This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Their
Professional
Journal
By Captain Roger W. Barnett, U. S. Navy, and Dr. Edward J. Lacey
there are similarities between their Morskoy Sbornik and the Proceedings. Moth are aimed at an audience larger— foreign as well as domestic—than only naval officers. Both contain articles by Junior as well as senior officers and °ccasionally, although less frequently in the Soviet journal, by civilian specialists, dissimilarities? One is less likely to see disagreements aired on the pages of the Soviet journal, although their inclusion is not altogether unknown.
Professional military men should learn as much as they can about their potential adversaries. This entails not only the consideration of an adversary’s capabilities as manifested in his deployed military hardware, but also the careful study °f his intentions.
. We can g|ean something of an adversary’s inten- h°ns by reading what he publishes. Morskoy Sbor- nik is a monthly naval journal published in the Soviet h'nion in Russian.* It has been published since 1848, ^hereby antedating the Proceedings, which was first
official Navy commands and organizations can he placed on the regular 'stribution list for English translations of Morskoy Sbornik articles by contacting NIC-312 (Antovon 293-3615; Commercial 202-763-3615).
published in 1874. To make the reader of Morskoy Sbornik aware of its general contents and themes, we will review its 1980 volume. As its lead topic, Morskoy Sbornik generally carries exhortations about the previous and forthcoming Communist Party Congresses. Another regular feature near the front of the journal is the “Fleet Chronicle,” in which each of the four Soviet fleets (the Northern, Black Sea, Pacific, and Baltic) is reported on with regard to newsworthy events of the previous month. Here, one finds reports of visits by naval dignitaries, commendations for crews of ships, and commentaries on how the “socialist competition” is faring. As many Soviet authors have written, the Fleet Chronicle “should be given all the attention it deserves." It is a surefire cure for insomnia, carrying such notices as a report by Vice Admiral Yu Padorin entitled “Steps to Further Improve the Communist Indoctrination of the Fleet’s Youth to Increase the Positive Struggle for Heightened Vigilance and Combat Readiness and for Strong Military Discipline in View of the Requirements of the November! 1979) Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Speech by L. I. Brezhnev at the Plenary Meeting.” Those with any interest in reading the Fleet Chronicle should read it as one reads the obituary page—let the eye float quickly over the information, pausing only when something familiar is detected.
Following the Fleet Chronicle arc one or more editorials and articles on general political-military subjects. These vary greatly in subject matter, length, and importance. This portion of the journal carried the only 1980 article written by a foreign dignitary— a treatise by General Van Cu Giap, Commander in
Chief of the naval arm of the Vietnamese People’s Army, entitled “The Naval Forces of the Vietnamese People’s Army on the Way to Building, Taking Shape, Struggling, and Winning Gloriously.’’
The substantive articles appear next. These articles can be divided into eight categories:
►Naval strategy
►Party—political work and indoctrination
►Training
►Naval history
►Ordnance and engineering
►Natural phenomena and marine life
►Foreign navies
►Critique and bibliography.
In terms of numbers of articles, training received the greatest amount of coverage in 1980, while naval strategy and natural phenomena received the least.
In some respects, the substantive articles in Morskoy Sbornik are similar to those in the Proceedings. Indeed, the two journals are often compared. Both are aimed at an audience larger—foreign as well as domestic—than only naval officers. Both contain articles by junior as well as senior naval officers and occasionally, although less frequently in the Soviet journal, by civilian specialists.
More important than the similarities between the two publications, however, are the differences. The Soviets discuss their own weapon systems very infrequently. It is truly noteworthy when an article that addresses Soviet combat capability in terms of Soviet systems appears. Similarly, one is less likely to see open disagreements about strategy, tactics, or military procedures in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik, although their inclusion is not altogether unknown. Finally, the Soviet journal does not devote issues to a single topic or theme as Proceedings occasionally does; each issue of the 1980 volume of Morskoy Sbornik contained about the same mixture of subjects.
