We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Cuba: Moscow’s Marionette"
(See J. E. Hopkins, pp. 58-64. July 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James Stavridis, U. S. Navy—General Hopkins’s energetic article is a dangerous simplification of the complex global relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The article seems to portray the world as a stage upon which only two actors stride. The world, however, is a larger place, and the forces that drive global events cannot be reduced to a simple struggle of wills between the two great powers. Although I agree with the broad assessment that the Soviet Union represents a clear and present danger to the ideology and society of the United States, I think it is imperative that we seek to understand the world in a larger sense.
Several points are worthwhile to emphasize in this regard. First, the “world communist community" is not a monolithic block. The Soviet Union has undoubtedly attempted and will continue to work at using proxies to further its aims. Before we build our world view on this fact, however, it is important to recognize that their strategy has not met with overwhelming success over the years since World War II. The Soviets have been thrown out of Egypt and Somalia; they have suffered open revolt in their Eastern European satellites; China and Yugoslavia, though remaining communist nations, have totally rejected the leadership of the Soviet Union; and even the current group of proxies shows signs of wandering from the guidance of Moscow. A major stumbling block for the Soviets has been their inability to create loyal allies anywhere in the world. Indeed, within the boundaries of their own country, major ethnic and cultural divisions claw at their heartland.
Second, many forces are at work in the world that have little to do with communism. Although we must never underestimate the threat of the Soviet Union or of the communist ideology, our strategic planning and resource allocation must also take into account these other powerful agents of change. A notable example of this is the current war between Iraq and Iran. Even though the Soviet Union is involved through arms supplies to the belligerents (as is the United States), the key to an understanding of this critical area is locked in the tenets of the Muslim faith and the historical enmity between Arabs and Persians. The deep implications of what may become a modern jihad (Muslim holy war) must be researched and understood if we are to deal effectively with this crisis. Many other forces are at work throughout the world, driving and influencing the crises of the modern world: Jewish and Palestinian desires for a secure homeland, anti-colonialisms, the new economic order, the hunger for land reform, water rights, tribal taboos; the list is endless. If we think only in terms of a “kaleidoscopic continuum of crises to undermine the status of Free World leaders” that is engineered from Moscow, we will miss the solution to many key issues. I agree that Soviet influence is pervasive and far-reaching; but I don't think the Kremlin is a total, omnipresent force pulling the strings of every world crisis. The long list of Soviet diplomatic and policy failures since World War II is testimony to this fact.
Finally, I don't think we should underestimate our own resources, ideology, and institutions. The long throw of history will demonstrate that communism, as practiced by the Soviet Union today, is economically, morally, and politically bankrupt. The strengths of the United States are the reverse of the Soviet weaknesses. We have loyal allies capable of “dealing with assertive Third World nations.” Great Britain has shown this most recently in its principled response to the Falklands crisis. In addition, the open society of the United States is ultimately an asset of great force. A society such as our own, with open debate, public media coverage, and intellectual participation in policy formation by a wide range of individuals will produce more thoughtful, fruitful diplomacy. The essence of this quality is our willingness to examine the world as a complex environment with many competing ideologies and cultures. We must not become exclusively concerned with the Soviet Union. We must balance U. S. national interests with the broad principles of liberal democracy, including self-determination, rights of sovereignty, and collective self-defense.
I agree that we should adopt a “counterstrategy" to deal with the threat posed by the Soviet Union, but our approach to strategy and global politics must also be the result of understanding a wide range of issues, ideologies, cultures, and nations vastly different from our own. The Soviet threat, while real and present, must not be the only factor in determining the direction of U. S. foreign policy.
“Not in My Navy”
(See S. A. Paolantonio, pp. 38-43, August 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Lawrence B. Brennan, Judge Advocate’s General Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve, and legal officer in the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and staff judge advocate for Commander Carrier Group Four at the time of the accident—The national crisis of drug abuse, which had its obvious adverse effects in the military society, was well-known prior to the evening of 26 May 1981, when an EA-6B Prowler crashed on the fiightdeck of the Nimitz, killing 14 sailors and Marines and injuring scores more. If the loss of the lives of my shipmates has had some positive effect in reducing the evils of drug abuse, then their deaths may not have been in vain, but to propogate the erroneous concept that the Nimitz was a den of drug abuse, which was a contributing cause of this unfortunate casualty, is wrong.
Marijuana was not a contributing cause of the air crash. Its traces were found only in the remains of six flight-deck personnel who were killed during the crash, explosion and fire, or in the subsequent reflash. There was not a scintilla of evidence to show that any of the air traffic control personnel, landing signal personnel, or aircrew personnel had engaged in marijuana abuse. There was incontrovertible evidence, however, that the pilot of the aircraft had medicated himself with non-prescription cold medicine, which may have contributed to the crash. Of course, it is impossible to tell if the lives of any of the six fiightdeck crewmen might have been saved had they not engaged at some time during the previous month in illegal marijuana use. Simply, could their reaction time have been better if they had not abused drugs? The congressional committee was advised of the foregoing by Secretary Lehman more than a year ago.
“Thoughts on the Falklands”
(See S. Gorton, p. 105, September 1982 Proceedings)
When the U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group needed high resolution Side Scan Sonar they could Dennis P. Moore—The recent Falkland Islands conflict has taught navies of the world two important lessons: the need for effective gun and missile systems to counter sea-skimming missiles, and the consequences from constructing ships’ superstructures largely of aluminum alloys. Sadly, a third lesson that could and should be learned from the confrontation and acted upon by Britain, but probably won’t be because of financial considerations, is the need once again for carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. If an AEW aircraft had been on constant patrol over the task force, the Argentine Super Etendards would have been spotted long before they could have unleashed their Exocet missiles on HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor. The presence of an AEW aircraft would have also given a greater period of warning for the air attacks by Skyhawk and Mirage aircraft on the ships anchored in San Carlos Bay. The vessels usually had only a few seconds notice because the skillful Argentine pilots often flew just above the wavetops to avoid detection by the warships’ radars.
It must be noted that the British Government had recognized the need for an AEW aircraft in the early stages of the conflict.
The fact that the Nimrod Mk-3 was not yet in Royal Air Force (RAF) service reportedly caused the Thatcher Government to request the use of an E-3A from the U. S. Air Force. This request was reportedly denied by President Reagan because American service personnel would have been required to operate the aircraft and its systems, which would be in defiance of his pledge to keep American forces from directly participating in the conflict over the Falkland Islands.
