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The progress of Soviet naval aviation was kept hanging in the air by a “great carrier debate” at the Kremlin that lasted 40 years. But in half that time, the Soviet Navy has gone from laying the keel for its first air- capable ship to the commissioning of three Kiev-c/ass carriers like the one at right, sporting a row of “Forger” VTOL aircraft. While we still debate the carrier issue, they seem to have made up their minds.
In February 1967, an article published in the Soviet naval digest Morskoy Sbornik attributed to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov postulated that the “sun was setting” on the aircraft carrier and further pronounced that this “inevitable decline” was “irreversible.”1 At the time, the first Soviet warship designed primarily for the operation of aircraft, the Moskva, was about to enter service. Although the ship was widely referred to as an aircraft carrier in the Western press, the Soviets called the Moskva and her sister ship Leningrad “large antisubmarine cruisers.” In 1976, the Kiev, lead ship of a second generation of air- capable vessels deployed, and during the summer of 1979, reports that the Soviets were constructing a large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier near
Nikolayev began to circulate in defense journals. Moreover, the frequent polemics against aircraft carriers which had appeared so regularly in Soviet naval publications gradually ceased and were supplanted by more positive appraisals.
Was Gorshkov engaging in some type of semantic sleight of hand? Had there been an evolution in Soviet naval doctrine regarding the utility of sea-based aviation since 1967? Or were we in the West again misreading the implications of these construction patterns?
To be sure, sea-based aviation in the Soviet Navy has experienced the same fitful, retarded development pattern characteristic of the service at large during its first 50 years. Early tsarist experimentations with aircraft at sea were of a level commensurate with those of the major sea powers of the day, and by August 1914, Russian naval units were operating some 50 aircraft, the majority of which were Curtiss flying boats of American manufacture. The U. S. Navy, by comparison, flew only 12 aircraft of its own at that time.
Neither the Imperial Navy nor its air arm distinguished itself during the ensuing hostilities and the subsequent collapse of the tsarist regime; the capitulation to the Germans and three additional years of civil war reduced the fleet to what one naval historian has termed “junk.”2
Several factors influenced the Soviets not to engage in the active development of aircraft carriers during the interwar period when other powers were exhibiting great interest in this ship type. Initially, the position of the Soviet Navy was seriously weakened by a mutiny staged at the Kronstadt naval base
Thus, the force commander afloat is given sufficient time to organize his forces. The force commander’s responsibilities are to give the target assignments to subordinate unit commanders, select the most appropriate method for tactical deployment of subordinate units, and ensure the arrival of individual units at their assigned attack positions within the designated time. The last factor has the most important role in coordinating the actions of all participating forces because the Soviets use their weapons simultaneously or in a timed sequence. Any delay in the employment of weapons in a battle is regarded as entailing “the most serious and even disastrous consequence. . . ,”3
In missile strikes or torpedo attacks carried out in succession, each preceding strike must weaken the opponent’s defenses, and thus create more favorable conditions for strikes by the succeeding tactical units. The principal features of the attacks are sudden and swift movement of the attacking forces toward the target area, relative simultaneity of the offensive weapons’ employment against the selected objective, and skillful maneuvering against a weak point in the enemy defenses.
Soviet naval doctrine postulates that any strike mission has to be carried out without any delay after the target has been detected, by the employment of superior forces, from different directions, from the weapons’ maximum effective range, by employing all available weapons, and by using different types of weapons. The aim then is to overwhelm the opponent’s defenses, prevent the target from avoiding attack, and inflict greater losses and damage upon the opponent, while minimizing the same for one’s own forces. Soviet naval theoreticians stress that a battle will be won, not by the side which possesses the greater number of missiles, but by the one which detects the enemy first, launches its missiles first, and obtains a hit with the first salvo. Thus, the attack will be carried out from standoff ranges, and every effort will be made to avoid close-in contact.