Four other divergencies peculiar to Morskoy Sbornik warrant dilation. They are the role of Marx - ist-Leninist ideology, the importance of history, the use of polemics, and the basing of articles on material from the foreign press. With regard to the first of these, Marxism-Leninism attempts to provide a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive background from which Soviet authors extract their views on the nature of reality. The Communist Party, as the repository of truth, establishes the “correct” point of view on any issue and requires that version to be assimilated, complied with, and further disseminated. Accordingly, all Soviet military writings must be ideologically correct. In addition, the Soviet military is required to carry out a significant amount of training in Marxism-Leninism. In part, the very purpose of the insistence by the Party on ideological purity is to develop habitual modes of thought and a common frame of reference for analysis. For these reasons, it is helpful for the reader of Morskoy Sbornik to be familiar with the tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology. He should be aware that all publications must be cleared by the Main Political Administration, from which emanates the guidance on all ideological interpretation for the Soviet armed forces.
Authors in Morskoy Sbornik also make relatively greater use of historical examples than do their U. S. counterparts. They rely almost exclusively on the The Great Patriotic War for provision of historical models. Clearly, Soviet writers deem it important to provide some historical underpinning for their work, especially when writing about principles of strategy, tactics, or operational art. Some of the historical examples used would (charitably) be called “revisionist” in the United States.
The third peculiarity is what the Soviets refer to as the identification and criticism of the enemy. We would call it polemical invective. The language used in the articles in Morskoy Sbornik is frequently shocking to the unattuned. “Imperialists,” for example, are said to be inculcated with “rabid anticommunism” and “bestial hatred” for the socialist system. They are “brainwashed” and taught to venerate “fascist” principles. “Antihumanism” is asserted as the essence of the indoctrination of “adventuristic bourgeois navies.” All of this falls under the rubric of cultivating hatred for the enemy, and although not entirely absent in Western literature, the difference in the language employed is striking-
Finally, basing articles on materials from the foreign press is not often seen in U. S. publications. Our asymmetrical position in regard to freedom of the press and freedom of information means there is greater opportunity for the Soviet than for the U. S. writer to use foreign press materials in his research. Some articles in Morskoy Sbornik are published with a subtitle stating that they are based on foreign press materials. Presumably, everything in them is “based” on external public sources, even though actual publications are infrequently cited. In other cases, the author inserts the qualification that “based on materials from the foreign press,” thus- and-so is the case, leaving the reader unsure of whether or not other facts are gleaned from the same sources. It is surprising how much detail can be amassed on U. S. weapon systems from the open literature. Soviet authors’ willingness to reveal they have such data indicates they have much more information on the subject. In some cases, they make revelations simply to let us know they know, and are watching.
Five substantive threads can be traced through the articles of the 1980 volume of Morskoy Sbornik- We have chosen to call them Strategy and Naval Art, The Threat, the Requirements of Controlling Documents, Technology, and Law of the Sea.
Strategy and Naval Art: Articles on strategy and naval art comprised only about 5% of the total articles in Morskoy Sbornik in 1980. For the U. S. naval officer, however, these should have been among the most interesting and important. The articles tended to be low in polemics and ideological diatribe, which makes them among the most readable.
Several themes are prevalent in the articles on naval art. First, command and control are emphasized. Articles by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, appeared ln two issues of Morskoy Sbornik in a series on command and control. Entitled “Problems With Respect to Control of Naval Forces,” the articles profess that modern warfare will have a large spatial scope and accelerated tempo and will be very di- vfrse in its situational variations. Gorshkov recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of centralized a_nd decentralized control and examines the poten- hal of different types of automated control systems f°r assisting commanders in decision making.
Similar points are made in an article by Rear Admiral M. Iskanderov entitled “The Development of battle.” He writes of the tension between the need i°r numbers in battle and the increasing difficulty °f control as the numbers increase. Like Gorshkov, he notes the complications the increase in the spatial scope of modern warfare imposes. Iskanderov’s major conclusion—based on the experience of past Wars—is that the side with the best control, every- fifing else essentially equal, will be the winner in battle.