If the Nimrod Mk-3 had been in service at the time of the Falklands conflict, it probably would have been used to monitor the airspace around the task force, warning of impending attacks by Argentine aircraft and vectoring Sea Harriers to intercept them. The Nimrods would had to have been based at Ascension Island, along with the Vulcan B Mk-2s and Victor K Mk-2s that took part in the raids on the Port Stanley airstrip. The fact that Ascension Island is more than 3,000 miles away would have meant that the amount of time that a Nimrod Mk-3 could have spent on station monitoring the airspace over the Royal Navy warships and the Falkland Islands would have been inadequate. Assuming that a Nimrod Mk-3’s endurance is 20 hours and it would take seven hours to reach the Falklands from Ascension Island, then only six hours would be spent on station. In other words, the presence of the Nimrod Mk-3s would have probably had a negligible effect in averting the loss of Her Majesty’s Ships Sheffield, Ardent, Coventry, and Antelope, plus the containership Atlantic Conveyor, because of the limited time available in each flight to carry out its designed task.
The conflict over the Falkland Islands may now be history, but the need for a carrier-based AEW aircraft still exists in the Royal Navy. The acquisition of such an aircraft should be paramount in the minds of naval planners, regardless of the tight financial constraints placed on the navy.
If Britain was to act as it should and equip its fleet with carrier-based AEW aircraft, its choice in aircraft readily available or ready for service in the near future is indeed limited. The layout of the Invincible class, which lacks fixed-wing facilities, makes the deployment of aircraft such as the E-2 Hawkeye impossible. As a result of this fact, the Royal Navy will either have to use a helicopter or a V/STOL aircraft in the AEW role. A helicopter, because of its limited performance when compared with a V/STOL aircraft, makes its employment in this task somewhat dubious, so the task must fall to a V/STOL aircraft. The fact that the Grumman Type ‘A’ V/STOL will probably not be operational until the mid-1990s means the only aircraft that could assume the AEW role for the Royal Navy before the end of this decade would be the Bell XV-15. The acquisition of enough aircraft to equip one squadron with XV-15s would provide the Royal Navy’s ASW carriers with an effective AEW umbrella wherever they may be operating. This would free the Nimrod Mk-3s, the acquisition of which totals only 11 aircraft anyway, to operate almost exclusively with the RAF and other air contingents of NATO. Granted, the XV-15 is not an ideal AEW aircraft for the Royal Navy, particularly when one considers the hangar arrangements of the Invincibles; but the XV-15 would provide a service that would be invaluable to the British fleet.
Ship Survivability vs. Comfort
Sonar Technician G (Surface) Seaman William H. Johnson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Having just retired from 30 years of naval service, I must plead guilty to aiding and abetting a problem as old as sailing ships and as new as the Falklands War. This problem is the introduction and the growth of various flammable materials in interior spaces of combat ships. In The Two Ocean War, S. E. Morison stated that the interior paint, linoleum, and wardroom upholstered furniture contributed greatly to the loss of the HMAS Canberra and USS Astoria (CA-34) at Savo Island in 1942. The bitter lesson learned by these early losses and the ensuing corrective action (chip, scrape; and jettison) contributed materially to ship survival at Leyte Gulf and Okinawa.
In my experience, many of the results of these lessons were still evident in the first destroyer I was assigned to in 1952. Plain painted bulkheads, paint and deck treaded interior decks, small mattresses, metal tables and benches in the mess halls, etc., were still the rule. Thirty years later, these had reverted, for reasons of comfort, looks, and ease of upkeep, to wood-paneled bulkheads, almost exclusively asphalt-tiled interior decks, mattresses two and three times thicker, bunk curtains and plastic partitions, and synthetic material for messdeck equipment, etc.
As a result of this emphasis on habitability, today’s combat ships are great showpieces for visitors and make for comfortable cruising, but as events in the Falklands have shown, this retreat from survivability to cruiseshipability could have disastrous effects in future actions.
“Thank God for the Sitting Ducks!”
(See T. B. Hayward, pp. 22-25, June 1982; P. H. Freeman, pp. 74-76, August 1982; W. Outerson and R. R. Jordan, pp. 92-94, September 1982 Proceedings)
“FMF for the RDF”
(See M. L. Cover, pp. 51-55, June 1982; J. G. Miller, pp. 16-18, July 1982; J. L. Byron, pp. 79-81, August 1982 Proceedings)
“Attack Submarine: The Hidden Persuader”
(See A. Van Saun, pp. 100-103, June 1982; W. J. Ruhe, pp. 25, August 1982; J. T. Hayward, B. B. Englehardt, and H. D. Connell, pp. 78-88, September 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Joseph M. Saur, U. S. Navy—In the debate over the future size and composition of the U. S. Navy, let us not fall victim to delusions of self-importance. There are several points we should clearly recall. The U. S. Navy (excluding the SLBM forces) is not capable of projecting power ashore by itself. It is only when we actually land, or threaten to land, troops ashore that we are able to influence the actions of a foreign government. When dealing with a continental power, sea control (i.e., the destruction of the enemy fleet) is not an end in itself, but simply gives us the freedom to use the seas without enemy interference.
In the first instance, our job is to prepare the way for transport ashore and support of the Marines, much as the Royal Navy did in the Falklands dispute. As we have learned in the past, at Savo Island and Leyte Gulf, the carrier's role, whatever her size, is to support the landing force through a combination of air supremacy and close-air support.
Again, as the British clearly demonstrated in the Falklands, if the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is to be effective, it must be ready to operate in an area where there is no friendly airfield, where there is organized resistance to its insertion, and where there are no nearby logistics facilities. The necessity for basing the RDF on the present Navy/Marine Corps team could not be more obvious.
As for our second major role, we again find that the task is related to the foot soldier: for NATO reinforcement, we must get him safely to Europe; for an RDF scenario, to wherever. In doing so, we must be prepared to protect him from submarines, aircraft, submarines, missiles, and submarines. Neither the Libyan nor the Soviet surface fleet will be out the first day; they will wait until the subs have taken their toll before venturing out. Offensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in the Atlantic will have to be our primary concern in the initial stages of any NATO conflict. Our discussions of nuclear sub versus diesel sub must be based on their relative abilities to seek out and sink enemy submarines before those subs can sink our merchant convoys. And in our debate for or against big-deck carriers, their roles in the defense of the amphibious task force, the merchant convoy, or the ASW task force against missile or aircraft attack must be emphasized.
Stanley G. Kalemaris—Commander Van Saun makes a compelling case for submarines in the sea denial role and raises important questions about the wisdom of our all-nuclear policy for the submarine force.