Soviet naval doctrine emphasizes the great significance of having secure, reliable, and uninterrupted communications in the targeting and target assignment phases. During tactical deployment, the communications transmittal has to be held to a minimum, and conducted only by the use of enciphered messages.
Reconnaissance: In order that the SSGs/SSGNs may carry out a combat mission, the prospective enemy targets on the sea have to be detected. In the Soviet view, the detection of the enemy ships represents the most difficult problem in the conduct of submarine warfare.4
The principal elements of the Soviet Navy’s reconnaissance system, known as the Soviet ocean surveillance system (SOSS), including the following:
► Ocean surveillance satellites
► Naval and air force long-range recon aircraft
► Submarines
► Surface ships
► Intelligence-collection ships (AGIs)
► Merchant ships
► Oceanographic research vessels
► Fishing trawlers
► Land-based over-the-horizon (OTH) radar stations
► Electronic intelligence (ELINT) stations
► A fixed ocean surveillance acoustic system
► A network of intelligence agents.
SOSS is directed and controlled from the navy’s operational headquarters near Moscow. In the Soviet view, only such an elaborate and deeply echeloned reconnaissance system can ensure continuous and reliable observations of the movements of enemy forces, even in the most distant areas of the world’s oceans.
Tracking: In the Soviet view, nuclear-tipped missiles have “expanded the spatial scope of warfare,’’ and greatly increased the significance of surprise upon the outcome of a war.5 Thus reconnaissance, in order to accomplish its main objective (that is, to prevent or weaken any surprise attack by an enemy against vital Soviet targets on land and sea), must be conducted well before the war breaks out and continuously. Specifically, the enemy forces on the sea must be searched for, detected, and kept under surveillance over a prolonged period of time.
The aforesaid tasks are carried out by specially designated tracking forces. They must be capable not only of searching for, detecting, maintaining contact, and transmitting reports to the command post, but also of being ready when needed for immediate combat employment. Soviet attack submarines (including the SSGs/SSGNs), aircraft, surface ships, and helicopters, are to track U. S./Westem submarines and surface ships. The Soviets pay particular attention to tracking the submarines and surface ships carrying nuclear weapons.
In the Soviet view, tracking by individual units without cooperation of other forces is ineffective and unreliable, and thus cannot be justified economically. Such tasks are better performed by larger numbers of one type of submarines, surface ships, or aircraft or by mixed forces. The latter provide the highest degree of tracking effectiveness, since the shortcomings in the capabilities of some units within a force are compensated for by the capabilities of other units.
Normally, units of the same type are employed for tracking large enemy surface combatants. The SSGs/SSGNs normally would be assigned to track carrier task forces or a group of other major surface combatants. The SSGs/SSGNs would be vectored
by the command post to the probable target's portion. In principle, the initial position of the SSGs/ oSGNs for tracking has to be beyond the maximum effective range of the enemy ship’s ASW defenses, but within the operating range of the Soviet sub’s Sor>ar. Thus, the SSGs/SSGNs have to be directed toward a position which lies somewhere between these two zones.
. In a tracking mission, each of the SSGs/SSGNs Is assigned a sector to prevent mutual interference *n the use of sensors and to preclude the possibility
an attack upon each other if and when an order Js received from the command post to cease tracking and carry out a surprise attack.
. The principal tasks of the SSGs/SSGNs conduct- ln8 tracking generally include establishing contact W|fh enemy ships, maintaining or resuming contact, ar>d informing the command post regarding the tarot’s position, movements, and intentions. Should war break out, the SSGs/SSGNs must immediately carry out attacks against the enemy ships being
tracked.
