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Sea Warfare: Weapons, Tactics, and Strategy
H. P. Willmott. New York: Sheridan House, Inc., 1981. 176 pp. Ulus. lnd.
Bib. $22.50 ($20.25).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander John P. Morse, U. S. Navy
In preparing to review a nonfiction work, and before reading the first word of text, I read the book's dust jacket promises, then I study the preface to see the author’s real intentions, review the book’s scope in the table of contents, glance at the typeset and length of text, scan the sources, notes, and index, and finally anticipate the book’s point of view from the author’s biography. My first impression of Sea Warfare was decidedly negative. The aim seemed too broad for 149 pages of text, the chapters appeared disjointed, the few sources were dated, and the epilogue tacked on to lend some modicum of academic credibility.
Sea Warfare's aim is ambitious—to trace the development of sea power and the evolution of the gun, the airplane, and the submarine as generic “arbiters of sea warfare.” Mr. Will- mott’s understanding of sea power too often skews to a simplistic causality that misleads rather than informs: “Both the Americans and Soviets have systematically created navies where major efforts are directed to ensure a permanent capacity to destroy the other’s heartland as a deliberate act of policy.” Because “their weapons are aimed at civilian as opposed to military targets, submarines are at the heart of any policy of deterrence.”
The gun, airplane, and submarine are presented historically (e.g., the gun evolved from the ram, and modern surface warfare tactics can be traced back to the era when all naval engagements were limited to line-of-sight) and are of general interest, despite the uneven level of analysis, selective data, and pigeonhole assessments. The chapter on submarines and mines touches upon the value of World War II convoy operations and poses the question of whether resupply of Europe could be conducted in a similar manner during a future conflict. Whether those data should be used as the basis of future tactics is debatable; unfortunately, Willmott’s analysis merely scratches the surface and remains little more than an informative collection of unevaluated facts. The discussion of the airplane includes the birth of seabased aviation and an assessment of air power that inexplicably stops with World War II. One lesson from that war is that “surface ships, without air support, imposed no check on a fleet based on the carrier”—true enough, but hardly applicable today with the advent of long-range antiship cruise missile armed modern warships, submarines, and aircraft.
The Soviet Navy’s unprecedented growth and the reason for its buildup are properly addressed in the context of economic, political, and military factors. The shift in Soviet thinking that occurred in the early 1970s, as indicated by clear signs of ship and weapon construction that exceeded the needs of defense, is highlighted in terms of the Soviets’ latest ships and ongoing building programs. Willmott concludes his comparison with the somewhat surprising net assessment that carrier-based air is the “last remaining area of clear Western superiority in naval warfare” and suggests that this temporal advantage depends solely on the U. S. Navy. The analysis of the present balance of power is abbreviated to four pages of vague and unrelated text followed by a numerical comparison of Soviet and NATO naval forces last updated in February 1980, nearly two years before the book’s publication.
In the epilogue, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton argues that the ability to supply, reinforce, and resupply Europe across the “Atlantic Bridge” remains the key to NATO deterrence. The admiral’s contribution is the highlight of this uninspired book.
First impressions can be misleading. Mine were not in the case of Sea Warfare. It contributes little to the vast body of fiction and nonfiction of naval literature.
Commander Morse is currently the assistant surface operations officer and CIC/combat systems officer on the staff of Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight. His next assignment will be executive officer of the Spruance (DD-%3).
The Voyage of the Armada: The Spanish Story
David Howarth. New York: The Viking Press, 1981. 272 pp. Illus. lnd. $13.95 ($12.55).
Reviewed by Robert L. Scheina
Mr. Howarth’s book is a fine addition to the literature concerning the Spanish Armada. Two qualities distinguish this work. First, the author has a superb knowledge of the sea. This is amply demonstrated throughout. Armed with his knowledge of 16th- century navigation, he constantly keeps the reader informed as to what were and were not the options available to the combatants. With this information, the reader can evaluate the leaders’ decisions. Second, Mr. Howarth understands the technology of the era, and he takes the time to explain it. 1 particularly appreciated his explanations of tonnage and his treatise on 16th-century ordnance. Mr. Howarth’s explanations of a ship’s scantling and how and why these scantlings differed among the Armada fleet contributes much to the reader’s understanding of the Spanish defeat.