However, between his prefatory remarks about our dependence on seaborne imports and his concluding assertions that enough submarines can sweep the Soviets from the seas, he loses sight of one essential fact: the Soviets can interdict our seaborne commerce without putting a single surface unit to sea. Satellite surveillance, the “Backfire” bomber, and the standoff missile constitute a potent threat to seaborne commerce. Submarines cannot defend merchant ships against this threat.
If we followed Commander Van Saun’s suggestion to develop a Navy which would sink the Soviet Navy and hide from the Soviet Air Force, we would guarantee the destruction of our merchant fleet and our economy.
The only practical defense against the Soviet Naval Aviation bomber force is sea-based air, whether it be large-deck carriers (and Commander Van Saun is right, 12 or 15 carriers do not provide sufficient geographical coverage) or V/STOL aircraft operating from escorts and Arapaho-equipped merchant ships. Admiral Doenitz lost the Battle of the Atlantic because he did not have sufficient surface and aviation assets to support his submarines. Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov is not going to repeat Doenitz's mistake and neither should we.
“Armed Confrontation Builds in South Africa”
(See J. Kapstein, pp. 34-39, December 1981: R, M. Andersen, p. 18, April 1982; W. D. Hartley, p. 85, June 1982 Proceedings)
Timothy C. Wetzel—Mr. Hartley is determined to portray the war in South Africa as a Black versus White war. It is not. The communist terrorists are rarely willing to do battle with the South African Army. It is easier for them to murder, maim, torture, and rob the native populace. The bleeding heart liberals have demoralized our military and Congress, and have given away Central America and Southeast Asia. Perhaps when our armed forces are engaged with armed terrorists operating across our southern borders, Mr. Hartley and Company will be able to recognize the enemy.
South Africa has the enemy operating on its border, and it’s not a black army. It’s a Red Hammer and Sickle.
“Soviet Snow Job’’
(See E. J. Thaubald. pp. 62-68, June 1982: A. P. Guzowski, pp. 22 & 24, August 1982 Proceedings)
Dr. Richard P. Hallion, Historian for the Air Force Flight Test Center—The United States, Captain Thaubald alleges, has failed to study the enemy, ignoring the centuries-old wisdom of Sun Tzu. As a result of “U. S. self-delusion” (p. 67) and Soviet propaganda, Soviet claims to superpower status have gone unchallenged. And all because the country is a military power with nuclear weapons and some spaceflight achievements—matched by achievements in other countries such as France, Great Britain, and even East Germany. Is this accurate?
A better question might be, "So what?” It is not important whether the community of nations believes the Soviet Union to be a superpower. To be or not to be is not the question. The Soviets are a strong nation-state and are capable of projecting their power and influence far beyond their borders by a variety of means, including diplomacy, covert and overt aggression, and (especially) naval activity. A recent essay in the Air University Review quotes Soviet military theorist Boris Shaposhnikov as stating that “if war is the continuation of politics by other means, then it is also true that peace, that is politics, is the continuation of war by other means.”
Nothing indicates that the dialectical reasoning which led to an Apocalyptic vision of the final battle between communism and capitalism has been abandoned. In public and written utterances, the late Marshal Andrei Grechko was explicit on this point. Rather than arguing about the ideological purity of the Soviet state and whether or not it is a superpower, we should be addressing the very serious challenges that this aggressive nation poses to us. It is unproductive to waste time trying to use our criteria of what a superpower is, or is not, to persuade someone else. Rather, borrowing a term from E. F. Schumacher, we might wish to recognize that there are such things as “appropriate” characteristics for various superpowers.
The Soviet Union, while not a superpower by American standards, is nevertheless a superpower in the real world. To ignore this, or argue that semantic differences mean anything, is to follow the time-honored example of the ostrich with its head in the sand. For this reason, Captain Thaubald’s five-point criteria for definition of superpower status (p. 68), while reasonable and appropriate for the United States and Western nations, is irrelevant to the Soviet challenge we face.
However, one must recognize that his six-point program for undercutting Soviet interests has a great deal of validity. It is ironic that the United States continues to support Soviet agriculture, freeing manpower to be applied to other industrial needs. Clearly, the United States must not let the lead that the space shuttle offers this country be ignored or spurned; space is an area where the Soviets have an aggressive, well-directed, and pragmatically oriented program. Supplying advanced technology to the Soviets is all too reminiscent of the old dictum that the last capitalist will be hanged with the rope he sold to his communist executioner.
It is worthwhile to have a dialogue with other world leaders so that they can best perceive the differences between the Soviet and American styles. But again, we should not expect only dialogue to win over hearts and minds. Much of the Third World consists of countries with few of the egalitarian aspirations that motivate Americans. Meaningless words to the effect that “what you see is not a superpower” smack of sophistry and mean very little to a country facing an internal security problem with guerrillas armed by the Soviet Union, or to a nation whose ports are routinely visited by Soviet ships.
What Third World nations will come to appreciate is the strength of a United States whose foreign policy is based upon realistic perceptions of Soviet intentions, Third World needs, and self-confidence. This latter point is an important one. For better or worse, the Soviets have a workable political system that has kept the country intact and running since 1922. Their foreign policy goals in Iran and the Persian Gulf, the drive into Afghanistan, and general naval expansion are not simply Soviet goals introduced by zealous followers of Marx and Lenin. Rather, they are long-standing Russian goals. They are goals that the average Soviet citizen—as oppressed as he or she might seem—would little question. It is unrealistic for the United States to expect that by applying restrictive trade pressure, the Soviet Union will “bleed to death from within” (p. 68).
Indeed, it is not only unrealistic and unproductive, it is potentially dangerous as well, in that it encourages the very nation-uniting xenophobia and climate that will draw Soviet citizens more closely together; it ensures continued big-power rivalry; in the eyes of the Third World, it calls into question America’s own sense of self-confidence in our system and our survival. Apply the pressure, but with the clear message to the Soviets that we are not concerned with affecting the Soviet heartland as we are in thwarting Soviet power projections in areas vital to our interests. Within this framework, it is to be hoped that a mellowing in Soviet policy will occur.
But if not, we must then have the range of options—including the application of military force—to prevent the forceful attainment of Soviet goals. Meantime, strident rhetoric and meaningless charges of whether or not the Soviet Union is a superpower can only serve to cloud the very real issues and challenges involved as the United States and the Soviet Union move ever closer to the turn of the century.
“CVNs Forever! Forever?”