The SSGs’/SSGNs' effectiveness in tracking en- etT>y surface ships is influenced by many factors, but generally depends upon choice of proper position °r tracking, speed ratio between the SSGs/SSGNs and the surface ships, the maximum effective range °f the submarines’ sensors, and the degree of coVertness in the sensors’ use. A submarine’s initial Position for tracking is determined largely by the bearing and distance to the surface ship and the submarine’s depth. Regardless of what tracking position is selected, it must ensure optimal conditions tor use of the submarine’s sensors and for maintaining secure and reliable communications with the command post and other tracking units. The speed fleeted by an SSG/SSGN for tracking must be such oat it generates the lowest noise possible, while
In terms of numbers, the nuclear-powered “Eclw-ll,” pictured, is the largest class of cruise missile submarine. Conventionally powered “Julietts,” pictured on pages 6061, second in number to the “Eclio-lls,” must surface, as is also the case with the “Echo-IIs,” to launch their missiles.
being sufficient to maintain contact with surface ships being tracked. A low speed generally enhances an SSG’s/SSGN’s survivability and her effectiveness in using her underwater sensors. In tracking enemy surface ships, an SSG/SSGN will normally operate her sonar passively. However, in the Soviet view, the SSNs, by using low-frequency passive sonars, are most effective in tracking surface ships on the open ocean and in deep waters.
The Soviet naval doctrine apparently provides that in time of heightened international tensions or imminent outbreak of war, the tracking forces deployed in the respective regions of the world’s oceans in peacetime will be reinforced by additional submarines, surface ships, and aircraft from home bases or by redeployment of forces from one sea region to another.6
Phases in the Combat Employment of the SSGs/ SSGNs: A typical combat mission of the Soviet SSGs/ SSGNs, assuming that they are not engaged in the tracking of enemy surface ships when a general conflict breaks out, includes the following distinctive phases:
► Departure from a base and transit to the operating area
► Patrolling
► Transit from a patrol position to the probable target’s area
► Tactical deployment
► Attack
► Disengagement
► Forces’ assembly
► Redeployment to another operating area or return to a base.
Soviet naval doctrine puts extraordinary emphasis upon the protection of submarines by other forces while at a base and during their departure for, and return from, a combat patrol. Such tasks are performed by organized forces which include small surface ASW ships and craft, land-based ASW helicopters, and a stationary defense system within a submarine base and at its approaches (mine barriers, hydroacoustic listening devices, antisubmarine nets, etc.). These forces comprise an integral part of the “antisubmarine defense zone” established in a specific coastal area. ASW forces intended for defense of a submarine base and its approaches have the
principal tasks of securing the safety of Soviet submarines en route from the base's entrance to a position outside the base’s defense system whence they can continue sailing independently and the area of the entry route for submarines upon their arrival from a combat patrol.
Land-based interceptors and fighter-bombers will also be employed to provide air cover to Soviet submarines heading toward or returning from their operating areas. ASW aviation and surface ships are intended to assist submarines, including the SSGs/ SSGNs, in breaking through the enemy’s ASW barriers on their way to or from a combat mission.
Upon reaching their operating areas, the SSGs/ SSGNs initiate patrolling intended to locate the prospective targets. However, frequently the enemy surface ships will be detected by a specially designated reconnaissance force. The command post then evaluates the data received and selects the time, action area, and forces for carrying out the attack mission. The SSGs/SSGNs are then vectored by the command post from their patrolling zone toward the probable target’s area. The command post computes and transmits by radio the courses and speeds which the SSGs/SSGNs will use until they have reached their positions for a tactical deployment. Submarines are vectored on a course heading as straight as possible toward the oncoming enemy surface ships. This head-on course is selected frequently because it enables the SSGs/SSGNs to arrive at the probable target’s area and carry out their missile strikes in the shortest possible time. Such a course also makes it easier for individual submarines to obtain favorable tactical positions for attack upon detecting the target with their own sensors. This is particularly the case for the SSGs, which generally are slower than the enemy surface ships.