A second element many writers on naval strategy address is the importance of surprise in warfare. Indeed, one article—Captain First Rank (Retired) Penzin’s “Surprise in Amphibious Landing Operations and Measures to Achieve It"—was dented exclusively to the question of surprise in amphibious warfare. Soviet military writers analyze historical examples for lessons about surprise, not- 'ng the importance of secrecy, deception, speed, and Preparation. In his article, Penzin concludes that since modern weapons are so powerful and amphibious forces are increasingly mobile, there is much Potential for achieving surprise in amphibious operations. Yet, because of the increased capability of fhe adversary to detect preparations for an amphib- 'ous assault, secrecy has become more difficult.
There are two other items of interest in the Penzin afticle. First, the editors added an insertion in Pen- z'n’s discussion of the Allied preparations for the Normandy invasion. Penzin notes that two years' Preparation were required for that operation, emphasizing the secrecy and deception needed to ensure that it would result in surprise. The editors reiterate the long-standing Soviet contention that the West’s delay in opening the second front was deliberate. Second, Penzin’s claim that the World
War I Gallipoli operation was unsuccessful because the combined forces failed to achieve surprise is contradicted in a later article by Admiral V. Sysoyev. Sysoyev’s “The Development of Forms of Naval Warfare” argues that the Gallipoli operation failed because the British were incapable of organizing joint actions between their naval and ground forces. Obviously, the two writers had different points to stress, but the open divergence in interpretation of history is unusual in Soviet military writings.
The Sysoyev article introduces a third recurring theme of the articles on naval strategy in Morskoy Sbornik—the growing importance of joint operations. Sysoyev emphasizes the need for close cooperation between naval forces and the other
branches of the armed forces. Indeed, the major change to Gorshkov’s The Seapower of the State in its second edition was the inclusion of a new section on the importance and problems of joint operations.
Finally, the Soviets continue to show great interest in U. S. aircraft carriers. For example, in '‘German Submarine Operations Against Aircraft Carriers During World War II,” Rear Admiral Pushkin summarizes those German submarine actions that had aircraft carriers as their targets. Among Pushkin’s conclusions were:
►Aircraft sank 20 carriers in World War II, and submarines sank 16.
►Even so, in the majority of cases, carriers tended to sink as a result of submarine torpedoing but generally suffered only disablement from air attacks.
►Except for one case, no submarines were detected by forces escorting aircraft carriers before torpedoes were fired by the submarine.
►Submarines had great success against carriers because they selected them as the primary target in advance.
►Watertight integrity was the carrier's greatest area of vulnerability.
►It is not easy to attack and destroy a carrier, but wartime experience has shown it can be done, even when the carrier is heavily escorted.
In general, the articles on naval strategy appearing in Morskoy Sbornik are high quality and very factual, with a low proportion of polemics and demagoguery. They are among those most worth reading in the journal.
The Threat: Morskoy Sbornik abounds with articles concerned with the military threat posed to the Soviet Union by the United States and its allies. These articles take two forms. The first purport to expose the aggressive intentions of the West. They tend to portray the United States and other Western countries—and particularly the NATO Alliance—
This Soviet author obviously knows that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. While we’ve been studying their naval journal, lie’s been studying us—his particular interest in this instance is about the education of our naval officers.
as inherently aggressive. They also decry the “slanderous myth” of the Soviet threat to the West. The second type addresses the capabilities, primarily naval, of the Western powers. Articles of this type present factual, usually accurate descriptions of Western ships and aircraft, weapons and sensors, modernization programs, support facilities, and tactics. Some are fairly straightforward, while others amplify the aggressive nature of the West.