(See G. O'Rourke, pp. 20-26. July 1982: S. L. Llanso. p. 94. September 1982 Proceedings)
Captain J. E. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain O’Rourke’s conclusion that buying two additional CVNs at this time “is a bankrupt naval policy which inexorably saddles this nation with an unwise and onerous mortgage of our maritime defense future” and the alternatives he proposes indicate to me that he has not looked closely at the Soviet threat to our continued control of the seas nor at the best and most cost-effective means of combatting this threat for the foreseeable future.
Captain O’Rourke seems most concerned about the effectiveness of the large carrier in the next century and not during the next ten to 15 years. This period could well be a period of great danger for the United States. New Soviet leaders, skeptical about United States’ resolve to use its military power to defend its national interests, will have an awesome and increasingly mobile military power and may choose to use that military power in an adventurous way, particularly as they are faced with growing economic problems at home.
Given a standoff in nuclear weapons that would make either side reluctant to start or escalate a conflict to a nuclear dimension, the presence of one or more large U. S. aircraft carriers in critical areas of the world might well be the deterrent factor that would keep the Soviet leadership from embarking on an expansionist military move to push their interests outward. Moreover, in many areas, if they were to undertake such an operation, the carriers are the only useable weapon systems now available to initially oppose such a Soviet operation.
Many Navy studies have repeatedly shown the advantages of the large nuclear Nimitz-class carrier vis-à-vis larger numbers of smaller catapult/arresting gear carriers and even larger numbers of small V/STOL carriers across the entire spectrum of warfare.
These studies have also shown that in order to meet the military tasks assigned the Navy in supporting national interests on a worldwide basis, at least 15 large carriers are required. Currently, the Navy has 14 large carriers. However, both the Coral Sea (CV-43) and Midway (CV-41) are nearing the end of their service lives. Hence, it is important that our Navy acquire as quickly as possible two new large carriers—the minimum number necessary to attempt to meet the challenge to control of the sea posed by the fast-growing Soviet Navy.
To answer Captain O'Rourke’s allegations that the two new carriers will absorb the lion’s share of all naval funding for the foreseeable future, leaving next to nothing for research and development (R&D), the following facts pertain. Historically, starting with the Forrestal (CV-59), the large carriers have absorbed less than 10% of the Navy’s ship construction budget. The cost of the two new CVNs in the current budget is $7.2 billion, or about 9% of the fiscal year 1983 overall Navy budget of $80.4 billion. Buying two carriers at the same time will save approximately $754 million and, more important, will result in each carrier being delivered 22 months early. The operating cost of a Nimitz-class carrier over the past few years has averaged $17.3 million per year, which includes everything except personnel costs.
As far as R&D dollars are concerned, these new carriers will be copies of the Nimitz and only require $5.5 million R&D dollars out of this year’s Navy R&D budget—a very small fraction of total Navy R&D funds. This, of course, would not be the case if the Navy were to design and build a new smaller carrier and develop the necessary V/STOL aircraft to go on her. The extra R&D costs for future V/STOL aircraft alone are estimated to be as high as $18 billion as compared with $9 billion for future conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft development costs. In addition, performance penalties involved in using V/STOL aircraft to meet the ever-increasing Soviet air, submarine, and missile threats should rule out the Navy’s reliance on this type aircraft to perform the more demanding air warfare tasks.
British Harriers in the Falklands could not protect their ships from direct Argentine air attack let alone from attack by standoff missiles. Even with airborne early warning, for the foreseeable future, no V/STOL fighter aircraft will have the performance and weapons-carrying capability to intercept the Soviet “Backfire” before it launches its air-to-surface missiles (ASMs); so, no V/STOL carrier will be able to cope with the “Backfire” threat to allied naval operations.
In a recent interview in Wings of Gold, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, initially quoting another admiral, stated, “Don't throw away one weapon system until you have another one that can do the job better.” We have designed big carriers, we have them now, and we have big aircraft that can fly only from big carriers. They can do a job that nothing else can do now. So it doesn’t matter if something else will work on a theoretical basis—we don’t have it. Until we can develop and have operating a better system, we have to keep our big carrier weapon system. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward is absolutely correct. The Navy can do a job now with big carriers, and it’s a necessary job, and it can’t be done in any other way.
The vulnerability of the big carrier to missile attack and especially to nuclear missile attack warrants discussion. In the Falklands, even though the Royal Navy had developed a fine close-in weapon system in Sea Wolf, only two of their ships deployed there were equipped with this system. Furthermore, their ships were not equipped with defensive electronic countermeasure equipment that could defeat the guidance system on the Exocet missile. As a result, their ships were vulnerable to air and missile attacks.
Contrast this defensive unpreparedness with the Israeli Air Force’s preparedness to attack the Syrian’s Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Lebanon recently. Their planes were all equipped with operating electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems that could counter the SA-6’s guidance system, and many were carrying Shrike missiles to knock out the SAMs’ ground radars. As a result, the Israelis lost no aircraft in their attacks and destroyed all the SAM installations.
Unfortunately, our Navy resembles more the British unpreparedness rather than the Israelis’ preparedness. Our outer air defenses are good with the very capable E-2C and F-14 teams, except for not having adequate numbers of Phoenix missiles. Also, our antisubmarine warfare (ASW) defenses are good with the highly effective ASW teams of S-3 and SH-3H aircraft and highly effective shipboard ASW systems. However, very few of our carriers and other major combatants are properly equipped with adequate numbers of close-in air defense weapon systems such as Sea Sparrow and Phalanx 20-mm. Gatling guns. Nor are they properly equipped with up-to-date automatic ECM systems with complete hemisphere coverage capable of coping with current Soviet missile guidance systems. Nor do many of them have installed the Mk-36 Chaffroc launchers that contain rapidly launched chaff and infrared decoys. Finally, many of the Navy’s escort ships are woefully lacking in installations of the medium-range new SAM SM-2 defensive missiles.
Soon, defensive missiles alone may not suffice to defend the carriers, and top priority development should be given to high-energy weapon systems for installation on the carriers for their self-defense against concentrated coordinated Soviet missile attacks. Also, priority should be given to developing the small manned high-performance space plane for carriage on a carrier-based aircraft such as the F-14, which could be used to destroy Soviet low-flying surveillance satellites and as a hypersonic fighter for intercepting Soviet bomber aircraft at long distances from the task force.