Secure, reliable, and continuous radio links between the command post, the reconnaissance forces, and the SSG/SSGNs play a crucial role in coordinating the movement of all participants during the combat mission. In the Soviet view, the widespread use of “radioelectronic equipment [today] makes it possible to identify the direction of movement in the region of enemy communications more reliably and accurately” than in the past. Also, the high endurance and speed underwater of the SSGNs, when combined with their ability to receive low-frequency radio messages while submerged, enable the command post to deploy or redeploy them rapidly and covertly.7
Vectoring the SSGs/SSGNs to the target’s probable area is generally a simpler process than guiding the SSs/SSNs. This is because the cruise missiles’ range, which is significantly longer than that of torpedoes, allows for greater errors in estimating the target’s initial position and courses. The SSGs/SSGNs are normally spread over a relatively large area of the ocean and outside the target’s probable courses while being vectored by the command post. Also, in contrast to the SSs/SSNs, the SSGs/SSGNs head directly to their respective positions for tactical deployment from the outset of the vectoring phase. As a rule, these positions lie somewhere on the outer edge of the “area of fire” which encompasses the entire area around the target’s presumed position's center, with the radius equalling the maximum effective range of the submarine's missile.
The sectors assigned to the SSGs/SSGNs for tactical deployment vary, but they have to be selected to allow each of them unhindered maneuvering and the use of their sensors and weapons. Many factors affect the assigning of sectors in the area of fire. They include: the initial position of the SSGs/SSGNs relative to the target’s probable position and direction of movement; the speed ratio between the opposing forces; the target’s gravity of defenses; the proximity of the coast or other navigational obstacles; and the presence or absence of any other enemy forces which may interfere with the movements of the SSGs/SSGNs, either in assuming their attacking positions and delivering the missile strike or in the subsequent disengagement phase.
The basic modes in the positioning of the SSGs/ SSGNs for tactical deployment are from the bow. starboard or port quarters, and stern target angles. If two or more SSG/SSGN pairs are employed, they will normally be positioned in three or more sectors around the target’s probable position to prevent the target from avoiding the attack and to saturate the latter's defenses. The position from the bow target angles is chosen when the tactical deployment and attack have to be carried out in the shortest possible time and by surprise. However, this attack creates a complicated task for the SSGs/SSGNs to break away from the engagement rapidly, unless they are armed with long-range missiles or enjoy a substantial margin in speed over that of the enemy. The opposite is true if the stern target angles are selected. Tactical deployment and attack from the starboard or port quarters target angles permit the SSGs/SSGNs to disengage rapidly after their missiles have been launched. However, such a mode has to be combined with either attack from the bow, or from the flanks to achieve the semi-envelopment or full envelopment of the target.
The tactical deployment phase of the SSGs/SSGNs is very short compared with SSs/SSNs. Before the SSGs/SSGNs reach their assigned positions on the arc of the area of fire, they should already have detected the target with their own sensors. The Soviet SSGs/SSGNs presently in service can detect surface ships by passive sonar, search radar, and combined use of sonar and radar. In the phase, the “Papa,” “Charlie-I/II,” and “Oscar”-class SSGNs normally use their low-frequency passive sonar for
detection and acquisition, and active sonar for missile fire control. The “Echo-lT’-class SSGNs, and the “Juliett”- and “Whiskey Long Bin”-/“Whiskey Twin Cylinder”-class SSGs use their surface search radar for target detection and missile guidance radar for fire control solutions.
The Soviet SSGs/SSGNs carrying surface-launched surface-to-surface missiles can also use their sonars to establish initial contact with the target, and the surface-search radar and missile-guidance radar for target classification and tracking.
For the SSGs/SSGNs, the attack phase is also very brief. It lasts only from the time when the target has been acquired until the missiles have been launched.
is reportedly 35 nautical miles, but its practical range does not exceed 25-30 nautical miles—that is, the sonar's acquisition range. Similarly, both the longer- range (reportedly 60 nautical miles) “SS-N-9,” fitted in the “Papa” class and in some “Charlie-IIs,” and the newest “SS-NX-19” carried by the “Oscar” class also have a maximum effective unassisted range of about 25-30 nautical miles.
