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The uniforms are different but the humor is universal as a senior officer explains, “Can’t help that, corporal . . . new policy . . . fewer men and more equipment.” Yet, there's nothing really funny about the plight of Canada’s defense establishment which, since unification, has continued to decline in manpower and equipment.
For more than ten years, I was an officer in Canada’s armed forces. Before unification, we were trained as seagoing officers with a goal of ultimately seeking our own command. The admiral and his staff determined our missions based on our defense priorities at the time. We set our sights on an exciting career with the honest belief that we were part of one of the best defense forces in the world, with the added caveat of “based on the equipment we had at our disposal.”
It is difficult to say exactly when the downturn started for our defense forces. Many military analysts argue it began in Prime Minister John Diefen- baker’s era when the Arrow fighter aircraft was cancelled, and we lost our aerospace engineers to the American space program. Personally, I saw the glue becoming unstuck in the mid-1960s. From an operational perspective, events changed dramatically for the forces under the Liberal Government. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau considered the military a very low priority item, as demonstrated by its share of the treasury pie. An annual change of defence ministers seeking higher profile cabinet positions began. Just as one minister had completed his tour of Canadian bases, a shuffle would take place whereby the “touring road show” would start up again. Thence followed the demise of the aircraft carrier Bonaventure (CVL-22) which severely curtailed sea/air operations. Fixed-wing naval aircraft were then relegated to land bases to perform surveillance operations such as fishery patrols.
Manpower and recruiting became severely restricted throughout the forces, and as a result, several destroyers had to be tied up against the jetties. Often ships could not go to sea unless they were augmented by reserve personnel. Ship programs were modified or curtailed because of the rising fuel prices. With fewer ships and aircraft going to sea, operational and training functions became downgraded. Instead of individual squadrons looking after their aircraft, servicing became centralized; thus, backlogs developed and individual squadron pride was sacrificed in the name of “efficiency.” One of the Liberal Government’s most significant blunders was the incorporation of the bilingual and biculturalism policy for the Canadian forces. Following the guidelines established by the cabinet for all government agencies, a directorate was established at headquarters in Ottawa for the francophone indoctrination program. The merit principle for promotion for all ranks was cast aside in favor of one- third representation for anyone whose mother tongue was French Canadian. Less qualified officers and men were promoted because of their surnames. Personnel were posted to one-year francophone training programs in Quebec and then returned to such anglophone bases as Halifax and Victoria. Recruiting was severely curtailed in the rest of Canada in favor of obtaining the Quebec quota. Ships were designated bilingual only, with their working language as French, even though they had to communicate with the rest of the fleet in English. An empire of translation services was established in order to cope with the policy of translating military publications into French. This practice was irrational considering the French Navy used NATO publications that were published in English only. The Bilingual and Biculturalism Program was not only detrimental to the organization as a whole but a colossal waste of taxpayers’ dollars.
Upon leaving the Canadian forces, I was dumbfounded by the general apathy and lack of awareness most Canadians have toward defense issues. A great majority really did not understand the Soviet naval threat to the Western world or the potential of the Warsaw Pact armies in Europe. Many considered the service a modified employment agency. I found I was forever defending the military as a viable career for a young man or woman. The countering argument was often, “Why have our own forces when we can rely on the Americans?”
Canada’s Defense Role: If Canada’s defense policy is read in total, it means our forces should:
► Carry out surveillance of all Canadian territory, including the 200-mile offshore economic zone
in
► Defend North America through NORAD by contributing 3 interceptor squadrons, 24 radar stations,
and 2 satellite-tracking installations
►Contribute to NATO forces in Western Germany with air and land units
►Provide ships and maritime patrol aircraft for NATO
►Reinforce the Allied deterrent forces in Norway with troops and provide two squadrons of aircraft for a close support role
►Provide United Nations peacekeeping forces such as in Cyprus and in the Middle East.
These defense commitments appear very creditable on paper, but they are almost impossible to fulfill if they must be implemented at the same time. At present, with the equipment and manpower at our disposal, we are unable to fulfill even the first task. In the total 1970-71 federal budget, 14.1% was alotted to defense spending in Canada. In 1980-81, this figure was reduced to 8.7%. Canada spends less per head on defense than all its 14 NATO allies except Iceland and Luxembourg. The new federal budget should however, increase defense outlays from $5.9 billion this year to at least $9.8 billion by 1985. It appears to be Canada’s intention to also increase its real defense expenditures by 3% per year, the target it agreed to two years ago, along with other NATO allies.