Captain O’Rourke also predicts the demise of weapons delivery aircraft and the assignment of the Navy’s main battery role to surface-launched and subsurface-launched missiles. Again, this prediction seems somewhat premature. Already it is predicted that the new Soviet SA-N-6 and SA-N-7 SAMs carried on Soviet ships such as the new Kirov-class cruiser and Sovremennyy-class destroyer can shoot down Harpoon in its pitch-up maneuver and also the subsonic Tomahawk. Therefore, in order to be successful in attacks against these well-defended Soviet ship targets, it will be necessary to have aircraft armed with highspeed antiradiation (HARM) missiles as well as air-to-surface missiles. The HARM missiles can knock out the ships’ SAM radars prior to arrival of the antiship missiles.
Even with the 1,500-mile maximum range Tomahawk missile, our surface ships will not be able to penetrate the 2,500-mile radius of action of “Backfires” to launch those missiles without the air superiority provided by our big carriers. Actually, reaching the most important targets within the Soviet Union will require air-delivered missiles given the current range limitations on our missiles. Naval air-delivered Tomahawk against critically important Soviet naval targets such as naval bases and naval air stations operating “Backfire” bombers may well be the only way our Navy can win control of the sea from Soviet naval forces.
Another of Captain O’Rourke’s proposals advocates a significant increase of naval reliance upon land-based air resources. Land-based air in foreign countries to support naval operations or support some national interest has been an expensive and unreliable proposition. Expensive by the time the bases are constructed and properly equipped with the necessary support systems; unreliable because of greater vulnerability to enemy attack than sea-based air and because they are often subject to last-minute political changes, especially in times of conflict, that make them unusable.
The Falklands War demonstrated the relative ineffectiveness of shore-based air to operate at sea long distances from its shore bases. Given the relative numbers of Argentine fighter/attack aircraft vis-à-vis the small numbers of British short-legged, weapons-limited, subsonic Harrier fighters (at least six to one) and the unavailable British early warning aircraft, it's hard to believe the British naval forces were able to survive, let alone carry out a successful landing.
Captain O'Rourke also advocates a single Tactical Air Force. How many carriers would be given the Navy under a single Tactical Air Force? Who would be telling the Navy how to carry out their missions? No naval missions can be successful these days without local control of the air and, in the not-too-distant future, without local control of space. Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov and his naval strategists have recognized this requirement and are giving high priority to the construction of large carriers and to building up both their own "Backfire” bomber force and a long-range land-based tactical air force. Note well, Admiral Gorshkov has his own "Backfire” force completely separate from Soviet Long Range Strategic Air Forces. He realizes the critical importance of air power to the success of naval missions and the need for the navy to be able to control the use of its own air power.
Our carrier deployments are still of great political and deterrent importance, and if the Navy puts the proper effort into improving carrier defenses, their credibility will continue. Even now, NATO's southern flank nations feel singularly insecure when carrier Mediterranean deployments are reduced from two to one.
Some of Captain O'Rourke’s suggestions are certainly worthwhile. The Navy should use all possible air assets in wartime, including any available air power from the other services and allied nations. The Arapaho containership program using helicopters, V/STOL, and close-in defense weapons deserves strong Navy support and funding. Oil rigs and sea mining efforts might be considered as potential bases for getting more aircraft out to sea. His advocacy of increasing the priority of development of space weapon systems and high-energy weapon systems deserves the support of all naval officers.
However, Admiral Hayward, until recently Chief of Naval Operations, has reiterated many times that our maritime superiority depends entirely on who controls the air. "Today it's the United States Navy's sea-based air power that is the only significant major difference between ourselves and the Soviets. That difference had better be taken into account."
Leadership: Again and Again
Admiral H. G. Rickover, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Regularly and for many years the Naval Institute has published articles on leadership. Apparently, this frequent publication of the many articles in your previous issues has not had the desired effect. Therefore, would it not be wise for the Naval Institute to ask the readers of the Proceedings whether it is worthwhile to continue publishing such articles and even to give prizes for them?
I suggest that you explain in an editorial why it is necessary, at frequent intervals, to publish these articles. Has the leadership taught at the Naval Academy been poor or inadequate? Are naval officers obtuse? Or, are the articles directed at the non-Naval Academy officers who may have suffered from neglect in this area because they had only the benefit of civilian colleges? Have you published anything new on this subject in the past 70 or 80 years? Is it because your readers are incapable of absorbing ideas? Or is it for the same reason that members of organized religions are required to attend church regularly—else they may stray from the "truth?"
I understand you have a permanent fund for publishing these articles. Would it not benefit the Naval Institute—and its readers—to divert these funds—with permission of the donor—to a useful purpose—perhaps to take care of indigent naval officers or others in naval homes or for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals?
Would it not also be wise, in the next Proceedings, to ask your readers to write just what practical benefits in their methods of “leadership” have taken place as a result of your published articles?
The military, particularly the Navy, can become the ideal place for an officer who has no inner desire to “grow up.” His pay is fixed. And his promotion is guaranteed if he “keeps his nose clean;” does not ruffle any superior’s feathers; and does his routine job properly. The leadership concept also implies one does not have to work at learning his job; he merely has to use his God-given qualities and lead.
Therefore, the officer has plenty of time to write letters to the Naval Institute—whose readers are mostly like him. He has little or no concept of creativity—of what it requires mentally and physically to effect change in an organization where there is no pressure to excel—until late in his career, when he aspires to high rank and has formidable competition.
So he criticizes the performance of others. The latter, at least, have tried. They are not like those Theodore Roosevelt pointed at in his Man in the Arena: those who tried valiantly but failed nobly.
The Naval Institute, being a “house organ,” is the only place where their words will ever be recorded. I leave to these officers the negative glory of doing little but complain. In fact, for some of them, the greatest trouble they ever took was to be born.
Publisher s Note: One of the Proceedings’ traditional strengths has been that Institute staff members do not normally editorialize in it—for several good reasons. Our job is to showcase our authors, not compete with them; and, we ain’t qualified. But several of the points raised by Admiral Rickover deserve clarifying responses.
In regard to the “desired effect’’ of our published leadership articles over the past century, our research has failed to reveal that a specific, quantifiable desired effect has ever been articulated. And since no one can accurately and objectively measure the depths to which the quality of naval leadership might have plunged had Proceedings never published any leadership articles, or the heights to which this quality of leadership has soared as a direct result of our published leadership articles, we are left with the modest boast that our leadership articles do not appear to have impeded the unparalleled successes of our nation's naval leaders over the years, particularly in combat at sea.
We support the belief that leaders are made, not born, and that most of the making is self-making. One means of self-making is reading. Therefore, we publish leadership articles to assist those readers of Proceedings who know that they have not yet completed the process of making themselves into flawless, experienced, successful leaders, ready to master any situation they might confront. There are those who believe the process never ends. Indeed, for every winning leader in combat at sea, there is a losing leader.
