The Soviet cruiser Kirov, seen on the opposite page, is yet another in a series of formidable-looking Soviet surface warships which have been built during the past three decades. To design and construct the Kirov and the ships she steams with, Soviet engineers started with the performance goals they hoped to achieve and then set out to translate those goals from ideas into completed warships. This article, and those which have preceded it in recent years, go at the process the other way around. By employing what might be called reverse engineering, the Naval Sea Systems Command looks at finished ships and then attempts to deduce the design and construction processes which brought them about. There are lessons to be learned about how both the Soviet Union and the United States design their warships and how they intend to fight them.
For the past decade, the Naval Sea Systems Command has conducted comparative engineering assessments in an effort to identify foreign warship design practices from which the United States might benefit. In 1975, the Proceedings published an initial assessment of U. S. and Soviet practices.[1] Since then, the Soviets have continued to expand their naval forces with new, large, capable warships such as the 38,000-ton Kiev-class aircraft carrier,[2] the 23,000-ton Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser,[3] the 8,000-ton Sovremennyy-class guided missile antisurface warfare destroyer,[4] and the 8,000-ton Udaloy-class guided missile antisubmarine warfare destroyer.[5]
In 1975, the data base for Soviet warships was limited and was heavily influenced by early post-World War II designs. In many areas these older Soviet ships were inferior to those of the United States. How had Soviet ship design practices evolved as the Soviets, beginning in the mid-1960s, gained the experience of extended deployment at long distances from their coastal waters? This question remained unanswered. The extent to which U. S. or Soviet ship design practices differed from those used by European NATO countries was also unknown. Today, many of these and other questions can be answered with much greater insight and confidence.
The naval engineer, whether Soviet or American, must balance conflicting requirements in order to design a ship. Trade-offs are intrinsic to any design process and are driven by basic physical laws that are neither Communist or capitalist. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that by applying reverse engineering logic to Soviet ships, a U. S. design engineer can, within certain limits, identify the trade-offs reflected in Soviet ships. Unfortunately, some performance requirements, such as endurance cruising range, cannot be adequately identified by reverse engineering analysis, whereas others—such as the types of weapons and electronics aboard a ship—are more easily identified by observation. Nevertheless, in our judgment, it is possible to identify differences in U. S. and Soviet ship design practices, to make a reasonable assessment of the relative impact of these differences, and to identify certain design trends. Furthermore, an understanding of the warship design practices of European NATO countries, particularly those of Italy, has enhanced our ability to identify and analyze those used by the Soviets. Let us, then, examine various factors which influence ship design.
Manning: Soviet ships are well armed and fully outfitted with sensors; they also have relatively large propulsion plants. In addition, the operation of many Soviet shipboard systems is manpower intensive. Yet, based on available data, Soviet ships appear to have about the same level of manning as U. S. ships. For example, the estimated numbers of men per 1,000 tons of displacement of U. S. and Soviet warships are compared in Figure 1. There is some indication that many Soviet ships are not normally fully manned in relation to the number of accommodations available. Therefore, the wartime manning of many Soviet ships could be much larger than is normally observed.
James W. Kehoe, Jr.
Recently retired from 36 years of naval service, Captain Kehoe is well known for his work in conducting comparative engineering analyses of U. S. and foreign warship design practices at the Naval Sea Systems Command. He is currently a partner in Spectrum Associates, Inc. Commissioned in 1952. his sea duty on-board three destroyers and three aircraft carriers included service as commanding officer of the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753) and engineer officer of the USS Wasp (CVS-18). Ashore, he has had duty in nuclear weapons, the Polaris missile program, and instructing in project management. He holds a B.S. in mathematics from Stonehill College, Massachusetts (1952), and an M.A. in education from San Diego State College (1959).
Kenneth S. Brower
Mr. Brower is a partner in Spectrum Associates Incorporated, Falls Church, Virginia, which he founded in June 1978. He graduated from the University of Michigan in 1965 with a bachelor's degree in naval architecture. He has contributed to the design of numerous merchant ships and warships. Since 1972, he has actively supported the Naval Sea Systems Command's comparative naval architecture program. During this period, Mr. Brower has contributed to or been the author of numerous technical reports on international ship design practices. He has contributed as an analyst, editor, and author of an extensive assessment of the engineering design practices of tanks, missiles, aircraft, ships, and electronics.
Herbert A. Meier
A graduate of the University of Michigan in 1951 with a bachelor's degree in naval architecture, Mr. Meier was employed by the Bureau of Ships and Naval Sea Systems Command as a naval architect in the offices responsible for the conceptual and preliminary design of U. S. warships from 1951 to 1976. During this period, he was the project naval architect on several classes of combatants and auxiliaries. He was also the senior civilian engineer working in support of the comparative naval architecture program since its inception in 1972. Mr. Meier is now the senior consulting engineer for Spectrum Associates Incorporated devoting much of his time to continued work on the comparative naval architecture program and warship feasibility design studies.
The manning of U. S. ships is generally based on the assumption that they will be capable of simultaneously meeting all operational, training, and maintenance requirements during wartime. This means that U. S. ships should be able to steam for periods of up to 60 days, with selected weapons and sensors manned, while conducting preventive maintenance and training and with most of the crew in a three-section watch rotation. This is called Condition III. Based on available data, a fully manned Soviet ship is thought to be incapable of maintaining an equivalent Condition III watch rotation. Instead, Soviet manning appears to be predicated on the requirements for general quarters—Condition I. At Condition I all personnel are at their battle stations, and rotation of the watch is minimal. This means that the endurance of the ship in this condition is limited by the physical endurance of the crew.
These differences in manning practice may also partially result from differences in American and Soviet manpower utilization, which are summarized in Figure 2.