In the view of the Soviet authors, the United States is committed to a policy of anti-Sovietism and confrontation. Numerous articles assert that the United States is aggravating world tensions and seeking a return to the cold war. Vice Admiral K. A. Stalbo declares in his article, “The U. S. Naval Presence and Defending the Interests of the USSR,” that U. S. armed forces are directed primarily against the Soviet Union and the countries of “socialist unity.” He also charges that the imperialist policy of “gunboat diplomacy" has been revived by the United States in the form of “carrier diplomacy.”
A number of articles express concern over the threat from the Federal Republic of Germany and warn of history repeating itself. In an article entitled “In the Foreground of the Scientific-Technical Revolution,” Vice Admiral A. Gontayev accuses the West Germans of following in the footsteps of the “fascist Reich.” The title of another article—“The Navy in the Revanchist Plans of German Imperialism”—speaks volumes. This article by N. Shevchuk (otherwise unidentified) conveys grave misgivings over the 1979 decision of the North Atlantic Council to remove the tonnage restrictions on West German naval construction imposed in 1952. It adds that the Federal Republic’s Western allies have apparently forgotten the lessons of the past and are “giving a ‘green light’ to the military machine of German imperialism.”
Some of the articles that deal with Western naval capabilities also focus upon the West German threat. The Bundlesmarine's attack submarine force is described in detail in Captain First Rank Ye Gal’Perin’s article on "FRG Submarine Construction.” In another article—Captain First Rank V. Sineguliov's “Technical Support Equipment for Navy Frogmen"—the equipment and tactics of West Germany’s underwater demolition team receive particular
JLih .la.ibneiimero iioBbiiueHHfl KBa.infJjHKaunu if cneniiaaiiaaumi oiJiHuepoB ,t- ;■ CTByer oko.io 500 yiieonbix nempoB h KpaTKOcpomibix Kypcoii, 150 in mix aaim'.n HOCTbio 6 ne,ie.ib n 6o.iee7. Ohh nrpaioT Baamyio po.ib b noxiepiKanmi h noBbuijeH;* < 6oeBofi roTOBHocTii (p.ioia h MopcKoii nexoTbi.
«U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1978, p .'t.
attention. The Royal Navy is also the focus of some °f the Soviet writers’ attention. An unsigned article entitled “Shipbuilding News” is devoted entirely to the naval modernization programs of the United Kingdom; another entitled “The System of Basing |n the British Navy,” also unsigned, enumerates British naval bases and facilities. In addition to the German and British navies, various aspects of the French, Italian, and Norwegian navies are also highlighted.
Notwithstanding this emphasis on the navies of the NATO allies, the capabilities of the U. S. Navy received the greatest attention in Morskoy Sbornik. Detailed discussions appeared on such topics as the F/A-18 Hornet, Tomahawk cruise missile, Pegasus- Gass guided missile hydrofoil. Trident submarine- launched ballistic missile, logistic support of aircraft carriers, electronic countermeasures equipment. and antiship missile employment. Central to these articles is the theme that the United States is engaged 'n a major effort to improve its naval forces. Typical °t their focus is the article by Ye. Rankin (otherwise unidentified), “TRIDENT is Being Improved.” Rankin emphasizes the technological improvements °f U. S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles and warns they are approaching “absolute accuracy."
A subsidiary refrain in these articles expresses {he need to react to the U. S. force improvements. These improvements cannot be ignored and the Soviet Union must draw “the necessary conclusions.” Captain First Rank A. Strokin summarized this view *n his article, “Antiship Missiles: Strengths and Weaknesses.” He states that developments in Western naval forces compel the Soviet Union to “take the necessary responding steps to overcome the threat to the interests of our country on the vast world ocean.”
The threat articles in Morskoy Sbornik thus reflect the Soviet view that the United States and the other NATO countries remain the principal adversaries. Moreover, they show that the U. S. Navy is still considered the most important potential opponent °t the Red Fleet. Despite this probably realistic view, the articles also reveal the depth of Soviet paranoia. The degree of concern expressed over the West German Navy, for example, is clearly unwarranted in light of the limited size of the Bundesmarine and of the tremendous disparity between its capabilities and those of the Soviet fleet.