With regard to not publishing “anything new on this subject [leadership] in the past 70 or 80 years, ’'we must ask: New to whom? Our Editorial Board members and older staff members must keep reminding themselves that perhaps 10,000 or so new young officers enter the naval services each year. What appears to be old-hat leadership stuff to a flag officer with 25 years of service can be an exciting new leadership idea to a lieutenant junior grade or first lieutenant in his or her third year of service. We believe most experienced senior officers know this and bear with us, because it is their OODs and division officers and platoon commanders we are endeavoring to assist.
We have no “permanent fund for publishing these articles.’’ The prizes awarded each year in the Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest (VAMLEC) are funded by a generous grant from the Vincent Astor Foundation. The purpose of this contest is to stimulate junior officer research into and writing on leadership in the naval services. The contest rules provide that only the winning essay is assured of publication in Proceedings. Other essays may be judged worthy of publication. The VAMLEC fund can be used for no other purpose.
Many of our published leadership articles are not VAMLEC entries; they come in over the transom, unsolicited but most welcome.
The Proceedings is not a “house organ,” although some folks in addition to Admiral Rickover keep trying to convince themselves and us that it is. Would a “house organ” have published Captain Gerry O'Rourke's “CVNs Forever! Forever?” (July 1982); or Lieutenant S. W. Smith’s “Combat Readiness: Naval Air vs. Air Force” (February 1982); or Commander Tom Buell’s “The Education of a Warrior” (January 1981); or Commander R. E. Mumford's “Get Off My Back, Sir!” (August 1977); or Captain E. N. Bouffard's “NROTC: Quo Vadis?” (July 1977); or Captain Bob Hanks' “Against All Enemies” (March 1970); to name a few of our barn burners? Certainly not. But we did. House organ? No, Sir!
As suggested by Admiral Rickover, we ask our individual readers if it is worthwhile to continue to publish leadership articles, and we ask them for comments on what practical benefits in their respective methods of leadership may have accrued to them as a result of reading one or more of our leadership articles. Our forum is yours!
And, finally, lives there a Proceedings reader with soul so dead, who to himself or herself has not yet said, “Commander John L. Byron’s sparkling September 1982 article, “The Captain,” is the best damned leadership article I have ever read, in Proceedings or any other magazine!”?
“Warrant Officers: Use Them or Lose Them”
(See J.B. Hart, pp. 59-61. April 1982; R.W. Phillipson, p. 88. July 1982 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer James F. Downs, U. S. Naval Reserve—Chief Warrant Officer Hart's title should be revised to read "Use Them Right or Lose Them." Obviously no complainer, he doesn't address several other issues which complicate his life and the lives of his peers. Consider the attitude of the person who has experienced exactly what Chief Warrant Officer Hart describes, filling in as an extra junior officer at sea, who finds when his rotation comes up that no billets are available for his designator ashore. Put simply, while a warrant can be assigned to do all the junior officer jobs on board ship, he cannot be assigned a junior office billet ashore because he is too specialized.
Consider also the inefficiency involved in assigning a former senior chief journalist with 16 years of top performance to be an assistant personnel officer in a major combatant. Or, an ex-quartermaster or signalman as ship’s boatswain. Many who have been put in such positions by promotion have survived. They have depended on their chiefs and senior petty officers, burned the midnight oil studying to learn an entirely new job, and some have excelled. But their experiences in many cases have resulted in personal and professional tragedy and have served to discourage other chiefs from applying for promotion. Chief warrant officers are not supposed to be apprentices. They are promoted precisely because they have done outstanding work in their enlisted fields. To expect them to begin all over again is unfair to them and a wasteful, inefficient use of Navy resources.
Chief Warrant Officer Hart’s description of what a warrant should be doing could have been taken almost word-for-word from Naval Regulations in the 1870s and 1880s: Serve as an assistant and advisor to the department head or commanding officer; constantly examine, inspect, survey, and inform those responsible for correcting deficiencies. The examinations required for promotion in those days demonstrated that the bosun, the gunner, carpenter, sailmaker, or machinist knew the jobs of his mates and thus was equipped to supervise them. This traditional model is still, I think, a viable one.
The last issue to consider is the other important resource, besides technical experience, which the warrant community represents. Their service has provided them with a broad and general understanding of the Navy and naval life from the perspective of the mess decks and the berthing compartments, the chief petty officer (CPO) quarters as well as officers' country. That understanding is wasted if the warrant is considered either a “super-super" chief or an "old-odd" sort of junior officer with time on his hands.
Having spent a great many hours with the U. S. Codes, Naval Regulations, military personnel manual, and sundry other publications trying to define precisely what the status and duties of a chief warrant officer are, I—along with most of the rest of us—have to admit that I'm not quite sure. What does "with but after ensigns" mean, for instance? Is the officer-in-charge of a Navy post office really only a technical supervisor? Can an ex-signalman chief boatswain become a communications officer or an ex-quartermaster a navigator? Are the distinctions between manager and supervisor quite as clear-cut as stilted in the Warrant Officer Limited-Duty Officer Manual? My own time will soon run out with these ambiguities unresolved. Without answers to these and a number of other very real questions, a good many younger chief warrant officers are going to be running out before their time.
“The Iowa Class: Needed Once Again”
(See H. W. Serig. pp. 134-49. May 1982 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Joshua W. Cooper, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Serig's essay stands as a most comprehensive and thorough treatment of a very timely subject. He is to be congratulated on his excellent work in depicting these splendid ships as they are. The essay should be required reading for all members of Congress.
As a former commanding officer of the Iowa (BB-61) during the Korean conflict, I would have preferred more space given to the substantial contribution made by these ships in Korean waters in 1951-53. All four served successively as Seventh Fleet flagship and simultaneously furnished gunfire support to troops ashore. Comments which follow are based on my experience in the Iowa: they apply equally to the New Jersey (BB-62). Missouri (BB-63) and Wisconsin (BB-64).
The ship ranged up and down the North Korean coast, taking selected targets from eyeball distance to long ranges (in excess of 20 miles). As Mr. Serig states, "the existing technology that could substantially improve both the range and accuracy of the battleship guns" should be developed without delay. Presumably, we could reach out to about 60 miles—if this is the case, we should get on with it!
