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For years, Soviet Navy ships were designed for coastal operations, as one might expect from a great land power. The “Grisha-Ill class frigate pictured on the previous page might venture out upon the open ocean in company with the fleet’s big surface combatants; but it would not be surprising to find most Soviet warships—large and small—sticking close to home waters in the event of hostilities.
For the last decade, dire warnings have been sounded with increasing frequency regarding the growing strength of the Soviet Navy— particularly its surface fleet capabilities. Such warnings have come from our senior naval officers, government officials, and civilian strategic theorists in a flood of articles, books, and testimony before congressional committees. A common thread running through these works is that the expansion of Soviet naval surface forces—the so-called “blue water navy”—threatens U. S. control of the seas to an ever-increasing degree.
Typically, such warnings have painted a gloomy picture of U. S. naval might vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union. For example, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (an official publication of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) claimed, “Today the Soviet Union is a true ‘sea power’ challenging the United States in all aspects of maritime activity.” Similar sentiments were penned by retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, who equated Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, head of the Soviet Navy, with Captain Alfred T. Mahan.1 In the course of this article, Zumwalt depicts the Soviet Navy as “the world’s most modern naval force. ' Indeed, the numerical increases in Soviet vessels and naval tonnage since I960 have been impressive.
Despite the upswing in the number of new Soviet naval vessels, particularly surface ships, it is still necessary to evaluate the significance of these increases for the U. S. Navy. Clearly, many commentators view the improvement in Soviet capabilities as a sign that the Soviet Union is building a sea power capability along U. S. lines. That is, the Soviet surface fleet is currently designed to carry out sea denial missions, and it is expected that someday it will have a sea control mission. In short, such observers view the Soviet surface fleet building in classic sea power terms and along traditional lines of Western naval theory.
These alarmist predictions regarding the Soviet surface fleet seem unjustified when examined more closely. This closer inspection of Soviet naval surface capabilities and probable intentions must, in turn, be divided between peacetime and wartime roles. Soviet capabilities and intentions must be evaluated from the perspective that the Soviet Navy is not the U. S. Navy and that its development is shaped by traditions, conditions, and experiences unique to the Soviet Union.
Clearly, Soviet naval leaders—especially Admiral Gorshkov—realize the peacetime importance of naval forces and want the Soviet Union to get maximum advantage from its surface fleet. Gorshkov, in a series of articles entitled “Navies in War and in Peace,” repeatedly makes the point that a surface fleet can aid Soviet political objectives through “showing the flag” around the world. Gorshkov’s 1976 book Sea Power of the State notes that “of all the branches of the armed forces, the Navy is to the greatest degree capable of operationally supporting the State interests of the country beyond its borders.” Gorshkov’s comments are consistent with the usual definition of a sea presence mission: ”... the orchestrated use of naval forces below the level of hostility in support of foreign policy.”2
A sea presence role can have two distinct facets. On the one hand, the surface fleet can win friends for the Soviet Union through visits to foreign ports and provide a highly visible token of Soviet power. On the other hand, a surface fleet may be deployed as a show of force in times of crisis to reinforce client states psychologically, to threaten the enemies of Soviet friends abroad, and to signal Soviet intentions to oppose some move by the United States. This type of role is in keeping with Soviet naval deployment practices in the 1973 Middle East War. Also the Soviet Union has used surface craft to signal its interests in particular geographic regions, such as the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, makes some important observations regarding the Soviet naval presence mission versus that of the United States. Admiral Turner argues that the Soviet surface capability is nowhere near that of the United States, and yet Soviet naval leaders have sought to gain maximum political advantage from their changing capabilities. As Admiral Turner explains, “Realizing that they are dealing with perception, they are gaining maximum advantage from the fact that any change is news. Small improvements in capabilities can be touted to the unsophisticated as big ones.”2
Admiral Turner uses the example of A7ev-class aircraft carriers to illustrate how a relatively small change in Soviet surface forces is portrayed to be a dynamic expansion of the fleet. Meanwhile, despite recent improvements in the U. S. Navy’s shipbuilding programs, its decreased size and naval presence are also making news with the result that we appear
to be a declining naval power. Thus, the Soviet Navy may be winning on the naval presence front since •his issue hinges more on perceptions of third parties •han it does on the actual warfighting capabilities of either the United States or the Soviet Union.