The Requirements of Controlling Documents: An oft-repeated phrase in Morskoy Sbornik is the “requirements of controlling documents.” Most of the large number of articles concerned with training contain either this or a similar phrase. These articles stress the necessity of strict compliance with rules and regulations, naval manuals, and established Practices. Adherence to the letter of controlling documents is emphasized in every activity from ship handling to aviation maintenance, from hunting submarines to the training of cadets. Such adherence is said to improve efficiency and combat readiness. At the same time, poor performance is charged to those who “deviate” from the requirements.
Discipline and strict observance of the rules are more important for the proper functioning of the Red Fleet than initiative and independent thought. An article by Major A. Terent’yev entitled “Before Approaching the Aircraft” specifically criticizes those who “change the conditions or order of performance of a combat training mission . . . under the pretext of ‘initiative.’ ” As a result of this attitude, Soviet naval commanders are repeatedly admonished to raise their subordinates’ sense of responsibility for “the requirements of controlling documents.”
One exception to this overwhelming call for conformance was provided in “Initiative and Self-Reliance in the Staff Officer” by Rear Admiral G. Bar- dashchuk. Bardashchuk asserts that initiative and self-reliance are vital, at least at the officer level. “Excessive interference in the work of subordinates gives rise to unnecessary regimentation of their performance and suppresses creative initiative.” However, even he agrees that “the more thoroughly a staff officer knows the requirements of regulations, manuals and other regulatory documents, ... the more competent his performance will be.”
Notwithstanding Admiral Bardashchuk's plea for the cultivation of initiative in the Red Fleet, the vast majority of the articles in Morskoy Sbornik make clear the value which the Soviets continue to place upon unquestioning obedience. If these articles are any indication, the emphasis upon rigid discipline to the exclusion of initiative is likely to remain the hallmark of Soviet naval training.
Technology: Each issue of Morskoy Sbornik contains a number of articles devoted to ordnance and technology. These articles are largely authored by engineering specialists, and they are, for the most part, devoid of polemics and ideological overtones. The degree of technical specificity contained within these articles varies with the topic. Much of the focus is on U. S. systems, and the degree of detail is frequently quite high.
What, therefore, can one expect from an article entitled “U. S. Navy Shipboard Electronic Warfare System AN/SLQ-32”? The authors, Captain First Rank-Engineer A. Partala and -Engineer N. Partala, tell us that the SLQ-32 was developed on a competitive basis with the SLQ-31 and is a design-to- price electronic warfare system. Both systems were tested in the USS Leahy (DLG-16), and the 32 won the competition. Each modification of the SLQ-32 (the V-l, V-2, and V-3) is then described, and a discussion of the number and types of platforms in which each will be installed follows. The authors continue with a discussion of the frequency bands that are covered, the antennae and their capability.
the power of the jammers, and how many adversary radars can be jammed simultaneously. They provide a block diagram of the major components of the three modifications. There is also a short passage that speaks to the integration of the system with the Navy Tactical Data System. In brief, the amount of specificity is remarkable!
Some articles are included for reasons other than simply pure technical or professional interest. For example, Colonel-Engineer M. Furems’s article, “Radiation Exposure of the Crews of U. S. Nuclear Powered Ships and the Personnel of American Ship Repair Yards,” examines reports on radiation exposure of U. S. personnel and suggests that the information in various reports differs substantially. Colonel Furems implies that the reports understate the hazards because they do not mention accidents or instances of overexposure. Noting that naval reactors came into use before their counterparts ashore and that Three Mile Island proves there have been emergency situations ashore that involved overexposure, he intimates that one cannot assume that all has gone smoothly on board naval ships.
Overall, the technical articles in Morskoy Sbornik can be informative for those with expertise in the subject areas. The titles of these articles usually provide enough information to permit the reader to rapidly screen the table of contents to discern those of his particular interest.