With regard to accuracy, experience in supporting troops ashore indicated that when the target was accurately described (by coordinates or geographical position), it could be hit. On numerous occasions, an Army spotter sitting in the middle of the Korean Peninsula, would request "one-gun, one-shot" on a designated target; then after observing the devastating results, ask for a short delay while he picked another target. On board the Iowa, the crew concentrated on precise navigation and got ready for the next salvo. Periodically, the ship would enter Wonsan Harbor, which was defended by North Korean heavy artillery, and methodically destroy gun emplacements identified by Army and Marine Corps spotters. This procedure was repeated at intervals of a week or ten days, and it added greatly to the health and comfort of our minesweepers and other light forces working in the area.
Contrast this with the situation along the Vietnamese coast 15 years later. The United States lost countless aircraft and pilots in the course of attacks against targets which could have been taken out by one of the lowas under “all weather” conditions and at a time of our own choosing. The difference here was that we had one ship (the New Jersey), less than fully equipped and manned, instead of four BBs on a full-time rotational basis as was the case at Korea.
The lowas have been carefully preserved and represent an asset of great potential worth. Ships possessing these capabilities are urgently needed by a Navy that is stretching at the seams to meet commitments in sea areas around the world.
“Pride in Her Name”
(See S. L. Morison. pp. 115-118. June 1982; B. D. Dunn. p. 80. July 1982 Proceedings)
Ensign Leonard R. Cleavelin, U. S. Naval Reserve—Concerning the naming of ships of the fleet. I am pleased to say that I am in almost total agreement with Captain Dunn. However, I would urge serious reconsideration of one of his proposals.
Facilitating ease of recognition of ship types is not the sole purpose of selecting classes of ships' names. Properly selected, a ship's name can serve an important morale-boosting function for both naval personnel and civilians back home. Naming ships after distinguished Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel, for instance, serves to remind those of us currently serving of the traditions and heritage of service to our country that we try to uphold. Similarly, naming other ships for famous historical battles serves to remind us of the ultimate sacrifices we may someday be called upon to make.
Naming ships after states, cities, counties, and other geographical places within the United States serves to remind us of the country we serve, and also gives civilians back home something to identify with. This, it seems, helps smooth relations between civilians and the naval establishment, and helps lift morale and instill pride of purpose in both Navy persons and civilians. As one brief historical example, recall the drive by the citizens of Houston, Texas, to raise funds to construct a new USS Houston after the first was lost early in World War II.
Captain Dunn proposes that states’ names be authorized only for battleships. Unfortunately, new battleship construction seems highly unlikely. Under this circumstance, it would be very unwise to restrict the use of states’ names to battleships, since it would mean—after the lowas were finally stricken—that no Navy vessels bear the names of states. I propose, instead, that after the last battleship is stricken, another class of ship be authorized to take that class of name. It is unthinkable that the U. S. Navy could have a fleet which did not have some ships named for the states.
A final note on the Corpus Christi controversy: the President and the Navy may have given in at the wrong time. While I am sure that Corpus Christi, Texas, is a perfectly nice town, I am also sure that it is afflicted with its share of crime, corruption, and immorality. I thus fail to see how naming a city after the body of Christ is any less sacreligious than naming a submarine after it (never mind the fact—conveniently overlooked by the protesters—that the ship is named for the city, and not Christ). I have a counterproposal for the Catholic bishops and the other protesters: We'll rename our ship if you will rename your city.
“Strait Shooting”
(See J. A. Hazlett, pp. 70-73. June 1982: J. J. White, p. 74. August 1982 Proceedings)
“Updating the Shore Battery”
(See M. E. Rogers, pp. 44-47. September 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Richard P. Hansen, U. S. Navy—When the two fine articles by Commander Hazlett and Major Rogers are combined, a clear, concise, and viable strategy can be derived for the control of vital straits and choke points.
In the past, large-caliber coastal batteries provided a means of protecting harbors and coastal areas from the incursion of enemy naval forces. These areas were also protected by defensive minefields and the use of coastal gunboats. By the integration of these factors with heavy coastal artillery, a viable and formidable defense against naval forces could be waged. The same type of defense could be used in the defense and control of choke points with Tomahawk cruise missiles taking the place of coastal artillery, hydrofoils and surface effect ships armed with cruise missiles taking the place of gunboats, and mine warfare being employed.
The ability to control the Greenland-lceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap will be critical in any protracted East-West confrontation. The 280-mile range of the Tomahawk could cover the entire G-I-UK Gap when launched from points in Iceland and Scotland. These missiles would be mated with mobile Air Force launchers of the type that are to be deployed in Great Britain and Western Europe as a part of the nuclear cruise missile system. The Air Force launcher is well suited for a coastal defense role, as it is highly mobile and hardened to withstand the effects of conventional and nuclear weapons. The mobility of the land-based Tomahawk missile would be critical, as its launching areas in Iceland and Scotland are well within the range of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile.
The use of these G-I-UK Gap cruise missile batteries would help defend the mine barriers laid in the gap from Soviet mine countermeasures (MCM), make transits by Soviet surface forces of the gap costly, and aid in blunting the threat of an amphibious attack on Iceland or northern Norway. Soviet naval vessels would have limited capability against these land-based targets, and the only Soviet response against these missiles would be from land-based bombers, VTOL aircraft from the Kiev, or in the form of an airborne assault against the launchers themselves. This would require the areas in which the antiship cruise missiles are based to have a viable air intercept and ground defense capability. The use of cruise missile-equipped hydrofoils would aid in the targeting of the land-based Tomahawks and allow for the destruction of damaged enemy craft by more cost-effective, shorter range missiles.
In narrow straits, the use of shorter-range antiship cruise missiles (i.e., Exocet, Harpoon, Gabriel, Otomat, and SS-N-2C) either on mobile, land-based launchers or mounted on high speed, low-mix naval vessels is feasible. Coupled with even a primitive minefield, a small country using cruise missiles could effectively close an international or territorial strait from passage by naval or merchant vessels. The proximity of Libya and its 31 naval craft with 172 antiship missiles to the Strait of Gibraltar, which has an eight nautical-mile throat, is an example of a small Third World power that has the potential and possible inclination to impede the movement of U. S. naval forces. In such an instance, the use of missile-armed hydrofoils and the surface effect ship should be used as choke point openers prior to the commitment of high value naval units for passage in confined waters.