Over the past 20 years, the manpower of the Canadian forces has deteriorated from more than
120.0 personnel to 79,000. On paper. Mobile Command has an army of 18,000 men. However, a vast majority of these personnel are assigned to the role of support services only. Even under the most ideal conditions, it is impossible for our soldiers to protect our shores as well as provide support to NATO. Our 5,000-man air and land contribution to the forces in Western Europe is a token insult to our NATO partners. When the support trades are subtracted from the above figure, there is a very limited number of operational soldiers and pilots in the country to counter the approximately 940,000 conventional Warsaw Pact troops and 4,500 aircraft believed assembled on West Germany’s borders. When Canada infuriated its NATO allies in 1970 by reducing half of its 10,000-man European contingent, it pledged it would commit those men to Norway’s defense in the event of a war. By prepositioning equipment this year, Canada intends to put some credibility into that commitment.
The Reserves: The Reserve or Militia, which is supposed to augment our regulars in time of war, has been reduced from approximately 59,000 to
21.0 men. Because of our reduced regular force complement, senior staff has realized that the Reserves are an important link to our operational commitments. For that reason. Major General Richard Rohmer was appointed to ensure more funding and responsibility is proportioned to these units.
Most of the personnel who make up the Reserves are students either in high school or college. From my active participation in the Reserves, I perceived no end to their drive and spirit. However, the Reserve’s major flaw is the great deal of time needed to train personnel to a level which can be utilized by the regular forces. It takes many weekends before an individual is adequately trained for combat in the field or on a ship.
Often the equipment the Reserves work with is antiquated and outdated. 1 had difficulty understanding the use of training our sailors in vintage ships, which were used to open and close gates to counter German submarines entering Halifax Harbor in World War II. In today’s threat situation, the Reserves should be training on equipment that is presently being used by the regular forces. Only in this way can they assist and augment the career servicemen in a crisis.
The primary roles of the Reserves are also outdated. One of the tasks assigned to our unit in time of war was naval control of shipping, which meant controlling convoys across the North Atlantic. We tackled these exercises with enthusiasm and determination. Unfortunately, my reaction towards World War II convoy tactics was rather pessimistic in light of satellite tracking systems, tactical nuclear weapons, and the individual speeds of many of today’s merchant vessels.
There is a lack of clarity concerning the appropriate levels for the Reserve force and the posture they require in order to meet future contingencies. General Rohmer intends to increase the responsibility of these secondary forces.
Command and Control: Our defense force is not only undermanned, but it is also top-heavy. There are more chiefs than Indians in our peacetime organization. Prior to unification, there were approximately 75 generals for 100,000 enlisted men, or one general per 1,300 men. Today, we have 119 generals and 65,000 men, or a ratio of 1 per 550. The balance of our forces is somewhat inverted. The result of this inverted pyramid manpower situation is a trend towards administrative “paper-pushers” at the National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, instead of officers remaining in their respective operational commands. Unfortunately, these senior officers often forget the problems and interests they should deal with back at the operational level. Their motives change to career self-interest rather than lending a voice to the concerns of each of the various commands. Commanders in the individual commands—maritime, mobile, and air—argue they have limited control over their respective services. They simply implement policies which have been established by the staff officers at Ottawa.
The Glassco Commission recommended main-
taining the principle that the armed forces are subject to civil power, and it perceived a need for a civilian staff group outside the management of the armed forces. It also recommended the deputy minister of national defence be given a greater responsibility in administrative matters and in advising the minister. The report further suggested there should be a greater interchange of military and civilian officers, especially of senior and intermediate rank, in National Defence Headquarters and the deputy minister’s organization.
Many retired senior military officers have criticized this civilian/military framework. Servicemen have argued the military headquarters orgamza tional charts look like the Public Service Commission. Major policy decisions which have ramifications for servicemen are being made by academics with little or no appreciation of what military requirements are needed in the operational areas.
In a submission by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies to the Fyffe study group, the organization stated:
“Instead of civil control of the Armed Forces, the result would appear to border on civil direction and dominance. The National Defence Headquarters structure has been excessively civilian- ized and the Defence Management Committee has, as a result, become civilian-dominated. Those responsible for military operational capability and effectiveness would appear to be underrepresented and not effectively heard. This has contributed to what, in our view, is a general deterioration in the operational capabilities and the operational orientation of the Armed Forces. The military aim of greater effectiveness as a result of unification has been lost in the process.
One of the strongest criticisms against National Defence Headquarters has been its lack of ability to formulate an effective mobilization plan for the
When this photograph was taken in the mid-1960s, the Canadian soldiers participating in a mock battle in Germany were part of a 10,000-man air and land force assigned to NATO. In 1970, Canada infuriated its NATO allies by halving the number of troops to 5,000.
Canadian armed forces. Due to the staggering commitments assigned to the military in Canada’s defense policy, defense planners have operated on a very short-term planning policy in an attempt to put out the “fires.” There has been no long-term planning for the Canadian forces for years, and national security planning is still in its infancy. There has been no major revision of Canada’s defense policy since 1971. Practically speaking, considering our operational capabilities and logistic requirements, it is quite safe to say the roles for our defense forces on paper do not match our actual ability to conduct combat in these sectors, if required to augment our forces simultaneously. Priorities in our defense planning must be established in order to clarify these false expectations in our defense policy.