The book also helps to destroy some old myths. The author demonstrates that the English victory was not based upon outranging the Spanish guns. Admittedly, others have made this point. However, myths are slow to die, and Mr. Howarth’s analysis is important because of his understanding of the technology of that era.
Howarth’s new book dispels some old myths about how the Spanish Armada, seen sailing from Ferrol, came a cropper—including the theory that the English won because their guns outranged the Spaniards’.
Mr. Howarth does, however, wrestle with the Spanish characters—particularly the king—and never quite seems to give them the personality depth they deserve. The author states early his dislike for Philip II and even credits the commander of the Armada, Medina Sidonia, with suspecting the king’s motives. “Even the commander-in-chief himself . . . suspected that the king’s intentions were selfish and less than holy.” Mr. Howarth seems to overcompensate for this by finding little fault with the Spanish commanders. “Stupid mistakes were made in preparing the armada and in its strategic plan. But once it was at sea its commanders made no mistakes at all.”
Seldom does the author leave one hanging with unanswered questions. A few comments did warrant a brief explanation, though. For example, "It was the second new naval concept, born in those days of battle . . . now the division into squadrons.” The Spanish had divided large fleets into squadrons for some time. Their tactics at Lepanto (1571) were based upon squadron formation. Therefore, if this concept was new, it would be new only to the English. Another teaser is, “. . . and then according to Spanish custom they burned their ship." I am not aware of any such custom. Since their grounded ship could be of little service to them, good military practice would be to deny her use to the enemy by burning her. This was the “custom” everywhere.
The index is adequate; however. I desired more subject entries, such as gunpowder and construction techniques. These would be particularly useful in a work that provides such a wealth of technical data.
The Voyage of the Armada may be accurately characterized as an Englishman describing the Spanish side of the defeat of the Armada. David Howarth succeeds admirably in understanding the sea and technology of the time and, to a lesser degree, the workings of the Spanish mind.
Dr. Scheina. having received his Ph.D. from Catholic University in 1976. is an expert on Latin American sea power and writes the regional review of Latin American navies for the Proceedings' annual International Navies Issue. He is the historian for the U. S. Coast Guard.
Military Service in the United States
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft,
U. S. Army (Retired), Editor.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Prentice Hall Inc., 1982. 227 pp. $14.95 ($13.45) $7.95 paper ($7.15).
Reviewed by Commander Donald L. Pilling, U. S. Navy
The full-scale incorporation of business organizational practices and values in the U. S. military establishment began with Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense in 1961. Proof of the extent of this transition to private sector values came with the 1973 establishment of the all-volunteer force (AVF), in which military life came to be viewed as an occupation rather than service. Despite recent recruiting and retention successes, a growing national awareness that the AVF concept may have serious shortcomings has led Lieutenant General Brent
Scowcroft, former director of the National Security Council, to oversee and edit this book that addresses many issues surrounding the AVF.
Military Serxice in the United States is a collection of six essays by recognized national security and manpower experts. The first half of the book includes a chapter by noted defense analyst William Kaufman on the increasing needs for military manpower in the 1980s. The second chapter is a framework for analysis of the manpower issues provided by James Hosek and John White, the latter a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. In the third chapter, an assessment of the AVF over the last eight years is contributed by Richard Hunter and Gary Nelson, manpower analysts who were members of the original Gates Commission in the early 1970s, which laid the analytical groundwork for the AVF.
A significant amount of statistical data is included in these three chapters; in the manpower area, arithmetic can be used to support either side of a complex issue. For example, the AVF experiment has taken place during a period in which the young adult male population has been expanding. That same population is now contracting and will decline 25% through the middle 1990s. Econometric model predictions of adequate manpower supply in the future become suspect because the predictions are based on a very different data set.
That this markedly different future manpower environment will force the nation to address the need for change is the focus of the final three chapters. Richard Cooper, former director of manpower studies at the RAND Corporation, provides a detailed examination as to why conscription should not be reinstated. In contrast, James Lacy, a former special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, provides an equally detailed case for conscription. The “pearl” in the book, however, is the chapter by Professor Charles Moskos of Northwestern University on the social considerations of the AVF. Well known in manpower circles for innovative ideas, Moskos waves aside the arguments on AVF and conscription by asserting that, “The starting point is not how are empty spaces to be filled,” but rather the broader question of citizen participation and national service. His discussion of the
Here captured in graphic text combined with action photographs is the drama and tension of the aircraft carrier and its daily operations. ISBN: 0-89141-105-4
Photographs by George Hall
Peter Garrison
CV:
Carrier Aviation
This beautiful book traces the history of the Yokosuka naval base from its use by Imperial Japan,through the centuries, to the transfer of custody from the Japanese Navy Admiral Totsuka, and the building of the base, familiar to countless men of the United States Navy.