In the Soviet Navy, personnel are conscripted for three years and, except for an average of six months of indoctrination and training, spend the rest of this period on board one ship. Notwithstanding Soviet efforts, relatively few conscripts volunteer for long-term regular service. Short-term Soviet conscript personnel obviously cannot be trained to perform in-depth, diagnostic maintenance. However, the crewmen of a Soviet ship undergo much less turnover each year than their American counterparts. Thus, Soviet crew members should be adept at performing the particular duties they are assigned. Also, Soviet officers, more than 90% of whom are estimated to be career men, remain on board ships of one type for long periods and are capable of performing hands-on maintenance and repair of shipboard equipment. As a result, Soviet officers are the backbone behind the operation and maintenance of Soviet ships.[6]
Equipment Utilization: In contrast to American Practice, the Soviets appear to compensate for the limited capabilities of short-term conscripts by developing military equipment which is reliable and which can be operated and maintained by repetitive type training of personnel with minimum skills. The Soviets achieve this by designing mostly single-purpose equipment, by emphasizing simplicity and standardization in its design, and by adopting realistic performance limits. The Soviets often provide redundancy and secondary modes of operation for equipment in order to ensure system availability. These practices help to explain the Soviets' use of numerous, and often redundant, weapons and sensors, the use of electro-optical devices as back-up to their fire control radars, and the use of a local control capability for some weapons. In order to conserve its availability for war, Soviet equipment is not operated very often during peacetime. Training is accomplished by the extensive use of simulators which are often built into Soviet combat systems. Organizational level maintenance is often manpower intensive, but relatively simple; repairs are accomplished primarily by replacement of modular elements. By comparison with American standards, the Soviets generally design equipment for a shorter mean time between overhauls. Equipment is sent to a factory or shipyard for major repairs and overhaul.
Analysis of Soviet warships indicates that in many ways they are simpler than U. S. ships and, there-fore, should be less demanding of their crews. Some of the differences are shown in Figure 3.
An additional factor contributing to the ability of the Soviets to operate their ships with short-term conscripts is the practice of emphasizing equipment standardization. This reduces personnel training requirements, enhances reliability, and simplifies logistics support. Both Americans and Soviets often build warships in large blocks to the same basic design. Within each class the ships of both navies are standardized so that they are basically identical when built. However, there are significant differences between American ship classes at the component or subsystem level. These differences reflect the constant improvements in U. S. technology and the influence of a competitive marketplace that provides many different components that can fulfill the same function. Also, many U. S. components become difficult to support logistically during a ship's 30-year service life, because the original manufacturers are no longer making the equipment or are no longer in business. These factors are not as prevalent in the Soviet Union.
Figure 2 Manning Practices | ||
---|---|---|
Item | U. S. | Soviet |
Personnel with maintenance capability | Senior petty officers | Officers & senior petty officers |
Technically trained senior petty officers | ~⅓ of crew | ~ 1/10 of crew |
Personnel turnover | 50–60% per year | 30–35% per year |
Figure 3 Warship Characteristics | ||
---|---|---|
Item | U. S. | Soviet |
Computer systems | Digital, general purpose | Primarily analog, special purpose |
Weapon systems | Complex, often multipurpose | Less complex, single purpose |
Stabilization system | Generally electronic | Often mechanical |
Support systems | Substantial | Limited |
Figure 4 Design Differences | ||
---|---|---|
Item | U. S. | Soviet |
Accessibility | Extensive | Limited |
On-board spares | Extensive | Limited |
On-board shops | Substantial | Limited |
On-board administrative spaces | Substantial | Limited |
Replenishment systems | Extensive | Adequate |
Standardization within the large number of Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) and Spruance (DD-963) class ships entering service should improve overall standardization in the U. S. Navy. Conversely, several new types of Soviet warships with different propulsion plants, weapons, and sensors are currently entering service. The Soviets have also recently introduced many new types of equipment into service, many of which are being retrofitted into older ships. This suggests a trend toward less standardization among Soviet warships, although it is not known if these changes are reflected at the component level.
Several design differences, which have been observed in the past, affect the ability of a ship to sustain operations. See Figure 4.
New Soviet ship designs such as the Kirov, Sovremennyy, and Udaloy are much more spacious than would have been expected on the basis of older Soviet design practices. This suggests an increased emphasis on the design features required for sustained operations. This additional space appears to reflect the lessons learned since the Soviet Navy began in the mid-1960s to conduct extended deployments out of home waters on a regular basis. However, there is only limited evidence which suggests that the Soviets have also changed their manning and training practices—factors which might continue to limit the sustainability of their ships.
Design and In-Service Margins: Two basic types of engineering margins are used in the ship design process. Design margins are those used during the design and construction phases to accommodate changes in the design or an inability to accurately estimate data early in the design process, thus assuring that the ship's final speed, stability, range, and cost will not differ from the original specifications. In-service margins are those provided for the operator in order to accommodate future ship or subsystem growth or changes.
An engineering analysis of Soviet ships has led to the conclusion that they are designed with small design and in-service margins. A study of European ship design practices suggests that Soviet practices seem to be very similar to those used by Italian ship designers.[7] Thus, the Soviets are not off in left field but actually very European in their methods.
The net effect of using margins is larger ships. However, margins provide for operational flexibility and preplanned ship growth. Development of the new USS Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruiser would have been impossible without the margins built into the original Spruance (DD-963) hull design, from which the CG-47 was derived. U. S. and estimated Soviet margins are compared in Figure 5.
Weapons and Sensors: Weapons, sensors, aviation facilities, and ammunition were studied only from the standpoint of their impact on the characteristics of a ship. Only their physical characteristics and associated support requirements were considered. Their effectiveness was not studied.
For the last 20 years, Soviet warships have had an ominous appearance, because they have generally carried about twice as many weapon launchers as American ships. Yet, the Soviets were able to keep their ships relatively small by mounting weapon systems on or above the main deck. This practice precluded carrying reloads for many weapon systems and meant that about 40% of the ammunition load of Soviet ships was located topside, on or above the weather deck, compared with about 10% for U. S. ships.
The location of weapons and ammunition topside also has an impact on survivability. When weapons and ammunition are located externally, they are more vulnerable to the fragments of air-burst antiship weapons. On the other hand, since today's cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are not heavily armored, even magazines deep in the hull are vulnerable to the attack of antiship missiles with penetrating war-heads. When detonated, ammunition located topside vents most of its energy directly to the atmosphere; internally stowed ammunition also vents its energy, but vents it by rupturing the ship. The advantage of external versus internal magazine storage, therefore, remains a center of debate. The new Soviet Kirov-class nuclear-powered strike cruiser has large, volume-demanding, internal magazines for its SS-N-14, SA-N-6, and SS-N-19 missiles. This arrangement could enhance survivability if the magazines are well protected.
