This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Even in the age of the missile, developments such as the 5-inch guided projectile offer much promise in a variety of shipboard gun applications. The problem is finding enough money to fund the naval gunfire developments.
Not long ago, a proposal was floated for a new destroyer . . . without a gun. This gunless destroyer was not just another symbolic statement by yet another anti-war group. It was actually dreamed up by a navy. Our Navy.
Accompanied by the whirring sound of John Paul Jones and William S. Sims making about 3,500 revolutions per minute in their respective resting places, others (including the Congress and the Secretary of the Navy) intervened to put a gun on the proposed guided missile destroyer (DDGX), thus keeping the ship from becoming—at least in part—a contradiction in terms.
Unfortunately, the gunless DDGX was not an aberration. It is merely one of the more recent expressions of missile age thinking carried to an unfortunate extreme. Undeniably, advances in weapons technology are increasing standoff distances. Equally undeniably, naval guns are relatively short- range systems, even though improved munitions have increased ranges to some extent. Neverthe-
less, there is room for honest questioning of a mindset that employs every possible stratagem to fence the billions of dollars going into missile development and procurement, allowing as little money as possible to escape to programs that will enable the Navy to carry out its full range of missions.
There are legitimate at-sea missions for naval guns. What happens, for instance, when a relatively limited shipload of missiles is expended? Or when a target must be engaged inside minimum missile range? Or when a number of small targets—not seeming to justify the expenditure of a missile for each—must be engaged? But even leaving these Potential uses aside, let us turn to the naval mission of amphibious warfare. Those who apply an infinite discount rate to the utility of amphibious forces will he quick to point out that we will never stage another !wo Jima. Perhaps it is a happy coincidence that no °ne is planning to try, for—in terms of firepower equivalents—the gunfire support available in the entire active fleet today does not match the capability of the 10 battleships, 12 cruisers, and 55 destroyers that supported the Iwo Jima operation. Naval gun ammunition expended there amounted lo 9,500 rounds of 12-inch, 14-inch, and 16-inch; 20,000 rounds of 6-inch and 8-inch; and 182,000 rounds of 5-inch.
By contrast, the current approach was summed UP recently in Navy testimony before Congress: “For amphibious assault the Navy is vitally concerned about providing adequate fire support for the Marines. We are looking to increase our ships' standoff range from defended coastal areas, and our Navy/Marine team must rely more on other types of fire support than ships’ guns.’’1 This statement might appear rather curious to one Part of that team—the Marine infantryman—for it expresses vital concern over fire support but removes its mainstay in almost the same breath. Having tried unsuccessfully for years to correct the imbalance that causes him to do a relatively small Percentage of the killing and a relatively large percentage of the dying,2 the foot-slogger is apt to feel like the pig who is asked by a chicken about teaming up for a ham-and-eggs breakfast. For the chicken, it might be a matter of some inconvenience, but for the pig it represents a total commitment.
The “other types of fire support,’’ cited later in the testimony, encompass fixed-wing aviation, some missiles, mobility systems (for example, air cushion landing craft and heavy-lift helicopters to displace Marine Corps artillery ashore), and even battleships (although there has been some unofficially stated reluctance to consider them for fire support missions). In other words, the substitute for naval gunfire becomes practically everything else but naval gunfire. What this form of logic does not acknowledge is that no adequate substitute exists for the sustained, round-the-clock, all-weather hitting power of naval guns in adequate numbers. And despite changes in operational concepts, naval guns could still be needed to create conditions in which the other fire support and mobility systems can operate effectively.
Over the past decade or so, the deterioration of naval gunfire support capability has exceeded even the dismal decay rate of amphibious forces in general. Since the loss of the heavy cruiser Newport News (CA-148) from the active fleet in 1975, naval gunfire support capability has rested almost completely on a dwindling number of 5-inch barrels, now barely a third of the 1970 total. In recent years, naval guns (especially larger calibers) have been difficult to match to platforms and have either been smothered at the bottom of long priority lists or publicly bludgeoned (sometimes unfairly) as expensive dinosaurs.
The bumpy history of the major caliber lightweight gun (MCLWG) provides a case in point. In 1969, the Chief of Naval Operations established a requirement, based on range and lethality, for a new gun for use both in shore bombardment and antiship roles. It was to be a fully automatic, single-barrel, 8-inch/55-caliber gun firing up to 12 rounds per minute and providing the capability to fire guided projectiles. In the strike role the major caliber lightweight gun was to provide an adequate standoff capability against coastal defense weapons and a long-range lethal payload to defeat shore targets. In the antiship role, the Navy considered the MCLWG a preferred weapon to employ against low-threat ship targets, saving Harpoon—an expensive ship- to-ship missile—for the high-threat targets. The MCLWG was also to complement other tactical alternatives for both antiship and shore strike.