ISBN: 0-89141-088-0 $12.95
YOKOSUKA:
Base of an Empire
Tom Tompkins
differences between the occupational and institutional models for military life sheds considerable light on a subject which is often narrowly focused on statistical analysis of the most cost- effective way to meet service end- strength goals.
One shortcoming from a naval point of view is that the essays do not examine these issues from the perspective of the individual services. The critical manpower issue for the Navy is retention of career petty officers who have always been members of an allvolunteer force. It is not clear how a return to any form of conscription would enhance retention. Further, as the Navy is more technically oriented than the other services and thus requires higher quality recruits, it is not obvious how a reinstatement of a draft to make up for marginal shortfalls in AVF recruiting would result in great numbers of quality youth enlisting in the Navy.
Military Service in the United States should be a valuable addition to the libraries of those desiring a comprehensive primer on AVF issues.
Commander Pilling is a U. S. Naval Academy graduate who earned his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge in 1970. He is currently serving as the resources planner in the CNO Long- Range Planning Group. His article. "The Dwindling Muster." was published in the June 1982 Proceedings.
Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global
Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Cambridge, MA.: Winthrop Publishers. 1981. Distributed by Little, Brown and Co., Boston. MA. 295 pp. Bib. Ind. $10.95 ($9.85) $15.95 (cloth) ($14.35).
Reviewed by Commander James John Tritten, U. S. Navy
Professor Rubinstein has provided us with a concise, readable, and thoughtful analysis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since 1945. Designed as an undergraduate textbook, it offers the reader with little or no background in the field an opportunity to acquaint himself rapidly with the issues at hand.
Without being an alarmist, Rubinstein gives meaning to the Soviet views of detente and peaceful coexistence. Soviet interpretations imply “a strategy of conflict, short of nuclear war, in which the Soviet camp is strengthened and extended to encompass new members. . . . There is nothing to suggest that the Soviet interpretation foresees a time or a situation in which the Soviet Union and the United States will end up as friends, settling their differences congenially around the bargaining table.”
His pre-1953 review of Soviet policy takes on a detailed approach. Important and recurring themes developed during this period include a paranoia for security, a Clausewitzian outlook, and the central position of the German question. With the death of Stalin in 1953. Rubinstein shifts his attention to major world areas, the United Nations, and political-military relations with the United States. In each area, Rubinstein documents Moscow's successes in keeping Germany and NATO weak, settling postwar boundaries issues, and gaining enormous influences in Western Europe as a whole, specifically in Austria and the Nordic area.
Active Soviet policies in the Far East, Rubinstein argues, have met with a much more limited success. Despite the thinning of U. S. power in Asia, the chasm between Moscow and Beijing remains. Soviet policies with the Arab world have been remarkably pragmatic despite the lack of attainment of any long-term significant strategic advantages. Moscow’s record with the Third World and the U. N. has been mixed at best. The Soviet Union has been accepted as a global superpower, managed to use international organizations to advantage, and secured important military advantages. The ups and downs of Soviet relationships with world communism are also traced.
With regard to relations with the United States, Rubinstein documents Soviet maneuvers which have led their only true military rival to accept parity in the military area and equality in the political. Soviet options have multiplied and negotiations are now conducted from a position of real and not apparent strength.
With an eye to the future, Rubinstein closes on a slightly pessimistic note; he finds no convincing evidence that the Kremlin will shift toward serious detente, or lessen its use of military force in maintaining the Soviet empire.
Commander Tritten is currently working on his Ph.D. in strategic planning at the University of Southern California.
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Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
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NAVAL AFFAIRS
Captain Cook’s Final Voyage: The Journal of Midshipman George Gilbert
Christine Holmes, Editor. Honolulu. HI.: The University Press of Hawaii, 1982. 158 pp. Illus. Maps. $20.00 ($18.00).