Two points need to be made regarding the Soviet naval presence mission. First, this mission is consistent with Gorshkov's announced aims of using naval forces to achieve foreign policy objectives (i.e., impressing Third World states with the might of the Soviet Union). Second, this is a peacetime mission and, consequently, may not accurately reflect Soviet intentions or strategy for conducting a future War at sea.
Nevertheless, many analysts point out that the Soviets are using their naval forces more often as a show of strength in regions outside the Soviet Union's •raditional sphere of influence. For example, for the last decade, the Soviet Union has frequently sent naval forces to politically or militarily troubled regions like the Middle East as a show of support for friendly states and as a counterbalance to U. S. naval presence. (A recent article cites 27 instances where the Soviets have practiced coercive diplomacy with naval forces since I967.4) Instances of coercive diplomacy, plus the large number of ship- days spent by Soviet surface vessels in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, support the view •hat the Soviet Union is building its navy in keeping with traditional Western concepts of sea power and therefore poses a serious threat to the U. S. Navy’s surface fleet. But, as will be demonstrated, such analysis ignores a variety of factors which apply to the Soviet Union and which suggest a much more modest wartime role for the Soviet blue water navy.
One of the major limiting factors on the wartime deployment and use of Soviet surface forces is geography . A glance at the map reveals that the Baltic, ^lack Sea, and Pacific fleets must pass through choke Points controlled by U. S. allies. Consequently, the Baltic Fleet could be denied passage to the Atlantic around Denmark, and the Black Sea Fleet could be bottled up at the Bosporus. The Pacific Fleet could he checked at the Straits of Tsushima or the Straits of La Perouse. Even the Northern Fleet based in Murmansk would experience difficulties reaching open ocean, because it would have to transit the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap—areas that could be controlled by U. S. allies. Additionally, the Northern Fleet’s operations could be restricted by winter ice floes. And, if these fleets venture out prior •o the outbreak of hostilities, they run the risk of being unable to return to home ports later for repairs and refitting. Also, if these fleets were destroyed, Soviet flanks would be exposed to invasion from U. S. amphibious forces.
Geography also works against the effective use of ar*y quantitative advantages the Soviets might enjoy over the United States. At present, Soviet surface vessels are assigned to one of four regional fleets (i.e., Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, or Pacific), which are based far apart. The current problem faced by Soviet naval commanders is not unlike that of their tzarist counterparts during the 1904-05 war with Japan, when the Russian Navy found it impossible to successfully reinforce its Pacific forces stationed at Port Arthur. In fact, the dispersal of the Russian Navy (much like the Soviet fleet today) led to its piecemeal defeat. In time of war. the Soviets would have as much difficulty reinforcing any one of their regionally based fleets as the Imperial Navy had in 1905. If the Soviet Navy should decide to make major adjustments in the disposition of surface units prior to commencing a war, it would provide the West with considerable warning time. This, in turn, would violate the principle of strategic surprise, which is a significent aspect of Soviet combined arms doctrine.
Soviet surface vessels operating as a blue water force would face severe replenishment and repair problems. And, although it would be difficult for Soviet forces to return to home ports if the Allies control key access points, it would also be impractical for some forces to make the long journey to those few Soviet ports that were not cut off. Even if all Soviet surface vessels could use the open ports, their numbers would overwhelm the repair capabilities. U. S. commentators have voiced concern that the Soviets might attempt to use bases in friendly countries to get around the difficulties of returning to Soviet ports for replenishment and repair, and yet such foreign ports seem to offer little hope for alleviating Soviet difficulties. In part, this is because few foreign ports have the facilities or spare parts necessary to work on Soviet combatant vessels. In addition, friendly foreign states might be unwilling to grant the Soviets basing rights in time of war for fear of inviting U. S. retaliation. Even in peacetime, Soviet attempts to establish bases have proven difficult because of the fluctuating foreign policies of Third World nations—e.g., the Soviet presence in Egypt was lost when that government shifted to a more U. S.-oriented position.
