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Despite great reductions in numerical strength, the Swedish Navy still represents a formidable force on the strength of its high-quality ships, weapons, and equipment, favorable coastal conditions, and excellent personnel.
But the Swedish Navy faces a problem similar to that confronting the U. S. Navy: Would a smaller number of highly capable but high-cost ships be adequate to make up for the lack of numbers?
Sweden faces a combination of potential opponents on the sea who possess a large number of high-quality ships and submarines. It should be noted that naval encounters in narrow seas such as the Baltic would be short but intense, and a high attrition rate must be expected—especially with the employment of FPBs, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters. While the Swedish coast provides the defender great advantages in both defense and offense, a point is reached when the enemy’s superiority in numbers— combined with the willingness to accept large losses—would overwhelm the defender, regardless of high-quality ships or well-trained personnel. The numerical weakness appears to present the most serious problem facing the Royal Swedish Navy in the years ahead.
The navy’s offensive capability has
been weakened since the backbone of strength now rests exclusively with the Spicas. Also the employment of the FPBs suffers because of the lack of flotilla leaders. Presumably, the projected 300-ton FPB, when she enters into service, might fulfill this role, but it appears doubtful.
The navy’s ASW capability has been decreased by the phasing out of destroyers and fast ASW frigates. Thus, the larger burden of ASW work has fallen upon the small force of helicopters. Again, it does not seem that the steps taken so far will eliminate the present weakness in the navy’s ASW capability. Similarly, the numerical strength of the submarine force appears too low for the navy’s needs despite greatly improved capabilities in the newest classes of submarines built or under construction.
The situation is especially serious because of no apparent change in naval policy on the part of the Swedish Government. Sweden cannot afford to have its naval position become further eroded: to do so may well lead to the weakening of its position in the Baltic—with accompanying political consequences.
Milan Vego is a naval and military analyst in Washington. A 1961 graduate of the Yugoslav naval academy, he served on fast patrol boats for most of his naval career. Mr. Vego also wrote the regional summary of East European navies that appears in this issue.
The “Luta” Fleet
By Andrew Li
Western naval observers have continually reported the number of the Chinese “Luta”-class guided missile destroyers as being only seven ships with the following hull numbers: 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, and 111. In fact, the number of “Lutas” is twice seven.
According to some Chinese sources, such as the articles and photographs released by Chinese publications, and the photographs of the
Chinese naval deployment to the South Pacific during the Chinese ICBM test in 1980, the “Luta”-class destroyer fleet actually consists of three series: 105-111; 161-165; and 131 and 132—for a total of 14 ships.
The ships of the 105 series may be deployed with the East Sea Fleet or North Sea Fleet; the 161 series is believed to be deployed with the South Sea Fleet; and the 131 series is reported to be deployed with the East
Sea Fleet. Ships from these series operated together in 1980 in the South Pacific.
The 161-series ships were built at the Guangzhou Shipyard. Other ships were built at the Hongqi (Red Flag) Shipyard at Dalian and the Hudong Shipyard at Shanghai.
The armament of the “Lutas” varies from ship to ship. The main weapons are two trainable triple missile launcher/containers for the “Styx-”
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type surface-to-surface missiles, which are designated as “Hai Ying No. 2” (HY-2) in China, and two semi-automatic dual-purpose twin 130-mm. gun turrets. These ships carry no spare missiles.
The “Luta’s” antiaircraft armament consists of four 57-mm. and four 25-mm. twin gun mountings. On some ships, 37-mm. twin gun mountings are used in place of the 57-mm. mountings. There are no fixed chaff decoy launchers on board the "Lutas.” A Chinese Navy officer, however, reportedly said that a Chinese-built portable decoy launcher is being carried on board these destroyers.
The antisubmarine weapons of the “Luta" are very poor. There are two □-barrelled antisubmarine rocket launchers mounted on the bow. This rocket launcher is believed to be a Chinese-developed weapon; there is no sign to indicate that it is a Soviet RBU-series weapon. Generally, two depth charge projectors are mounted on the fantail, but some ships have been seen with four projectors mounted.
The “Luta’s” electronic gear is old- style. The search radar is similar to the obsolescent Soviet “Cross Slot" or Top Bow”-type and is mounted , on the mainmast. The mainmast also supports a “Square Tie” fire control radar for "Hai Ying No. 2” missiles, a Post Lamp”-like target designation radar, and a “High Pole”-type IFF antenna. A “Knife Rest”-type air warning radar is installed on the after superstructure. Atop the bridge, a
Wasp Head”-type director is equipped with a “Sun Visor” radar for the main gunfire control. Two Soviet-type “Watch Dog” electronic countermeasures antennae are also carried.
According to press reports, the "Luta"-class destroyers are to be improved by the addition of equipment, including the British Aerospace Sea Dart missiles and the Westland Lynx helicopter.
Mr. Li is a writer who contributes to many military-related publications in Hong Kong.
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