Land-based development test and evaluation, as well as limited operational test and evaluation of a prototype, were conducted by the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia, and the Operational Test and Evaluation Force in 1971 and 1972. An at-sea technical evaluation was conducted in 1975, followed by an operational test at sea in late 1975 and 1976.
The Operational Test and Evaluation Force concluded that the 8-inch gun was not operationally suitable, mostly because of inaccuracy, and further said that the 8-inch gun was no more effective than the 5-inch gun. The test report recommended that the major caliber lightweight gun not be authorized for fleet use, that it not enter major production, and that more tests and analyses be conducted. That report subsequently generated much controversy, both within and outside the Navy. Newspaper accounts of the debate appeared; the General Accounting Office conducted an investigation; and Senator William Proxmire wrote to the Secretary of Defense cautioning against a production decision. In 1977, the original conclusions about the 8-inch
gun were repudiated by a Joint Munitions Board that had been tasked by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering to reexamine all existing data. Doubt remained, however, and even after MCLWG was approved for production in 1978, funding was suddenly killed. Nevertheless, the major caliber lightweight gun issue still lives in the Congress.
The only naval gun program in development at the present time is the 5-inch semi-active laser guided projectile (SAL GP). The Navy guided projectile program was initiated in 1969, after a joint study by industry and the Navy, aimed at improving naval gunfire effectiveness. In February 1977, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering assigned the responsibility for development of all cannon- and gun-launched SAL GP to the Army. Shortly afterward, ajoint Army-Navy SAL GP program was established, with the Army designated as the executive agent and the Navy as the participating service. Under this program, the projectile has completed engineering development. The 5-inch SAL GP provides a naval gunfire support capability, neutralizing such point targets as tanks or gun emplacements. That capability, coupled with a promise of single-hit probability and increased ranges, makes it an excellent medium-caliber weapon to support amphibious forces.
On 2 June 1981, the SAL GP completed a highly successful technical evaluation test series on board the USS Briscoe (DD-977). The tests were conducted against a variety of targets on the Vieques Island shore bombardment range under all weather conditions, including rain and night firings. Using 20 SAL GPs, with targets designated by Marine Corps portable modular universal laser equipment (MULE) and the OV-10 (airborne laser designators), the Briscoe knocked out nine tanks, two bunkers, two surface-to-air missile radar sites, and two howitzer battery sites at various ranges. Two rounds were declared as “no tests” because of adverse range conditions. These tactical engagements included realistic smoke and battlefield dust conditions that could normally be expected during naval gunfire support missions. At maximum range, the targets were beyond visual range of the ship. Command and control was successfully demonstrated, with essentially no change to basic fire support procedures. No additional shipboard personnel or maintenance requirements were attributed to the gun system. Familiarization with this system by personnel of the Briscoe came easily and quickly, prior to commencement of the technical evaluation. SAL GP also demonstrated operational suitability against surface targets, using a shipboard laser designator similar to Seafire.
In early August 1981, the SAL GP completed operational evaluation under the direction of the Operational Test and Evaluation Force. The testing was successful. Linked to the test results, of course, is any future funding. With these results, it is anticipated that production can commence in fiscal year 1983. The SAL GP system will provide a quantum leap forward in naval gunnery. It will drastically reduce mission times for naval gunfire support and attendant exposure to counterfire, reduce gun ammunition logistic requirements, and provide more kills per shipload of SAL GP than is now possible with conventional ammunition.
Ancillary to the 5-inch guided projectile program is Seafire, which uses electrical sensors in the visual and infrared regions to provide actual images of the target in day and night conditions. Seafire will enable a ship to generate a fire control solution and fire her weapons when radars are jammed (or turned off during a period of emission control). It will also provide the laser energy to illuminate targets for firing laser-guided ordnance and projectile bombs. In addition to the fire control function, Seafire will provide surface ships the capability to detect clouds of chemical warfare agents. Because of its high res-
olution and magnification, it will also be extremely valuable in search and rescue operations and intelligence gathering.
Seafire has been on a budgeting roller coaster in recent years. The Navy dropped it from the fiscal year 1982 budget, but, after pressure from the Congress, sufficient funding has been made available to see the program through development. Seafire, along with 5-inch guided projectiles, will be in the baseline DDGX. Other new systems deserve consideration as well.
The Naval Sea Systems Command, after three years of study and preliminary design work, has Proposed an imaginative and financially attractive 155 -mm. vertical load gun mount which is compatible with the Army’s 155-mm. family of ammunition. The design emphasizes the simplicity, reliability, and maintainability of the gun mount, as well as its compatibility with existing gunfire control systems.