Figure 5 Margin Practices | ||
---|---|---|
Design Margins | U. S. | Soviet |
Weight | 10–12.5% | 2–3% |
Stability (KG) | 10–12.5% | 2% |
Powering, EHP | 10% | 0 |
Endurance | 21–33% | 0 |
In-Service Margins | U. S. | Soviet |
Future growth weight | 50–100 Tons | 0 |
Displacement, full load | 10% | 0 |
Stability (KG rise), full load | 1 foot | Small |
Accommodations | 10% | 0 |
Electrical | 30% | 0 |
Fire main | 30% | 0 |
In the early 1970s, the assumption was that Soviet ships generally carried less ammunition per weapon system than American ships. They often had no reload capability for their major missile and torpedo systems. This suggested at the time that Soviet ships were configured for a preemptive first strike in a short, intense conflict. However, current data do not justify this previous estimate. Figure 6 shows the current estimate of Soviet and American ammunition loads as a percentage of full-load displacement. The current estimate indicates that Soviet ships carry about twice the total weight of ammunition as American ships. However, it should be noted that because the Soviets often use very large, heavy missiles and torpedoes, they usually carry a lesser number. One 21-inch diameter Soviet antisubmarine torpedo has about the same impact on ship size as three U. S. 12.75-inch antisubmarine torpedoes, and one Soviet 6,000-pound surface-to-surface missile should have the same impact on ship size as four 1,500-pound Harpoon missiles.
One interesting facet of Soviet weapon system design practices, consistent with their manning, training, and maintenance philosophy, is their practice of providing each ship with redundant and complementary single-task weapon and electronic systems to perform each mission. By comparison, the United States generally provides ships with single, multipurpose weapons and electronics systems which have been optimized in performance. Therefore, when comparing the combat systems of American and Soviet ships, it is often necessary to compare the capabilities of a single American system with the synergistic capabilities of several Soviet systems which together perform the same function.
The Soviets have also continued to provide alternative modes for operating equipment. For example, while the United States did not provide a local control capability for the lightweight 5-inch/54 caliber gun mount, the Soviets provided this capability for their new 76-mm., 100-mm., and 130-mm. mounts. Until recently, the United States has also not provided electro-optical backup for electronic fire control systems, while the Soviets have done so for a long time. The U.S. Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS) has only a single, automated firing mode, while the Soviet CIWS has both a radar and a simple, local control system with a manual sight [figure 7). It could also have an electro-optical backup.
Compared with the American Navy, the Soviet Navy has placed more emphasis on the use of variable depth sonar systems and long-range SS-N-14 Antisubmarine missiles for antisubmarine warfare. The U. S. Navy has emphasized the use of hull-mounted sonars and helicopters for ASW.
Ship Survivability: This issue is complex since many technical features simultaneously influence the ability of a ship to withstand attack. How much various features affect survivability is often difficult to quantify. It must be recognized that survivability depends primarily on the effectiveness of a ship's weapons and sensors, but also on a ship's electronic warfare equipment, operational tactics, fleet composition, and numbers. These critical factors are beyond the scope of this paper, which addresses only design practices which are within the cognizance of the ship designer—signature reduction, passive protection, and damage control.
Signature Reduction: Soviet ships generally have higher acoustic signatures than recent U. S. Navy ships. The emphasis on reducing the acoustic signature of recent U. S. ships has had a significant impact on their size, as a result of the increase in weight and volume requirements associated with machinery foundations, reduction gears, shafting, acoustic insulation, and air compressors.
The deckhouses of Soviet ships are generally designed with some slope and rounded edges, which tends to reduce their radar signatures. However, the topsides of Soviet ships are very cluttered, and this has the opposite effect. Most recent U.S. ships have had relatively large, rectangular deckhouses. However, future U. S. ship designs should incorporate features to reduce their radar signatures.
Both American and Soviet gas-turbine powered ships are designed with features to reduce the temperatures of their stack exhausts; however, in both cases the temperature of the gas plume is still well above ambient levels.
Passive Protection: The survivability of ships, once hit, depends primarily on their size. For a given size of weapon, large ships are inherently more survivable than small ships because of their ability to absorb more damage. However, as the size and lethality of weapons increase, the advantage of ship size becomes less influential on survivability. Several design practices that contribute to the survivability of a ship against conventional weapons are compartmentation, separation, redundancy, armor protection schemes, and damage control features. The features that enhance the survivability of ships against nuclear weapons include shock and blast protection, as well as nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection. Figure 8 compares U. S. and Soviet design practices against the effects of conventional weapons.
Figure 8 Passive Survivability Design Practices | ||
Item | U. S. | Soviet |
Ammunition location | 90% below decks | 30–40% topside |
Command center location | Centralized, superstructure | Distributed, superstructure and hull |
Combat system: Redundancy | Limited | Extensive |
Alternate control | Limited | Extensive |
Electrical and Auxiliary Systems: |
|
|
Capability | Extensive | Limited |
Redundancy | Extensive | Limited |
Separation | Large | Minimal |
Propulsion plant: Separation | Yes, except frigates | Not generally |
Multiple shafts | Yes, except frigates | Yes, always |
Subdivision: Length of damage | 0.15 × length of ship | 3 compartments |
Transverse bulkheads | Adequate number | More than U. S. |
Heavy armor | None | None |
Fragment protection | Around missile magazines | Probably around magazines |
Figure 9 Damage Control Practices | ||
Item | U. S. | Soviet |
Damaged stability | Adequate | Adequate |
Auxiliary systems | Redundant and separated | Limited and concentrated |
Flammable materials | Limited | Extensive |
Accessibility | Excellent | Limited |
Fire fighting systems | Extensive | Limited |
Manning and training | Excellent | Adequate |
Both U. S. and Soviet warships are designed to minimize the effects of radio frequency interference (RFI) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). External fittings are bonded and grounded, cables and wave guides are shielded, electronics systems are physically isolated, and antennas are judiciously sited.
The Soviets emphasize nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare protection in the design of their ships. Even some 1950s-vintage Soviet warships are believed to have citadel-type protection systems. (The use of such a system that long ago probably reflects the Russian experience of having suffered about 500,000 casualties to German chemical warfare in World War I.) A citadel system consists of a group of adjacent spaces which are designed to be isolated from other spaces so that they can be securely closed and then provided with filtered air and maintained at a small overpressure. Any leaks will be to the external atmosphere. New Soviet ships are thought to have a comprehensive citadel-type overpressure system. Until recently it has been U. S. practice not to use such systems but to provide individual protection, including masks, protective clothing, and decontamination spaces. Consideration is currently being given to incorporating a citadel-type system in future U. S. ships.
