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Soviet Navy cruise missile submarines pose a mortal threat to Western surface forces. With 70 such submarines in service or under construction, this is a form of warfare the Soviets obviously have faith in and one which Western navies should be prepared to encounter and counter.
The greatest threat to U. S. and Western navies will occur during the first few days of a general conflict, when Soviet Navy conventionally and nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGs/ SSGNs) and other Soviet antisurface warfare (ASUW) forces will attempt to carry out surprise and coordinated missile strikes against U. S. carrier task forces and other major surface combatants. Should the Soviets fail to deal lethal blows in these initial strikes, their ability to mount successful subsequent strikes would certainly decrease dramatically. The Soviets’ employment in the initial phase of war depends heavily on their ocean surveillance system, which would likely be destroyed or neutralized quickly. Therefore, the tactical employment of Soviet SSGs/SSGNs, the most potent component of the Soviet Navy’s antisurface warfare forces, will be critical to the outcome of any general conflict with the Soviet Union.
Tactical Organization: Soviet SSGs/SSGNs will likely be employed singly and/or in pairs. Two or three pairs of submarines of one class, intended to carry out a specific tactical mission under the command of a senior officer, comprise a "tactical group
of submarines.” The cruise missile-armed submarines also may be attached to a tactical group of one type or mixed types of surface ships. The latter are tactical units of surface combatants intended for search and destruction of enemy surface combatants, amphibious forces, convoys, and shore targets. The larger formation is a naval flotilla which is intended to carry out "operations and combat actions” in a separate sector of a theater of naval operations. Depending on the scope and character of the mission to be carried out, the naval flotilla may consist of, besides surface ships, submarines (including the SSGs/SSGNs), naval aircraft, and coastal defense units.
Targeting and Missions: The primary task of the Soviet SSGs/SSGNs is to carry out missile strikes against “military targets” on the sea and in coastal areas. Depending on the target’s size and value, the Soviet military classifies it as strategic, operational, or tactical. For example, SSBNs are strategic targets; aircraft carriers and amphibious forces are operational ones; and surface combatants and merchant ships are tactical targets.
The SSGs/SSGNs are assigned to combat operational targets. The primary targets for the SSGs/ SSGNs on the sea are, in decreasing order of importance: aircraft carriers, amphibious forces, major surface combatants (CGs/CGNs, DDs/DDGs, FFs/ FFGs), nuclear stores supply ships, submarine depot ships (ASs) for SSBNs, transports carrying submarines’ missiles, and other naval vessels. If the SSGs/SSGNs are employed for anti-sea lines of communications (SLOCs) tasks, their principal targets will be: supertankers, containerships, tankers, and other merchant vessels.1 In conducting strikes against land targets, the primary objectives will be to destroy aircraft carriers’ staging areas, command, control and communication (C3) centers, submarine bases, ports of embarkation or disembarkation of troops, and other military and industrial targets in coastal areas.
When Soviet SSGs/SSGNs are employed independently, they will be used against individual ships °r a small number of enemy surface combatants, fast troop transports, and other naval and merchant vessels. Operating independently, the SSGs/SSGNs will often carry out surprise strikes against land targets, particularly in the opening phase of a war. Independent missions will also be conducted, principally by the SSGNs, in the most distant regions of the world’s oceans, where there are no other forces to provide support or when there are no other forces available at the time required.
The predominant form of joint employment of cruise missile submarines will be between SSGNs and aircraft. In the open ocean, antisurface warfare missions generally will be conducted by the SSGNs working with land-based strike bombers. Combined actions involving SSGs/SSGNs, surface ships, and aircraft will take place at the very outset of a war, in carrying out surprise and mass attacks against enemy carrier task forces and—after the war has broken out—in the sea areas where fighter-bombers and interceptors can be employed effectively in addition to land-based strike bombers.