The importance of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission for Soviet surface forces will further constrain their availability for opposing U. S. surface forces on the high seas. Many articles by high- ranking Soviet naval officers make it clear that they see ASW as one of the navy's primary missions. The importance accorded to ASW is also demonstrated by the fact that the Soviets have designated several classes ofvesselsas "large ASW ships.’’Currently, Soviet ASW doctrine calls for packing the "near zone” around the Soviet coast with ASW forces to kill U. S. submarines prior to their launching cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. Because of this concentration of ASW forces—many of which are surface vessels—it seems unlikely that the So-
viet Navy will have enough extra surface ships for widespread deployment against U. S. surface units.
The extensive blue water deployment of Soviet surface fleets in the manner contemplated by Western navies is limited by more than just operational or geographic constraints. The Soviet Navy’s freedom of action is also limited by political factors such as its relationship with the Soviet ground forces in time of war. Admiral Gorshkov often complains in his writings of the interference from other elements of the Soviet defense establishment in the operations of the navy, and it is unlikely that such interference would cease during a war.5 In fact, it would probably increase because of the likely appointment of an army officer as overall commander of the war effort. In the past, officers of rival services have not seen an independent role for the Soviet Navy, but rather considered its primary function to be support of ground actions through guarding the seaward flanks of the army, defending the ground forces against enemy amphibious attacks, and launching amphibious assaults. This view of the appropriate role and value of the Soviet Navy would make it difficult for surface forces to operate along classic Western lines in projection of power or sea control actions.
Soviet naval tradition also bears against the use of Soviet surface forces in a manner similar to that of the U. S. Navy. Nowhere is the reverence for tradition more apparent, or more stifling, than in Soviet works dealing with the experience from the Great Patriotic War (i.e., World War II). Admiral V. Sysoyev, writing in the April 1976 issue of Mor- skoy Sbornik, typifies Soviet military respect for the relevance of experience in past wars, particularly World War II, when he writes:
“The experience of war has been widely used in training and educational work and also in the investigations of contemporary problems in training and research establishments of the Navy.” Syoyev also quoted former Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A. A. Grechko who said that “creative assimilation of the experience of the Great Patriotic War . . makes it possible “to develop military affairs better and faster" and makes it possible “to foresee the character of future wars.”'’ This judgment is significant in evaluating Soviet intentions for using a surface fleet. In World War II, Soviet surface forces had no power projection role or strategic significance. Rather, Soviet accounts of their World War II naval actions emphasize a tactical and defensive orientation. If experience is a powerful guide to future action, as Marshal Grechko and Admiral Sysoyev argued, then Western fears of the Soviet Navy's pushing for supremacy of the sea through the surface forces is unfounded. Even if Soviet naval leaders wished to abandon these traditions and lessons learned, it is unlikely that successors to Marshal Grechko among the ground commanders would permit the Soviet Navy to ignore
the past.
Although Soviet naval officers may write about the importance of sea power, their view of this concept differs radically from the principles espoused by Mahan and practiced by Western navies. Even though the Soviets use familiar terms like “sea supremacy,” these terms carry a far different meaning for Soviet naval officers than similar expressions employed by their U. S. counterparts. These conceptual differences are demonstrated clearly in an article by Captain First Rank Yu. Bystrov dealing with winning sea supremacy. In it, he defines sea supremacy within a World War II context as:
“. . . the creation of favorable conditions in a theater of military operations (only on seas immediately adjoining USSR territory), under which the enemy was in no position to disrupt accomplishment of our naval operations for actions by ground forces.7
Bystrov goes on to say that this World War II concept still has validity and concludes that “sea supremacy in all cases is not an end in itself, but merely a condition for successful conduct of major operational-tactical operations.” He stresses that history fails to confirm the “reactionary” sea power theories of Colomb and Mahan, who saw supremacy at sea as the key to world domination. This difference in perception of what constitutes sea supremacy suggests that Soviet surface forces will have different wartime roles and functions than those of U. S. surface ships.