Capital Acquisitions: Canada’s military capital equipment acquisition cannot be classified a success story. The government has been reluctant to update worn-out equipment, and I believe recent purchases were acquired only as a result of economic pressure from our NATO allies to live up to our military commitments.
Historically, military procurement in Canada has been a disaster. For example:
► The Arrow fighter aircraft, a machine far ahead of its time, designed and built in Canada, was cancelled by the government as too expensive.
►The Bomarc missile system rusted to its ungrateful end defending North Bay, Ontario.
►F-5A close-support aircraft were purchased in large numbers as a great bargain. Because of their very limited range and lack of “all-weather” capability, their only effective role was close support of troops in Europe. Many of these aircraft never made it out of mothballs, and an effective role for these machines has never been found.
►The Boeing 707 aircraft was purchased to replace the aging Yukon transports. Unfortunately, we only bought five. If one is used for VIPs and another is being serviced, the remaining three aircraft must serve all the domestic and international service personnel airlift requirements.
► Four Iroquois (DDH-280)-class destroyers were purchased eight years ago at more than $60 million each. Unfortunately, the offensive hardware is questioned by military experts and foreign allies. Its main armament consists of one 5-inch gun forward, mortar MK-X depth charges developed more than 25 years ago for antisubmarine warfare, and a standoff missile system, the Sea Sparrow, with a range of approximately five miles, which is totally inadequate to ward off today’s missile threats.
►The number and design of the promised six new frigates, costing $1.5 billion in 1977, and now esti-
mated at $2.6 billion, is seriously questioned.
► The acquisition of the F-18A fighter aircraft is a typical example of Canadian mismanagement and ineptitude in purchasing military hardware. Observers have questioned the so-called final short list, the emphasis on a cheap deal rather than the best product, the industrial spinoff for our industry rather than the primary consideration being the use and performance of the aircraft itself, the conduct of negotiations, and the government’s withholding of information and inability to make a decision for over three years. It is estimated the 1977 price of $2.3 billion will probably mushroom to more than $5.2 billion before the 138 aircraft are finally delivered.
In announcing the F-18A as the government’s eventual winner, 1 was alarmed to see Herb Gray, Minister of Trade and Commerce, discussing with reporters the industrial benefits for our manufacturers. What does the pilot who has to ride in the cockpit have to say about this machine? We have since learned the U. S. Navy is having difficulty shaking the “bugs” out of this aircraft. It has been claimed that the performance specifications and range of this aircraft have not been met by the manufacturer. Canada has attempted to buy an aircraft to fulfill the role of an all-weather interceptor and a fighter/support aircraft to replace the CF-101 Voodoo and the CF-104 Starfighter. There is a possibility the F-18A will be unable to fulfill either of these commitments.
Financial Post writer Robert English reported in 1980 that Canada’s two European bases in West Germany “. . . can only be defended if the enemy gives us lots of warning, picks a sunny day and promises to fly slowly.” Don Baird stated in The Edmonton Journal on 1 February 1980 our destroyers at sea, with the exception of the DDH-280s, were using antiquated glass vacuum tubes, which are manufactured in the Soviet Union, for their sonar and radar systems. Besides this, the “St. Laurent”- class ships were launched before 1955, and they are
now more than five years past their life expectancy.
In December 1981, boiler problems confined 16 of our destroyers to port to determine “. . . how serious the boiler cracks were and what repairs were needed.” Only the four 280-type destroyers were serviceable for sea, on both the east and west coasts. As Frank Caldwell, a retired commodore and now assistant national secretary of the Navy League of Canada, stated, “How can you go about recruiting people for a navy with 30-year-old ships which can’t go to sea?” These destroyers are now being refitted at a cost of billions of dollars to ensure they stay afloat until the commissioning of the new frigates expected in 1987.
The former Head of Maritime Command, Vice Admiral Douglas Boyle, stated in the Globe and Mail in 1981 that the current armament programs being undertaken by the Department of National Defence were inadequate. The $697 million program to purchase 18 long-range patrol aircraft for Maritime Command should be expanded to allow for 36 aircraft. The fighter program which allows for 130 aircraft should allow for 200 aircraft. A $187 million program to purchase 128 Leopard tanks from Germany should be tripled or quadrupled. “You can lose 128 tanks in a single day on the field,” he said. The $1.5 billion program to purchase six new frigates should be expanded to 24 ships in order to meet our requirements and the 200-mile limit.