The Soviet SSGs and the “Echo-IIs” armed with the “SS-N-3/-12” launch their missiles only when surfaced. Their launching speed cannot exceed 15 knots, and the missiles can be fired up to sea state six. The SSGNs carrying “SS-N-7/-9s” launch their missiles from a depth of between 60 and 120 feet.
As a rule, the SSGs/SSGNs will carry out their shikes from the maximum effective range of their missiles. In general, the unassisted range of submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) is limited to the radar's or sonar’s acquisition range. Thus, the effective range of the “SS-N-3/-12” equals the radar horizon distance—i.e., approximately 12-18 nautical miles. The maximum theoretical range of the “SS-N-7” SLCMs carried by the “Charlie-I/II”
and at a speed of eight to 12 knots. The “Oscar" SSGN reportedly is armed with the vertically launched “SS-NX-19” missiles.
The number of missiles to be launched by individual SSGs/SSGNs in a single strike depends primarily upon the number of SSGs/SSGNs assigned to carry out an attack against a certain target, the size of the target and her degree of survivability, the missile’s hit probability, and the type of warhead used. Normally, each SSG/SSGN can be expected to fire a salvo of two missiles against a target to enhance the hit probability. The first salvo of two missiles may be followed after five to ten minutes by another salvo to finish off the heavily damaged target.
The Soviet submarine-launched cruise missiles are generally larger, heavier, and slower, and have a less sophisticated guidance system than their Western counterparts. Yet they are relatively cheap and therefore can be produced in large numbers. In addition, they are reliable and highly destructive if they hit the target. With the exception of the “SS- N-3A/-12” and “SS-NX-19,” all Soviet submarine- launched missiles are subsonic. Their guidance system comprises an autopilot with midcourse correction and an active radar-homing head for the terminal phase of the flight. The exceptions are the “SS-N-9” missile, which is guided by an autopilot with command override and an active radar/in- frared-homing head, and the “SS-N-19” which is fitted with an autopilot and active radar. Some sources claim that the “SS-N-3s,” and presumably other missiles, are fitted with a data link which transmits the homing radar picture back to the SSGs/SSGNs, so that the targets can be evaluated, and the missiles can then be directed toward the selected targets.8 The “SS-NX-19s” on board the “Oscars” apparently do not possess a midcourse guidance system. The “Oscar” maneuvers to within the missile’s range of the target using data provided by an ocean surveillance satellite.
The flight altitude of the Soviet surface-launched antishipping missiles is generally high, making them and their platforms very vulnerable to early detection and destruction by the enemy's countermeasures. For example, during its cruising phase the “SS-N-3A/C" flies, depending on the range to the target, from about 900 to 12,000 feet above the sea’s surface. The “SS-N-12” flies at some 30,000 feet when fired at a target 300 nautical miles away. The “SS-N-12,” however, is reportedly a sea skimmer in the final phase of its flight. The Soviet submarine- launched missiles are more difficult to counter because of their relatively short range and low trajectory. The “SS-N-7" flies at about 90 feet and the “SS-N-9” at 225 feet above the sea surface. The trajectory of the “SS-NX-19,” when fired by using the sonar’s data, is probably similar to that of the “SS-N-9." As far as is publicly known, none of the Soviet SLCMs possesses a true sea-skimming capability.
The antishipping missiles carried by the Soviet SSG/SSGNs are fitted with either high explosive or nuclear warheads. Reportedly, about 25% of all missiles carried on board Soviet ships are equipped with nuclear warheads (usually two missiles per SSGN).9 Larger missiles, such as the “SS-N-3C/-12,” carry a 2,200-pound, and the “SS-N-3A” a 1.000-2,000- pound, high explosive warhead. Because of their liquid fuel propulsion system, the destructive power of the “SS-N-3/-12s” is greatly increased when launched at targets at close range because residual fuel creates a secondary area incendiary effect after the warhead detonates. When “SS-N-3s/12s” are used against sea surface targets they can be fitted with a 350-kiloton nuclear warhead. The “SS-N-7/-9s” carry either a 1,100-pound high explosive or 200- kiloton nuclear warhead.