Even the writings of one of the most vocal advocates of Soviet sea power. Admiral Gorshkov, portray a limited outlook for the sea power value ot surface forces. In his last installment of the series “Navies in War and in Peace,” Admiral Gorshkov frequently mentions the value of the Soviet surface fleets for sea presence functions, but is strangely quiet regarding their strategic role in wartime. This suggests that he too shares Captain Bystrov’s views regarding the role of surface forces in war—i.e., one much more limited than usually ascribed to Gorshkov by Western commentators.
As a counter to the arguments advanced here, many Western observers would cite the Soviet practice of sending surface ships to crisis areas as an indicator of Soviet intentions to use their surface forces for sea control during war. Indeed, the Soviets do send surface ships to trouble spots and that presence invites the possibility of war with the United States: but even so, this Soviet behavior can still be interpreted conservatively. That is, in no one action has the Soviet Navy committed the majority of one of its surface fleets to confront the Americans.
Also, given the usual caution of Kremlin leaders in delegating decision-making authority, it seems unlikely that the commander of any Soviet task force has the descretion of firing the first shot. Thus, the Soviets have minimized the chances of serious in-
ternational conflict. Also, less serious incidents (e.g., bumping of ships) can be handled at a later date through diplomatic channels. Consequently, Soviet behavior in dispatching surface forces to troubled regions seems more to signal Soviet interest in an area, to increase potential risks and constrain potential courses of action for American military forces, and to offer some tangible sign of support for Soviet clients abroad. The conservative nature of this commitment, in turn, argues against the widespread deployment of Soviet surface forces in the case of war with the West.
The Okean exercises of 1970 and 1975 apparently pontradict my judgments regarding Soviet capabilities and intentions for a future war because both of these naval exercises were carried out on a worldwide basis. But these maneuvers remain consistent with my earlier discussion; the significance of the exercises has been overplayed by Western analysts.
An article dealing with Soviet naval exercises by Donald C. Daniel makes several general points regarding Soviet motives for any naval exercise.8 First, 1975 were conducted in the latter stages of five-year economic plans and so the exercises may have been designed to convince Soviet leaders (then formulating the next economic plan) of the navy’s potential. Seen from this perspective, Soviet naval exercises can be viewed as a “pitch” for additional funding. Finally. Daniel suggests that an exercise may be an accurate reflection of Soviet intentions.
Given these purposes, Okean-70 and -75 can be interpreted as propaganda shows designed for both foreign and domestic audiences. Such propaganda is certainly consistent with recent Soviet attempts to generate political support in nonaligned nations and to gain political leverage vis-a-vis the West. Daniel’s analysis of many past Soviet exercises offers such a conclusion: “. . . the Soviets may have wanted the West to observe their anti-SLOC (sea lines of communication) training in order to force Western leaders to think twice about their own vulnerability.” At the same time, Soviet naval leaders can use Western expressionss of concern over these exercises as a tool in internal Soviet policy debates
the Soviets realize that their maneuvers are highly Wsible to Western naval analysts, so they may use this opportunity to impress the West and possibly to deceive us regarding their true intentions. Sec- 0r>d, the Soviets may “seek to maximize training °Pportunities during major exercises; hence, much °f what goes on may consist of discrete, separate events which do not necessarily fit into some over- ah, logical, or unified scenario.”9 Daniel also points 0ut that the Soviet naval maneuvers of 1970 and
Newer surface combatants like the Sovremennyy-c/asv guided missile destroyer below and the Kiro\-class battle cruiser at right seem to be designed with emphasis on sea denial and sea control missions. Whether they will function as such under combat conditions remains to be seen.
regarding the allocation of resources among the services. This is an important consideration for the Soviet Navy, given its “poor sister” status among Soviet military forces.