Possible Strategic Alternatives: Because there has been no examination of our defense policy for approximately a decade, the following are areas which could possibly be examined for future strategic consideration:
Among the highly regarded equipment needed by the Canadian armed forces are Lockheed-built Aurora patrol aircraft and German Leopard tanks. Canada has 18 Auroras, but the number ought to be doubled, and the 128 Leopards contemplated ought to be tripled or quadrupled.
►Brigadier General C. E. Beattie, the previous Commander of Northern Region, has advocated an increased military presence in the North. Our natural resources must be protected from possible enemy intrusion. We should use long-range aircraft surveillance instead of a token quarterly flight, augmented by warships with icebreaking capabilities. There are several aerodromes in the North capable of handling the new long-range Aurora aircraft. Northern Region should be supplemented with an ample number of troops, in lieu of the present 50.
►Increase our NATO commitment in West Germany to at least triple our present strength of 5,000 personnel.
►Encourage the expansion of mobile airborne brigades, which are flexible and able to respond to crises in any part of Canada or could be used in a rapid response peacekeeping role around the world.
► Examine the feasibility of withdrawing our destroyers from an antisubmarine detection role in the North Atlantic. With sonar detection ranges of often less than a half mile in the North Atlantic, tracking submarines is next to impossible. Nuclear submarines can now outrun our aging destroyer fleet. Other than their possible ASW capability, 16 of our destroyers are unable to counter any surface missile attack at sea. If antisubmarine warfare is to be a viable consideration, the new Aurora aircraft must work in unison with attack submarines or possibly fast and well-armed ships with a minimum crew.
►Because of the 200-mile economic zone, our total surveillance coverage of Canada’s coastal territory has increased. Our sea element needs many smaller frigates, properly armed, and high-speed patrol craft to adequately meet this operational role. Long-range patrol aircraft would be stationed in support of these ships along each of our coastlines and stationed in northern aerodromes such as Inuvik, Resolute Bay, and Nanasivik in the Northwest Territories.
►Examine the decision of withdrawing all nuclear hardware from our forces. Is this policy realistic in light of tactical nuclear weapons believed to be in the arsenal of such countries as Iraq, Pakistan, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, and Israel?
►The acquisition of airborne early warning aircraft to augment our detection systems, such as the distant early warning line. Canada should also investigate the feasibility of acquiring more transport aircraft to replace the Hercules and Boeing 707 personnel transport carriers.
►Ensure our fleet has a minesweeping capability. It would take days before Halifax Harbor could be effectively cleared of mines and the fleet released for operations in the Atlantic.
Developing and maintaining our military requires money, equipment, manpower, and planning. Our armed forces have been sadly neglected by our politicians and the public for at least 15 years. If our forces are to have credibility around the world, they must not only have the best equipment, but they must also have realistic roles.
It is time our politicians considered Canada’s best interests in light of the immense Warsaw Pact military presence around the world. We must not lose sight of the Afghanistan situation and the real and potential threat to our nation’s security. Our military has been looked upon as second-class citizens by Parliament. The Canadian armed forces are losing experienced people who are leaving the services for lack of career incentives and sufficient pay. The people of Canada must realize in the next confrontation we will not have time to build up our military forces as we did in World War II. We must have enough regular force personnel, highly trained to operate sophisticated hardware, to deter any form of aggression in North America or Europe. Unfortunately, we have neither enough men nor equipment to properly fulfill the tasks outlined in the 1971 “White Paper” on defense. In addition to this, our Reserve forces, vital to the defense of the country in a major war, are also understrength and, in many cases, poorly prepared.
The Canadian public must be made aware of such Soviet ships as the Kirov, the Soviet Union’s first nuclear-powered surface warship. Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, the director of U. S. Naval Intelligence, described the guided-missile cruiser as a “ship of monstrous proportions, twice the size of any surface combatant, other than an aircraft carrier, built since the battleships of World War II.”
The Soviet “Oscar”-class submarine can launch up to 24 long-range antiship cruise missiles while submerged. The “Typhoon” is the world’s largest ballistic missile submarine with a 25,000-ton submerged displacement and is believed to carry ballistic missiles with ranges of more than 4,000 miles and have the ability to deliver independent target- able warheads. The “AIfa”-class submarines, the Soviet Union’s newest nuclear attack submarines, whose hulls are made of lightweight titanium alloy, are believed to attain speeds in excess of 40 knots and are considered to be the deepest diving submarines in the world.
Canada’s armed forces can no longer rely on the statement, “We are the best with what we have.” Canada must increase its defense spending to again establish a creditable fighting force to offset the Warsaw Pact challenge in the years ahead.
Major Gilmour was a seagoing officer in the Canadian armed forces from 1964 to 1973. He served on destroyers and was an air control officer on HMCS Bonaventure. He attended the Dal- housie Law School in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and is presently legal counsel for the Northwest Territories Government. Major Gilmour also serves as a reserve legal officer in the Canadian armed forces.