The disengagement phase of an attack carried out by the SSG/SSGN begins shortly after the first missile salvo is fired and the target is hit. If the target was only damaged but not sunk, and if the conditions are favorable, an SSG/SSGN may close and attack the target with torpedoes. Afterward, the SSG/ SSGN disengages rapidly and chooses independently a course and diving depth. All the SSGs/ SSGNs participating in a mission then head toward an “assembly area,” from which they either proceed to a new operating area or return to their base.
Command and control of the SSGs/SSGNs during their combat patrol is exercised directly by the command post, except in the phases of tactical deployment and attacks when the submarine tactical group commander coordinates and directs the movements of subordinate SSGs/SSGNs.
Joint Tactics: In wartime, the Soviet SSGs/SSGNs, with the probable exception of the “Oscars,” will be employed rarely, if at all, without some support from other forces. Usually such support will be provided by land-based aircraft. In direct support for SSG/SSGN missions, aircraft can transmit reconnaissance data and conduct electronic countermeasures (ECM). The Tu-95 “Bear-Ds” reportedly have the capability, while reconnoitering, to transmit the pictures on their radarscopes to other platforms, including the SSGs/SSGNs, by way of video data link. The naval and air force Tu-16 “Badger H/J” ECM aircraft can be used during a strike conducted by the SSGs/SSGNs. The “Badger Hs” are intended primarily for chaff dispensing, while the “J” version is fitted with a large number of high-powered offensive jammers.
Both aircraft and helicopters are intended to provide midcourse correction for the SSGs’/SSGNs’ missiles. Besides the Tu-95D aircraft, the Ka-25
"Hormone B” helicopters are also used for such tasks. The Tu-95D is fitted with an I-band “Big Bulge” search radar, which reportedly has a maximum effective range of about 150-200 nautical miles. The “Hormone B” is equipped with a similar radar, but its range is some 100 nautical miles at a helicopter altitude of 3,700 feet. The midcourse correction data provided by the “Bear Ds” or “Hormone Bs” enable the missiles launched by the SSGs/SSGNs to hit their targets at ranges many times longer than could be achieved by use of the submarines’ sensors alone. As a result, the maximum practical range of the “SS-N-3C” is increased to about 170 nautical miles, and that of the “SS-N-3A” to 250 nautical miles. The range of the “SS-N-12,” when midcourse correction is used, is 300 nautical miles.
The primary objective of Soviet antisurface warfare will undoubtedly be the destruction of U. S. carrier task forces at the outset of a general conflict by surprise and combined attacks carried out with cruise missile-armed submarines, land-based bombers, and surface ships. The aircraft carriers have to be subjected to concerted attacks well before they reach positions from which they can threaten Soviet territory. In the Soviet's view, the most propitious times for the execution of attacks against carriers are during their air operations, underway replenishment, and transit of straits or narrows—i.e., whenever their maneuverability is greatly restricted.
The Soviets believe that the successful accomplishment of an anticarrier mission will depend upon the degree of centralization of command and control over the forces participating in a specific mission and their cooperation. Apparently, the most common feature of an anticarrier mission will be concerted attacks carried out by SSGNs and land-based aviation. Their joint employment is planned and organized in a selected area of combat operations. The forces’ composition and movements and the timing °f their strikes are tightly controlled by the command post ashore during the execution of the entire mission. Soviet doctrine postulates that strikes by aircraft and SSGNs against large ship formations SL*ch as carrier task forces do not necessarily need to be carried out simultaneously. In fact, attacks in a Pre-selected sequence are apparently preferred. In Principle, each preceding strike then facilitates the execution of the succeeding strikes. Also, the intervals between strikes must be selected so that the enemy ships never have time to recover from the damage suffered in the preceding strike. Thus. ASM- carrying bombers, accompanied by ECM aircraft, normally will strike first in order to weaken the enemy. Then the SSGs/SSGNs will close rapidly and launch their missiles from a position beyond the detection range of the ships and helicopters deployed in the carrier’s close protection screen. In a deployment pattern typically used by a U. S. carrier task force while transiting, the width of that zone is about 30-40 nautical miles. The SSGNs, in contrast to the torpedo-armed submarines, can usually accomplish their missions without having to penetrate the protective screen of an aircraft carrier; or, at most, they will have to engage only a part of the enemy forces.10 The SSGNs’ missile-launching distance, when carrying out strikes against carriers jointly with ASM-armed bombers, but beyond the range of friendly air cover, apparently would not exceed the maximum effective and unassisted range of their respective missiles.