The propaganda value derived from open sea exercises and from stationing naval units outside waters contiguous to the Soviet Union has considerable value for Soviet attempts to restrict Western military power through political negotiations. The stationing of Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean, for example, puts pressure on the West, which until recently had enjoyed a virtual naval monopoly in the region. The presence of Soviet naval units thus
breeds concern among Western political and military leaders and among the leaders of countries lying along the Indian Ocean. This concern, in turn, creates an atmosphere in which the Soviets can offer political solutions—e.g., proposals to “neutralize” the Indian Ocean by the withdrawal of all U. S. and Soviet naval vessels. Such offers only have credibility in a situation wherein the Soviets appear to pose a genuine threat. Open ocean naval maneuvers also provide the Soviets with ammunition for arms limitation or force reductions negotiations, because the Soviet Navy gives the appearance of being a sea power in the classical Western sense of the term. Furthermore, exercises like Okean-70 and -75 implicitly threaten Western sea lines of communication and so could have a chilling effect on future Western political or military action in the Third World for fear of Soviet retaliation against Western commerce.
So far, I have argued that Soviet naval maneuvers are not an indication of Soviet interest in sea control. But suppose that these exercises are a true expression of the Soviet Navy’s intentions—what then? Operationalizing an open ocean strategy would face serious difficulties as discussed earlier (e.g., geographic, supply problems), and so the Soviets might not be able to carry it out even if they desired to do so. Another more serious question involves the re-
lations between the Soviet Navy and ground forces •n time of war. As mentioned earlier, the ground forces would probably dominate the Soviet high command during a war, and this dominance could affect naval operations. That is, ground force officers would Probably seek to define the navy’s mission in conservative terms—tactical support of the land operations, guarding the army’s flanks, and protecting Soviet shores. This scenario suggests that even if the Soviet Navy wanted to pursue an open ocean, sea denial, and sea control strategy, it might not be able to do so because of overall command decisions taken by ground forces.
The conclusions contain both bad news and good news. The bad news is that the Soviet surface fleets must be evaluated as a potent threat in the area of the naval presence mission and in the resultant political advantages that accrue from that success. This ,s an area which is likely to increase in seriousness 0ver the next decade as the size of the Soviet fleet continues to expand. The good news is that the So- yiet surface navy seems ill-prepared, doctrinally disinclined, and traditionally disinterested in engaging m wartime sea control operations.
Western analyses of the Soviet sea control threat do, however, pose some serious problems. The flood °t Western articles about the quality of the Soviet surface navy and its threat is often used ammunition m the U. S. budgetary process—unfortunately, nothing seems to impress Congress more than a Red scare. The danger in such talk is that U. S. Political leaders and U. S. naval personnel may come to believe that the worst case is the most likely nlternative. Convincing ourselves of the potency of Soviet naval power (despite its many limitations) may undermine the resolve of U. S. leaders in poetical confrontations with the Soviets and erode the
morale and confidence of U. S. sailors in their ability to meet the Soviet naval challenge.
But even more important, the Soviets may come to believe the exaggerated assessments of their own capabilities. That is, they may accept Western conclusions as accurate and this, in turn, may lead them to undertake bolder actions in crisis situations or to engage in overseas adventures. Miscalculations like these in the past have often led nations into wars that neither side wanted. Consequently, overestimating Soviet capabilities, whether from genuine concern or as a tactic in the U. S. budgetary process, may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
'RAdm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, “20th Century Mahan." Proceedings, November 1974. pp. 70-73.
'Stansfield Turner. “The Naval Balance: Not Tust a Numbers Game." Foreign Affairs, January 1977, p. 344.
'Ibid., p. 346.
JJames M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes. "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World," Problems of Communism, February 1979.
p. 20.
'Adm. S. G. Gorshkov. “The Development of the Soviet Naval Art." Morskoy Sbornik, February 1976, p. 19.
'■Adm. V. Sysoyev. "The Experience of War and the Present." Morskoy Sbornik. April 1976, p. 21.
7Yu. Bystrov, "Winning Sea Supremacy." Morskov Sbornik. March 1977. pp. 20-25.
“Donald C. Daniel. "Trends and Patterns in Major Soviet Naval Exercises." Naval Power in Soviet Policy, ed. by Paul J. Murphy. Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office. 1978. pp. 221 - 31.
“Ibid., p. 221.
Mr. Hull received a bachelor’s degree in political science from Adrian College. Michigan, in 1968 and a master's degree in diplomacy from the William Andrew Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. University of Kentucky in 1973. He specializes in defense policy and Soviet weapons acquisition practices.