The use of shore-based artillery and mines during the Gallipoli naval campaign in 1915 proved highly effective against larger ships of the French and British navies. The use of mobile cruise missiles, either on board ships or land-based, coupled with the use of mines and fast, low-mix patrol craft could prove just as decisive in a future conflict in which the control of vital straits is at issue. The U. S. Navy needs to integrate the antiship cruise missile with mobile land and sea launchers and couple this weapon system with mine barriers, patrol hydrofoils, surface effect ships, and a Marine Corps detachment to provide air intercept and protection of the missile launchers from airborne or amphibious assault. This mix would provide a viable force for closing the choke points that are so vital to the Soviet Navy. The use of hydrofoils and—if necessary—the ability to deploy rapidly and land Marine amphibious troops to capture enemy land-based cruise missiles would give the U. S. Navy a means to open straits and choke points closed by its adversaries.
“The Treasure of the Awa Maru"
(See D. D. Lowman, pp. 44-48. August 1982 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. C. Mott, U. S. Navy (Retired), former Judge Advocate General—Admiral C. Elliott Loughlin is a close friend and classmate. At the time of Admiral Loughlin's court-martial, I was dodging kamikazes at Okinawa. Had I known such a miscarriage of justice was taking place on Guam, I would have requested orders to defend him myself. I'm not talking about Elliott’s letter of admonition. His own statement seems to indicate that he probably deserved the letter.
But the letters of reprimand delivered to each member of “the highest-ranking U. S. Naval Board ever assembled" represented an outrageous “miscarriage of justice." More than any other factor, it was these “skin letters" which led the Congress of the United States to scrap the procedures under which Elliott was tried and substitute the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Command, and that included Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz, simply shot itself in the foot by indulging its “rage" (the word is Lowman's) in the practice.
Captain Charles Curley, U. S. Navy (Retired), who was for many years Secretary to the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, tells me that many letters such as those given to the Board in the instant case were removed from individuals’ records later, but some were not, and many naval careers were probably ruined as a result.
The practice was by no means confined to the Navy. Army “skin letters" were even more prevalent. Some members of Congress endured such reprimands while in the military, notably the late Congressman A. Walter Norblad of Oregon, who was once summoned over the loud speaker by his (Army Air Forces) Commanding Officer to explain his ridiculous verdict in a court martial! Naturally, he led the congressional charge to eliminate command influence, which the letters to Admiral Loughlin's board exemplify. May the services never again shoot themselves in the foot with such practices.
“Ticonderoga: Another Hood?”
(See S. Morss, pp. 116-117, August 1982 Proceedings)
Captain Edward L. Beach, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Morss is close to right in that the Ticonderoga's displacement is 9,100-9,300 tons, vice the original designed 7,810 tons of the Spruance, whose hull and machinery plant she uses. In castigating her as therefore “overweight,” with seriously impaired built-in resistance to damage,” he is, however, wrong. The Spruance class of destroyers was designed very carefully and thoughtfully, with the intent to take special account of the fast-growing sciences of electronics and computers. In an effort to design a ship which could still be viable into or near the 21st century, even with addition of much more equipment than was available at the time her plans were drawn, she was given far greater than usual margin for growth. Morss admits this in his second and third paragraphs. He does not say what the designed margin for growth was, but simply that the Kidd’s, at 9%, “is about normal," is “generous,” and that the Ticonderoga's at “16 to 19%” is “unlikely.” His figures, in fact, are a bit off: the Spruance-class tincans gross out at around 8,000 tons, the Kidd's at 9,000, and the Ticonderoga cruisers at about 9,500. The Ticonderoga's hull was strengthened during building because of the planned extra weight, so that right now she actually has some 800 tons of growth margin left in her.
She floats some six inches lower in the water than the Spruance, but there is a tremendous amount of reserve buoyancy in her above-water watertight volume, as anyone can see. Thus, the concern about her weight can only relate to the possibility of hull strain (against which she was strengthened) or reduction in righting moment. I was on board during full rudder trials at full speed and can attest that she listed about 20°, no more, at the extreme condition. Further, she righted herself smartly. A great deal of battle damage will be necessary to capsize her. So far as wave damage to forecastle weapons, her forecastle has not been "raised,” but her side plating has been raised some three feet to provide a handsome bulwark around the forward three-quarters of her bow. This may improve seakeeping slightly, but it is more likely to benefit the men who might have to be on the forecastle during heavy weather than as “an attempt to minimize wave damage to the weapons installed . . .”—which, so far as I could see, were pretty well weather-proofed already.
Commander Morss is on firmer ground with his criticism of the aluminum superstructure, which I, too, think should be done away with in new ships. More achievable in the near term, however, would be maximization of fire-fighting ability under combat conditions, which we are doing. On the other hand, he criticizes the gas turbine because it requires larger deck penetrations than steam plants; steam plants in their turn require larger penetrations than nuclear plants. Diesel-engined submarines need large air intakes too. Maybe we should go 100% nuclear or, better yet, build nothing at all. Regarding compartment size, he does not say to what he is comparing the Ticonderoga when he castigates her for “increased compartment volume" and potential excessive “free surface” effect—doubtless some ship with smaller compartments.
It is with his suggestion that the Ticonderoga is “another Hood'' that I differ most, however, for he is predicting she will be a white elephant, which she will not. And I don’t believe the Royal Navy thought the Hood was. It is fairly likely that the Hood's forward magazine detonated, as did those of HMS Invincible, Indefatigable, and Queen Mary and the USS Arizona. Morss says that the Hood's construction “was slightly delayed to incorporate changes as a result of Jutland," and that she shared “the same design fault" of the three ill-fated battle cruisers, “identified and confirmed by test (but) nothing was done to correct it.” The official British position is that a great deal was done “to correct” this “fault" which, so far as I know, related to protection of the powder train during loading. Whatever it was, the "fault” was not lack of metacentric height, which Morss avers is the problem with our new cruiser. An inclining experiment can easily establish, with finality, whether this is, or is not, true. Such an experiment used to be done for all new construction, and if not yet accomplished for CG-47, it ought to be prior to delivery. Then, we will know for sure. In the meantime, I don't see the analogy to the Hood, since it's not the same "fault," nor yet proved to be a “fault" at all.
My greatest concern is over the cloud Morss throws upon the entire concept of the ship. She is obviously the best thing we have going in the modern age, a completely integrated, computerized, combat control system. At Pearl Harbor, the appalling fact was that our battle fleet could not shoot back. At the Falklands, the Sheffield and her consorts could not either, because of insufficient radar coverage and the terribly short time involved. When missiles can strike with less than a minute’s warning, as they did time after time in the Falklands War, there must be some way for ships to shoot back, or they ought never be placed in such positions. The Ticonderoga can defend herself, better and faster than any other ship in our navy, quicker and more accurately than a plane can shoot her. She bids fair to redress this unfavorable balance of power, and in my humble opinion will revolutionize (once again!) control of the sea.