The attack modes chosen for conducting missile strikes against a carrier task force will depend chiefly upon the number of SSGNs available, the composition, deployment scheme, and depth of the carrier’s protective screen, and the degree of damage inflicted upon the enemy in the preceding strike. The best attack mode would be one wherein the SSGNs close in on the center of the carrier task force from both the starboard and port quarters and launch their missiles against the carrier from their maximum effective range, simultaneously or in succession. In another variant, one or two SSGNs could be assigned to carry out a diversionary attack against the ships in the protective screen. After the enemy defenses are tied up, other SSGNs would close in from the opposite side and launch their missiles against the main target. Although the SSGNs would then launch their missiles from their maximum effective (but unassisted) range, such an attack would pose a greater threat than those wherein midcourse correction is provided by aircraft or helicopters. For example, a 30-nautical mile-range SLCM Hying at the speed of 0.9 M will need only about two-and- one-half minutes to reach a target. The same missile when guided by a third party will require about 23 minutes to hit a target some 250 nautical miles away. Because of their very short flying time and relatively low trajectory, Soviet SLCMs such as the "SS-N- 7/-9/-19” will provide little if any warning, thus making it very difficult for the intended target to initiate countermeasures and escape destruction, especially if large numbers of such missiles are launched almost simultaneously and from various directions.
The most favorable sectors for the SSGNs to use in approaching the target, particularly when the carrier’s protective screen is deeply echeloned, are from 60°-90° off the target's bow. Such an approach will allow the SSGNs to close the task force’s protection screen along the latter’s lateral axis (where ASW defenses are the weakest), disengage rapidly after the missile strike is carried out, and obtain the greatest target aspect value. The latter is important in targeting with SLCMs fitted with active radar terminal homing. Soviet SLCMs, when used without
midcourse correction provided by aircraft or helicopters, apparently lack the capability to distinguish large from small surface ships. They will generally home on the ships producing the largest radar crosssection, which is dependent primarily upon the target's aspect angle, not upon its size.
For the SSGNs, the principal tactical disadvantage in the approach mode from “favorable” target angles (60°-90°) is that searching for and detecting the target with their own sensors is more complex than it would be if an approach from the bow or forward quarters target angle were used, unless of course very precise data on the target’s whereabouts were continuously obtained from the command post. Also, more time would be required for closing the target, owing to low relative speed ratio, than if the approach were carried out from the bow target angles. The SSGNs, however, generally avoid the approach mode from the bow target angles, despite its many advantages, because it increases the possibility of detection and subsequent destruction of the SSGNs by the carrier’s protective screen, and it compels the SSGNs to carry out their disengagement from the approaching enemy forces under the most difficult conditions.
A considerable problem to be overcome in the successful employment of the Soviet SSGNs against U. S. carrier task forces is the presence of U. S. SSNs deployed as a part of the long-range ASW screen. The Soviet SSGNs will likely make every effort to avoid contact with the enemy SSNs and to arrive at their launching positions, even if the SSGNs have the opportunity to destroy the SSNs with torpedoes." It can be presumed that Soviet SSNs will be employed with the SSGNs to neutralize the threat of the enemy SSNs. Similarly, one or two SSNs will probably be attached to each of the “Oscar” SSGNs.