Damage Control: During the ship design and construction process, the U. S. Navy emphasizes damage control features. While the Soviet open literature addresses damage control, visits to Soviet warships and a review of available Soviet literature suggest that by American standards the Soviets have not emphasized damage control in the design or operation of their warships to the same extent as the United States. A comparison of the American and Soviet damage control practices is summarized in Figure 9. By American standards, Soviet shipboard manning and training for damage control are thought to be poor. Damage control in Soviet ships is considered to be a divisional responsibility.
Insufficient data are available upon which to make a firm assessment of the relative survivability of U. S. and Soviet ships. It is estimated that the net effect of the many differences between American and Soviet survivability design practices is that similar size American and Soviet ships, attacked by similar size conventional weapons, would suffer similar levels of immediate damage. However, the available data regarding the use of electronic warfare, weapons, and passive protection suggest that, in relative terms, the U. S. Navy puts more emphasis on ship and crew survivability, whereas, the Soviets put more emphasis on combat system survivability. Said another way, the superior detail design, quality of construction, and damage control capability of U. S. ships indicate that, following an enemy attack, fewer U. S. ships would be lost because of flooding and fire. On the other hand, the in-depth defense capability of Soviet ships, with redundant weapon and electronic warfare systems and their alternate modes of operation, suggests that fewer Soviet ships would be out of commission as a result of inoperative combat systems.
One speculative thought about a confrontation at sea could be that the United States might end up towing a number of hulks home for repair, with many of the remaining ships out of action with inoperative combat systems. The Soviets might end up with more ships sunk, but with more of their remaining ships still capable of fighting, with some portion of their combat systems still operative.
Hull: A ships's hull form has a major impact on her stability, powering, and seakeeping characteristics. The hull forms of different navies vary widely. The Soviets use a hull form characterized by a large waterplane area, especially aft. As shown in Figure 10, compared with American practice, Soviet midship sections are characterized by straight deadrise, a harder bilge radius, along with flare in the side of the hull through the waterline. Knuckles are usually Used in the hulls of Soviet ships. By contrast, U. S. hull forms tend to have minimum deadrise, a soft bilge radius, and flare only through the waterline forward. American waterplanes are also narrower than Soviet counterparts, especially aft.
The Soviet-style hull form provides more intact stability than an American-style hull form of the same length and beam because it has a wider waterplane area aft and, therefore, more transverse inertia. The flare in the hull of Soviet ships also enhances their damaged stability characteristics, since additional buoyancy is gained as their ships heel or sink lower in the water. The Soviet-style hull form has more wetted surface than an American-style hull form, even when the beam is adjusted to provide comparable stability. Therefore, it has more frictional resistance at all speeds. However, at speed-to-length ratios (V/L.5) of about 1.3 or higher, large waterplane area hull forms have less wave-making resistance. Therefore, on an overall resistance-per-ton basis, Soviet hull forms are superior at high speeds where wave-making resistance predominates, and inferior at lower speeds where frictional resistance predominates.
The Soviet-style hull form is also beneficial in terms of ship arrangements and volume utilization. Because of the wide stern waterlines and the use of flare along the sides of the ship, all other things being equal, Soviet ships have relatively more useable deck area and internal hull volume available than American ships.
Design Displacement: A ship's design displacement is the loading condition at which her hull form coefficients and shape are optimized and at which her speed and range performance are calculated. U. S. ships are designed to operate at or near their full-load displacement. From a U. S. ship designer's standpoint, as fuel oil is consumed, it is intended that it be replaced by saltwater ballast in order to maintain stability. U. S. ships typically operate with no less than two-thirds of their total liquid load onboard; one-half of this can be fuel oil and one-half clean or dirty ballast. American hull forms are optimized, and speed and power calculations are made for the full-load displacement.
It is thought that the Soviets design their warships to have adequate intact and damaged stability in the standard (or zero-fuel) loading condition without having to use saltwater ballast to maintain adequate stability. This design practice is also used by several European NATO countries. Because ships designed in this way need not ballast, they do not necessarily need to operate at or near their full-load displacement. Therefore, Soviet ships, like those of several European NATO countries, use a "normal" loading condition, sometimes called the mean trial displacement, as their design displacement. The mean trial displacement usually includes a partial load of consumables—about half the ship's capacity.
A ship's resistance is strongly influenced by her displacement-to-length ratio (displacement/[0.01L]3). Compared with a ship at full-load displacement, a ship at mean trial displacement will have about a 5–8% lower displacement-to-length ratio.
Stability: The design of warships includes an assessment of both intact and damaged stability. Intact stability describes a ship's ability to withstand severe sea states and the forces of winds and waves. Damaged stability describes a ship's ability to withstand flooding caused by accidents or war damage.
U.S. ships are now designed with sufficient intact stability to withstand 100-knot beam winds, and still have sufficient reserve energy to right themselves. Assessments of the estimated intact and damaged stability characteristics of Soviet ships indicate that in the standard loading condition—without any liquid loads—they generally can withstand beam winds of about 90 knots, or even more, as the ship's liquid load is increased. Therefore, indications are that the intact stability characteristics of Soviet warships should be adequate.
The United States has rigorous criteria for assessing the damaged stability characteristics of warships. Large surface ships are designed to withstand a length of damage at or below the waterline equal to 15% of their length between perpendiculars, with small initial heel angles and with enough reserve righting energy to withstand the effects of moderate beam winds and waves. In addition, U. S. ships are designed to be watertight well above the expected damaged waterline to compensate for the effects of the seaway and moderate beam winds. U. S. ships have adequate damaged stability characteristics without using manually controlled sluice valves to limit heel by cross-connecting tankage on each side of the ship.
Soviet damaged stability design practices differ from American practice, but appear to be generally similar to the practices of several European NATO countries. Soviet ships are apparently designed to a three-compartment standard; that is, they can successfully withstand flooding of any three adjacent compartments. This generally corresponds to a length of damage of 12-14% of the ship's length between perpendiculars. They are thought to use sluice valves to limit heel and to have less demanding criteria for the effects of seaway and beam winds after damage. However, damaged stability characteristics of Soviet ships are thought to be generally adequate, even though they are based on different criteria, minimum loading conditions, and other assumptions than those used for American ships.