The Law of the Sea: As a major maritime power with shipping, fishing, and scientific as well as political and military interests to safeguard, the Soviet Union has been deeply involved in the negotiations on the law of the sea. Many articles in Morskoy Sbornik stress the importance of a thorough understanding of maritime law by naval officers of the Red Fleet. One such article by Major-General P. Barabolya and Colonel I. Tarkhanov, both of the legal service, is entitled “International-Law Training lor Navy Officers.” This article emphasizes that planning for the use of naval forces must begin with an awareness that changes in the law of the sea have influenced the activities of warships in the past and will continue to do so in the future.
Articles on the law of the sea take two forms. The first are short, straightforward, informational articles. They provide information on changes to the territorial sea limits, fishing zones, and continental shelf claims of Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland. This information is of obvious importance for navigation, particularly in such relatively restricted waters as the Baltic Sea.
The second type focuses upon the various issues under negotiation at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. They provide detailed explanations of the Soviet positions on these issues and highlight the major provisions likely to be incorporated within the new law of the sea treaty. Particular attention is devoted to those issues that carry the greatest impact for naval operations. For example, the article by Barabolya and Tarkhanov stresses the view that warships must be guaranteed the right of transit passage through international straits and archipelagic waters; one by Tarkhanov and Captain First Rank V. Mikhalev entitled “Legal Regime of Air-Capable Ships and Their Flying Craft” emphasizes that air-capable ships—i.e., the Moskva and Kiev classes—have the same rights of passage as all other warships.
These articles contain unfavorable commentary on the United States and its NATO allies. The Western powers are charged with making the work of the law of the sea conference “more difficult” and with attempting to establish “underwater spheres of influence.” An article on “The Problem of the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf” by Captain First Rank R. Sorokin and Candidate of Jurisprudence V. Tsarev expresses grave concern over NATO plans for the “outright military use of the shelf and the waters covering it.” Crediting “foreign naval experts,” they list undersea missile launching platforms, installations for employment of mines and torpedoes, observation and communication systems, and storage depots and bases as possible uses for the shelf.
Even when writing on the law of the sea, then, Soviet preoccupation with potential Western military capabilities is evident. Their desire to have such Western systems constrained under the terms of the law of the sea is evident. Nevertheless, the Soviets share certain military interests with the Western {Maritime powers—i.e., freedom of transit through international straits for warships—and these too are made clear in Morskoy Sbornik.
Morskoy Sbornik is not recommended reading for the casual, uninitiated reader. Although it contains much that can be fruitfully harvested, it contains oven more chaff. It is, however, replete with articles indicative of Soviet naval thought on such important topics as the role of command and control in combat, the threat of Western aircraft carriers, and the military implications of the law of the sea treaty. It contains articles that indicate the current emphasis on Soviet naval training, operations, and hardware interests. Moreover, Morskoy Sbornik can be an excellent source of unclassified data on numerous U. S. and other Western naval systems. In terms of accuracy and detail, some of the articles in Morskoy Sbornik are among the best to be found on Western systems in the open literature.
For these reasons, Morskoy Sbornik is recommended reading for the naval officer who desires to learn something of his potential adversary’s intentions. Provided the various peculiarities and pitfalls of this journal, such as the purely polemical-ideological material, be kept in mind, a selective reading can be quite informative.
Captain Barnett is deputy director of the Political-Military Affairs Division in OPNAV. He has served in cruisers and destroyers, most recently commanding the USS Buchanan (DDG-14) in 197779. Staff duty has included tours with the military delegate to SALT 1. the destroyer school, and a cruiser-destroyer flotilla. He holds a bachelor's degree from Brown University and master's and doctor's degrees from the University of Southern California.
Dr. Lacey is an intelligence analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency. He is currently assigned to the Department of the Navy where he is an assistant for intelligence in the Systems Analysis Division of OPNAV. Dr. Lacey received a B.A. degree from the University of Notre Dame in 1977. an M.A. from Villanova University in 1974. and a Ph.D. in political science from Rutgers University in 1982.