Principles of Employment: Depending upon the objective, sizes of forces employed, and tasks to be conducted, Soviet military theory defines three types of cooperation: tactical, operational, and strategic. In the employment of Soviet SSGs/SSGNs, only the first two forms of cooperation apply. Tactical or “close” cooperation of individual SSGs/SSGNs or their pairs and aircraft or surface ships has two objectives. The first is to prevent mutual interference of sensors and weapons of individual ships, pairs, or tactical groups participating in the combat. The second is to achieve, by obtaining favorable tactical positions and selecting the proper mode of attack, strikes which will exceed the sum of attacks by the participants singly.2
Operational cooperation involves coordinating tactical-sized units of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft or mixed forces carrying out tasks which are separated from but aimed at accomplishing an overall objective. Thus, the forces conducting a mission in a secondary sea area contribute to the success of the forces engaged in the principal area of operations. There might be a case in which operational cooperation has to be effected among forces participating in different operations but in the same sea area. In such a case, the forces carrying out their strikes first must create favorable conditions for attacks by the succeeding forces.
In the Soviet view, the surprise, coordination, and mass use of all available forces and weapons necessary for a successful missile strike or torpedo attack can be achieved only through the highest degree of command and control over the participating units. As a rule, such control is exercised by the command post ashore. After the enemy forces have been detected, the target’s movement data are transmitted from the command post by radio to the force commander. The command post vectors forces toward the known or estimated position of the target.
the effect of a concentrated aerial mining campaign on convoy defense and protection of the sea-lanes. Based on Soviet policies of using naval forces to support the land battle and their concepts of multiple lines of defense, it would seem logical that Soviet submarines would be employed in barrier defense positions rather than for interdiction. The anti-SLOC tasks would be accomplished by mining and by bombing the critical ports and harbors.
Soviet tacticians do not envision mine warfare as an end unto itself, but rather as an effective method to augment most of the missions assigned to the navy. Its value has not been lost to modern thinking as evidenced by the great interest Soviet writers took in the U. S. mining of Haiphong, which literally closed that port for 300 days.
Mine warfare can be used in support of strikes by mining ports and harbors to stop the flow of vital war materials. Mines can be used to deny egress to in-port SSBNs; mines can also be used offensively against U. S. aircraft carriers. Mines can also be used in conjunction with the widely publicized Soviet multiple defense zones where they could form a protective barrier around the Soviet SSBNs to insulate them against U. S. ASW forces. In support of the battle against the shore, mines can be used to prevent the resupply of enemy ground forces and to prevent enemy naval gunfire support. They also have great value in defending bases and protecting the flanks of the army from seaward attacks and amphibious landings.
One advantage of mine warfare for the Soviets is its wide versatility in supporting any number of naval missions. In addition to this tactical versatility, a mine also provides a great number of options with its technical diversity. Triggering mechanisms based on magnetic fluctuations, acoustic signatures, or pressure variations, or any combination of the three allow the mine to be highly selective in its targets. The development of deep water-moored mines such as encapsulated torpedoes (CAPTOR) have greatly increased the effective operational area for mining.
Using mines for sea-lane interdiction could release submarines and surface combatants to conduct higher priority tasks such as anti-SSBN and anticarrier operations for submarines and pro-SSBN operations for surface craft. As an alternative for at- sea anticonvoy strikes, mining would be less costly in terms of submarine and aircraft losses. Initial mining could be carried out in a relatively low-risk environment, and even minefield replenishment would minimize risk to the reseeding platforms.
Mines are cost-effective weapons in terms of cost per unit and destructive capability per dollar. On the other hand, a mining campaign against the Western European ports would be extremely expensive for the Western nations not only in terms of losses to mines, but also because of the time, vessels, and personnel that would be expended in clearing the minefields. Damaged shipping would also put a tremendous strain on the available repair facilities in terms of capital and personnel.
Little can be done to safeguard or protect a port against a mining campaign. The primary U. S. and Western European ports are especially susceptible to mining operations, and these nations arc generally ill-equipped for mine countermeasures. An aggressive mining campaign could saturate Western minesweeping efforts and cause massive backups and delays in the delivery of strategic materials. Western hictics regarding Soviet interdiction of SLOCs invariably concentrate on the ASW problem of en- siiring convoy integrity against Soviet submarines. The other half of the equation, mine blockade of the Ports, has been largely neglected. An intensive So- v*et mining campaign would have the advantage of striking at a link in the Western plan.