Seakeeping: The seakeeping characteristics of Soviet warships are generally excellent, well matched to the difficult Northern waters in which they must operate.[8] All Soviet warships built since the mid-1950s have had active fin stabilization systems, even very large ships such as the 23,000-ton Kirov and 38,000-ton Kiev. While virtually all modern European NATO warships have fin stabilizers, only the U. S. Bronstein (FF-1037), Garcia (FF-1040), Brooke (FFG-1), and Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates have fin stabilizers. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class was designed with a space and weight reservation for fin stablizers which are scheduled to be fitted in the future. The advantage of active fin stabilization systems is that they can reduce the amplitude of roll motions by at least 50% at ship speeds of 10-12 knots or more. This allows ships that are roll stabilized greater course selectivity and the ability to choose headings that reduce pitch and heave motions. With ship motions reduced in higher sea states, weapons and sensors perform better, structural damage is reduced, personnel performance and equipment maintenance are improved, underway replenishment is facilitated, the living environment is enhanced, and, most important of all, the operational availability of the ship is increased.
Indications from model tests are that the pitch and heave motions of Soviet ships are reduced by their hull flare and full waterplane-area sections. These factors, plus the use of active fin stabilization, give the Soviet-style hull form better seakeeping characteristics than the American-style hull form, with its more conventional, finer lines. Also, Soviet ships are generally designed with good freeboard and flare in the bow. By comparison, American Bronstein, Garcia, Brooke, and Knox-class frigates, which were built in large numbers, are deficient in freeboard as well as flare. However, the new Spruance and Oliver Hazard Perry were designed with sufficient flare and freeboard to provide good deck wetness performance. Also spray rails and bulwarks are being retrofitted to ships of the Knox class to correct the original design deficiency.
It is interesting to note that the "Krivak"-class frigate, like most other Soviet warships, has a variable-depth sonar and a long-range SS-N-14 antisubmarine missile launcher. The Oliver Hazard Perry, like many other U. S. warships, does not yet have a variable depth sonar or towed array and uses helicopters to deliver long-range antisubmarine ordnance. In response to a recent seakeeping questionnaire, the commanding officers of U. S. Navy frigates, destroyers, and cruisers indicated that the operation of hull-mounted sonars and helicopters is severely limited by ship motions in northern latitudes. On the other hand, the operation of variable-depth sonars or towed arrays, once in the water, and deck-launched missiles, are not nearly as constrained by ship motions. As a result, the "Krivak," with her Soviet-style hull form and fin stabilizers, should be more viable for ASW than the Oliver Hazard Perry class during heavy weather in the northern latitudes, where she might be able to operate her variable depth sonar and launch her SS-N-14 missiles more often than the Oliver Hazard Perry can operate her hull-mounted sonar and helicopter. (See Figure 11.)
Observers of the Soviet shipbuilding program have often wondered about their mix of ships, weapons, and sensors. For example, the Soviet Navy has not built as many 3,000-5,000-ton frigates and destroyers as expected, concentrating rather on ships larger than 7,000 tons for open-ocean antisubmarine operations, and small ships less than 1,200 tons for coastal zone antisubmarine warfare. Also the Soviets have emphasized the use of fin stabilizers, variable depth sonars, and long-range antisubmarine missiles, in contrast to the U. S. emphasis on hull-mounted sonars and helicopters, with fin stabilization used only in ships of frigate size. Considering the northern latitudes in which the Soviets primarily operate, their choices appear to be more logical than those of the United States. This suggests that, in contrast to the limitations of U. S. ships, large Soviet fin-stabilized antisubmarine cruisers and destroyers with large waterplane area hull forms—the Kirov, "Kara," "Kresta," and Udaloy—have the ship size, seakeeping characteristics, and the weapons and sensors necessary to conduct antisubmarine operations in all but the most severe weather conditions of northern latitudes. It also suggests that the question of the interaction of ship size and sea-keeping characteristics with the choice of weapons and sensors for certain missions in various geographical areas is worthy of additional study.
Propulsion: The first Soviet warships constructed after World War II used obsolescent, low-temperature, low-pressure steam-plant technology. Prior to 1955, American high-temperature, high-pressure steam plants were generally more efficient and lighter in weight than those used by the Soviets. The first Soviet steam plants that were reportedly comparable to American technology were the propulsion Plants of the 1954-vintage "Kotlin"-class destroyer. By the early 1960s, the Soviets had introduced several new types of propulsion-plant technology into their surface warships, including the following:
► High-speed diesels with controllable-pitch propellers
► Large gas turbines with combining reduction and reversing gears and fixed-pitch propellers
► More advanced steam plants, with what are behaved to believed high-temperature, pressure-fired, turbocharged boilers
These advances in propulsion-plant technology meant that the design characteristics of Soviet ships no longer had to be compromised by obsolete propulsion-plant technology.
In 1980, the Soviets introduced nuclear power into a surface warship, the cruiser Kirov. Unlike American nuclear-powered cruisers, however, the Kirov apparently also has some sort of conventional steam plant. Conventional and nuclear power could be combined several ways: separate plants powering Separate screws, separate plants powering separate turbines with combining gears, or an oil-fired superheater used to superheat the steam generated by a nuclear reactor. (For a diagram of this plant, see the July 1981 Proceedings, page 77.) In the case of the Kirov, use of an oil-fired superheater is considered most likely. The most interesting feature of the Kirov's propulsion plant—whatever the actual concept used—is that the Soviets have combined nuclear and conventional power in a surface ship for the first time. Combining a nuclear propulsion plant with either a superheater or a conventional propulsion plant could provide attractive benefits in terms of cost, scarce resources, and skilled personnel from which the United States might benefit.
Prior to 1980, one general characteristic of Soviet ships was that their propulsion plants appeared to be more tightly packed than their American counterparts. The specific volume of Soviet propulsion plants, that is, the cubic feet of volume per unit of installed power, decreased as they introduced the new technology mentioned previously. By comparison, U. S. ships have exhibited just the opposite trend. The compactness of Soviet propulsion plants is thought to be explained by less emphasis on the following design features: noise reduction, shock hardening, equipment separation, accessibility for maintenance, operational flexibility, and auxiliary plant capability and redundancy.
Speed and Range: Soviet ships are generally capable of higher speeds than U. S. ships, but with the exception of the new nuclear-powered Kirov-class cruiser, generally have less range. The reasons for this are partly technical and partly a result of mission requirements. It should be noted that navies often specify speed and range using different criteria. For example, the United States generally specifies a sustained speed requirement, which includes a 25% powering margin for the effect of wind, waves, and fouling. Furthermore, the sustained speed of U. S. ships is calculated at the ship's full-load displacement. By comparison, several European NATO navies and, most likely, the Soviets specify a trial speed requirement, without a margin, measured at full power under ideal conditions. Also, this trial speed is calculated at a mean trial or partially loaded displacement. Obviously, sustained and trial speeds are very different. As a result, a U. S. ship with a rated speed of 32 knots may be able to go just as fast as a Soviet ship reported at 34 knots.