The 155-mm. family includes submunitions and Projectiles (anti-armor, mine-laving, anti-personnel, smoke, incendiary, illuminating, and nuclear). The 155-mm. guided projectile range is 50% greater than that of standard 5-inch projectiles and equals the destructive power of the 8-inch major caliber rounds. The cost of this gun system is estimated to be about 65% of the Mark 45, 5-inch/54 gun. The 155-mm. vertical load gun mount has a number of other positive aspects:
► It supports the Navy-Marine Corps gun require-
Seafire survived the ups and downs of recent budgeting struggles and will be included in the baseline DDGX. Its fire control function, along with its many other capabilities, should prove an invaluable supplement to the 5-inch guided projectile.
ments and complements the need for force projection of other organizations such as the Rapid Deployment Force.
►It provides antiship missile defense/antiair warfare capability as a “stand alone” or as a complementary weapon system which significantly enhances ship survivability.
►It provides a reliable surface/shore strike capability to about 20 nautical miles with a growth potential to much greater ranges.
►It has substantial growth potential, with the guided projectile family of ammunition and other improved munitions. The technology for a new family of seekers (anti-radiation, millimeter wave, dual color, etc.) is already available.
►It provides a gun system for all destroyer (and other) classes at an affordable cost.
The 155-mm. vertical load gun mount is designed to fit existing 5-inch gun mount base rings, though the overall gun mount weight is below that of the Mark 45. The firing rate is ten rounds per minute, with either conventional or guided projectiles.
Another interesting concept is the Naval Surface Weapons Center’s proposed “integrated naval fire
A major-caliber naval gunfire capability will be restored to the fleet with the recommissioning of the New Jersey (BB-62) and her 16-inch guns. She is shown last summer while being towed from Bremerton, Washington, to Long Beach, California, to undergo reactivation.
support system.” The concept was developed because our naval gunfire capability is declining while the requirement is increasing. The two major components in the system are the ship and gun. Under the concept, each system contains no fewer than five nor more than ten ships. Each system would mount between 10 and 30 automatic 155-mm. (6- inch) and 203-mm. (8-inch) guns. Each gun mount would be capable of firing 300 rounds per hour. The system would also include a fire direction center, intelligence center, and an array of standoff target acquisition systems. These target acquisition systems would have the ability to target at maximum ranges of 100 kilometers (range of enemy air defense radiofrequency emitters, communication emitters, moving vehicles, and fire support weapons). The fire support system would be equipped with conventional and guided projectiles producing maximum ranges out to 75 kilometers. Each system would be capable of handling up to 1,000 targets per hour. Total system magazine capacity would be between 10,000 and 30,000 rounds. The systems would be installed in frigates (considered the best candidates) and amphibious warfare ships.
To support the integrated naval fire support system concept, there also exists a technological base for development of a high-performance automatic gun mount: a universal lightweight gun could be designed with very high levels of parts commonality in 5-inch/54, 155-mm./47, or 203-mm./36; a modular gun mount can be designed which has only a minimum impact on ship platforms. The basic design is termed the non-deck penetrator. The ready service magazine is carried above deck in the gun house (40 conventional rounds or 20 guided projectiles). As part of an exploratory development program, a 203-mm./36 soft recoil gun was demonstrated during fiscal year 1979.
Given appropriate funding and support, the integrated naval fire support system could be introduced in 7 years from program initiation with full system capability in 10-12 years. At the end of this period, 10 systems involving 67 ship installations and 200 gun mounts could be in the fleet.
Missiles are yet another alternative to existing naval gunfire support systems. They are expensive, but their ranges and payloads are attractive. Beachcomber, one such system, would have the capability to kill area (light materiel) and company-sized armor targets with a single round, from over-the-horizon launch positions, and to attack targets up to five times as far inland, beyond the reach of current naval gunfire.
Beachcomber is a relatively long-range ballistic weapon with a variety of payload options for amphibious fire support missions. It employs a vertical launch system magazine to be installed aboard surface combatants and amphibious ships. The weapon range varies from 50 to 130 nautical miles, depending on the payload. Beachcomber has simple fire control requirements, similar to those for naval gunfire. The only basic data required are the ship’s position and the target coordinates, but the ship’s position must be known more accurately than in the past for first-round kill capability. The NavStar global positioning system is expected to provide this position accuracy.
Proceedings / January 1982
.......................... ±
Beachcomber is designed to achieve multiple individual target kills per weapon launched (for example, a single Beachcomber can destroy an entire surface-to-air missile battery—radar plus six missile launchers). The long range of Beachcomber allows attacking ships to stay well over the horizon, out of range of most enemy forces other than aircraft. It allows support of vertical assault operations much farther inland than previously contemplated. Beachcomber also provides a force multiplier effect by permitting those ships with antiair and antisubmarine missions to render concurrent general fire support to forces ashore. This effectively increases the number of ships available to the amphibious force commander for fire support missions.