Mines are ideally suited for changing the geograPhy of the theater and, by doing so. can be instrumental in redressing an unfavorable balance of forces. Mines can deny the enemy access to specific areas and can force an enemy to use selected channels or straits. As Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge put it: “The mine is the only weapon of naval warfare that is to some extent capable of altering geographical circumstances by making certain areas onpassable to ships. Thus an area which has been declared dangerous because of the use of mines is usually treated with great respect and is avoided as though it were land.”4
The psychological effect of mining is often underestimated. Often, just the threat of mining has been sutficient to alter tactics and almost invariably causes an adversary to use more caution than would otherwise be exhibited. The U. S. mining of Haiphong Harbor is a case in point. The United States adverted that mines had been laid, and as a result, the 29 ships that were in port were immobilized for 300 daYs. The fact that mines were actually deployed is 'ncidental to the point that no ship attempted to transit the channel.
in a major conflict between the Soviet Union and ihe United States, the Soviets would employ mines extensively, both offensively and defensively. The Soviets regard the use of mines as simply one more Weapon available to accomplish their objectives, and they have made preparations to both use and to defend against mines. Soviet writings and a long heritage of mine warfare support their use. Posses- Sl°n of the world’s largest inventory of mines and ihe most capable mine countermeasures fleet attest i° the value the Soviets place in mine warfare.
Western planning for a war of attrition against the Soviet submarine threat will not materialize because Soviet submarines will not be engaged in an anticonvoy role. They will be engaged in barrier defense, anti-SSBN and carrier operations, and in minefield replenishment. The Soviets have long claimed that multilayered defense zones will be set UP to counter Western naval advances. Since re- sllPply of Europe can be threatened by using a combination of mine blockade and the bombing of receiving ports, there is no reason to believe that Soviet forces will venture outside of their defensive zones to attack Western convoys.
The Soviet Navy would be used primarily to support the “battle against the shore" as described by Admiral Gorshkov. In short, this strategy will avoid Heet-to-fleet confrontations except in a defensive posture to protect the flanks of the Soviet Army or to defend Soviet SSBNs. The Soviets firmly believe that victory will ultimately be accomplished on the land.
U. S. mining capability at the outset of a major conflict will be barely adequate. However, because of the ease and low cost of mine production, sufficient stores of mines could be manufactured in a relatively short period of time, particularly through the conversion of aircraft bombs. Mine delivery by submarines and aircraft is well within U. S. capability. However, this will deny platform availability for other, perhaps more critical, tasks.
U. S. capability to counter a concentrated Soviet mining campaign is inadequate. There are insufficient minesweepers, mine countermeasure helicopters, and the trained personnel to operate them. U. S. mine countermeasure capability has been dangerously neglected for a number of reasons, and the result will be severe losses to shipping and massive delays and breakdowns in logistics resupply. Mine warfare does not have the charisma of other methods of combat. There is no face-to-face confrontation with the enemy. Perhaps because of its cost- effectiveness and employment by many weak nations, the United States views mine warfare as being somewhat cowardly. The result is that there is no strong sponsor for mine warfare within the Navy. Politically, mine warfare does not present an impressive finished product such as a fighter aircraft, a missile cruiser, or the ominous silhouette of a submarine. Lacking this type of glamor, mine warfare has also lacked a political sponsor to shepherd the funds through the budget process to make U. S. mine warfare healthy.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union will use mines in the next war. There is some doubt that the United States will be able to counter them.
'Adm. S. Gorshkov as quoted by John G. Hibbits. “Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Twenty Years of Naval Thought," Paul J. Murphy, ed.. Naval Power in Soviet Policy (Washington. D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office and U. S. Air Force, 1978), p. 8.
2 Adm. S. Gorshkov. The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, ML): Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 221.
’Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, p. 273.
4VAdm. Friedrich Ruge, Sea Warfare 1939-1945: A German Viewpoint (London: Cassell. 1957), p. 13.
Commander Wile was commissioned in 1971 through the NROTC program at Pennsylvania State University. He has served as administrative assistant and navigator in the USS Durham (LKA- 114), executive officer in the USS Tawasa (ATF-92), operations officer in the \JSS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16), and combat systems officer on Com DesRon 35 staff. He received an M.A. in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently the commanding officer of the USS Constant (MSO-427).