographs by George Hall
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“Ihank God for the Sitting Ducks”
(See T. B. Hayward, pp. 22-25, June 1982; P. H. Freeman, pp. 74-76, August 1982 Proceedings)
Captain W. Outerson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Hayward, as always, makes a convincing case for the big carriers. But I was sorry to see that he did not address one of the elements of survivability that is bothering some of us.
1 here are, as of now, several nations that have a nuclear capability. And it will not be long before all nations have this capability.
The question uppermost in our minds is just how survivable the carrier and the other ships that make up a carrier battle group are. This is no trivial or nitpicking question. It is one on which the effectiveness, indeed, the survival, of our Navy hinges. Anyone who was at Bikini, or who has seen the pictures of the tests of nuclear explosives conducted there, must have the gravest misgivings about our adherence to a fleet composition based on operational conditions that pertained during World War 11.
Admiral Hayward mentions five occasions on which our superior air power presented us with notable victories. There are others that he did not mention. But four of these occasions were before the dawn of the nuclear age. In the remaining one. our opponent did not have nuclear weapons.
Can we rely in the future on nuclear weapons not being used against our ships at sea? Since this class of weapon is ideally adapted to use at sea, and since it is equally as deadly in the hands of a small nation as it is in the hands of a great nation, it is difficult to see how we can count on it not being used.
Even if it is not used, the threat of its possible use must be taken into account. Only if we have naval forces that can survive a nuclear attack will we be able to send them into high-risk areas. Are our present carriers in this category? Could we. for example, have risked our recent confrontation with Libya if we had known that the Libyans had nuclear weapons at their disposal? There are knowledgeable people who think not.
Data Systems Technician First Class Richard R. Jordan, U. S. Naval Reserve—It is refreshing to discover relevant and complete facts in the
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Carrier Debate. Reasonable arguments for the carrier have been obscured, forgotten, or lost in the muttering of too many misplaced apologies over her cost.
Various news magazines, in their effort to present the pros and cons of the carrier debate, present only a limited number of points against the carriers so as to present equal time in the argument for carriers. Unfortunately, the pro side should not be given only equal time, simply because there is so much more that should be said on this side. It is also disturbing that many of Admiral Hayward’s simple points have, for the most part, not been seen in the mass news media. I mentioned some of Admiral Hayward’s points to co-workers who are aware of the carrier debate. They were surprised that carriers were so durable. One of these, who repeated often the standard compound phrase, “gold-plated, sitting duck,” reversed his non-support to full support after reading Admiral Hay- warid’s message.
ft is unfortunate that we Americans still tend to generalize and cling to trite aphorisms. And this tendency is surging as issues become more complex and inquire more than a cursory review., Of all the services, the U. S. Navy must be studied in four-dimen- sional'terms.
“CVNs Forever! Forever?”
(See G. O'Rourke, pp. 20-26. July 1982
Proceedings)
Steven L. Llanso—Captain O’Rourke gives too little consideration to the CVNs’ use during the necessary transition period between now and the greatly changed Navy of a decade or two hence.
Many of the 13 CVs/CVNs are expected to endure long into the 21st century. How can we reserve them for strategic situations which merit risking losing such valuable and expensive assets? The number of plausible scenarios is quite small, and they share the common goal of eliminating Soviet sea power.
Such scenarios demand carrier task groups be positioned as mobile reserves and having the Mahanian mission of seeking out and defeating the enemy’s main battle units. Therefore, CVs/CVNs should not be regularly deployed with permanent forward fleets. Task force training and exercises should focus on defeating a seaborne battle force supported by submarines and long-range, land-based air cover. CVs/CVNs should not be used for: (1) “goodwill tours,” (2) evacuations, (3) patrols in designated areas, (4) amphibious landings in any but the most strategically necessary circumstances (e.g., during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict), and (5) in most sea control operations.
Conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft will continue to have significant advantages over vertical short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft in those circumstances in which the elimination of the enemy threat is paramount. A sea cbntrol strategy cannot be successful unless it acknowledges the need to take the attack to the enemy’s forces. A mobile reserve, with closer support V/STOL carriers can provide that capability.
Such a disposition of forces requires far more extensive use of V/STOL aircraft on V/STOL carriers to supplant the CVs/CVNs in forward- deployed fleets. The air-sea battles over the Falkland Islands suggest that the V/STOL design can be substituted for more capable CTOL aircraft in many situations. Further development should include tankers (e.g., an XV-15 variant) and, when feasible, supersonic interceptors. The CV/CVN mobile reserves would be used only in those circumstances when incidents mushroom beyond the local V/STOL task group’s capabilities.
I am discussing a “high-low” posture in a world which seems to require only “high-mix” ships. And a change in doctrine which requires the construction of several V/STOL platforms of at least the Invincible's size may not cost less than bulk-rate procurement of CVNs. Indeed, the need to obtain V/STOL aircraft and additional FFs/FFGs suggests that no bargains are found in viable alternate force structures. Nevertheless, Captain O'Rourke’s arguments persuade me that the large CV/CVN has become critically vulnerable.
A mobile reserve strategy conserves the CVs’/CVNs’ offensive power by divesting them of the defense of noncombatant ships or geographic points. It simplifies the CVs’/ CVNs’ defense and that of their highspeed escorts. Creating CV/CVN battle fleets would permit these ships to serve out their days as true capital ships with a truly strategic role.