Joint employment of the Soviet SSGs/SSGNs and surface ships is envisaged in the sea areas within the combat ranges of land-based bombers and fighter- interceptors. A typical anticarrier task force will consist of one to two SSGs/SSGNs, a few SSs/SSNs, and one surface-to-surface missile-armed and surface-to-air-missile-armed surface ship each.12 The command and control of such mixed forces will be exercised by the command post throughout the mission except in the engagement phase, when participating units will be directed by the senior tactical commander embarked on board an SSM-armed surface ship, where a “flagman” command post will be established.
In such a force, the SSGs/SSGNs will have a task similar to that of aviation when employed jointly with other forces against enemy surface ships: carry out the missile strike from a maximum effective range. The helicopters carried by the SSM- or SAM-armed surface ships will then be used to provide midcourse correction data for the submarines’ missiles. The SSGs/SSGNs could also conduct their strikes from the maximum effective and unassisted range of their missiles. In this case, the modes of attack selected would be similar to those used when the SSGs/SSGNs are employed independently or in strikes carried out in cooperation with land-based bombers. Regardless of whether the SSGs/SSGNs conduct strikes from over-the-horizon or from the unassisted range of their missiles, the results create favorable conditions for the succeeding torpedo attack by the SSs/ SSNs and the missile strike executed by the SSM- armed surface ships.
Conclusions: The gravest threat to the survivability of the U. S./Western major surface combatants, particularly their carrier task forces, is posed by the Soviet SSGNs because of their long range, high speed underwater, and deep-running capabilities, which make them suitable for employment in the most distant regions of the world’s oceans. Even if the Soviets should fail to execute their first strikes successfully at the outset of any general conflict, the Soviet ASUW forces would pose a grave threat to all U. S./Western surface combatants for the duration of a war if they were to operate closer to the Soviet shores, where both cruise missile- and torpedo-armed submarines, ASM-carrying bombers, and SSM-armed surface combatants would be brought to bear.
'K. Titov. Captain 1st Rank. "Obyekty i sily razvedky na more" (Naval Intelligence Targets and Forces). Morskoy Sbornik. September 1972. pp. 58-62.
-B. Kostev. Captain 1st Rank, "Vzaimodeystvye—vazhneyshiy printsip ispolzovanii” (Coordination—The Most Important Principle in the Employment of Forces). Morskoy Sbornik. February 1974. p. 29.
JSergei G. Gorshkov. "Voyenno-morskogo flotu v voynakh i v mirnoye vremya" (Navies in War and Peace). Morskoi Sbornik. February 1973. p. 22.
4I. Kuz'min. Captain 1st Rank. "Razvedka v blokadnykh deystviyakh na more" (Intelligence in Blockade Operations at Sea). Morskoy Sbornik. December 1978. p. 35.
7B. Makeyev, Captain 1st Rank, "Slezheniye i navedeniye v boyevykh deystviyakh na more" (Tracking and Guidance in Combat Operations tit Sea). Morskoy Sbornik. July 1980. p. 16.
‘Ibid., p. 18.
7lbid.. p. 20.
“"Soviet Threat to Carrier Task Forces." Jone s Defence Review (London. 1981). p. 189.
‘Ibid., p. 190.
MJhe Soviet Military Strategy, 1st edition. (London/Tokyo: Prentice Hall International. Inc: 1963). B. Rodionov. Captain 1st Rank. UJttnwya silo flotu (Striking Power of the Fleet). 2nd edition (Moscow: DOSAAF Press. 1976). p. 111.
"Krasnaya Zvezda. 10 October 1980 and 21 December 1980.
'-Brad Dismukes & James McConnell. Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press. 1979). pp. 11-28. 50.
Dr. Vego, once a naval officer in the Yugoslav Navy, is a naval analyst who has been published widely in the Western press. He is the author of the “East European Navies Review" in the Proceedings' International Navies Issue.