Similarly, the United States calculates endurance range at the ship's full-load displacement and uses several conservative assumptions, including powering and propulsion plant performance margins for the effects of plant deterioration, sea state, hull fouling, and wind, which can total between 20% and 33%. This method minimizes the calculated range of an American ship but probably reflects a realistic assessment of achievable range. By comparison, several European NATO navies and, most likely, the Soviets do not include these types of margins in their calculations of endurance range which they calculate at a partial load displacement. Therefore, when comparing the range of U. S. and foreign ships, care must be taken to identify and consider the displacement and margins that were used in the calculations.
Soviet ships generally have much more power per ton of displacement than American ships (Figure 12), which is the major factor accounting for the higher speed of their ships. Higher speed is also achieved by the additional influence of several other factors, including the superior high-speed hydro-dynamic performance of the Soviet-style hull form and the low displacement-to-length ratio of Soviet ships. If the installed power and other design features of an American and a Soviet ship were the same, the combined effect of the Soviet use of a large waterplane-area hull form and of calculating speed at a mean trial displacement would be a requirement for about 10-15% less power at high speeds or, conversely, the attainment of about 1 knot of additional speed at the same power.
By comparison with the Soviet advantage in speed, the range of older Soviet ships is estimated to have been much less than that of American ships. The lesser range of older Soviet ships resulted primarily from the high specific fuel consumption of their steam propulsion plants, that is, the amount of fuel consumed per unit of shaft horsepower per hour. As Soviet steam propulsion plant technology improved during the later part of the 1950s, the specific fuel consumption rates of their propulsion plants should have improved to the point at which they were comparable to those achieved by American steam propulsion plants of 1960 vintage.
During the early 1960s, the Soviets also introduced gas turbine propulsion technology in the "Kashin"-class guided missile destroyer. In the early 1970s, the United States introduced a very efficient General Electric LM2500 marinized aircraft derivative turbine in the Spruance and Oliver Hazard Perry classes. By comparison with earlier gas turbines, the LM2500 has a low specific fuel consumption rate, especially at the lower power levels required for cruising speeds. There is no indication that the Soviets have introduced equivalently efficient second-generation gas turbines into service, although that is a distinct possibility. The information on Soviet practice with regard to gas turbines came from Rear Admiral A. M. Kalinin, during the course of a conversation on board the Zhguchy, one of two Soviet destroyers which visited Boston in 1975. According to the admiral, Soviet designers specifically set out to produce a marine gas turbine engine rather than just a marinized version of one originally designed to power aircraft. This approach resulted in a very reliable engine, one able to operate for thousands of hours between overhauls.
Finally, in 1980, with the introduction of nuclear power in the Kirov-class cruiser, the Soviets have a ship whose range, for all practical purposes, is equivalent to U. S. nuclear-powered cruisers. What remains to be seen is whether, as expected, the Soviets also build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier by the end of this decade.
Structure: U. S. and Soviet structural design practices are both based on the use of a longitudinal framing system; that is, the deck and shell plating is stiffened by beams running fore and aft. Except for this similarity, American and Soviet structural design practices are very different. This difference is summarized in Figure 13. Compared with an American structural design, a Soviet midship section:
► Has much more closely spaced longitudinal beams, about 19-20 inches apart rather than 24-30 inches, and closely spaced web frames, 39.4 inches apart instead of 84-96 inches.
► Has unsymmetrical bulb angles instead of symmetrical I-T or T-shaped sections for longitudinal stiffeners.
► Has heavier sheer and stringer plates with abrupt changes in plating thickness.
► Has numerous, closely spaced longitudinal girders to support web frames rather than numerous stanchions.
► Generally has an inner bottom, whereas many U. S. ships have only a single bottom.
► Has very light plating on the second deck, without thicker outboard margin plates.
► Has light plating in the centerline portion of the main deck.
Figure 13 Structural Design Differences
Until recently, most Soviet ships had riveted gunwale angle connections. By comparison, post-World War II American ships have had welded gunwale angle connections and special notch-tough steels for crack arresting.
Soviet ships have transversely framed deckhouses with closely spaced stiffeners. In the 1950s, Soviet deckhouses were of all-steel construction. Available data suggest that the Soviets currently mix steel and alloy subassemblies, with steel boundaries often being provided around vital command spaces and magazines and aluminum being used elsewhere. By comparison, since the early 1950s, American Warships have had all-aluminum deckhouses that are longitudinally framed. In addition, insofar as Possible, American deckhouses are usually hard-counted; that is, their transverse bulkheads are aligned with transverse structural bulkheads in the hull, which precludes the need for expansion joints. Soviet deckhouses do not generally appear to be well aligned with structural bulkheads in the hull, and, therefore, use expansion joints. The soft-mounting of deckhouses and the use of expansion joints minimizes the ability of Soviet deckhouses to withstand the lateral sheer loads of nuclear air blasts.
Habitability: Both American and Soviet habitability standards have improved since the 1950s. However, the percentage of total ship volume allocated to personnel has not significantly changed over a 30-year period. While the habitability-related space per man provided by both American and Soviet designers has increased, the use of automation and other new technologies has allowed a decrease in crew size which has more than offset the increase in the space allowed each man. In American ships, personnel have larger mess spaces, separate lounges for off-duty recreation, and more generously arranged berthing areas. The level of outfitting is much more luxurious with sheet metal bunks replacing older "pipe racks." The bulkheads of all berthing spaces have a special covering to improve their appearance. The space provided for food preparation and storage and other support services also has been substantially improved. Therefore, in American ships the overall habitability space provided for each man has increased from about 250 cubic feet to more than 600 cubic feet since World War II; estimated Soviet habitability space has increased from about 250 cubic feet to more than 450 cubic feet.
A major factor contributing to differences between U. S. and Soviet space and weight trends is the deck heights provided in American ships. American ships generally have at least 8 feet, 6 inches of molded deck height (steel plating to steel plating) and a clear deck height of 6 feet, 5 inches everywhere. By way of comparison, in one berthing space in the "Kanin"-class destroyer, the molded deck height was less than 7 feet and the clear deck height was only about 6 feet. The average molded deck height of 9 feet, 6 inches for the Oliver Hazard Perry is considerably more than the estimated 8 feet, 6 inches for the "Krivak." This difference reflects the shallower deck structure, less room for overhead distributive systems, and less clear deck height in the "Krivak." It is estimated that the deck height provided in the way of major operational spaces and major passageways of the "Krivak" is adequate, but that elsewhere the clear deck height is lower than permitted by American criteria.