The Tomahawk tactical land attack cruise missile is much more costly than the other missile and gun systems—about $1.5 million per copy. Designed as a long-range subsonic cruise missile, it will fit on submarines or surface combatants. With a range of more than 500 nautical miles, Tomahawk provides a significant standoff range when engaging enemy forces. For large critical targets of the amphibious task force, such as air bases, Tomahawk could be an ideal weapon.
A sea-configured version of the Army’s 9-inch multiple launch rocket system is also under consideration. Massive barrages of rockets in previous Wars, including Vietnam, have proved to be tremendously effective both in the actual physical damage inflicted and the psychological impact.
With the quality and quantity of naval fire support for amphibious operations steadily eroding, the demand for this support is ever increasing. The target spectrum has changed from one of entrenched infantry, hard beach defenses, and soft vehicle columns to one of armored fighting vehicles, massed armored field artillery, and motorized logistics columns as well as sophisticated air defenses down to the platoon level. A specialist fire support ship has been proposed to help overcome the lag in capability. The primary mission of such a ship would be to provide sustained, long-range, general and direct support interdiction and air defense suppression fires during all phases of amphibious operations. The ship would be armed with 203-mm. gun mounts and one 9-inch rocket launcher as well as large magazine capacity for both systems (4,000 conventional or 2,600 guided 203-mm. and 600 9-inch rockets). Later consideration may be given to adding a vertical launch system for Beachcomber and Tomahawk missiles.
Finally, the reactivation of the battleship New Jersey (BB-62) is under way with a recommissioning date of January 1983 expected. The ship will bring back a major gun capability of considerable dimension. The ship will also be outfitted with Tomahawk and Harpoon. Discussions are now in progress about the reactivation and configuration of the remaining three Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships. The concept of operation for these three follow-on ships is being evaluated and will drive consideration for candidate systems. To support landing forces, one proposal is to configure the battleship as an interdiction assault ship.3 Capable of transporting assault forces, the ship would have a flight deck with a ski-jump for vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and helicopters. A missile farm of 88-320 vertical launch systems, housing Tomahawk, Harpoon, and Beachcomber, could be added—combined with the existing 16-inch guns to make each ship one of the most powerful fire support bases in the world.
Conclusion: Technology clearly exists—or can be developed—to close the naval gunfire gap, first cited by former Marine Commandant Wallace M. Greene, Jr., far too many years ago.4 The biggest obstacle is posed by funding priorities, fed by a missiles-only mind-set. The hardening Navy position appears to be that gun systems development cannot proceed until the Marine Corps has restated its requirements to acknowledge the departure of 6-inch and 8-inch guns from the scene. The marines are doing so, but the irony should be apparent in a multipurpose Navy system depending solely upon a Marine Corps statement of requirements, especially in light of a widely recognized shortfall in total capability that should brook no delay in seeking a solution. For centuries, the issue of guns vs. butter has been raised in democratic societies. A zero-sum game of guns vs. missiles, on the other hand, is nothing more than a spurious subset of that classical debate.
SA 1957 NROTC graduate of Yale University, Colonel Miller spent his early years of service in Marine infantry battalions in California and the Western Pacific. After a three-year tour at the Eighth and Eye Barracks in Washington, D.C., he attended the Army’s infantry and airborne schools at Fort Benning, Georgia, before going to Vietnam as a rifle company commander in 1965. He returned to serve on the staff of Commander in Chief Atlantic and then attended the Armed Forces Staff College. In 1970, he was back in Vietnam as advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps at battalion, brigade, and division level. He has subsequently served as speechwriter for three Commandants of the Marine Corps, attended the Naval War College, commanded a deployed battalion landing team in the Mediterranean, and now heads the Amphibious Ships Requirements Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
§ Major Peterson joined the Marine Corps in 1968 under the PLC program and was graduated from | The Basic School, Quantico. He served as a platoon commander in Vietnam and was then ordered to 1st Marine Brigade, Hawaii, where he served as company executive officer and assistant operations officer. In 1973, Major Peterson returned to Vietnam as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. He attended Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, followed by assignments as commanding officer of Marine detachment on the USS Forrestal (CV-59) and commanding officer of Security Company Marine Barracks, Naval Weapons Station, Concord, California. Major Peterson’s current assignment is in the Amphibious Ships Requirements Branch, Operations Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
ITestimony of Director of Navy RDT&E before Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 April 1981 (insert for the record).
2General Robert E. Cushman, USMC, “To the Limit of Our Vision—And Back,’’ Proceedings, May 1974, pp. 110-121.
3Charles E. Myers, Jr., "A Sea-Based Interdiction System for Power Projection,” Proceedings, November 1979. p. 103.
4“Navy ‘Gun Gap' Worries Marines," Proceedings, December 1964, p. 146.