The author of this narrative was a midshipman on board Captain James Cook's flagship during his Pacific voyage. 17761780. The voyage led from the Cape of Good Hope to the South Pacific, the discovery of Hawaii, the Pacific Northwest, the Bering Strait, the coast of Asia and Japan, and back across the Indian Ocean. Written soon after Cook’s return in 1780, the manuscript was in the British Museum until now. This first publication reveals a well-written, firsthand account that should appeal to adventure lovers as well as historians.
B The Hidden Menace
Maurice Griffiths. Greenwich. England:
Conway Maritime Press, 1981. 159 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. £5.50 Approx. $13.95 ($11.16).
This brief history of mine warfare surveys the use of mines from early experiments in the 18th century to the present and speculates on their use in future wars. Griffiths includes descriptions of how mines were laid in both World Wars, their role in maritime strategy, and minesweeping methods. Special emphasis is placed on mine warfare in World War II because Griffiths was involved in rendering mines safe during the war. His speculations about the future of mine warfare do not inspire optimism: Soviet nuclear mines that can destroy the Thames Barrier and flood London, and chemical mines strategically placed to poison the water supply.
The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968
James A. Boutilier, Editor. Vancouver. B.C.: University of British Columbia Press. 1982.
451 pp. Illus. Maps. $28.00 ($25.20).
This book is composed of papers delivered at a conference held at Royal Roads Military College in 1980. It relates the history of the Royal Canadian Navy from its origins to its integration into the Canadian defense forces in 1968. Some of the accounts are anecdotal, some archival, while others are exercises in diplomatic history.
B The Underwater War, 1939-1945
Richard Compton-Hall. Poole, Dorset (England): Blandford Press, 1982. 160 pp. Illus. Ind. $19.95 ($15.96).
Compton-Hall covers the mechanics and
habitability of both Allied and Axis submarines in World War 11, as well as operations, in this pictorial history. Chapters include coverage of the lesser-known activities of Soviet submarines and even of midget submarines, and the major undersea battles of the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Contemporary photographs and some original artwork by John Batchelor supplement the text.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age
Geoffrey Till with contributions from others. London, England: Macmillan Press. 1982. 274 pp. Bib. Ind. £ 20.00 (Approx. $36.00).
This volume surveys the literature on sea power from the age of galley warfare to the present, including such classical writers as Colomb, Mahan, and Corbett, as well as modern U. S. and Soviet strategists. The sources and elements of maritime power are examined; specific case studies are cited in order to compare theory with practice. Till also attempts to answer the question of how relevant theories of naval warfare can remain in an age of nuclear weaponry.
Sailing Years: An Autobiography
K. Adlard Coles. Clinton Corners, NY.: John deGraff. Inc., distributed by International Marine Publishers in Camden, ME., 1981. 209 pp. Illus. Ind. $18.50 ($16.65).
An engaging account spanning the sailing life of a leader in many areas: author (best known for his Heavy Weather Sailing), publisher, businessman, cruiser, and racer. Coles involves the reader in more than 50 years of adventures in the boats he has owned. For example, in describing his first cruise to the Baltic in 1923, he provides absorbing recollections of ports and conditions prior to World War II. After the war, he turned to racing, competing in the Bermuda race in 1950, transatlantic racing, and Fastnet races.
ES The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan
Grace Person Hayes. Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press. 1982. 964 pp. Bib. Ind. $31.95 ($25.56).
Immediately after World War II, the Joints Chiefs of Staff authorized a multivolume history of their efforts during the conflict. Only two were completed. This volume helps fill the void left by the termination of that project. It is a methodical and well- written summary of the strategic planning against Japan. Declassified in 1971. this volume draws mainly on official records and some interviews—principally with Admiral Ernest J. King—in its fine treatment of the major issues that faced the Joint Chiefs from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima. Although Hayes could not make use of Ultra or Magic material when she undertook her project, this study is an essential starting point for any serious student of Pacific and Asian strategy in World War II.
Monty: The Making of a General (1887-1942)
Nigel Hamilton. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1981. 871 pp. Illus. Ind. Bib. $22.95 ($20.65).