We believe that Soviet habitability standards have also improved since 1955. The "Kashin"-class destroyer of 1960 vintage has a large mess space for enlisted personnel. It also has a large separate wardroom for chief petty officers. American and Soviet officers probably have about the same level of habitability. Additionally, chief petty officers sleep two-high in staterooms, which are better accommodations than those of American chiefs, who sleep three-high in large dormitory-style berthing spaces. However, except in officers' country, joinerwork is generally more austere than that in American ships. The living and berthing spaces for crew members have also increased in quality. Also, since Soviet ships have less deck height than U. S. ships, the difference in overall space per man magnifies the actual differences in American and Soviet practice. In terms of square feet of deck area per man, current American and Soviet habitability design standards are probably more nearly equal.
Impact of Design Practices: One way to compare the impact of the differences in American and Soviet design criteria on ship characteristics over the last 30 years is to determine how a U. S. ship designed around 1970 would have been designed in 1960 and in 1950 by U. S. engineers as compared with Soviet engineers. The ship selected for this assessment was the U. S. Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate.
What would have been the result in 1960 or 1950 if U. S. and Soviet ship designers had been given the same combat system, speed and range requirements, and number of accommodations found on the FFG-7? With this in mind, the FFG-7 was redesigned using the Garcia (FFG-1040) as representative of American 1960 practice, and the Dealey (DE-1006) as representative of American 1950 practice. Similarly, the "Sovietized" versions of the FFG-7 were based on the 1970-vintage "Krivak" as representative of 1970 Soviet practice, the "Kashin" as representative of 1960s practice, and the "Riga" as representative of 1950s practice.
The characteristics of the resulting American and Soviet design concepts are compared in Figure 14. Weight and space trends are compared in Figure 15. The data show that in 1950, U. S. design criteria would have resulted in ships of about the same displacement as those designed to Soviet criteria; however, U. S. ships required about 15% more volume. The lack of a weight advantage in the Soviet designs was primarily because of their use of obsolescent steam propulsion technology—less efficient, low-pressure, low-temperature steam plants with high fuel consumption rates.
The estimated U. S. acquisition cost trends for the six U. S. and Soviet ship design concepts, less the cost of weapons, sensors, and other government furnished equipment, are shown in Figure 16, both in dollars per ton and in unit cost. The 1950s American ship design was estimated to be slightly less expensive than its Sovietized counterpart because it was smaller and not much more sophisticated. In 1960, the American ship design was still less costly than its Sovietized counterpart, largely because its pressure-fired, single-screw steam propulsion plant was less expensive than the combined gas turbine plant of the Soviet design. By 1970, however, the cost of the U. S. ship had escalated rapidly, it was substantially higher than the estimated cost of the Soviet ship, primarly because of:
► Larger ship size (50%)
► Greater complexity and quality control (27%)
► Increased design and engineering costs (23%) Prior to 1970, U. S. and Soviet design and engineering costs were estimated to be about the same. However, additional U. S. design and engineering costs for program management; integrated logistics support; reliability, maintainability, and availability; data management; producibility management; test and evaluation; integration management; and configuration management have caused the cost of this category to double in the years since 1970.
Soviet advances in propulsion technology by the early 1960s and their more austere criteria resulted in a much smaller design than would have been developed by U. S. engineers. Also, 1960 U. S. design criteria required much more internal volume than did those of the Soviets. Virtually all of this additional volume was associated with requirements for ship control and propulsion spaces, auxiliary systems, shops, access and voids, storerooms, and tankage.
These trends are consistent with the fact that the specific volume or cubic feet per ton of lightship displacement of American ships has increased steadily over the last 30 years. Meanwhile, the specific volume of Soviet ships has also increased, although not yet to American levels. This increase reflects a trend toward more volume in warships. It grows out of an increase in deck height, accessibility, auxiliary systems, habitability standards, and support for new, volume-demanding weapons and sensors.
Soviet 1970 ship design criteria had not yet begun to reflect the lessons learned during long, extended deployments which were begun in the mid-1960s. However, the lightship weight of the 1970 Soviet design is more than 10% higher than the 1960 design. This represents the same growth experienced by U. S. designs between 1960 and 1970. Consistent with this trend, it was not surprising that the designs of the new Soviet Kirov cruiser and the Sovremennyy and Udaloy guided missile destroyers, first seen in 1980, are similar to those of U. S. warships. To improve the sustained operational characteristics of these ships, Soviet ship designers are thought to have begun providing more comprehensive auxiliary systems, better outfitting, and more space for ship control, shops, stores, and access. They are now volumetrically very large, with perhaps more space provided for the functions required to enhance sustainability than is found in U. S. ships.
As shown in Figure 17, the 1970 Sovietized Oliver Hazard Perry design would have had less displacement, volume, and cost than the U. S. design. However, because of differences in ship design practices and criteria, the Sovietized ship would have higher self-noise characteristics, lower shock protection, and been more vulnerable to nuclear air blast. With fewer shops, storerooms, and administrative facilities, the Sovietized ship would be less capable of conducting sustained operations. Access to equipment for maintenance would be difficult, and there would be few subsystem margins available for future modernization. Also, because of a lack of growth capability, major overhauls would require significant changes to these systems. Therefore, the time and cost of overhauls would increase. Also, without the provision of in-service margins, the ship's displacement and weight distribution, as well as subsystem loads, would have to be carefully controlled.
The disadvantage of austere Soviet design practices reflected in the 1970 "Krivak" must be compared with a nearly 3:2 trade-off in hull numbers for a given amount of resources. However, it must be noted that the new 1980-vintage Kirov, Sovremennyy, and Udaloy are about the same size as would have been designed by an American ship designer. Therefore, many of the limitations associated with the Soviet design practices of the early 1970s, reflected in the Sovietized FFG-7, do not apply to these new ships of the 1980s. Yet, because of an estimated lower quality of construction and a lesser requirement for design and engineering services, it is estimated that these new Soviet ships, less their weapons sensors and other government furnished equipment, should still be about 25% less costly than the same ship built to U. S. Navy standards.