This fat volume is the first of two which are supposed to be the definitive works on Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. The first volume covers his youth and his rise in the service to his victory at El Alamein. It is unlikely, however, that this work will be accepted as the final word on Montgomery—not because Hamilton has not done his homework (he has), but because Hamilton is so clearly an admirer of the Field Marshal. He relied heavily on Montgomery's personal papers and introduces the volume with the statement that the book is intended to repay Monty for “his years of affection and encouragement." It is as fascinating as the man it portrays.
r 1:1250 Ships, over 1500 models to select. Also • j the new 1:2400 models. We have NAVIS, i ( NEPTUN, HANSA, VIKING, MERCATOR, f 3 DELPHIN, ATLANTIC, SANTOS, FLEET- 3 i LINE, SEXTANT, FRAMBURG, EAGLE, k • STARCAST, MICRO-FLEET & even DE- • j GEN custom-made models, plus many others. \ t In model railroading we carry MAERK- I j LIN, FLEISCHMANN, ARNOLD-RAPIDO, J l TRIX, MINNITRIX, LILIPUT, ROCO, S / RIVAROSSI, LEHMANN, FALLER, KIBRI, : J BRAWA, BUSCH, HERKAT, HERPA, S ? MERTENS, PREISER, POLA, VIKING, ( 3 SEUTHE—everything in railroading. Also a 3 ^ large array of R/c equipment. We nave the ( : experience and the know-how, gained : \ through many years of service to the model \ » railroader, to assure safe delivery of your • J orders at the lowest possible cost. J
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The KGB: The Eyes of Russia
Harry Rositzke. Garden City. NY.: Doubleday and Company. Inc.. 1981. 295 pp. Ind. SI4.95 ($13.45).
This book by a former CIA agent surveys the organization, history, and intelligence gathering techniques of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) which the author claims is the best intelligence agency in the world. The reason for its success, he argues, is that it is “a straightforward secret service” with support from its government. high prestige at home, and able therefore to act with boldness at home and abroad. Moreover, “its mistakes are not heralded in the Soviet press.”
The Soviet Estimate: U. S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength
John Prados. New York: The Dial Press. 1982. 367 pp. Tables. Append. Bib. Ind. S17.95 ($16.15).
This book is not so much about Soviet military strength as it is about the process by which U. S. intelligence agencies arrive at their analysis of that strength. Using a historical approach. Prados examines the relatively unsophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques used in the late 1940s. He then pursues the story through the 1970s and the verification problems inherent in the SALT negotiations. Throughout his narrative, he demonstrates that U. S. estimates frequently have been in error, concluding that a reliance on such information as a basis for policy planning can be very dangerous.
FICTION
The Apocalypse Brigade
Alfred Coppel. New York: Holt. Rinehart, and Winston. 1981. 310 pp. $12.95 ($11.65).
From its opening lines, this spy thriller involves the reader in a tangle of intrigue and terrorism as current as the headlines. It is not hard to determine where the author got his inspiration for this novel; it includes a revolution in the Mideast. Western diplomats held hostage, a tangled political crisis involving the superpowers, and an international organization of terrorists.
Papa Tango, A Novel
John Clagett. New York: Crown Publishers. Inc.. 1982. 279 pp. $12.95 ($11.65).
This is a different kind of war novel. All the battle action takes place in flashbacks as the survivors of a World War II PT boat squadron meet at a 25-year reunion. Old relationships blossom anew and old problems resurface. For some, the reunion marks a new beginning, for others a final ending. This is the sequel to an earlier novel. The Slot, about the adventures of the same PT boat squadron during the campaign for Guadalcanal.
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED
The Amateur Pilot John E. Milligan. Centreville. MD; Cornell Maritime Press.
1982. 125 pp. lllus. Tables. Ind. $7.50 (paper) ($6.75).
The Air and Sea Lanes of the North Atlantic: Their Security in the 1980s Sherwood S. Cordier. Washington. D.C.: University Press of America. 1981. 84 pp. $6.25 (paper) ($5.62).
French Ensor Chadwick: Selected Letters and Papers Doris D. Maguire. Editor. Washington. D.C.: University Press of America. 1981.646 pp. Ind. $22.75 (paper) ($20.47). $32.75 (cloth) ($29.47).
The Log of HMS Mentor, 1780-1781: A New Account of the British Navy at Pensacola
James A. Servies, Editor. Gainsville, FL.: University Press of Florida, 1982. 207 pp. Illus. Gloss. $11.75 ($10.57).
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