Conclusions: The Soviets appear to design ships primarily in response to a military doctrine which emphasizes speed, concentration of force, preservation of combat effectiveness, and the primacy of the offensive. This has resulted in the Soviets building a large number of ships that are designed within the state of the art, adequate in performance, easy to operate and maintain, and relatively simple and inexpensive. By comparison, the United States designs ships to a military doctrine which emphasizes superior performance, economy of force, preservation of life, and combat effectiveness. This has resulted in the U. S. building a smaller number of ships, with an emphasis on optimized performance and the use of advanced technology. It is thought the U. S. ships are generally superior to Soviet ships in military performance, but are difficult to operate and maintain, and more complex and expensive.
Soviet ship designers do an excellent job in basic design and ship system configuration and integration. The design competence reflected in Soviet ships appears to be the product of an environment that encourages competition between designers, promotes technical exchanges between design teams and shipyards, facilitates communications between designers and operators, and is characterized by longevity and stability in the leadership of design bureaus. Senior U. S. ship designers do not perceive that such an environment exists in the United States, where ship design is considered secondary to other technological considerations; the prestige, authority, and freedom given to ship designers are limited.
In a 1974 assessment of U. S. and Soviet warship design practices by the Naval Sea Systems Command, Soviet warships built prior to 1970 were noted to be generally smaller, faster, and more heavily armed than those of the U. S. Navy, but to have only a limited ability to conduct sustained at-sea operations. (See August 1975 Proceedings, page 56.) These design characteristics were explained, in part, by the fact that up until the mid-1960s, Soviet ships, unlike U. S. ships, had not been designed for sustained operations worldwide with a carrier or surface action battle group. Therefore, they did not need to be designed with an inherent self-sufficiency, including a capability for performing on-board maintenance and repair of equipment and at-sea replenishment of stores and ammunition. Rather, the Soviet Navy's missions of coastal defense and sea denial in selected geographical areas required a design emphasis on firepower, speed, good seakeeping, and a first-strike capability against air, sea, and submarine threats. Thus, Soviet ships could be volumetrically small, with tightly packed machinery and auxiliary machinery rooms, limited internal access, and numerous weapons mounted "on," rather that "in," the ship to minimize their impact on ship size.
The 1974 assessment indicated a very definite growth trend in the size, endurance, and habitability of Soviet ships, particularly their cruisers. It further indicated that this growth was expected to continue as the Soviets experienced the problems associated with the extended operational deployments which they initiated on a regular basis in the mid-1960s. Hence, knowing that it normally requires about 12 to 15 years for new naval requirements to be translated into new ships, it should not have been surprising that new Soviet destroyers and cruisers are volumetrically large ships that are very similar to new American ships. The design of these Soviet ships reflects the size, internal volume, and sustainability characteristics that American designers normally incorporate in U. S. ships to meet worldwide mission requirements. The technological sophistication and innovative combination of capabilities incorporated in new Soviet ships, including the 38,000-ton Kiev-class aircraft carrier and 23,000-ton Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruiser—and the cost they represent—are unmistakable indications of the increasing offensive and forward-deployment capability of the Soviet Navy. They are also unmistakable indications of the Soviets' attitude toward sea power and their growing ability to project that power.
It is the opinion of many of the engineers who have participated in this comparative assessment that, because of the difficulty in operating and maintaining technologically advanced ship systems, the United States often achieves far less than the full performance capability designed into a ship and her combat system. The Soviets, on the other hand, with ship systems whose performance capability may often not be as high as comparable U. S. ship systems but which are easier to operate and maintain, are more likely to achieve nearly all of the performance capability designed into a ship and combat system. If true, this could mean that the actual capability of Soviet ships is, in fact, comparable with that achieved by U. S. ships, Indeed, in a number of areas Soviet ships are superior to U. S. ships. This conclusion suggests that, in general, the United States has not successfully compensated for numerical inferiority by qualitative superiority.
The most interesting finding of the study is that Soviet ships could be built in U. S. shipyards at substantially less cost than comparable U. S. ships, because the Soviet ships have generally been smaller, have been built with lesser quality, and are not thought to have as high design and engineering costs associated with their acquisition. The validity of this finding is supported by the results of other studies which suggest that Soviet tanks, aircraft, and missiles could also be built in the United States for less than two-thirds the cost of comparable U. S. weapon systems. Whatever the actual cost differences, the fact remains that the Soviet Union appears to have the ability to acquire more ships than the United States for a given amount of resources. The implications of these findings for American military planners, congressmen, and taxpayers are manifold. They clearly suggest that there are lessons to be learned by the United States through further studies of the Soviets' ship design practices, acquisition process, and their practice of providing longevity and stability in design bureaus. They raise fundamental questions about the interrelationship of design competence, advanced technology, unit cost, and numbers of ships. They also call for a comparative assessment of the interaction of ship systems and performance characteristics with military doctrine, available resources, and personnel limitations. It is particularly important that resolution of these issues continue to be pursued if the U. S. Navy is to achieve the right balance in the quality and quantity of ships required to offset the quantitative superiority of the Soviet Navy.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the following Naval Sea Systems Command design engineers to this article: N. T. Yannarell, V. W. Puleo, J. D. Raber, M. M. Shen, L. E. Dye, L. I. Isaacson, J. A. Schell, J. E. Traylor, J. R. Possehl, E. N. Comstock, and Clark Graham.
[1] Captain James W. Kehoe, Jr. USN. "Warship Design: Ours and Theirs," Proceedings, August 1975, pp. 56-65.
[2] Kehoe; Herbert A. Meier; Major Larry J. Kennedy, USMC; and Lieutenant Commander Don C. East, USN, "U. S. Observations of the Kiev," Proceedings, July 1977, pp. 105-111.
[3] Kehoe and Kenneth S. Brower, "Their New Cruiser," Proceedings, December 1980, pp. 121-126; "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings, July 1981, pp. 77-78.
[4] Kehoe and Brower, "One of Their New Destroyers: 'Sovremennyy'," Proceedings, June 1981, pp. 121-125.
[5] Kehoe and Brower, "One of Their New Destroyers: Udaloy," Proceedings. February 1982, pp. 115-119.
[6] Kehoe, "Naval Officers: Ours and Theirs," Proceedings, February 1978, pp. 50-60.
[7] Kehoe, Brower, Meier, and Commander Clark Graham, USN, "Comparative Naval Architecture Analysis of NATO and Soviet Frigates," Naval Engineers Journal, October 1980, pp. 87-99, and December 1980, pp. 84-93.
[8] Kehoe, "Destroyer Seakeeping: Ours and Theirs," Proceedings, November 1973, pp. 26-37.